The state and the development of small-scale industry in Ghana since c.1945. by Ball, Rajiv
R a jiv  B a l l
T h e  S t a t e  a n d  T h e  D e v e lo p m e n t  
o f  S m a l l - s c a l e  I n d u s t r y  
in  G h a n a  s in c e  c .  1945
A  T h e s i s  s u b m i t t e d  f o r  F i n a l  E x a m i n a t i o n  f o r  t h e  D e g r e e  o f
D o c t o r  o f  P h i l o s o p h y
D e p a r t m e n t  o f  E c o n o m ic  H is t o r y  
L o n d o n  S c h o o l  o f  E c o n o m ic s  a n d  
P o l it ic a l  S c ie n c e
S e p t e m b e r  1997
UMI Number: U615B61
All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.
Dissertation Publishing
UMI U615361
Published by ProQuest LLC 2014. Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author.
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.
All rights reserved. This work is protected against 
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.
ProQuest LLC 
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346
Library
British Library o' Poiitica' 
and Economy Science
ABSTRACT
Since c.1945, there has been an ‘explosion* of small-scale industrial activity in 
Ghana. This thesis attempts to explain why this has happened.
First, developments in small industries during the colonial period are analyzed. 
Using new sources of data, it is argued that indigenous industries survived this period 
and were of significant importance by the end of British rule in 1957. Next, changes 
in the size and sophistication of these industries in the postcolonial period are 
quantified. It is estimated that, between 1960 and 1984, the number of workers 
employed in this sector more than doubled. There was also a clear increase in the 
small industry sector’s sophistication.
A significant part of the thesis concerns government policy towards small 
industries since c.1945. Extensive use is made of newly-released archival material, 
particularly from the Nkrumah years (1951 to 1966). It is argued that, in general, 
government policies cannot explain Ghana’s small industry expansion: although some 
governments have championed the cause of small industrialists, their small industry 
development programmes have been relatively small. Also, some government 
policies actually have prevented small industry growth.
Given that the state cannot be accountable for the ‘explosion’ of small-scale 
industrial activity, this thesis considers other possible reasons for this phenomenon. 
This is done by examining previous studies of the small industry sector and using new 
material from a survey of 40 small-scale industrialists conducted in 1996. It is argued 
that Ghana’s small-scale industrial ‘explosion’ can be understood as one of the 
consequences of Ghana’s pattern of economic development until the early 1960s, 
followed by a period of prolonged and rapid economic collapse during the 1970s and 
early 1980s.
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1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 Theoretical and Comparative Perspectives
Since the 1970s, interest in small-scale forms of economic activity in the Third World 
has been increasing. In the African case, this development can be traced to the work 
of Keith Hart1 and the International Labour Office2 on the so-called ‘informal sector’ 
in the early 1970s. More recently, interest has shifted from the activities of small 
forms of economic activity in general, towards small-scale industries in particular. 
There has been extensive research into small industries in Africa for several reasons.
The Economic Contribution o f Small Industries in Africa
The primary reason for the study of African small industries (industry defined here 
as the processing of raw materials, manufacturing and the repair of manufactured 
products) is a practical one. As Liedholm writes, in Africa, ‘small firms dominate 
the industrial scene’.3 Firms employing fewer than 10 workers provide up to 90 per 
cent of industrial employment in Sub-Saharan Africa.4 Those with fewer than 60 
workers account for up to 64 per cent of industrial value-added in the region.5 
Substantial small industry sectors exist in wealthier African countries such as Kenya,6
1 Keith Hart, ‘Small Scale Entrepreneurs in Ghana and Development Planning’, Journal of 
Development Studies, 6 (1970) no. 4, pp. 104-20. Keith Hart, ‘Informal Income Opportunities and 
Urban Employment in Ghana’, Journal of Modem African Studies, 11 (1973) no. 1, pp. 61-89.
2 International Labour Office, Employment, incomes and equality. A strategy for increasing 
productive employment in Kenya (Geneva, 1973), cited in S.V. Sethuraman, ‘Concepts, methodology 
and scope’, in S.V. Sethuraman (ed.), The urban informal sector in developing countries. Employment, 
poverty and environment (Geneva: International Labour Office, 1981), p. 11.
3 Carl Liedholm, ‘Small Scale Industries in Africa: Dynamic Issues and the Role of Policy’, in 
Frances Stewart, Sanjaya Lall and Samuel Wangwe (eds.), Alternative Development Strategies in Sub- 
Saharan Africa (London: Macmillan, 1992), p. 185.
4 Liedholm, ibid., table 6.1, p. 186.
5 Ibid., p. 187.
6 Peter Kilby, ‘Breaking the entrepreneurial bottle-neck in late-developing countries: is there a 
useful role for government?’, Journal o f Development Planning, 18 (1988), pp. 221-49.
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Nigeria and South Africa, as well as in poorer nations such as Tanzania7 and 
Malawi.8
Surveys of African small industries indicate that important sub-sectors have 
been the manufacture of textiles, wood-working, metal-working, food production and 
brewing, as well as vehicle, shoe, electrical goods and bicycle repair.9 Most small 
industries have been located in rural areas.10 Moreover, small industries have not 
been a transient feature of the African industrial landscape. Studies of the small-scale 
industrial sector in Kenya conducted by House11 and Mwega12 suggest that a 
significant number of enterprises have been in existence for over a decade. Evidently 
then, small industries have been playing a major role in African economies. 
Therefore, interest in their activities is warranted.
Small-Scale Industries in the English and Japanese Industrial Revolutions 
A further reason for the study of African small industries derives from the changing 
historiography of the Industrial Revolution in the West. In the English case, it used 
to be argued that the Industrial Revolution marked a period of discontinuity, with 
large-scale, high-technology, capital-intensive firms appearing suddenly from the late 
eighteenth century.13 Nowadays, however, with regard to the Industrial Revolution, 
historians tend to stress ‘continuity, rather than change’.14
7 M.S.D. Bagachwa, ‘The Small Scale Industry Sector in Tanzania: a Review’, African Review, 
2 (1984) no. 2, pp. 90-103.
8 Wim Ettema, ‘Small-Scale Industry in Malawi’, Journal o f Modem African Studies, 22 (1984) 
no. 3, pp. 487-510.
9 Liedholm, ‘Small Scale Industries’, p. 187.
50 Ibid., p. 189.
n William J. House, ‘Nairobi’s Informal Sector: Dynamic Entrepreneurs or Surplus Labour?’, 
Economic Development and Cultural Change, 32 (1984) no. 2, pp. 277-302.
12 F.M. Mwega, ‘Informal Entrepreneurship in an African Urban Area’, Small Enterprise 
Development, 2 (1991) no. 3, pp. 33-7.
13 T.S. Ashton, An Economic History of England (London, 1955), p. 125, cited in Maxine Berg, 
Die Age o f Manufactures, 1700-1820. Industry, Innovation and Work In Britain (London, 2nd ed.: 
Routledge, 1994), p. 14. E.J. Hobsbawn, The Age of Revolution, 1789-1848 (London, 1962), p. 28, 
cited in Pat Hudson, The Industrial Revolution (London: Edward Arnold, 1992), p. 2.
14 David Cannadine, ‘British History: Past, Present—and Future?’, Past and Present, 116 (1987), 
p. 183.
One of the reasons for this revision has been the development of the proto-
industrialization concept. The term proto-industrialization was coined by Mendels to
refer to ‘traditionally organized but market-orientated, principally rural industry*,
which existed in England before the advent of ‘modern, factory, or machine
industrialization’.15 These proto-industries were mostly small, labour-intensive and
used little fixed capital.
According to Mendels, and others writing in a similar tradition, proto-
industries facilitated English factory industrialization in several ways. First:
proto-industrialization created an accumulation of capital in the hands of the 
merchant entrepreneurs, making possible the adoption of machine industry 
with its (relatively) higher capital costs.16
Second, the skills developed in proto-industrial activities formed the basis of those
used in factory industries. As Samuel notes, ‘the mid-Victorian engineer was still
characteristically a craftsman, an "artisan" or a "mechanic" rather than an "operative"
or a "hand"*.17 Third, proto-industrial technologies complemented modem factory
technologies during the Industrial Revolution.18 Thus, iron was smelted in the giant
furnaces of the Black Country but worked in small, back-yard smithies. Textiles
were manufactured in large, machine-powered factories in the Midlands, but tailored
by hand in small workshops.19 Finally, proto-industrial activities increased the
responsiveness of populations to full-fledged factory industrialization, when this
arrived. In this connection, Rowlands suggests that in the West Midlands, one of the
centres of the Industrial Revolution in England, the proto-industrial past meant that:
potent agents of change, such as the coke-fired furnace, the rotative steam 
engine and the long-distance canals, were introduced ... not into an 
agricultural society but into a region which had already served a long
15 Franklin F. Mendels, ‘Proto-Industrialization: the First Phase of the Industrialization Process’, 
Journal o f Economic History, 32 (1972) no. 1, p. 241.
16 Ibid., p. 244.
17 Raphael Samuel, ‘Workshop of the World: Steam Power and Hand Technology in mid-Victorian 
England’, History Workshop: a Journal of Socialist Historians, 3 (1977), p. 40.
18 Ibid., p. 20.
19 Ibid., p. 17.
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apprenticeship to industrialization.20
Admittedly, in several instances, proto-industries failed to give birth to factory 
industries.21 Moreover, as Coleman argues, industrialization in England appears to 
be correlated more closely to a region’s proximity to coal and iron ore rather than its 
proto-industrial past.22 Nevertheless, at the very least, it is difficult to dispute 
Mendels’ original contention that proto-industries provided the basic skills and 
technology upon which England’s Industrial Revolution was based. As Mendels 
remarks:
many of the machine builders of the industrial revolution in England had been 
trained in the old handicraft industrial sectors, and they were in intimate 
contact with the scientific advances of their time.23
This raises the question of the extent to which the concept of proto- 
industrialization can be applied to small-scale industries in Africa today. The 
evidence suggests that Africa’s small industries, like the proto-industries of early 
modem England, have used labour-intensive methods of production, little fixed capital 
and have been located in rural areas.24 However, unlike English proto-industries, 
African small industries have not had a high degree of merchant capital penetration.
In the Japanese case, as in the English, small industries played a significant 
part in industrialization. This is important, given that Japan is one of the only non- 
Westem countries to have industrialized fully. Before the Tokugawa Restoration in 
1868, Japan had an agricultural economy, but non-farm by-employments were 
common: up to 25 per cent of the farm population was engaged part-time in 
commerce and manufacturing,25 and around 55 per cent of rural income was non­
20 Marie B. Rowlands, ‘Continuity and Change in an Industrializing Society: the Case of West 
Midlands Industry’, in Pat Hudson (ed.), Regions and Industries. A Perspective on the Industrial 
Revolution in Britain (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 123.
21 Eckart Schremmer, ‘Proto-industrialization: A Step Towards Industrialization’, Journal of 
European Economic History, 3 (1981) no. 10, pp. 653-70.
22 D.C. Coleman, ‘Proto-Industrialization: a Concept Too Many’, Economic History Review, 36 
(1983) no. 3, pp. 442-3.
23 Mendels, ‘Proto-industrialization’, p. 244.
24 Liedholm, ‘Small Scale Industries’, p. 189.
25 Nomura Kametaro, Mura meisaicho no kenky (Tokyo, 1949), ch. 5, cited in Osamu Saito, ‘The 
Rural Economy: Commercial Agriculture, By-Employment and Wage Work’, in Marius B. Jansen and 
Gilbert Rozman (eds.), Japan in Transition. From Tokugawa toMeiji (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1986), p. 406.
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farm in origin.26 During industrialization, small-scale industries survived: in 1930,
almost 60 per cent of manufacturing workers were in establishments employing fewer
than five workers.27 In the postwar period, small-scale industries have maintained
a large share of Japanese industrial employment in comparison to the West. For
instance, in the late 1980s, firms employing fewer than 50 workers accounted for 47
per cent of manufacturing employment in Japan, compared to 16 per cent in Britain
and 15 per cent in America.28
Just as in England, the existence of small industries facilitated the process of
industrialization in Japan. First, small-scale industrial by-employments endowed
agricultural workers with skills which were to be valuable in factory production.
Smith writes that the first generation of factory-workers:
thanks to by-employments, brought to their new employments useable crafts, 
clerical skills and even managerial skills. Thus traditional weavers had no 
great trouble learning to operate power looms ...29
In addition, certain factory industries evolved directly out of smaller industries. For
example, Japanese bicycle manufacturing developed from the small-scale production
of spares for imported British bicycles.30 Finally, according to Friedman, Japanese
manufacturing growth after 1945 was caused by ‘the dramatic expansion of smaller
producers throughout the nation’s economy’.31 Friedman contends that these small
producers have been flexible in terms of design change, product differentiation and
rapid response to altering market conditions. This has made them more efficient and
dynamic than the rigid, mass-scale American systems of production.32
26 T.C. Smith, ‘Farm Family By-Employments in Preindustrial Japan’, Journal o f Economic 
History, 29 (1969) no. 4, p. 692.
27 Edwin O. Reischauer and Albert M. Craig, Japan. Tradition and Transformation (Boston: 
Houghton Mufflin Co. 1978), p. 200.
28 Hugh T. Patrick and Thomas P. Rohlen, ‘Small-Scale Family Enterprises’, in Kozo Yamamura 
and Yasukichi Yasaba (eds.), The Political Economy of Japan. Volume One. The Domestic 
Transformation (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1987), pp. 335-6.
29 Smith, ‘Farm Family By-Employments’, p. 712.
30 Penelope Francks, Japanese Economic Development. Theory and Practice (London: Routledge, 
1992), pp. 224-5.
31 David Friedman, The Miracle Misunderstood. Industrial Development and Political Change in 
Japan (New York: Cornell University Press, 1988), p. 2.
32 Ibid., p. 20.
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Therefore, given the importance of small-scale industries in the English and 
Japanese industrial revolutions (and indeed elsewhere: in Germany before 1914, 95 
per cent of industrial enterprises employed fewer than ten workers)33 there is good 
reason to be interested in the activities of Africa’s own small industrialists.
African Small-Scale Industries and Changing Development Theories 
Another argument for the study of African small industries relates to the end of the 
consensus among development theorists from the 1970s, and the replacement of this 
consensus with the paradigm of neo-classical economics in the 1980s.
Small-scale industries hardly featured in the prescriptions of the first 
generation of development economists, who held that Western patterns of economic 
development could be replicated in the Third World.34 Gerschenkron and Rostow 
had little concern for small industries. Gerschenkron argued that, in ‘backward’ 
countries:
industrial labour, in the sense of a stable, reliable and disciplined group that 
has cut the umbilical cord connecting it with the land and has become suitable 
for utilization in factories is not abundant but extremely scarce.35
Thus, according to Gerschenkron, ‘backward’ countries usually industrialized through
the ‘application of the most modem and efficient techniques*.36 In other words,
industrialization in a ‘backward’ setting required high-technology and large, capital-
intensive factories. Rostow adopted a similar approach by suggesting that an
economy’s ‘take-off into an era in which ‘growth becomes normal and relatively
automatic’37 required the emergence of a ‘leading sector’.38 Rostow’s ‘leading
sectors’ were typically large-scale and capital-intensive: railway-building in America;
33 Paul Kennedy, African Capitalism. The Struggle for Ascendency (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1988), p. 182.
34 Rajnarayan Chandavarkar, ‘Industrialization in India before 1947: Conventional Approaches and 
Alternative Perspectives’, Modem Asian Studies, 19 (1985) no. 3, p. 623.
35 Alexander Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective. A Book of Essays 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 1962), p. 9.
36 1bid.
37 Walter W. Rostow, ‘Take-Off into Self-Sustained Growth’, in A.N. Agarwala and S.P. Singh 
(eds.), The Economics o f Underdevelopment (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1958), p. 157.
38 Rostow, ibid., p. 178.
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the modernization of the armed forces in Russia, Germany and Japan; timber- 
processing in Sweden.39 Hence, Rostow did not consider that small industries had 
an important part to play in an economy’s ‘take-off.
‘Dual economy* theorists conceived of a developing economy as a dichotomy, 
with modem, industrial, large-scale, capital-intensive, high-technology enterprises on 
the one hand, and backward, agricultural, labour-intensive, low-technology firms on 
the other. This dichotomy ignored the small-scale industrial sector and again resulted 
in an obsession with capital investment. Thus, Higgins asserted that ‘development 
requires primarily large amounts of capital investment’,40 while Lewis suggested 
that ‘we cannot explain any ‘industrial* revolution (as economic historians pretend to 
do) until we can explain why saving increased relative to national income’.41
To be fair, not all development economists opposed the notion of small 
industry development. For instance, Hoselitz presented the case for small industry 
promotion as early as 1959.42 Also, in the context of the existing industrial 
technology of the immediate postwar years, development economists committed to 
using a ‘big push’ of investment to break out of the ‘low level equilibrium trap* were 
obliged to opt for strategies of large-scale industrialization. After all, the small-scale, 
‘appropriate technology’ route has been only a comparatively recent possibility.
Since the 1980s, development economists have become increasingly positive 
about the role of small industries in economic development in Africa.43 Indeed, 
small industry promotion has been a central plank in World Bank and International 
Monetary Fund Structural Reform Programmes which have been implemented across 
Africa since the 1980s. For example, in 1985, during the early stages of the 
Ghanaian Structural Reform Programme, the World Bank wrote that:
39 Ibid., pp. 182-4.
40 Benjamin Higgins, ‘The "Dualistic Theory" of Underdeveloped Areas’, Economic Development 
and Cultural Change, 4 (1956) no. 2, p. 113.
41 W. Arthur Lewis, ‘Economic Development with Unlimited Supplies of Labour’, in Agarwala 
and Singh, Economics o f Underdevelopment, p. 416.
42 Bert F. Hoselitz, ‘Small Industry in Underdeveloped Countries’, Journal o f Economic History, 
19 (1959) no. 4, pp. 600-18.
43 Sanjaya Lall, ‘Structural Problems of Industry in Sub-Saharan Africa’, in World Bank, The 
Long-Term Perspective Study of Sub-Saharan Africa. Volume Two. Economic and Sectoral Policy 
Issues (Washington D.C.: World Bank, 1990), p. 106.
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The vigor of industrial recovery will depend in large measure ... on the 
responsiveness of small- and medium-scale entrepreneurs to the opportunities 
being provided [by the Structural Reform Programme].44
There are several reasons for contemporary interest in small industries. First,
several studies suggest that small enterprises have certain economic advantages vis-a-
vis larger firms. Sethuraman notes that the informal sector—which essentially
consists of small firms—uses little capital, appropriate technologies and local raw
materials. It also generates demand for semi-skilled and unskilled labour,45 both of
which have been in abundant supply in the Third World. By contrast, it often is
argued that large-scale industries in Africa have under-performed significantly in
terms of employment generation and the creation of backward domestic linkages.46
This is not to argue that the case against large-scale industries is infallible. It is
possible that market imperfections created by governments have encouraged large
firms to use capital rather than labour47 and imported raw materials rather than
domestic inputs. It is possible that these market imperfections, rather than
diseconomies of scale, have weakened large industry’s performance compared to the
small industry sector. If this is true then the case against large-scale industries has
yet to be proven, although that would not be an argument for ignoring small-scale
industrial development.
A second reason for interest is small industries is their development of
indigenous technology appropriate for Third World factor endowments which,
typically, have been characterized by a relative abundance of labour to capital.
Technology is arguably the key to economic development.48 One of the reasons for
44 NAGA RG 6/6/146, World Bank, ‘Ghana: Industrial Policy, Performance and Recovery (Report 
No. 5716-GH, 1985)’, p. 14.
45 S.V. Sethuraman, ‘The urban informal sector and development policy’, in Sethuraman, Urban 
informal sector, p. 33.
46 Tony Hawkins, ‘Industrialization in Africa’, in Douglas Rimmer (ed.), Africa Thirty Years On 
(Portsmouth: Heinemann, 1991), pp. 130-54.
47 Hla Myint, The Economics o f Developing Countries (London, 5th ed.: Hutchinson, 1980), p. 54 
and ch. 5.
48 Yoshihiro Tsurumi, Technology Transfer and Foreign Trade: the Case o f Japan, 1950-66 (New 
York: Amo Press, 1980), p. 13.
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the African problem of ‘growth without comparable development’49 during the
colonial period was the transfer of inappropriate technology from Europe to Africa.
As Austen and Headrick write:
from oceanic sailing ships through steam vessels and railroads, the transport 
technology which Europeans brought to Africa was simply too 
‘lumpy’—consisting of massive items which could not be reproduced in any 
but an advanced proto-industrial system—to be incorporated by Africans.50
It is clear that small industries in Africa have been developing appropriate technology
for local use: the informal machine makers of post-colonial Kenya, engaged in the
production of machine tools for bicycle accessory production, are a case in point.51
A further reason for interest in small industries is that, in Africa, a significant
proportion of large firms have emerged from the ranks of previously small
enterprises. A survey of 64 firms employing between 11 and 200 workers in Nigeria
in 1965 found that 44 per cent of them originated in enterprises which once had fewer
than 11 persons.52 A study of 42 enterprises in Sierra Leone in 1975 yielded a
corresponding figure of 30 per cent.53 In the Ghanaian case, there are two notable
examples of small industrial firms evolving into large concerns. Fan Milk started as
a small company in 1960, but now employs 280 workers and produces a wide range
of frozen confectionery products.54 Nkulenu Industries began as a one-woman
business in the 1940s55 and now employs over 50 workers in the manufacture of
jams, fruit juices, beverages and palm products for markets in Ghana, Europe and
49 Ralph A. Austen and Daniel Headrick, ‘The Role of Technology in the African Past’, African 
Studies Review, 26 (1983) nos. 3&4, p. 176.
30 Ibid. , p. 177.
51 Kenneth King, ‘Kenya’s Informal Machine-makers: a Study of Small-scale Industry in Kenya’s 
Emergent Artisan Society’, World Development, 2 (1974) nos. 4&5, pp. 9-28.
52 J.R. Harris, ‘Industrial Entrepreneurship in Nigeria’ Northwestern University, PhD, 1967, cited 
in Liedholm, ‘Small Scale Industries’, table 6.8, p. 202.
53 E. Chuta and C. Liedholm, ‘Employment Growth and Change in Sierra Leone Small Scale 
Industry: 1974-80’, International Labour Review, 121 (1982) no. 1, pp. 101-12, cited in Liedholm, 
ibid.
54 Letter from the Managing Director, Fan Milk, to Rajiv Ball, ref: AOL/EA/C.5, 26/04/1996.
55 NAGA RG 7/1/32, ‘Memorandum on Lime Juice, Orange Squash and Marmalade Submitted by 
Miss Esther Nkulenu, Food Industry, Christianborg’ to the Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Mines 
(1951).
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North America.56
Even so, a host of factors (ranging from poor managerial skills, backward 
technology, lack of access to raw materials, credit and markets) impede the growth 
of African small firms. Hence, it sometimes is argued that there is a low ‘graduation 
rate’ from small to large firms in Africa. According to Onyeiwu, only 14 per cent 
of a sample of small industries in Eastern Nigeria ‘graduated’ into large firms 
between 1960 and 1991.57 However, a sense of perspective is necessary here. 
Given the very substantial number of small firms in Africa, even a low ‘graduation 
rate’ would imply that a significant absolute number of small firms move into the 
ranks of medium and large enterprises.
Not all development economists believe that small industries have an important 
part to play in Third World industrialization. Little et al. have argued that Indian 
small-scale industries, far from employing optimal amounts of labour and capital, 
actually utilize resources inefficiently and therefore hinder economic growth.58 They 
conclude, from a survey of 345 industries engaged in shoemaking, printing, soap- 
making, machine tool production and metal-casting, in and around Bombay, Calcutta 
and Delhi in the 1980s, that ‘very often both capital and total factor productivity peak 
in the medium range of 50-200 workers*.59 Wantabe arrives at a similar conclusion 
using Japanese data.60
However, it is important to recognize that the findings of Little et al. , may not 
be of much relevance to small-scale industries in either India or Africa. On the one 
hand, Mead argues that Little et al. ’s methodology is flawed, and their contention that 
it is ‘the medium-size, not the small that is beautiful’,61 is a ‘most surprising
56 Interview with Miss Ester Nkulenu, founder of Nkulenu Enterprises, conducted in Madina on 
23/4/1996.
57 Steve Onyeiwu, ‘"Graduation" Problems Amongst Micro and Small Enterprises in Eastern 
Nigeria, 1960-91’, Journal of International Development, 5 (1993) no. 5, table 3, p. 505.
58 Ian M.D. Little, Dipak Mazumdar, and John M. Page Jr., Small Manufacturing Enterprises. 
A Comparative Study o f India and Other Economies (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987).
59 Ibid., p. 306.
60 Susumu Wantabe, ‘Reflections on Current Policies for Promoting Small Enterprises and Sub­
contracting’, International Labour Review, 110 (1974) no. 5, p. 418.
61 Little et al., Small Manufacturing Enterprises, p. 126, cited in Donald C. Mead, ‘Small 
Enterprises and Development’, Economic Development and Cultural Change, 39 (1991) no. 2, p. 413.
19
conclusion ... only weakly supported by weak data’.62 Also, it could be that the 
reasons for the apparent inefficiency of India’s small industry sector are specific to 
Indian small firms, and not to small firms in general.63 This may be a result of the 
substantial degree of protection that the Indian government has provided this sector 
since 1947.64
There is African evidence to support the contention that small-scale industries 
use capital efficiently and provide jobs cheaply. In an investigation of the beer 
industry in Botswana in 1982, Haggblade found that small brewers were more 
efficient and generated a higher level of employment than large-scale producers.65 
In Ghana, Aryee’s study of small-scale manufacturing in Kumasi in 1975 found that, 
for each cedi of capital invested, small-scale manufacturers produced significantly 
more value-added than large-scale industries.66 Van Heemst came to a similar 
conclusion from a survey of 27 Ghanaian shoe producers in 1976 and 1977.67 
Likewise, from an examination of small industries in the Ghanaian towns of Accra, 
Aburi and Nsawam in 1977, Steel argued that ‘the data do not show any direct 
conflict between employing more workers through expanded investment in the small- 
scale sector and maximizing industrial output’.68
In short, evidence from Africa, and indeed from elsewhere in the Third 
World,69 suggests that small-scale industries do have a crucial role to play in 
industrialization today.
62 Mead, ibid., p. 414.
63 Walter Elkan, ‘Policy for Small-Scale Industry: a Critique’, Journal o f International 
Development, 1 (1989) no. 2, p. 253.
64 Ibid.
65 Steve Haggblade, ‘Vertical Considerations in Choice-of-Technique Studies: Evidence from 
Africa’s Indigenous Beer Industry’, Economic Development and Cultural Change, 35 (1987) no. 4, p. 
738.
66 George Aryee, ‘The informal manufacturing sector in Kumasi’, in Sethuraman, Urban informal 
sector, table 5, p. 97.
67 Jan van Heemst, Scale, Organization and Efficiency in Footwear Production. An Analysis o f 
Some Ghanaian Data (The Hague: Institute of Social Studies, 1982), table III, p. 11.
68 William F. Steel, Small-Scale Employment and Production in Developing Countries. Evidence 
from Ghana (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1977), p. 108.
69 Fong Chan Onn, ‘Small and Medium Industries in Malaysia: Economic Efficiency and 
Entrepreneurship’, The Developing Economies, 28 (1990) no. 2, p. 169.
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1.2 Small-scale Industries in Ghana: Literature to Date
Turning to the Ghanaian case of small industry development, it generally is argued 
that there has been an expansion in small-scale industrial activity since the Second 
World War, with most of this occurring since c.1970.70 Whether this expansion 
actually occurred, and if so, its exact characteristics, will be examined in detail in 
Chapter Three. First, it is necessary to analyze critically the literature explaining this 
growth and to identify its deficiencies.
Supply-Side Explanations o f Small Firm Growth
The literature on small-scale industries in the Third World usually locates the
dynamics of small firm growth in two areas: the supply of factors of production
necessary for small firm development (such as capital and labour) and the demand for
the products of small firms.71
In the Ghanaian case, the ‘supply-side* approach is expounded by Marxist
theorists such as Kwame Ninsin.72 Ninsin argues that the growth of the ‘informal
sector’ (to which, according to Ninsin, small-scale industries belong)73 can be
explained in terms of the inability of the formal capitalist economy to create jobs for
the growing labour force. As Ninsin writes, the ‘informal’ sector:
refers to that array of precarious economic activities which have become the 
haven of people seeking desperately to eke out a living because they are 
unable to secure wage or salaried employment in the formal capitalist 
sector.74
Thus, according to Ninsin, the ‘informal sector’ is the ‘dumping ground for 
unemployed labour’.75 Here, Ninsin echoes what Engels wrote of England in the
70 Jonathan Dawson, ‘Development of Small-scale Industry in Ghana—A Case study of Kumasi’, 
in Henk Thomas, Francisco Uribe-Echevarria and Henny Romijn (eds.), Small-Scale Production. 
Strategies fo r Industrial Restructuring (London: Intermediate Technology Publications, 1991), pp. 173- 
207. Kwame A. Ninsin, The Informal Sector in Ghana’s Political Economy (Accra: Freedom 
Publications, 1991).
71 Elkan, ‘Policy for Small-Scale Industry’. Liedholm, ‘Small Scale Industries’.
72 Ninsin, Informal Sector.
73 Ibid., pp. 69-81.
74 Ibid., p. 2.
75 Ibid., p. 5.
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mid-nineteenth century, the ‘surplus population* of which kept ‘body and soul 
together by begging, stealing, street-sweeping, collecting manure, pushing hand carts, 
driving donkeys, peddling or performing occasional jobs’.76
At times, non-Marxists too have explained the development of small-scale 
industries and the ‘informal* sector in terms of the inability of the formal sector to 
provide adequate income opportunities. For example, Munro contends that, in post­
colonial Africa:
as the demographic dynamic met the rising capital-intensity of the ‘modem 
sector’, or the larger capitalist enterprises, there was an expansion of 
employment in small-scale urban services—what surprised economists would 
call the ‘informal sector’ once they had finally discovered it.77
Azarya and Chazan argue that the expansion of the ‘informal* economy in Ghana
since independence represents a ‘hedge* against instability and the declining
performance of the state.78 Similar explanations exist for the development of small-
scale industries in Kenya79 and Indonesia.80 Thirsk has suggested that, in early
modem England, rural small industries appeared first in regions where income
opportunities from farming were most restricted.81
Ninsin’s explanation for the growth of Ghanaian small-scale industry is
appealing. Recorded per capita income fell almost 40 per cent from 1974 to 1983.82
By the 1980s, formal sector wages had become inadequate to support a family.
According to one estimate, the academic salaries of senior members of the University
76 F. Engels, Conditions o f the working class in England in 1844 (London, 1920), p. 85, cited in 
S.V. Sethuraman, ‘Introduction’, in Sethuraman, Urban informal sector, p. 8.
77 J. Forbes Munro, Britain in Tropical Africa, 1880-1960. Economic Relations and Impact 
(London: Macmillan, 1984), p. 67.
78 Victor Azarya and Naomi Chazan, ‘Disengagement from the State in Africa: Reflections on the 
Experience of Ghana and Guinea’, Comparative Studies in Society and History, 29 (1987) no. 1, p. 
108.
79 House, ‘Nairobi’s Informal Sector’.
80 Tulus Tambunan, ‘Rural Small-Scale Industries in a Developing Region: Sign of Poverty or 
Progress? A Case Study in Ciomas Subdistrict, West-Java Province, Indonesia*, Entrepreneurship and 
Regional Development, 6 (1994) no. 1, pp. 1-13.
81 Joan Thirsk, The Rural Economy o f England. Collected Essays (London: the Hambledon Press, 
1984), p. 232.
82 M.M. Huq, The Economy of Ghana. The First 25 Years since Independence (London: 
Macmillan, 1989), table A.2, p. 288.
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of Ghana covered only one-third of their total monthly expenditures in 1985.83 With 
waged employment providing so little income and, in any case, being difficult to find, 
Ghanaians have had to use small-scale industrial employment specifically and the 
‘informal sector* more generally, in order to survive.
However, there is a problem with the Ninsin hypothesis. This derives from 
its failure to distinguish between those entering the small industry sector as employees 
and those entering as entrepreneurs. For prospective employees, there are virtually 
no barriers to entering small industries. Most do not require any industrial skills, 
since these are learnt on-the-job through the apprenticeship system.84 Thus, in the 
case of employees, the growth of small-scale industries in Ghana can be thought of 
as being poverty-driven, since significant numbers of workers, unable to find 
employment elsewhere, have sought to ‘eke out a living* in the informal sector.
Yet for there to be employees there needs to be entrepreneurs to create their 
jobs. It is here that Ninsin’s hypothesis is deficient. Those entering the small 
industry sector as prospective entrepreneurs do face barriers to entry because they 
need to acquire skills and accumulate capital. In certain instances, these entry 
barriers may be small. For example, food-processing probably requires little start-up 
capital, while the necessary skills can be learnt within the household. However, in 
other sectors, the barriers to establishing a small firm may be considerable: 
prospective machine manufacturers probably require both very specific technical skills 
and substantial sums of capital.
Besides, if small industry growth is a function of poverty alone, then poor 
African countries in general would be expected to have comparatively substantial 
small industry sectors. This has not been the case. In 1983, Black Africa’s per 
capita income was well below Ghana’s.85 However, with the exception of Nigeria, 
it is not known that small-scale industrial sectors comparable in size and
83 Kodwo Ewusi, Structural Adjustment and Stabilization Policies in Developing Countries. A Case 
Study o f Ghana's Experience in 1983-86 (Tema: Ghana Publishing Corporation, 1987), table 29, p. 
61.
84 W.H. Thomi and P.W.K. Yankson, Small Scale Industries and Decentralization in Ghana. A 
Preliminary Report on Small Scale Industries in Small and Medium Sized Towns in Ghana (Legon: 
Department of Geography, University of Ghana, 1985), pp. 33-35.
85 World Bank, World Development Report 1985 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), table 
1, pp. 174-5.
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sophistication to Ghana’s exist anywhere else on the African continent.
Demand Side Explanations o f Small Firm Growth
While Ninsin focuses on the supply side of small firm creation, Jonathan Dawson
concentrates on the demand side of the equation. Dawson contends that, as foreign
exchange became scarce in the 1970s, formal sector industries collapsed and
manufactured imports became scarce. According to Dawson, this resulted in an
‘economic vacuum’86 which stimulated demand for small firm products, and resulted
in small-scale industrial expansion. Dawson substantiates this explanation with
reference to the small-scale vehicle spares industry, which grew as foreign exchange
for the import of vehicle spares contracted in the 1970s. At the same time, the local
Guinness factory stopped packaging its bottles in imported cardboard and switched
to using wooden crates produced by the small-scale carpenters of Anloga.87
Dawson’s hypothesis is useful because it draws attention to the fact that there
would be no small industrial firms if the demand for their products did not exist.
However, there are problems with this explanation as well. First, Dawson’s focus
on the demand side neglects unduly the supply side of small firm creation. As noted
already, prospective entrepreneurs probably face barriers to entering the small firm
industrial sector (p. 23); they do not appear on the scene simply when a demand for
their services exists. As Peter Kilby writes in reference to the development of
entrepreneurship in Africa:
complex organisms—whether they be plant, animal or social—do not spring 
into existence robust and fully operational. They develop from fragile 
beginnings, gaining strength over time.88
A further problem is Dawson’s assumption that the collapse of large-scale 
industrial production in the 1970s and early 1980s increased the demand for small- 
scale industrial products. This assumption is possibly false, for during the years of 
large-scale industrial collapse, recorded per capita income was also collapsing, which
86 Jonathan Dawson, ‘The Wider Context: the Importance of the Macroeconomic Environment for 
Small Enterprise Development’, Small Enterprise Development, 1 (1990) no. 3, p. 44.
87 Jonathan Dawson, ‘Small-Scale Adjustment’, West Africa, 28/12/1988, p. 2439.
88 Peter Kilby, ‘Manufacturing in Colonial Africa’, in Peter Duignan and L.H. Gann (eds.), 
Colonialism in Africa, 1870-1960. Volume 4. The Economics o f Colonialism (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1975), p. 511.
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would suggest, a priori, that the overall market for industrial goods was contracting. 
Therefore, to argue that the foreign exchange crisis and the collapse of the large-scale 
industrial sector created the ‘economic space* for small-scale industries is simplistic. 
If small industries carved out an increasing share of a contracting market for 
industrial products, then there may well have been other factors at work besides the 
fall in competition from large-scale industrial producers and imported manufactures.
1.3 The State and the Development of Small-scale Industry in Ghana: Issues 
and Hypothesis
Given the inadequacy of the existing literature, this thesis attempts to offer a more 
comprehensive explanation for the growth of small-scale industries in Ghana since 
c.1945. To this end, the thesis investigates two main issues and tests a central 
hypothesis.
Quantifying Small Industry Development Since 1945
The first main issue is the quantification of developments in Ghana’s small-scale 
industrial sector since c. 1945. This subject has not been researched adequately. The 
size and characteristics of Ghana’s small-scale industrial sector at the end of the 
colonial period are unknown. Evidence concerning the years since the 1960s points 
to expanding employment and increasing sophistication in this sector, but is still thin 
and requires substance.
Government Policy Towards Small-Scale Industries Since 1945 
The second main issue is the influence of government policy on small industry 
development. North argues that governments have a major role to play in economic 
development generally by ‘getting the prices right’, as well as establishing, and 
facilitating the enforcement of, property rights.89 According to Gerschenkron, in 
‘backward’ economies, governments have a major part to play by acting as the ‘the
89 Douglass C. North, ‘The New Institutional Economics and Third World Development’, in John 
Harriss, Janet Hunter and Colin Lewis (eds.), The New Institutional Economics and Third World 
Development (London: Routledge, 1995), pp. 17-26.
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primary agent propelling the economic progress of the country*.90
In post-colonial Africa, the development of small industry, which is, in a
sense, the development of private capitalism, cannot be understood adequately without
reference to the activities of the state.91 Although African governments typically
have consumed a small proportion of national income,92 their influence on African
economies through various controls has been huge. As Iliffe contends:
everywhere in Africa, the practical problems of government bureaucratic 
inefficiency and obstruction, foreign exchange shortages, corruption and the 
like—have been major obstacles to entrepreneurial success.93
David Andoh, a former Chairman of the United Africa Company Ghana, noted the
importance of Ghanaian government policies on the private sector in a lecture
delivered at the University of Ghana in 1978:
The first consideration for investment must be the attitude and policies of 
Governments ... they have it in their power to either throttle business or 
conversely allow it to flourish and make its full potential contribution to 
national development.94
Hence, to understand the growth of Ghanaian small-scale industry, it is essential to
consider government policy towards the private sector in general and the small
industry sector in particular.
Iliffe has proposed that, in post-colonial Africa, the state ‘as a very broad
generalization*,95 has adopted one of three approaches towards private capitalism.
The first has been to ‘prevent the emergence of private African capitalism in any
form*.96 According to Iliffe, Ghana followed this model between 1961 and 1966,
as did Guinea, Mali, Benin, Somalia and Tanzania at various times since the
90 Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness, p. 17.
91 John Iliffe, The Emergence o f African Capitalism (London: Macmillan, 1983), pp. 76-7. 
Kennedy, African Capitalism, p. 1.
92 World Bank, World Development Report 1983 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), table 
5, pp. 156-57. World Bank, World Development Report 1996. From Plan to Market (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1996), table 13, pp. 212-3.
93 Iliffe, Emergence o f African Capitalism, p. 76.
94 David Andoh, The Private Sector: a Case (Accra: Ghana Universities Press, 1980), p. 1.
95 Iliffe, African Capitalism, p. 77.
96 Ibid.
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1950s.97 The second approach has been one of ‘parasitic capitalism’, that is, the use 
of state power for the material gain of those connected closely to the state.98 This 
occurred in post-colonial Zaire, when the Zairianization measures of 1973 and 1974 
transferred almost all foreign-owned enterprises into the hands of some 2,000 Zairian 
‘acquirers’.99 The third stance has been one of ‘nurture capitalism’100 or the use 
of the state as a vehicle for the advance of indigenous capitalism. Hence, the Kenyan 
state provided capital for Kenyans to buy out European farms in the early 1960s and 
passed legislation to parachute Kenyans into wholesale and retail trading.101 In 
Nigeria, the Africanization decrees of the 1970s shifted economic control towards 
private Nigerians.102
What, then, has been the attitude of the state towards the development of 
private capitalism and small-scale industries in Ghana? Generally, it is thought that 
after the Second World War, governments across West Africa became more active 
in economic development.103 Yet for the period between 1945 and 1951, 
government policy towards the development of indigenous private capitalism and 
small-scale industries remains unclear. Stockwell has written about the relationship 
between British business and industrial development in the Gold Coast, but offers 
little on the government’s specific relationship with indigenous industrialists.104 
Bowden’s work on British colonial policy in West Africa examines the period up to 
1948, but from the perspective of the Colonial Office in London and not the colonial 
government in Accra.105
97 Ibid., pp. 77-8.
98 Ibid., p. 80.
99 Ib id.
100 Sayre P. Schatz, Nigerian Capitalism (Berkley: University of California, 1977), cited in ibid.,
p. 82.
101 Iliffe, ibid., p. 83.
102 Ibid., pp. 83-4.
103 A.G. Hopkins, An Economic History o f West Africa (London: Longman, 1973), pp. 267-8.
104 Sarah Stockwell, ‘British Business, Politics and Decolonisation in the Gold Coast c. 1945-60*, 
University of Oxford, D.Phil., 1993.
105 Jane Helen Bowden, ‘Development and Control in British Colonial Policy, with reference to 
Nigeria and the Gold Coast: 1935-1948*, University of Birmingham, PhD, 1980.
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For the Nkramah years, 1951 to 1966, it usually is agreed that large-scale 
African private capitalists either were subsumed under a policy of etatisme or were 
subordinated to the interests of foreign capital. This process has been well- 
documented by Killick,106 Esseks107 and Garlick.108 However, government 
policy towards small African businessmen has yet to be analyzed comprehensively, 
except for the work of Rathbone, who argues that, before independence, Nkrumah 
received support from ‘aspirant’ small businessmen.109 With the advent of 
Structural Adjustment Programme in 1983, the attitude of the Rawlings government 
towards the development of private capitalism has been researched in detail. It is 
now commonplace to argue that the government has adopted a positive attitude 
towards the development of private capitalism and small-scale industries, although, 
at times, both rhetoric and substance have suggested otherwise.110
However, for the period between Nkrumah’s overthrow in 1966 and the 
advent of structural reform in 1984, the state’s policy towards indigenous private 
capitalism is unclear. Killick’s major study of the Ghanaian economy closes shortly 
after 1966, covering only briefly the period to military coup of 1972.111 Rimmer’s 
work on the Ghanaian political-economy since the 1950s offers an overview of 
developments in the economy during the 1970s, but no detailed analysis of 
government policy towards indigenous private capitalism.112 Yet the years from
106 Tony Killick, Development Economics in Action. A Study o f Economic Policies o f Ghana 
(London: Heinemann, 1978), ch. 3.
107 John D. Esseks, ‘Government and Indigenous Private Enterprise in Ghana’, Journal o f Modem 
African Studies, 9 (1971) no. 1, pp. 11-29. John Dixon Esseks, ‘Economic Independence in a New 
African State. Ghana: 1956-65’, Harvard Government Department, PhD, 1967.
108 Peter C. Garlick, African Traders and Economic Development in Ghana (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1971), ch.9.
109 Richard Rathbone, ‘Businessmen in Politics: Party Struggle in Ghana, 1949-57’, Journal of 
Development Studies, 9 (1973) no. 3, pp. 395-6.
110 Roger Tangri, ‘The Politics of Govemment-Business Relations in Ghana’, Journal o f Modem  
African Studies, 30 (1992) no. 1, pp. 97-111. Gerhard Fischer-Quincke, ‘Small Enterprises for the 
Needs of the People? Ghana’s "Small-Scale Industrial ‘Take-Off"’, in Karl Wohlmut et al. (eds.), 
African Development Perspectives Yearbook, 1989. Volume One: Human Dimensions o f Adjustment 
(Berlin: Scholzky and Jeep, 1990), pp. 239-241.
1.1 Killick, Development Economics.
1.2 Douglas Rimmer, Staying Poor. Ghana’s Political Economy, 1950-1990 (Oxford: Pergamon 
Press, 1992), chs. 6, 7.
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1966 to 1983 were clearly significant in the development of Ghanaian 
entrepreneurship. The government legislated substantial sections of the economy into 
the control of Ghanaians through the Indigenization Decrees of 1968 and 1970. At 
the same time, these years marked the beginning of what Dawson terms Ghana’s 
small-scale industrial ‘explosion*.113
Hypothesis
It is hypothesized that the expansion of small industries since 1945 has been one of 
the consequences of Ghana’s particular history of economic development until the
1960s, followed by the specific manner of the country’s subsequent economic
(
collapse.
In outline, Ghana’s experience of economic development and collapse can be 
described as follows. By 1960, income per head was approaching £70,114 a figure 
higher than that in most Black African countries at the time. Levels of human and 
physical capital formation were high by African standards.115 Indigenous 
entrepreneurship was well-developed in farming, trading116 and, as this thesis will 
show, small industries. During Nkrumah’s ‘big push’, large-scale state industries 
proliferated.117 However, the ‘big push’ turned sour: between 1962 and 1974, 
Ghana’s recorded per capita income stagnated, before falling almost 40 per cent 
between 1974 and 1983.118 Imports fell severely,119 and the Government’s 
administrative capacity collapsed.120 As the economy contracted, the parallel
113 Dawson, ‘Development of Small-scale Industry’, p. 173.
114 Robert Szereszewski, ‘The Performance of the Economy, 1955-62’, in Walter Birmingham, I. 
Neustadt and E.N. Omaboe (eds.), A Study of Contemporary Ghana. Volume One. The Economy of 
Ghana (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1966), table 2.3, p. 42.
115 Killick, Development Economics, pp. 4, 7.
1,6 Margaret Katzin, ‘The Role of the Small Entrepreneur’, in Melville J. Herskovits and Mitchell 
Harwitz (eds.), Economic Transition in Africa (London: Routledge, 1964), pp. 179-198.
117 Rimmer, Staying Poor, p.89.
118 Huq, Economy o f Ghana, table A.2, p. 288.
119 Ibid., table A.4, p. 290.
120 ‘Editorial: Reckless Dissipation of Public Funds’, TheLegon Observer, vol. XII, no. 5, 14-27 
March 1980, pp. 97-98.
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market or kalabule expanded,121 while hundreds of thousands of Ghanaians 
emigrated in search of better living conditions.122 Yet despite this collapse, the 
education system expanded throughout the period, and by 1986, the proportion of 
children enrolled in secondary education was higher in Ghana than in the wealthier 
Cote d’Ivoire and even Botswana.123
It is hypothesized that this particular experience of development followed by 
collapse can account for much of Ghana’s small-scale industrial ‘explosion’. For 
example, it is postulated that the large-scale industries established during the ‘big 
push’ provided a pool of skilled labour and capital for later small-scale industrial 
expansion. The growth of the education system added to the pool of skilled labour. 
Meanwhile, kalabule provided one of the sources of capital used to finance small 
industries.
Methodology and Structure o f Thesis
Chapter Two examines the activities of small industrialists in the Gold Coast before 
1945. This chapter demonstrates that, on the eve of independence, there was already 
a sizeable small industry sector to provide the foundations for post-colonial small 
industry expansion. The material for this chapter is drawn from the observations of 
visitors to, and officials in, the Gold Coast, as well as newspapers and government 
records.
Chapter Three surveys the small-scale industrial landscape in the immediate 
postwar decades and argues that the scope for further small industry expansion was 
great. This chapter also constructs a definition of small-scale industry and, using this 
definition, analyzes quantitative and qualitative changes in Ghana’s small-scale 
industrial sector since the Second World War. It is argued that small industry 
employment has increased since c.1945 and small industrial firms have become 
increasingly sophisticated.
121 Richard Jeffries, ‘Ghana: the political economy of personal rule’, in Donal B. Cruise O’Brien, 
John Dunn and Richard Rathbone (eds.), Contemporary West African States (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1989), pp. 77-81.
122 Azarya and Chazan, ‘Disengagement from the State’, pp. 118-9.
123 World Bank, World Development Report 1989 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 
table 29, pp. 220-1.
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Chapters Four to Eight document government policy towards small-scale 
industries from c. 1945 to c. 1992. Much of the analysis for the period up to c. 1966 
is based on internal government documents in the National Archives of Ghana. In 
particular, Chapter Five examines the Nkrumah Cabinet Papers, which have yet to 
receive serious academic attention. Other sources include published policy 
documents, parliamentary debates and newspaper reports. For the period after 
c.1966, most of the archival material on government policy is still closed to the 
public. Given this, together with the dearth of published sources on the state’s 
relationship with small-scale industries, the analysis is broadened to include the state’s 
dealings with the indigenous private sector more generally. Although this is not an 
ideal approach, it is legitimate because small-scale industries are a sub-set of the 
private sector. Hence, by analyzing policy towards the private sector generally, it is 
possible to arrive at some useful conclusions about policy towards small-scale 
industries specifically.
The issue of policy is dealt with on two levels. First, there is an investigation 
of governments’ public rhetoric and, where archival sources permit, their private 
language. A government’s public rhetoric is important because persistent hostility 
towards small industries probably discourages businessmen from establishing such 
firms. Government rhetoric provides useful clues on the intentions of government 
policy as well. Second, actual government policies towards small industries are 
examined with a view to understanding their role in Ghana’s small industry 
‘explosion’. The general conclusion of these chapters is that direct government policy 
cannot account fully for the expansion of Ghanaian small-scale industries. In fact, 
governments have impeded the development of this sector on numerous occasions.
Chapters Nine and Ten test the hypothesis that the growth of small-scale 
industries has been a result of Ghana’s particular experience of development followed 
by collapse. This is done by reviewing critically the findings of previous surveys of 
Ghana’s small industry sector, and analyzing data from 40 in-depth interviews which 
I conducted with small-scale industrialists in Kumasi in 1996. Some of the material 
from this 1996 survey is used in chapter Seven to provide tangible examples of the 
effects of government policies on small industries in the 1970s. The final chapter 
concludes the thesis by discussing some of its main findings.
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2 SMALL-SCALE INDUSTRIES DURING THE 
COLONIAL PERIOD, C.1800-C.1950
This chapter examines issues relating to small-scale industries in the Gold Coast 
between the beginning of the nineteenth century and the end of the Second World 
War. In Section One, the characteristics of small industries before the establishment 
of British rule are considered. Section Two assesses what impact the region’s 
integration into the world economy had on these industries and argues that, instead 
of dying out, many survived and expanded. Section Three investigates the reasons 
for this and for the failure of small industries to expand further. Section Four 
considers the period between the World Wars, and suggests that there was a profound 
structural change in the nature of indigenous industrial activities. This change marked 
the evolution of the modem small-scale industrial sector in Ghana.
2.1 Small Industries in Precolonial Ghana
In the early nineteenth century, most of the geographical area known today as Ghana 
was under the suzerainty of the Asantes, although the Fante states to the West of 
Accra maintained a limited degree of self-control.1 Given Asante’s dominant 
position, this chapter considers the development of small-scale industries with 
particular reference to Asante, but occasionally to other areas.
In precolonial Ghana, there existed a wide variety of small industry activities. 
An important one was iron-smithing. According to John Beecham, who collated the 
observations of visitors to the Gold Coast in the 1830s, iron was manufactured ‘to a 
considerable extent’.2 Iron products included farm implements, hinges, bolts, 
swords, knives, rings and chains; there was also some repair of firearms.3 With
1 Edward Reynolds, ‘The Gold Coast and Asante, 1800-1874’, in J.F.A. Ajayi and Michael
Crowder (eds.), History o f West Africa, Volume Two (Harlow, Essex, 2nd ed.: Longman, 1987), pp.
215-9.
2 John Beecham, Ashantee and the Gold Coast (London, 1841), republished (London: Dawsons of 
Pall Mall, 1968), p. 146.
3 Joseph Raymond LaTorre, ‘Wealth Surpasses Everything: an Economic History of Asante, 1750- 
1874’, University of California, Berkeley, PhD, 1978, p. 46.
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regard to iron-smelting, Bowdich observed in 1817 that the ‘interior neighbours’ of 
Asante knew how to do this, although the Asantes themselves had ‘no idea of making 
iron from ore’.4
Another common industrial activity was goldsmithing, since grains and nuggets 
of gold were found in many parts of Asante. In the royal court at Kumasi, gold held 
a particular symbolic value and thus Kumasi was a magnet for goldsmiths.5 Wood­
working and textile manufacture were also commonplace. Wood was found in many 
parts of precolonial Ghana, and carpenters’ main products included stools, umbrellas 
and musical instruments such as guitars.6 There was also some canoe-building along 
the Coast.7 In the textile industry, the main inputs were both locally-produced and 
imported. On the one hand, cotton often grew in the wild and dyestuffs were 
obtained from local plant products. On the other hand, yarn was imported from 
Europe and India, or obtained by unravelling imported cotton pieces and silk cloth.8
A variety of less common industries existed too. These included: pottery,9 
the tanning and working of leather,10 basket-making,11 palm wine fermentation,12 
rope-making13 and the manufacture of beads.14 In addition, there was some 
smithing of metals such as copper and brass, particularly around Kumasi.15
4 T. Edward Bowdich, Mission from Cape Coast to Ashantee (London, 3rd. edition: Frank Cass, 
1966), p. 312.
5 LaTorre, ‘Wealth Surpasses Everything’, p. 47.
6 Ibid., p. 313.
7 J. Kopp, ‘Eine Wolta-Reise auf dem "Pionier"’, Mitteilungen der Geographischen Gesellschaft 
fur Thiiringen zu Jena (Band I, 1882), pp. 71-8.
8 LaTorre, ‘Wealth Surpasses Everything’, p. 51.
9 Beecham, Asantee and the Gold Coast, p. 147.
10 Ibid. Bowdich, Mission from Cape Coast, p. 313.
11 LaTorre, ‘Wealth Surpasses Everything’, p. 52.
12 Henry Meredith, An Account o f the Gold Coast o f Africa: with a Brief History o f the African 
Company (London, 1812), republished (London: Frank Cass, 1967), p. 26.
13 Ibid.
14 LaTorre, ‘Wealth Surpasses Everything’, p. 52.
15 Ibid., p. 48.
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Markets fo r Small Industry Products
It is possible to distinguish two markets for small industry products in precolonial 
Ghana. The first was what LaTorre has termed the ‘stoolholders’ market’,16 which 
served the consumption needs of the ‘leisure class’.17 This ‘leisure class’ consisted 
of the various chiefs of the stools around Asante as well as the Asantehene and his 
court at Kumasi. The importance of state demand for manufactures was not unique 
to Asante among precolonial African states. For example, in Masina, the state’s need 
for armaments stimulated local crafts there.18
The court at Kumasi created demand for small industry products from the 
neighbouring area because it had an income above its subsistence requirements and 
did not hesitate to exhibit its wealth openly, for example, through court regalia.19 
The link between court demand and the expansion of small industries can be 
discerned clearly from the development of craft villages around Kumasi. These 
satellite villages usually specialized in the manufacture of one particular product for 
the Kumasi court. Hence the villages of Breman and Adum were known for gold- 
and metal-smithing, Ahwia for wood-working, Ntonso for cloth-dyeing, Bonwire for 
weaving and Pankrono for pottery.20 Within Kumasi itself, certain wards, or 
abrono, specialized in particular industries. Thus, goldsmiths were located in Burase 
and blacksmiths in Tunsuoarim.21 All these satellite villages and abrono survived 
because of demand from the Kumasi court.
The second type of market for small industry products was what LaTorre has 
called the ‘mass market’.22 This served the population in the villages and towns of
16 Ibid., p. 53.
17 Stephen H. Hymer, ‘Economic Forms in Pre-Colonial Ghana’, Journal o f Economic History, 30 
(1970) no. 1, p. 34.
18 Marion Johnson, ‘The Economic Foundations of an Islamic Theocracy—the Case of Masina’, 
Journal o f African History, 17 (1976) no. 4, p. 485.
19 Bowdich, Mission from Cape Coast, pp. 34-41.
20 Kwame Arhin, ‘Trade, Accumulation and the State in Asante in the Nineteenth Century’, Africa, 
60 (1990) no. 4, pp. 527-8.
21 James Wilson Brown, ‘Kumasi, 1896-1923. Urban Africa in the Early Colonial Period’, 
University o f Wisconsin, PhD, 1972, p. 26.
22 LaTorre, ‘Wealth Surpasses Everything’, p. 53.
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the region. This market existed because income levels in Asante and on the Coast
were above subsistence levels. As Cruickshank remarked, in the average Fante
house, it was common to find mats, stools, earthen pots, calabashes, pewters, cutlery,
tables, chairs, beds, trunks, pictures and muskets.23
It is likely that, until the 1870s, the demand for small industry products in the
‘stoolholders’ market* was growing. Although the abolition of the Atlantic slave
trade resulted in a significant loss of revenue for the Asante state, the Asante ‘leisure
class’ managed to respond vigorously to the challenges of the new ‘legitimate
commerce’ period.24 However, from the 1870s, faced with the expansion of British
colonialism, the Asante kingdom disintegrated slowly. As the position of the ‘leisure
class’ weakened, so did its demand for small industry products. Hence, according
to Brown, there was a exodus of craftsmen and artisans from Kumasi following its
destruction at the hands of the British in 1874 because:
the numerous artisans and craftsmen of Kumasi could find little employment 
in the town, and hence little reason to return, so long as limited Asante 
wealth remained there.25
In the ‘mass market*, the demand for small industry products probably was 
stagnant. Admittedly, incomes in the mass market were rising. The era of 
‘legitimate commerce’ provided ample opportunities for West African small-scale 
producers to export cash crops.26 In Asante specifically, commoners played an 
important part in this trade.27 Even so, two factors worked in the opposite direction 
to constrict this market. First, general under-population and limited concentrations 
of population hindered market growth across West Africa because it ‘encouraged 
extensive cultivation, favored dispersed settlement, and promoted local self­
23 Brodie Cruickshank, Eighteen Years on the Gold Coast o f Africa, including an account o f the 
native tribes, and their intercourse with Europeans, volume two (London: Hurst and Blackett, 1853), 
republished (London: Frank Cass, 1966), p. 293.
24 Gareth Austin, ‘Between abolition and Jihad: the Asante response to the ending of the Atlantic 
slave trade, 1807-1896’, in Robin Law (ed.), From slave trade to ‘legitimate' commerce. The 
commercial transition in nineteenth century West Africa (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1995), pp. 105-6.
25 Brown, ‘Kumasi, 1896-1923’, p. 64.
26 A.G. Hopkins, An Economic History of West Africa (London: Longman, 1973), ch. 4.
27 Gareth Austin, ‘"No Elders were Present": Commoners and Private Ownership in Asante, 1807- 
96’, Journal o f African History, 37 (1996) no. 1, pp. 12-6.
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sufficiency’.28 Where concentrations of population did exist (such as in Kano, in 
present-day Nigeria) manufacturing thrived29 and productivity-enhancing techniques 
were introduced.30 Wilks and Arhin have suggested that the population of Asante 
contracted in nineteenth century.31 Although there are problems with this 
contention,32 at the very least, it is unlikely that Asante*s population grew 
significantly during this time.
A second factor restricting the expansion of the ‘mass market’ was the high 
cost of transport. With animal traction precluded by the incidence of tsetse fly, 
human porterage remained the main means of transporting goods until the advent of 
the railways in the late nineteenth century. Since human porterage was costly, it 
constricted trade in all but high value, low bulk manufactures. Hence, in 1921, the 
District Officer of Bawku, a small town in the Northern Territories, was pessimistic 
about the prospects for local industrial development. Although ‘good quality’ string 
and rope was manufactured locally, ‘when the cost of transport to Tamale is taken 
into consideration it would not appear to be a paying investment’.33 Around 
Wenchi, in 1926, cotton was spun into yarn but this was not exported since ‘The cost 
of headporterage of so bulky yet light a substance renders it [mc] export 
unprofitable’.34 Likewise, a small mill which was established in Tamale in 1930 to 
process local shea butter kernels for markets in the South proved a failure, again
28 Abdullahi Mahadi and J.E. Inikori, ‘Population and Capitalist Development in Precolonial West 
Africa. Kasar Kano in the Nineteenth Century’, in Dennis D. Cordell and Joel W. Gregory (eds.), 
African Population and Capitalism. Historical Perspectives (Boulder: Westview Press, 1987), p. 72.
29 Hopkins, Economic History o f West Africa, p. 50.
30 Philip J. Shea, ‘Economies of Scale and the Indigo Dyeing Industry of Precolonial Kano’, Kano 
Studies, new series, 1 (1974/77) no. 2, pp. 55-61.
31 Ivor Wilks, Asante in the nineteenth century. The structure and evolution o f a political order 
(London: Cambridge University Press, 1975), table 8, p. 90. Arhin, ‘Trade, Accumulation and the 
State’, p. 530.
32 Marion Johnson, ‘The Population of Asante, 1817-1921: a reconsideration’, Asantesem: The 
Asante Collective Biography Project, 8 (1978), pp. 22-8.
33 NAGA ADM 56/1/273, District Commissioner, Bawku to the Provincial Commissioner, 
Northern Territories, 1921.
34 NAGK D 2439, W.J. Pitt, District Commissioner, Wenchi, ‘Report on the Country to the West 
of Wenchi’ (1926), p. 10.
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because of transport costs.35 All these examples are from the twentieth century by 
which time there had been several decades of transport infrastructure development. 
Therefore, it is certain that, in the nineteenth century, transport costs constricted the 
demand for indigenous industrial products even more.
2.2 Small Industries during the Integration of the Gold Coast into the World 
Economy: C.1800-C.1940S
The Portuguese had built a fort at Elmina in 1482 to facilitate gold exports from the 
Costa da Mina,36 while the Dutch, Danish and British had all been important traders 
in the Gold Coast from the sixteenth century.37 However, West African economies 
were altered fundamentally with the transition from slave-trading to ‘legitimate* cash- 
cropping in the nineteenth century,38 and the gradual extension of formal British 
political influence in the region. This influence penetrated the Fante states of the 
Coast in the first half of the nineteenth century and culminated in the proclamation 
of the Gold Coast Protectorate in 1874.39 Three decades later, Asante and its 
former northern states were brought under British control as well.40 There are 
generally three views about the performance of small industries during the Gold Coast 
economy’s integration into the wider world economy.
Small Industries during Integration into the World Economy 
The Dependency view is that international free trade, combined with colonial 
government’s economic policy of laisser-faire and ambivalence towards indigenous 
enterprise, meant that indigenous industrial activity in the colonized ‘periphery’ was
35 ADM 5/1/70, W.J.A. Jones, Chief Commissioner of the Northern Territories, Report on the 
Northern Territories for the Year 1937-38 (Accra: Gold Coast Colony, 1938), p. 39.
36 Ivor Wilks, Forests o f Gold. Essays on the Akan and the Kingdom o f Asante (Athens: Ohio 
University Press, 1993), pp. 4-5.
37 Larry W. Yarak, Asante and the Dutch, 1744-1873 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990).
38 Hopkins, Economic History o f West Africa, ch. 4. Law, From slave trade to legitimate' 
commerce.
39 Reynolds, ‘Gold Coast and Asante’, pp. 229-31.
40 Ibid., p. 249.
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eradicated by cheap, machine-produced manufactures from an industrializing
Europe.41 Agbodeka has expressed this Dependency view in the Ghanaian context:
the art of tool-making which was basic to the growth of industry declined 
with the increasing dependence of the people on imported European tools.
Since tool-making skills were impaired, the growth of industries like 
manufacturing industries, and even agricultural industries which depended on 
the use of improved tools were also stunted.42
Similarly, Hakam has claimed that the small weavers of Ashanti and Eweland ‘were
to perish in the aftermath of the colonization and the competition of unrestricted cheap
imports*.43
An alternative interpretation is offered by Szereszewski. According to 
Szereszewski:
In 1891 the Gold Coast was primarily an economy dominated by indigenous 
activities ... and by trade flows whose nature in terms of organisation, 
conveyance, spatial incidence and type of commodities had not changed 
significantly over centuries.44
To be fair, Szereszewski was writing before much research into this subject had been
conducted and, in any case, not with particular reference to small-scale industries.
However, the contention is clear: before the onset of the cocoa boom in the 1890s,
the Gold Coast economy had been stagnant and without significant structural change.
A third interpretation is offered by Hopkins and Munro. Hopkins contends
that, together with the growth of small-scale African cash cropping, some indigenous
West African industries survived and expanded during the colonial period.45
Likewise, Munro suggests that:
particularly in the growth phases of the 1920s and 1950s ... there emerged 
a variety of small businesses and self-employed artisan workshops such as 
joinery and brick-laying, blacksmithing with imported scrap iron, tailoring,
41 Samir Amin, ‘Underdevelopment and Dependence in Black Africa—their Historical Origins and 
Contemporary Forms’, Social and Economic Studies, 22 (1973) no. 1, p. 193. Walter Rodney, How 
Europe Underdeveloped Africa (Washington D.C.: Howard University Press, 1982), p. 232.
42 Francis Agbodeka, An Economic History o f Ghana From the Earliest Times (Accra: Ghana 
Universities Press, 1992), p. 33.
43 A.N. Hakam, ‘Impediments to the Growth of Indigenous Industrial Entrepreneurship in Ghana: 
1946-1968’, The Economic Bulletin o f Ghana, 2 (1972) no. 2, p. 6.
44 R. Szereszewski, Structural Changes in the Economy of Ghana, 1891-1911 (London: Weidenfeld 
and Nicolson, 1965), p. 1.
45 Hopkins, Economic History o f West Africa, p. 250.
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shoe-making, or motor vehicle repair and servicing.46
The Survival o f Small Industries
In the absence of comprehensive data on the subject, it is difficult to know what 
happened to small industries during the period c.1800 to c.1945. Nonetheless, three 
sources appear to confirm Hopkins* and Munro’s view that many survived, despite 
competition from European imports.
The first source is the eye-witness accounts of contemporaries. These 
accounts require cautious use since they often consist of mere snapshots of particular 
areas at particular times. Thus, they may not be representative of general trends. 
Nonetheless, taken together, they do undermine the Dependency notion of complete 
small industry eradication. For example, in 1840, a British official wrote to the 
Colonial Office that many foreign manufactures entered the Gold Coast. These 
included: Manchester goods, guns, powder, lead, iron bars, flints, rum, pipes, 
tobacco, beads, cowries, brass wire, earthenware, soap, glassware, and perfumery.47 
Several of these items were used by small-scale industries. Some of the ‘Manchester 
goods’ were unravelled and their yam used for weaving.48 Some of the lead and 
iron bars were melted down and smithed, since they had no value in themselves. 
Another eye-witness account is provided by Mohr, a Basel missionary, who noted on 
one of his journeys to the Volta region in 1881 that weaving was very much alive in 
the areas which he visited.49
Turning to the twentieth century, eye-witnesses continued to refer to the 
existence of thriving small-scale industries. At the Kumasi Agricultural Show of 
1908, an anonymous visitor observed ‘Leather work from the North, iron work, 
cloths, wood-carving, stool, baskets, pottery, and other things too numerous to
46 J. Forbes Munro, Britain in Tropical Africa, 1880-1960. Economic Relationships and Impact 
(London: Macmillan, 1984), p. 63.
47 Report of Richard Robert Madden to the Colonial Office, 1840, in G.E. Metcalfe, Great Britain 
and Ghana. Documents o f Ghana History, 1807-1957 (London: Thomas Nelson, 1964), p. 168.
48 LaTorre, ‘Wealth Surpasses Everything’, p. 51.
49 ‘Mohr to Basel—Report of a Journey from Begoro to the Hinterland of the Anum Station, July 
1881 (no. 236)’, in P. Jenkins, ‘Abstracts from Correspondence in the Basel Mission Archives, 
1852-1898’, translated 1970 and deposited at the Balme Library, University of Ghana.
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mention*.50 Rattray found in Asante in the 1920s that there were weavers, cloth 
stampers, wood-carvers, potters and metal-casters,51 and that ‘though these arts and 
crafts were dying out, there was life still left in some of them’.52 Adams, writing 
on the ‘home industries’ of the Gold Coast in 1931, remarked that in ‘Keta district 
hundreds of men are weavers*.53 In the Northern Territories, ‘most of the cloth 
used is made in the villages*,54 while ‘in every town of any size in the Colony and 
Ashanti there is a goldsmith ... Cape Coast had 86 goldsmiths in 1921’.55
Even the colonial administration, which is not known to have been interested 
in indigenous industries, did remark on their activities occasionally. For instance, in 
1921, the Governor wanted to know what native industries existed in the Northern 
Territories.56 According to submissions by various districts commissioners, local 
industrial products included baskets, string bags, straw hats, earthenware pots, 
ornamental pottery, beads, string, rope, mats and ornamental cloth.57
In addition to eye-witness accounts, import data also suggest that small 
industries survived. This is because they demonstrate that there were goods entering 
the Gold Coast which only could have been used in small-scale industrial production. 
Table 2.1 charts imports of cotton yam between 1923 and 1929. In the absence of 
any textile factory in the Gold Coast in the 1920s, it can be assumed that all of this 
was destined for small weavers.
30 NAGK D 2026, ‘Notes on the Kumasi Agricultural Show taken by an Anonymous Visitor’ 
(1908), p. 3.
51 R.S. Rattray, Religion and Art in Ashanti (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1927), chs. 24-28.
52 Ibid., p. 217.
53 David Thickens Adams, An Elementary Geography o f the Gold Coast (London: University of 
London Press, 1931), p. 146.
54 Ibid., p. 147.
55 Ibid., p. 150.
56 NAGA ADM 56/1/273, Colonial Secretary’s Office to the Chief Commissioner, Northern 
Territories, 16/3/1921.
37 NAGA ADM 56/1/273, District Officers (various) to Provincial Commissioner, Northern 
Territories (1921).
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Table 2.1. Weights and Prices of Gold Coast Cotton Yarn Imports, 1923-29.
Year Weight (lbs) Value (£)
1923 369,803 52,734
1924 315,929 51,714
1925 511,818 75,398
1926 386,726 47,912
1927 591,520 63,726
1928 441,724 51,496
1929 369,864 40,292
Sources: Gold Coast, Trade Report fo r  the Year 1927  (Accra: Government Printer, 1928), 
table 5 , pp. 32-47. Gold Coast, Trade Report fo r  the Year 1929  (Accra: Government Printer, 
1930), table 5, pp. 40-55.
Table 2.2 shows that artisans* implements and tools were also imported during the 
1920s, again implying the survival of small industries.
Table 2.2. Value of Imports of Artisans’ Implements into the Gold Coast, 1923- 
29.
Year Value (£)
1923 37,816
1924 44,086
1925 37,865
1926 37,620
1927 36,111
1928 46,910
1929 45,224
Sources: Same as table 2.1.
These import data prove beyond doubt that small industries were not eradicated 
completely by competition from European manufactures. There is the possibility that
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these data are inaccurate, because some imports may not have been recorded. 
However, non-recording would only strengthen the case for the survival of small- 
scale industries because then, the actual imports of small-industry inputs would be 
higher.
A third source which points to small industry survival is population censuses. 
A 1911 census of 110,000 African adults in 29 towns, enumerated 1,445 carpenters, 
557 bricklayers and masons, 298 blacksmiths, 183 coopers, 87 sawyers, 40 fitters,
40 mechanics, 16 printers and 2 engineers.58 Since large-scale industry did not 
develop in the Gold Coast until the 1940s, most of these workers must have been in 
small enterprises. Similarly, in 1921, the African population of Kumasi was 
estimated to be 18,058.59 Among them, there were: 560 com grinders, 107 
dressmakers, 79 carpenters, 76 bricklayers, 71 bakers, 60 goldsmiths, 55 sawyers,
41 fitters, 35 weavers, 34 tailors, 21 blacksmiths, 15 mechanics, 8 shoemakers, 2 
electricians and 1 cooper.60 Assuming that Kumasi’s labour force represented half 
of its total population, then about 13 per cent of the town’s economically-active 
population was engaged in small industry activities in 1921.
Clearly then, some small industries did survive the competition from the 
factories of Europe. Naturally, certain indigenous industries fared better than others. 
For example, iron-smelting generally disappeared, squeezed by ecological factors and 
competition from imports.61 By the 1920s and 1930s, this industry was confined to 
the Volta Region.62 In place of iron-smelting, the smithing of imported iron bars63 
and scrap iron become more common. Thus, in the Northern Territories, it was 
observed in 1938 that:
Iron smelting was formerly carried out ... but lorry parts, railway sleepers
and other manufactured iron which can be purchased at a low price have
58 Gold Coast, 1911 Census Report, appendix G, cited in Szereszewski, Structural Changes, table 
14, p. 59.
59 Census Report, 1921, cited in Brown, ‘Kumasi, 1896-1923’, appendix E, p. 254.
60 Census, ibid., appendix F, cited in Brown, ibid., pp. 256-7.
61 Candice L. Goucher, ‘Iron is Iron ’Til it is Rust: Trade and Ecology in the Decline of West 
African Iron-Smelting’, Journal o f African History, 22 (1981) no. 2, pp. 179-89.
62 Rattray, Religion and Art, pp. 309-10.
63 Ibid.
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killed the industry.64
Against this, however, there is no evidence that iron-working itself experienced such 
a collapse.
In short, while some small industries were eradicated by European imports, 
many others were not. How did certain indigenous industries compete against 
Western manufacturers?
2.3 Explanations for the Survival of Small Industries
There are five reasons why some small industries survived the colonial period: the 
cost and opportunity cost of small-scale industrial activity; the cost of transport; the 
nature of consumer tastes; the new demands which were created by contact with 
Europeans; and the comparatively advanced state of African entrepreneurship. Each 
of these issues is now considered in turn.
Cost and Opportunity Cost o f Production
For many small industries, the absolute cost of industrial activity was negligible. For 
instance, goldsmiths could find gold by panning for it in streams.65 In the Volta 
River lagoon near Ada, when the rains ended and the lagoon dried out, ‘anyone could 
collect as much [salt] as he wanted, piling it up*.66 In both cases, there may have 
been a cost in securing raw materials in terms of labour and tools, but the absolute 
cost of the inputs themselves was probably minimal.
For a large number of households, the opportunity cost of engaging labour in 
industrial activities was also minimal, since these activities either were conducted by 
women or were carried out at times when the demand for labour in agriculture was 
low. Thus, in the Ada salt industry, ‘Production costs were minimal. Women and
64 NAGA ADM 5/1/70, W.J.A. Jones, Chief Commissioner of the Northern Territories, Report 
on the Northern Territories for the Year 1937-38 (Accra: Gold Coast Colony, 1938), para. 265.
65 Adams, Elementary Geography, pp. 158-9.
66 I.B. Sutton, ‘The Volta River Salt Trade: the survival of an indigenous industry’, Journal o f 
African History, 22 (1981) no. 1, p. 50.
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children generally collected the salt; previously, it had been done by slaves*.67 In
1926, the District Commissioner of Wenchi, noted, with regard to spinning, that:
It is a home occupation and the women usually spend the evening in spinning 
as a relaxation after their days [j/c] work. Only once have I met a woman 
. .. who in court declared her occupation as a spinner.68
Basket-weaving in the North was carried out by women during the dry season. As
the District Commissioner of Northern Mamprusi remarked in connection with a
request for samples of local baskets in 1921:
I cannot send specimens now as the basket season is over. Not until the New  
Year will the women begin to make them ... The supply is dependent on that 
o f the grass which is only ready at the end o f the rains.69
With the advent of cocoa farming, which is a major dry as well as wet season
activity, the seasonal surplus of labour in agriculture probably diminished. Hence,
the cocoa farms of the southern forest zone attracted large numbers of migrant
labourers from the northern, savannah regions.70 Nonetheless, it was not eradicated
altogether. Thus, in a study of the cocoa village of Akokoaso in the 1940s, Beckett
observed that cocoa farmers usually devoted 216 days a year to farm work, mostly
between February and June.71 This left 52 days for Sundays, 53 days for resting,
16 days for travel, 8.5 days for illness, 5.5 days for village work, 4 days for religious
work and 10 days for miscellaneous activities.72 Thus, for the cocoa farmers of
Akokoaso, there were times of the year when household labour was otherwise
unemployed and could engage in industrial activities at minimal opportunity cost to
the household. In other words, there still existed a certain seasonal ‘vent-for-surplus’
for labour.
The dearth of well-paid, unskilled modern sector jobs reinforced the low 
opportunity cost for labour. A typical unskilled modem sector job was road-building,
67 Ibid., p. 51.
68 NAGK D 2439, W.J. Pitt, District Commissioner, Wenchi, ‘Report on the Country to the West 
of Wenchi’ (1926), p. 13.
69 NAGA ADM 56/1/273, District Commissioner, Northern Mamprusi, to the Provincial 
Commissioner, Northern Territories, 1921.
70 Szereszewski, Structural Changes, p. 58.
71 W.H. Beckett, Akokoaso, A Survey o f A Gold Coast Village (New York: AMS Press, 1979), pp. 
81-3.
72 Ibid., p. 83.
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but working conditions were unattractive as the Transport Department’s records for 
1908 suggest:
with constant walking for a twelve month averaging 400 miles a month ... a 
large number of carriers have been incapacitated from sore feet ... the 
majority had their soles almost completely worn through, to say nothing of 
cracks ... The experiment was then tried of tarring the carriers’ feet. Coal 
tar is most suitable. It fills the cracks and is good antiseptic ...73
Given these conditions, labour had little incentive to engage in unskilled, modem-
sector activities when otherwise unoccupied.
Low opportunity costs for labour were characteristic of the urban economy as
well. Many urban workers received incomes which hardly covered their subsistence
needs. Thus, small-scale industrial by-employment offered an attractive avenue for
supplementing income. There is evidence for this from a social survey of post-1945
Sekondi-Takoradi, where Busia found:
labourers ... at nights weaving mats or handbags in order to supplement their 
wages. They explained that weaving mats did not pay as a full-time job, 
because it took two or three weeks to weave one which sold for five or six 
shillings; but the little extra they earned from weaving in the evenings 
enabled them to pay their rent.74
Transport Costs
While the cost of transport constricted the market for locally-produced manufactures,
it also shielded existing indigenous industries against competition from imports.
Indeed, this was the case across colonial Africa.75 The cost of transport was
probably one reason why a witness to the 1865 Select Committee on British
Establishments in West Africa noted:
If we come to the interior, six days* journey, people make iron and make 
their own clothes, but nobody thinks, along the coast, of making iron or
73 Quoted in D.K. Greenstreet, ‘The Transport Department—the First Two Decades’, Economic 
Bulletin o f Ghana, 10 (1966), p. 42 and cited in Hopkins, Economic History o f West Africa, pp. 230-1.
74 K.A. Busia, Report on a Social Survey o f Sekondi-Takoradi (London: Crown Agent for the 
Colonies, 1950), p. 23.
75 David K. Fieldhouse, Colonialism 1870-1945. An Introduction (London: Weidenfeld and 
Nicolson, 1981), p. 96. Ralph A. Austen, African Economic Development. Internal Development and 
External Dependency (London: James Currey, 1987), p. 74. Hopkins, Economic History o f West 
Africa, pp. 50, 251. Marion Johnson, ‘Technology, Competition, and the African Crafts’, in Clive 
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India (London: the Athlone Press, 1978), p. 265.
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clothes; native industry disappears, so far as the European trade is going.76
For the present century, it is likely that transport costs continued to protect 
indigenous industrialists, particularly in the North. The Chief Commissioner of the 
Northern Territories, reviewing the year 1937-38, observed that, during the dry 
season the main road to Asante and the South had become ‘one long series of 
corrugations with pot-holes interspersed, and a journey over it in a light car was in 
the nature of a nightmare’.77 As late as 1950, the poor state of the road network 
meant that a 760-mile round-trip in a 5-ton Bedford lorry from Kumasi to Bawku cost 
£30 in repairs and depreciation alone,78 a figure equal to one-and-a-half times the 
average per capita income in the North in that year.79
To be sure, government advisors and politicians placed much emphasis on 
improving transport infrastructure,80 and indeed, transport facilities did improve 
gradually. Shipping connections were enhanced with the creation of a steamship link 
with Europe by 1852.81 The railway from Sekondi to Kumasi was completed in 
1903,82 while between 1918 and 1939, the road network expanded enormously, 
particularly in the cocoa belt.83 In the 1920s a new, deep water port was 
constructed in Takoradi and the rail network was expanded further.84 The Ten Year 
Development Plan for the 1920s earmarked 75 per cent of Plan expenditure for
76 Select Committee on British Establishments in West Africa (1865) evidence, Q. 3295, cited in 
Szereszewski, Structural Changes, footnote 17, p. 7.
77 NAGA ADM 5/1/70, W.J.A. Jones, Chief Commissioner of the Northern Territories, Report 
on the Northern Territories for the Year 1937-38 (Accra: Gold Coast Colony, 1938), para. 133.
78 NAGA ADM 5/3/79, Colonial Office (John R. Raeburn), ‘Report on a Preliminary Economic 
Survey o f the Northern Territories of the Gold Coast (1950)’, paras. 66-9.
79 Ibid., table 3, p. 26 and table 6, p. 29.
80 Cmd 2744 (1926), Report o f the Hon. W.G.A. Ormsby-Gore (Parliamentary Under-Secretary o f  
State fo r the Colonies) on His Visit to West Africa during the Year 1926, in Metcalfe, Great Britain and 
Ghana, p. 609. Allan McPhee, The Economic Revolution in British West Africa (London, 2nd ed.: 
Frank Cass, 1971), p. 106. Governor’s Annual Address, Legislative Council Debates, 1921-2, pp. 29- 
48 (extracts), reprinted in G.B. Kay (ed.), The Political Economy of Colonialism in Ghana. A 
Collection o f Documents and Statistics, 1900-1960 (London: Cambridge University Press, 1972), p. 
54.
81 Edward Reynolds, ‘Gold Coast and Asante’, p. 239.
82 Brown, ‘Kumasi, 1896-1923’, p. 84.
83 Kay, Political Economy o f Colonialism, p. 22.
84 Ibid., pp. 20, 22.
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developing the transport system.85
Yet despite these developments, transport costs still protected many indigenous 
industrial producers from competition from imports. By the early nineteenth century 
the rail network still extended only 250 kilometres north of the Coast to Kumasi. The 
Kumasi hinterland stretched a further 600 kilometres to the border of French West 
Africa. This Northern region remained reliant on road transport which was itself 
dependent on the season and condition of the roads until the 1950s.
Consumer Tastes
The only gradual erosion of consumer preferences for African products may have
sustained the demand for some local industries. After returning from the Gold Coast,
Meredith remarked on the potential market for European manufactures there. But he
received this rebuff from an anonymous commentator:
experience o f  the past, certainly, does not warrant this conclusion. The 
natives o f this coast have had intercourse with Europeans about three hundred 
years, and (with the exception o f a very small number ... ) have adopted 
none o f  their customs but smoking and drinking. Their clothing, tools, 
houses, canoes, nets, etc. etc. are all after their old fashion.86
This is hardly surprising, since Africans attached a utility value to several
locally-produced items. Textiles is a case in point. In West Africa, garments have
reflected the social status of the wearer. Because of this, West African textile
manufacturers, unlike some of their European competitors, have tended to tailor-make
their products for this very differentiated market. This appears to be the key to
understanding the survival of the indigenous textile industry in West Africa.87
Another product which benefitted from the gradual erosion of traditional tastes was
local salt which was said to promote virility, while local ironware was thought to be
of a better quality than the imported equivalent.88
In addition to African consumer tastes, it is apparent that the colonial
85 Ibid., p. 20.
86 Anonymous Editorial Comment on Meredith, An Account o f the Gold Coast, p. 37n, cited in 
LaTorre, ‘Wealth Surpasses Everything’, p. 403.
87 John E. Flint and E. Ann McDougall, ‘Economic Change in West Africa in the nineteenth 
Century’, in Ajayi and Crowder, History o f West Africa, p. 382.
88 Hopkins, Economic History o f West Africa, p. 251.
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government and the expatriate community in the Gold Coast formed a market for 
locally-produced industrial goods too. In December 1921, 150 round baskets made 
by native industries in the Northern Territories were sent to the Public Works’ 
Department in Accra, together with 90 waste paper baskets for the Printing 
Department.89 In 1925, when the Chief Commissioner of the Northern Territories 
furnished his quarters, the records show that he spent £50 on local mats.90
New Demands o f the Colonial Economy
During the colonial era, new products proliferated which generated ‘backward’ 
linkages to indigenous industries. The growth of palm oil production in the late 
nineteenth century stimulated cask-rolling (the main means of transporting palm oil 
until the arrival of the lorry in the 1920s) which in turn generated demand for 
carpenters, joiners and cask-makers.91 Similarly, the import of firearms increased 
the need for blacksmiths to service the firearms themselves.92
Between the modem sector ‘introduced* by the British and traditional small 
industry, a wide range of new industrial activities evolved. Examples of these include 
the ‘mammy lorry*, which was an imported truck chassis and engine fitted with a 
local wooden body,93 canoes carved from tree trunks and fitted with out-board 
engines, and buildings constructed with swish, thatch and bamboo, as well as iron, 
asbestos and aluminium.94
Entrepreneurship
Small industries would not have survived the colonial period if there had not been
89 NAGA ADM 56/1/273, ‘Native Industries, 1921-9’, p. 19.
90 NAGA ADM 56/1/401, Chief Commissioner, Northern Territories, to the Executive Engineer, 
Public Works Department, Tamale, 16/12/1927.
91 Agbodeka, Economic History o f Ghana, p. 53.
92 Goucher, ‘Iron is Iron ’Til it is Rust’, p. 179.
93 NAGA CSO 6/6/177, Acting Chief Transport Officer to the Financial Secretary, Colonial 
Secretary’s Office, 28/4/1938.
94 Robert Szereszewski, ‘Capital’, in Walter Birmingham, I. Neustadt and E.N. Omaboe (eds.), 
A Study o f Contemporary Ghana. Volume One. The Economy of Ghana (London: George Allen and 
Unwin, 1966), pp. 200-1.
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entrepreneurs to keep them alive. An entrepreneur is defined here in the traditional 
Schumpeterian sense as a risk-taker, who also has the necessary technical skills for 
small industry. Using the history of commercialization and capital accumulation, it 
is possible to show that risk-taking was common in precolonial and colonial Ghana.
Before the establishment of British rule, the Asante kingdom had probably the 
most commercialized economy in West Africa, with the exception of the Sokoto 
Caliphate and the other jihad  states of the northern savannah.95 From before the 
nineteenth century, the Akan region used various currencies for exchange such as iron 
discs and cowrie shells.96 In Asante proper, gold dust, or sika futuro, was used, 
even for petty transactions.97 Markets were well-developed in Asante and on the 
Coast. For example, Bowdich noted how the main Kumasi market sat every day of 
the week and consisted of sixty stalls or sheds with ‘throngs of inferior vendors seated 
in all directions’.98 On the Coast itself, a market for labour existed from a 
comparatively early stage. As Meredith noted in 1812, in the coastal towns 
‘labourers may easily be had at the rate of from ten shilling to twelve shillings and 
six-pence per month’.99
Commoners were extensively engaged in trading. Cruickshank remarked that 
‘there was not a nook or corner of the land to which the enterprise of some sanguine 
trader had not led him’,100 and that ‘the commercial spirit is very strong in the 
African’.101 Likewise, Governor Sir William Brandford Griffith observed in 1893 
that:
there is in this Colony a vast and almost inexhaustible field for what is known 
as the petty trader, semi-educated men, who purchasing small quantities o f  
dry goods and other articles saleable to the natives o f  the interior carry them
95 Flint and McDougall, ‘Economic Change in West Africa’, pp. 386-92.
96 Timothy F. Garrard, Akan Weights and the Gold Trade (London: Longman, 1980), p. 3.
97 Wilks, Forests o f Gold, pp. 128-9.
98 Bowdich, Mission from Cape Coast, p. 324.
99 Meredith, Account o f the Gold Coast, p. 181.
100 Cruickshank, Eighteen Years on the Gold Coast, p. 33.
to the inland towns and villages.102 
Asante commoners played an important part in long-distance trade too, exporting kola 
nuts, gold and Western manufactures to the jihad states of the northern savannah, and 
importing, in return, salt, shea butter, livestock, thread, cloth, metal locks, gold and 
slaves.103 African merchants along the Coast also exported palm products to 
Europe.104 By the middle of the nineteenth century, an indigenous merchant class 
had evolved in the trading towns of the Coast,105 although, subsequently, many of 
its members were squeezed out of the import-export trade as European merchant 
houses expanded their business with the region.106 Nonetheless, as Dumett writes, 
on the Coast, ‘small-scale trading was pervasive ... ‘buying cheap* and ‘selling dear’ 
were raised to high arts’.107
Wealth was accumulated by commoners and merchants and often was 
mobilized to maximize returns in typical entrepreneurial fashion. Capital mobility 
underpinned the development of sophisticated credit markets in the region.108 It is 
possible to discern two categories of capital mobility. First, there were capital 
transfers from the trade to the non-trade sector. An example of this was the transfer 
of capital from trading to cocoa production.109 This occurred when returns from 
cocoa increased after the 1890s. Second, there were transfers within the non-trade 
sector. Hence, proceeds from rubber production were used for the establishment of
102 Dispatch dated 6 March 1893 (ADM 1/492, no. 67), cited in Polly Hill, The Migrant Cocoa- 
Farmers o f Southern Ghana. A Study in Rural Capitalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1963), p. 165.
103 Arhin, ‘Trade, Accumulation and the State’, p. 529.
104 Raymond E. Dumett, ‘John Sarbah, the Elder, and African Mercantile Entrepreneurship in the 
Gold Coast in the Late Nineteenth Century’, Journal o f African History, 14 (1973) no. 4, p. 663.
105 Ibid. Susan Kaplow, ‘The Mudfish and the Crocodile: Underdevelopment of a West African 
Bourgeoisie’, Science and Society, 41 (1977) no. 3, pp. 317-333. Susan B. Kaplow, ‘Primitive 
Accumulation and Traditional Social Relations on the Nineteenth Century Gold Coast’, Canadian 
Journal o f African Studies, 12 (1978) no. 1, pp. 19-36.
106 Kaplow, ‘Mudfish and the Crocodile’, pp. 323-33.
107 Dumett, ‘John Sarbah’, p. 656.
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Macmillan, 1993), pp. 93-159.
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cocoa farms,110 again when returns from cocoa became favourable.
Thus, there was no general entrepreneurial deficit in precolonial and colonial
Ghana. In fact, it is probable that, throughout the period c. 1800 to c. 1945, there was
an increase in the number of Africans having the specific technical skills for small
industry work. With the expansion of the mission schools, the standard of technical
education in the Gold Coast improved. Thus, while Horton complained in 1865 that
skilled artisans were difficult to find,111 by the 1870s, it was noted that Accra was
the place for skilled labour in West Africa. According to Harford, ‘you may procure
any kind of mechanic you may mention ... For all these trades the natives have to
thank chiefly the Basel Mission’.112
It is likely also that wider access to formal education113 increased the number
of entrepreneurs with industrial skills, although this issue will be analyzed in more
detail in Chapter Nine (pp. 227-231). Small increases in the stock of educated
Africans certainly had promoted the development of the trade sector: as Bowdich once
remarked, even the 100 or school leavers each year were:
compelled to seek out a way o f respectable living and as they generally turn 
their attention in the direction o f trade, it has given a most extraordinary 
impetus to business here and is most essentially adding to the amount o f  
exports from the country.114
The effect of formal education on small industry specifically was probably similar.
Of the 124 boys who had graduated from the Accra Technical School between
December 1929 and April 1936, and whose subsequent employment activities are
known, 52 were working in the private sector in 1936. Of this number, 12 were
110 R. Dumett, ‘The Rubber Trade in the Gold Coast and Asante in the Nineteenth Century: African 
Innovation and Market Responsiveness’, Journal o f African History, XII, 1971, cited in Barbara 
Ingham, Tropical Exports and Economic Development. New Perspectives on Producer Response in 
Three Low-Income Countries (London: Macmillan, 1981), endnote 35, p. 103.
111 J.A.B. Horton, Political Economy of British West Africa (London, 1865), p. 33, cited in 
Szereszewski, Structural Change, p. 8.
112 J. Harford, ‘A Voyage to the African Oil Rivers Twenty Years Ago’, appendix to M. Kingsley, 
West African Studies (London, 1899), pp. 571-2, cited in Szereszewski, ibid., p. 9.
113 Szereszewski, ibid., pp. 41, 59.
114 PRO CO 97/17, Bowdich to Forster, 26/05/1849, cited in Reynolds, ‘Gold Coast and Asante’, 
pp. 234-5.
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operating on their own,115 presumably as small-scale industrialists.
2.4 The Interbellum and Structural Change: the Emergence of Modern Small- 
scale Industries
It would appear that, between the two World Wars, the small industry sector was in 
flux. Rattray had found that there was a wide variety of small industries in Asante 
in the 1920s.116 However, many of these seem to have vanished by the 1930s. As 
Meyerowitz, an Arts Supervisor at Achimota College, wrote in 1937, ‘I visited places 
where Capt. Rattray had been, and looked for the work he admired. It was gone; the 
last representatives had died there and craftsmanship had died with them*.117
What then was the nature of the structural change in the small industry sector 
in the Interbellum, and what can account for this?
Structural Changes: Incomes
According to Martin, the interwar years were a period of ‘long depression* for West 
African cash crop producers.118 Hopkins has argued that the effect of depressed 
cash crop prices was a general depression in the West African domestic market.119 
While this is true, it is evident that different sections of Gold Coast society were 
affected by the ‘long depression’ in different ways. The agricultural sector suffered, 
particularly during the Great Depression. Between the 1927-8 and 1933-4 season, the 
average price of cocoa fell almost 75 per cent.120 Although some of the income 
effects of falling cocoa prices were mitigated by an increase in cocoa output, in
1,5 PRO CO 96/732/7, S. W. Saxton, ‘Memorandum on the Proposed Establishment of a Technical 
School in the Takoradi-Sekondi-Ketan Area (1936)’.
116 Rattray, Religion and Art, chs. 24-28.
117 PRO CO 96/735/9, ‘Memorandum on the Expansion of Arts and Crafts at Achimota College, 
submitted by H.V. Meyerowitz’ (1937).
118 S.M. Martin, ‘The Long Depression: West African Export Producers and the World Economy, 
1914-45’, in Ian Brown (ed.), The Economies o f Africa and Asia in the Inter-war Depression (London: 
Routledge, 1989), pp. 74-94.
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120 Barbara Ingham, Colonialism and the Economy o f the Gold Coast 1919-1945 (Salford: 
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general, there was a significant contraction in the disposable income of cocoa 
farmers.121
However, outside the cocoa sector, the situation was different. In the gold 
industry, the Gold Coast’s second largest export industry after cocoa,122 prices and 
output both rose and the number of African gold miners increased from 8,000 to 
25,000 between 1931 and 1945.123 In the urban sector, the incomes of some groups 
were growing. During the 1920s there had been much capital spending on physical 
infrastructure and this required a significant level of recurrent expenditure in the 
1930s. For example, the Korle Bu hospital, which was built in the 1920s, required 
doctors, nurses, administrators and other staff in the 1930s.124 Hence, between the 
census years 1931 and 1948, the number of skilled Africans in the Gold Coast 
increased substantially, as table 2.3 shows.
Table 2.3. Number of Skilled Africans in the Gold Coast, 1931-48.
Branch 1931 1948
Professional and technical 2,064 4,168
Commercial 48,388 93,204
Transport and communications 4,260 11,650
Blue collar 43,641 44,979
Source: Ingham, Colonialism and the Economy, p. 17.
Not only were the number of skilled and semi-skilled urban workers rising, but so too 
were their incomes. The real wages of railway workers were 37 per cent higher in 
1939 than in 1920, while those of urban skilled workers (such as nurses, teachers and 
clerks) rose by 40 per cent between 1921 and 1938.125
121 Martin, ‘Long Depression’, table 3, p. 89.
122 Kay, Political Economy of Colonialism, table 21A, pp. 334-5.
123 Ingham, Colonialism and the Economy, p. 13.
124 Kay, Political Economy of Colonialism, p. 44.
125 Ingham, Colonialism and the Economy, p. 19.
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Thus, the interwar years constituted a period of structural change in the 
economy of the Gold Coast, as incomes fell in the cocoa sector but increased in some 
non-agricultural sectors. Urban sectors were evolving as nodes of demand for 
manufactures. Such a rejigging of the economy had implications for small industries. 
In essence, it is likely that older small-scale industries in rural areas declined while 
a new small-scale industrial sector evolved in the towns.
There is support for this contention in the fact that exactly the opposite had 
happened in 1920 when the 'cocoa boom* had increased the income of the agricultural 
sector and led to an exodus of skilled labour from the urban sector. During that year, 
Governor Guggisberg had lamented that building works had had to be deferred on 
account of the ‘shortage and quality of labour* caused by the ‘cocoa boom’.126 
Guggisberg estimated that, in 1920, the government could find only 20 per cent of 
the carpenters and only 15 per cent of masons and painters it required.127 
However, by the 1930s, the situation was quite different. Agricultural income was 
depressed, and it is reasonable to suspect that the flow of artisans and craftsmen was 
reversed, with skilled labour moving from the countryside to the towns. Indeed, 
exactly this response to falling agricultural incomes occurred in British India during 
the Depression.128
Structural Changes: Artisans
In addition to changes in relative income levels within Gold Coast society, the number 
of skilled artisans available for work in the small industry sector as a whole rose 
substantially during the interwar years. In the early 1920s, skilled blue-collar 
workers were in short supply. In 1921, the Provincial Engineer in the Kumasi Public 
Works Department wrote, with regard to vacancies for Africans in the Public Works 
Department, that:
With more particular reference to Leading Carpenters, Masons and
Blacksmiths, I regret to say that I am o f  the opinion that it w ill be a very
126 Governor’s Annual Address, Legislative Council Debates, 1921-2, pp. 29-48 (extracts), in Kay, 
Political Economy of Colonialism, pp. 58-9.
™ Ibid., p. 59.
128 Christopher Baker, ‘Debt and Depression in Madras, 1929-1936’, in Dewey and Hopkins, 
Imperial Impact, pp. 233-42.
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difficult matter to find men who will fill the posts.129
Even in 1927, there were complaints of shortages of skilled artisans, with the Acting
Provincial Engineer for Ashanti and the Northern Regions noting:
As far as Ashanti and Northern Territories is concerned there is insufficient 
local skilled labour to execute the building works to be done ... Last year 
with our large programme o f  works the supply was not equal to the demand 
and we had difficulty in getting artisans . . . 13°
By the end of the 1920s, the situation was very different as the shortage of 
skilled artisans had turned into a ‘glut’.131 According to the Secretary of Native 
Affairs, there were 50 applicants for every vacancy in the Public Works Department 
in 1931, while ‘the supply of artisans and mechanics ... is considerably in excess of 
the demand’.132 This was partly the result of the agricultural slump, but also a 
consequence of the increase in skilled labour graduating from the recently-established 
Trade Schools.133 These trade schools had been set up in the 1920s in order to 
produce ‘educated artisans ... the backbone of any community*.134
Therefore, during the interwar years, the foundations of Ghana’s modem 
small-scale industrial base were laid. Craftsmen in mral areas disappeared and small- 
scale industries in urban areas evolved to serve the markets of the towns and cities. 
This marked a decisive break with the past. While before, small industry activity was 
generally a by-employment to farming, by the Second World War a group of urban 
small-scale industrialists was emerging, whose only income derived from 
manufacturing for the expanding urban market.
Before the advent of colonial rule, there were several small industries in the area 
which is known today as Ghana. The Dependency view suggests that these
129 NAGK D 2760, H. Gayton, Provincial Engineer, Kumasi, to the Director of Public Works, 
Accra, 11/11/1921.
130 NAGK D 2397, H. Dyson, Acting Provincial Engineer, Ashanti and Northern Territories, to 
the Director of Public Works, Accra, 14/5/1927.
131 NAGA ADM 11/1/1288, Secretary for Native Affairs to the Colonial Secretary, 22/6/1931.
132 Ibid.
133 Ibid.
134 Gold Coast, Junior Trade Schools o f the Gold Coast Colony (Accra: Government Press, 1923), 
p. 3.
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indigenous industries were eradicated by competition from the West. However, this 
chapter has used eye-witness accounts, import data and population census material to 
demonstrate that this was not the case. Indeed, by the period between the World 
Wars, small industries were well-established in the emerging towns of the Gold 
Coast. This is important in explaining the postwar growth of the small industry 
sector, as Chapters Nine and Ten will demonstrate.
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3 GHANA’S SMALL-SCALE INDUSTRIAL 
INHERITANCE AND THE GROWTH OF SMALL- 
SCALE INDUSTRIES, c.1945-TODAY
This chapter analyzes developments in Ghana’s small-scale industries between c. 1945 
and the present day. Section One examines the characteristics of the small-scale 
industrial sector in the Gold Coast at the end of the Second World War. The types 
of small-scale industries are outlined and their economic importance is assessed. 
Section Two considers the potential for further small industry expansion as of c. 1945. 
In Section Three, a definition of small-scale industry is constructed. Using this 
definition, Section Four measures changes in the size, output and sophistication of 
Ghana’s small industry sector since c.1945.
3.1 Ghana’s Small Industry Inheritance
It has been common to argue that few industries—be they small or large—existed in
the Gold Coast after the Second World War. Seers and Ross, writing on the
economy of the Gold Coast in 1952, observed that there was:
practically no manufacturing for consumers—tailoring, a little handloom  
weaving, some handicrafts, a brewery and furniture making.1
Similarly, Arthur Lewis, assessing the prospects for industrialization in 1953, noted
that:
one o f  the remarkable features o f the Gold Coast is the relative insignificance 
o f handicraft industries ... There is some handloom weaving, but it probably 
does not account for more than about 4 per cent o f the cloth used annually.
There is a little rough pottery, and some weaving o f  mats and baskets. There 
is a fair amount o f work with precious metals, but practically no work with 
iron or with the base metals ... One or two other even smaller trades exist.
But the only substantial trade appears to be wood-working.2
Indeed, Kilby estimates that, in 1954, total manufacturing output was only 6 per cent
1 Dudley Seers and C.R. Ross, Report on Financial and Physical Problems o f Development in the 
Gold Coast (Accra: Office of the Government Statistician, 1952), para. 41.
2 W. Arthur Lewis, Report on Industrialization and the Gold Coast (Accra: State Publishing 
Corporation, 1953), para. 159.
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of national income,3 although he admits that these figures harbour a ‘very wide 
margin of error’.4
The crucial issue is determining the size of this margin of error. This is 
difficult because of the large, but unknown, number of small industrial enterprises 
which did not register in official statistics. Nonetheless, it is likely that the margin 
of error was substantial. One attempt in 1954 to account for otherwise unrecorded 
economic activity attributed 12 per cent of Gold Coast national income to ‘residual’ 
activities comprising, inter alia, handicrafts and traditional industries, as well as 
unrecorded manufacturing and industrial activities.5 If this particular estimate is 
correct, it is possible that small-scale industries were making a substantial 
contribution to national income in the early postwar period.
Various sources help to build a picture of the types and importance of small- 
scale industries in the Gold Coast in the years immediately following the Second 
World War.
Eye-Witness Accounts
The first source is the observations of contemporaries. They often remarked on the 
importance of certain small-scale industries. A case in point is wood-working. By 
the 1940s, large numbers of carpenters were seen all over the country producing 
furniture.6 Indeed, by this time, wood-workers were supplying the Gold Coast 
railways with furniture, doors and windows frames for train coaches, as well as 
wooden sleepers for rails.7
Another important indigenous industry was textiles, and this was given a boost
3 Peter Kilby, ‘Manufacturing in Colonial Africa’, in Peter Duignan and L.H. Gann (eds.), 
Colonialism in Africa, 1870-1960. Volume Four. The Economics o f Colonialism (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1975), table 112, p. 475.
4 Kilby, ibid., p. 471.
5 D. Walters, Report on the National Accounts o f Ghana, 1955-61 (Accra, 1962), cited in Robert 
Szereszewski, ‘The Performance of the Economy, 1955-62’, in Walter Birmingham, I. Neustadt and 
E.N. Omaboe (eds.), A Study o f Contemporary Ghana. Volume One. The Economy of Ghana 
(London: George Allen and Unwin, 1966), pp. 55-7.
6 NAGA ADM 1/2/279, Gold Coast no. 171 of 9/6/1945, cited in Francis Agbodeka, An Economic 
History o f Ghana From the Earliest Times (Accra: Ghana Universities Press, 1992), p. 136.
7 NAGA ADM 1/2/275, Gold Coast no. 222 of 26/7/1944, cited in Agbodeka, ibid.
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during the War by the collapse of cloth imports from Europe and Asia.8 Local 
textile production, particularly of the more elaborate and traditional cloths, appears 
to have survived when imports resumed after the War. Hence, the United Nations 
estimated that, in 1962, Ghanaian small-scale production of the expensive and weighty 
Kente cloth amounted to 2 million square yards or 900 tons.9
Household Budget Surveys
A second source which offers insight into the activities of small-scale industries is a 
series of government surveys into household budgets which were carried out across 
south and central Ghana in the mid 1950s. In some of these surveys, employment in 
the crafts and artisanal sector was enumerated as a distinct category. For instance, 
in the Accra survey of household budgets conducted in 1952, 599 artisans were 
counted among the 2,332 wage-earning heads of families interviewed.10 Among the 
2,566 non-wage earning heads of families, 458 were employed in artisanal 
activities.11 If these figures were representative of employment patterns in Accra 
as a whole, then artisanal w ork-in other words, small-scale industrial 
activity—occupied about a fifth of all Accra heads of family.
In the household expenditure surveys in the rural regions of the Gold Coast, 
such as Oda-Swedru-Asamankese in 1955-6 and Ashanti in 1956-7, employment in 
crafts and artisanal activities was not recorded as a distinct category. The data 
produced by these surveys are useful nonetheless. It is known that large-scale 
industry developed mainly in the towns of the Coast, and in the Accra area in 
particular. According to Szereszewski, gross value-added in manufacturing in Ghana 
was £G8.3 million in 1960, of which £G5.8 million was generated in the Accra and
8 NAGA ADM 39/1/654, Controller-in-Charge, Northern Section, to the Comptroller of Customs, 
8/9/1945, p. 29.
9 United Nations, ‘The Textile Industry in the West African Sub-Region’, Economic Bulletin for  
Africa, 7 (1968), pp. 103-25, cited in A.G. Hopkins, An Economic History o f West Africa (London: 
Longman, 1973), p. 250.
10 Office of the Government Statistician, 1952 Accra Survey o f Household Budgets (Accra: Office 
of the Government Statistician, 1953), appendix III, table 10, p. 58.
11 Ibid., appendix III, table 12, p. 59.
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Western Regions alone.12 Large-scale industry had little incentive to locate in rural 
areas where transport costs were high (pp. 45-47). Also, skilled industrial labour was 
concentrated in the towns of the coast: in 1960, the Accra region accounted for only 
7 per cent of Ghana’s population, but was home to 21 per cent of the country’s 
mechanics, 34 per cent of students in higher education, 52 per cent of directors and 
managers, and 58 per cent of book-keepers, accountants and cashiers.13 Given the 
absence of large-scale industries in rural regions in the mid 1950s, it would be safe 
to assume that the majority of those engaged in industrial activities in Oda-Swedru- 
Asamankese and Ashanti worked on a small scale. From this premise, table 3.1 
outlines employment in small-scale industries in these areas by type of activity.
Table 3.1 Employment in Small Industries in the Rural Regions of the Gold 
Coast in the Mid 1950s.
Small Industry Sector Oda-Swedru-
Asamankese
Ashanti
Textiles and leather 1,978 2,891
Wood-working 706 899
Metal-working 505 679
Food-processing 457 497
Labourers in crafts 34 295
Total in small industry 3,680 5,261
Total adults enumerated 53,078 103,207
Percentage of all adults in small 
industry
6.9 5.1
Sources: Office o f the Government Statistician, Survey of Population and Budgets of Cocoa 
Producing Families in the Oda-Swedru-Asamankese Area, 1955-1956 (Accra: Office o f  the 
Government Statistician, 1958), table 2, p. 47, table 3, p. 48. Office o f  the Government 
Statistician, Survey of Cocoa Producing Families in Ashanti, 1956-7 (Accra: Office o f  the 
Government Statistician, 1960), table 2, p. 33, table 3, p. 34.
12 Robert Szereszewski, ‘Regional Aspects of the Structure of the Economy’, in Birmingham et al. , 
Study o f Contemporary Ghana, table 4.2, p. 91.
13 Ibid., table 4.6, p. 100 and table 4.7, p. 101.
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Table 3.1 demonstrates that between 5 and 7 per cent of the total adult 
population in the cocoa-producing regions of Oda-Swedru-Asamankese and Ashanti 
was engaged in small industry work. The most important sub-sector was textiles and 
leather-processing. Wood-working and associated activities were also important, most 
probably in the provision of firewood and charcoal for cooking and heating. In 1955, 
the average Kumasi family allocated about 4.5 per cent of its total monthly 
expenditure on the purchase of these items,14 a figure not dissimilar from that in 
Sekondi-Takoradi.15 Less important were metal-working and food-processing, 
although the seeming un-importance of the latter was probably not the case 
everywhere. In the coastal regions, the drying and salting of fish were major 
indigenous industrial activities,16 with processed fish forming an important part of 
the average diet. In Accra in the 1950s, spending on dried and smoked fish 
consumed 6 per cent of the household budget,17 while in the Oda-Swedru- 
Asamankese region, this figure was 16 per cent.18 The existence of a number of 
‘labourers in crafts* indicates that some of these small-scale industries were more than 
just owner-proprietor businesses and that small industries which employed labour 
were beginning to emerge.
Clearly, small-scale industries were important in the Gold Coast economy in 
the early postwar period and, if anything, they had expanded since the interwar years. 
In 1953, imports of artisans* tools and implements amounted to £130,379. In 
absolute and nominal terms, this was almost three times its 1920s peak.19 It is 
possible to form an idea of the employment significance of this figure by assuming
14 Office of the Government Statistician, Kumasi Survey o f Population and Household Budgets, 
1955 (Accra: Office of the Government Statistician, 1956), table 45, pp. 48-51.
15 Office of the Government Statistician, Sekondi-Takoradi Survey o f Population and Household 
Budgets, 1955 (Accra: Office of the Government Statistician, 1956), table 43, pp. 44-7.
16 NAGCC ADM 23/1/543, W.A.R. Walker, ‘Report on the Economic Products o f Nzima (1933)’.
17 Office of the Government Statistician, 1952 Accra Survey, appendix I, pp. 22-3.
18 Office of the Government Statistician, Survey o f Oda-Swedru-Asamankese, table 41, pp. 90-5.
19 Office of the Government Statistician, Monthly Accounts Relating to External Trade o f the Gold 
Coast, December, 1953, vol. Ill, no. 12 (Accra: Office of the Government Statistician, n.d.), table III, 
p. 31. Gold Coast, Trade Report for the Year 1927 (Accra: Government Printer, 1928), table 5, pp.
32-47. Gold Coast, Trade Report for the Year 1929 (Accra: Government Printer, 1930), table 5, pp.
40-55.
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that all of these tools and implements consisted of handlooms for weaving. A 
handloom was estimated to cost approximately £12 in 1953, and gave employment to 
one weaver and two apprentices.20 Therefore, if all the artisans* tools and 
implements imported in 1952 were handlooms, then in that year, they provided 
employment for about 30,000 workers.
3.2 Potential for further Small Industry Expansion
Before quantifying the growth of small-scale industries in the postwar period, it would 
be useful to assess the potential for further small-industry development at the end of 
the colonial period. This helps to place the postwar expansion of Ghana’s small-scale 
industries into proper perspective. In this connection, one official at the Colonial 
Office in London argued in 1939 that indigenous craftsmanship in the Gold Coast was 
‘probably doomed*.21 However, on careful analysis, it is evident that the potential 
for further development was actually favourable. This is because valuable small 
industry skills were being accumulated in several sectors of the economy, while 
African participation in commerce continued.
African Accumulation o f Technical Skills
With the survival of small industry, institutions evolved for reproducing small 
industry skills. One was the passing of industrial skills from parents to their off­
spring. Rattray found that in weaving, skills were handed down from fathers to sons 
with boys learning to weave by playing on small toy looms called asase tama.22 In 
a similar fashion, pottery skills were passed down from mother to daughter. As 
Rattray remarked:
pot-making is a hereditary craft, which is handed down from mother to 
daughter; whole families o f  girls are ‘pottresses’, having learnt the art from 
the time that they are quite small children.23
20 NAGA ADM 39/1/654, District Commissioner, Ho, to the General Manager, Industrial 
Development Corporation, 7/2/1950.
21 PRO CO 96/761/4, Minute to the despatch of the Governor to the Colonial Office, 20/1/1939.
22 R.S. Rattray, Religion and Art in Ashanti (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1927), p. 233.
23 Ibid., p. 301.
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Another institution for reproducing industrial skills was the apprenticeship 
system. This was widespread by the end of the colonial period. The Ga of the Accra 
region had such a system by 1913.24 According to Adams, writing in 1931, 
goldsmiths took on apprentices who learned the trade for a number of years before 
becoming master goldsmiths themselves.25 In a 1955 social survey of the Togoland 
village of Kete-Krachi, 20 apprentices were enumerated among the economically- 
active population of 1,877.26
From the late 1930s, the number of Gold Coast Africans with industrial skills 
increased dramatically and for two reasons. First, with the outbreak of the Second 
World War, skilled European labour left the Gold Coast to join the war-effort in 
Europe, while imports of manufactures contracted. This resulted in a substantial 
degree of import-substituting industrialization in the Gold Coast and across West 
Africa,27 which in turn imparted technical skills onto the African population.
A second factor was army recruitment during the Second World War. It is 
estimated that about 65,000 Africans from the Gold Coast served in the Royal West 
African Frontier Force during the War.28 In the army, recruits learnt a variety of 
skills ranging from driving to wood-working, and these were to be useful later. For 
instance, those who learnt to drive were in an excellent position to move into the 
haulage business after 1945 or even into the repair of motor vehicles. As Israel 
writes:
after the end of World War II, most of the soldiers who had earlier received 
some education continued to work as skilled tradesmen—drivers, carpenters, 
electricians, or nursing orderlies.29
Of the 65,000 Gold Coast Africans serving in the British Army, about 30,000 were
24 A.B. Quartey-Papafio, ‘Apprenticeship amongst the Gas’, Journal o f the African Society, 13 
(1914) no. 52, pp. 415-422.
25 David Thickens Adams, An Elementary Geography o f the Gold Coast (London: University of 
London Press, 1931), p. 152.
26 Office of the Town Planning Adviser, Report on a Preliminary Social Survey o f Kete-Krachi 
(Accra: Government Printer, 1956), table 5, p. 23.
27 Michael Crowder, ‘The 1939-45 War and West Africa’, in J.F.A. Ajayi and Michael Crowder 
(eds.), History o f West Africa, Volume Two (Harlow, Essex, 2nd ed.: Longman, 1987), p. 681.
28 Adrienne M. Israel, ‘Measuring the War Experience: Ghanaian Soldiers in World War II’, 
Journal o f Modem African Studies, 25 (1987) no. 1, p. 159.
29 Ibid., p. 168.
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stationed in Burma and India.30 What they saw there, gave them new ideas. One 
of the recruits, Frederick Annan, marvelled at India’s railway stations, roads and 
buses, and thought of developing his own village ‘because of what we saw in 
India*.31 While in India, some soldiers even learnt to weave on the Indian loom, 
and after returning to the Gold Coast, they sought to put their recently-acquired skills 
to use in the Gold Coast’s own textile sector.32
African Enterprise in Commerce
Chapter Two has shown that Africans were extensively involved in commerce during 
the nineteenth century (pp. 48-52). During the twentieth century, this involvement 
continued. Africans were major participants in the cocoa trade, buying cocoa from 
farmers and selling it to European merchant houses.33 The Watson Commission, set 
up after the War to investigate African grievances, found that, between 1937-41 and 
1948, the proportion of total commerce conducted by Africans had increased from
1.75 per cent to 21 per cent in the sugar trade, 1 per cent to 12.4 per cent for canned 
meats, and 6.5 per cent to 26 per cent for unmanufactured tobacco.34 The majority 
of the African population was involved in local petty trading as well. In 1954, in the 
Volta River town of Akuse, it was estimated that, on average, 55 per cent of total 
family income was derived from petty trading activities.35 In Kumasi in 1955, this 
figure was believed to be even higher at 70 per cent.36
30 Ibid.
31 Frederick S. Annan, cited in ibid., pp. 166-7.
32 NAGA ADM 39/1/415, Secretary and Executive Officer of the Industrial Development Board 
to the Paramount Chief, Awatime State, 5/6/1946.
33 John Miles, ‘Rural Protest in the Gold Coast: the Cocoa Hold-Ups, 1908-1938’, in Clive Dewey 
and A.G. Hopkins (eds.), The Imperial Impact: Studies in the Economic History o f Africa and India 
(London: the Athlone Press, 1978), pp. 152-70. Christer Gunnarson, The Gold Coast Cocoa Industry, 
1900-1939. Production, Prices and Structural Change (Lund: Economic History Association, 1978), 
pp. 52-3.
34 Colonial Office, The Report o f the Commission o f Enquiry into Disturbances in the Gold Coast, 
1948 (London: Colonial Office, 1948), in G.B. Kay (ed.), The Political Economy of Colonialism in 
Ghana. A Collection o f Documents and Statistics, 1900-1960 (London: Cambridge University Press, 
1972), table 3.3, p. 70.
35 Office of the Government Statistician, 1954 Akuse Survey of Household Budgets (Accra: Office 
of the Government Statistician, 1955), table 1, p. 7.
36 Office of the Government Statistician, Kumasi Survey, table 28, p. 36.
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Trading not only provided a means of acquiring capital, but it represented an
excellent introduction to entrepreneurship as well. In turn, this probably laid the
foundations for subsequent small-scale industrial development. As Kilby writes in
regard to African participation in produce-buying, retail and wholesale distribution,
and transport in colonial West Africa:
these activities in turn generated the technical skills, social traditions and 
market networks that would lead inter alia  to the development o f  a substantial 
amount o f  small-scale industry.37
However, this issue will be investigated in more detail in Nine and Ten.
Clearly then, small industries survived the colonial period, and their potential
for further expansion was considerable. In other words, Ghana’s postwar small-scale
industrial ‘explosion’38 did not materialize out of nothing. The remainder of this
chapter considers the nature of this ‘explosion’.
3.3 What is ‘Small-scale’?
In order to measure the growth of small industries in Ghana since c.1945, it is 
necessary first to define what constitutes a small-scale industry. ‘Industry* can be 
defined with comparative ease to include the processing of raw materials, 
manufacturing itself, and the repair of manufactured products.
The definition of ‘small-scale’ is more complicated. The literature offers two 
possibilities. The first is the dichotomic definition and examples of this include the 
formal-informal sector classification used by the International Labour Office39 and 
writers such as Ninsin.40 In these definitions, a firm is small-scale if it exhibits 
certain pre-defined ‘informal* sector characteristics and large-scale if it has ‘formal’ 
sector attributes. The major problem with such definitions is their subjectivity. As
37 Kilby, ‘Manufacturing in Colonial Africa’, p. 488.
38 Jonathan Dawson, ‘Development of Small-scale Industry in Ghana—A Case Study of Kumasi’, 
in Henk Thomas, Francisco Uribe-Echevarria and Henny Romijn (eds.), Small-Scale Production. 
Strategies fo r Industrial Restructuring (London: Intermediate Technology Publications, 1991), p. 173.
39 S. V. Sethuraman (ed.), The urban informal sector in developing countries. Employment, poverty 
and environment (Geneva: International Labour Office, 1981).
40 Kwame A. Ninsin, The Informal Sector in Ghana’s Political Economy (Accra: Freedom 
Publications, 1991).
65
Sethuraman notes, the informal sector concept is ‘vague and slippery’.41 A further 
difficulty is that dichotomic definitions preclude the possibility of constructing time 
series data on small-scale industries, not least because the formal/informal sector 
concept dates back only to the 1970s.
The second type of definition is the size definition. Typically, such definitions 
are based on an enterprise’s number of employees, assets or turnover. Some 
definitions use a combination of these indices. Staley and Morse pioneered this genre 
of classification in the 1960s, when they defined a small firm has having fewer than 
100 workers.42 Today, there are several size definitions for small-scale industry in 
Ghana. For instance, the National Board for Small-Scale Industries defines a small 
enterprise as employing fewer than ten persons and having less than US$100,000 of 
assets,43 while social scientists such as Thomi and Yankson consider firms with up 
to 30 workers as small-scale.44
The utility of the size definition is that, unlike dichotomic definitions, it 
demarcates very precisely the set of firms under analysis. In turn, this facilitates the 
comparison of small-scale industries across places and times. Hence, it is ideal for 
constructing time-series data on small-scale industrial growth. The difficulty is that 
there remains a degree of subjective judgement as to which index to use: should a 
small firm be defined on the basis of the number of its employees or the value of its 
assets? An important consideration here is a practical one. In developed countries, 
tax obligations require most firms to maintain accounts. However, in Ghana, most 
small firms have operated outside the formal,45 taxed economy and have not kept
41 S.V. Sethuraman, 'Summary and conclusions: implications for policy and action’, in 
Sethuraman, Urban informal sector, p. 189.
42 Eugene Staley and Richard Morse, Modem Small-Scale Industry fo r Developing Countries (New 
York: McGraw-Hill, 1965), p. 2.
43 Nii K. Sowa, A. Baah-Nuakoh, K.A. Tutu and B. Osei, Small Enterprises and Adjustment. The 
Impact o f Ghana’s Economic Recovery Programme on Small-Scale Industrial Enterprises (London: 
Overseas Development Institute, 1992), p. 11.
44 W.H. Thomi and P.W.K. Yankson, Small Scale Industries and Decentralization in Ghana. A 
Preliminary Report on Small Scale Industries in Small and Medium Sized Towns in Ghana (Legon: 
Department of Geography, University of Ghana, 1985), p. 15.
45 Sowa et al., Small Enterprises, p. 25. Helmut K. Anheier and Hans Dieter Seibel, Small-Scale 
Industries and Economic Development in Ghana: Business Behavior and Strategies in Informal Sector 
Economies (Saarbrucken: Verlag breitenbach, 1987), p. 9. Ghana Statistical Service, Ghana Living
66
regular financial records. As a result, estimating levels of turnover or the value of
assets is difficult, and indices based on these have little practical value.
By contrast, defining a small firm by levels of employment is both practical
and simple. Again though, the issue of subjectivity arises. Should ‘small* be defined
as having fewer than thirty workers or fewer than ten workers or, indeed, should
some other cut-off point apply? As the Minister of Industries noted, in a draft
memorandum for a cabinet meeting in 1962:
... the distinction between small, medium scale or large factories is like the 
distinction between hot and cold water. It is a matter o f  degree and any 
sharp line is necessarily arbitrary ... And just as water that is hot for washing 
one’s hand may be cold for running a steam turbine, so the idea o f  what is 
a small or a large manufacturing establishment depends upon the industry, the 
country and the purpose in hand.46
Given that the problem of subjectivity will remain whichever index is chosen, 
a more important consideration is to have a definition of ‘small-scale’ which permits 
conclusions to be drawn from the thin statistical base which is available. In other 
words, what is required is a convenience definition of a small firm. In the analysis 
below, two definitions of small-scale are used. The first, used to measure changes 
in employment, defines a small firm as having fewer than ten workers. The second, 
used to measure changes in output, defines a small-scale firm as employing fewer 
than thirty workers. Both these definitions may lack qualitative significance, but they 
permit the generation of time series data on employment and output. Also, given that 
the Ghanaian government itself has used both of them at various times since the 
1950s,47 it seems sensible to continue to do so, rather than to create completely new 
definitions.
Standards Survey—Report on the Third Round (GLSS3) (Accra: Statistical Service, 1995), p. 98.
46 NAGA RG 7/1/1958, ‘Draft Cabinet Memorandum by Imoru Egala, Minister of Industries, on 
the Definition of Small-Scale Industry’, 1962.
47 Ghana, Central Bureau of Statistics, 1963 Statistical Yearbook (Accra: Central Bureau of 
Statistics, 1966), table 93, p. 93 and table 100, p. 101. Ghana, Central Bureau of Statistics, Industrial 
Statistics, 1979-81 (Accra: Central Bureau of Statistics, 1983), table 1.1, p. 5.
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3.4 The growth of Small-scale Industries since c.1945: Employment, Output
and Sophistication
There is general agreement that, since c.1945, employment in Ghana’s small-scale 
industrial sector has grown.48 However, this phenomenon has never been quantified 
accurately. This section attempts to rectify this deficiency.
Turning specifically to changes in employment, a first snapshot of employment 
in small-scale industries can be formulated for 1960, through an analysis of the 
national population census49 and employment data from the Central Bureau of 
Statistics (CBS).50 The 1960 population census enumerated the total population aged 
15 and above by economic sector, while the CBS estimated the number working in 
industrial establishments with ten or more employees. By subtracting the CBS 
estimate from the population census count, it is estimated that there were 210,456 
workers in Ghana’s small industry sector in 1960. This figure was equal to 90 per 
cent of total industrial employment in that year, 22 per cent of employment in the 
secondary and tertiary sectors of the economy, and 8 per cent of total employment.
The possibility that these figures are erroneous cannot be discounted. 
Nonetheless, there are three reasons for confidence in their accuracy. First, it is 
likely that population census material is fairly reliable, since there is relatively little 
incentive to avoid enumeration. With regard to the CBS figures, it is probable that 
these are also quite accurate: while small firms may be able to avoid enumeration, 
larger firms, by their very size, must find this more difficult. Second, the estimate 
that small industries provided about 8 per cent of total employment in 1960 is similar 
to the 5 to 7 per cent of adults in Oda-Swedru-Asamankese and Ashanti who worked 
in the small industry sector in the mid 1950s (table 3.1, p. 60). Third, on the basis 
of a separate government sample survey of small industrial establishments conducted
48 Ninsin, Informal Sector. Dawson, ‘Development of Small-scale Industry’.
49 Ghana, Census Office, 1960 Population Census o f Ghana. Volume IV. Economic 
Characteristics o f Local Authorities, Regions and Total Country (Accra: Census Office, 1964), table 
3, pp. 17-23.
50 Central Bureau of Statistics, 1963 Statistical Yearbook, table 93, p. 93, table 100, p. 101.
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in 1963, the CBS calculated that there were 184,027 persons engaged in this 
sector.51 This figure is somewhat different from the 210,456 derived from the 
population census and CBS material, but only in degree.
A second snapshot of small-scale industrial employment is available for 1970. 
Collating that year’s population census figures52 with data from the CBS,53 it is 
estimated that 343,228 workers were engaged in small industry activities in 1970. 
This figure was equivalent to 90 per cent of total industrial employment, 25 per cent 
of total employment in the secondary and tertiary sectors of the economy, and 11 per 
cent of total employment in 1970. Therefore, from 1960 to 1970, there was clear 
growth in the absolute number engaged in small-scale industries, although as a 
proportion of the total labour force, the increase was slight.
Independent Ghana’s third population census was conducted in 198454 and 
588,418 industrial workers were counted. However, from 1980, the Central Bureau 
of Statistics discontinued counting the number engaged in enterprises with ten or more 
persons, opting instead to survey only those firms with thirty or more employees. 
In 1979, the last year for which statistics are available for industrial firms employing 
ten or more persons, approximately 79,800 industrial workers were enumerated.55 
The discontinuity of the series represents a problem for the purposes of continuity of 
measurement, but it is not insurmountable. It is highly probable that the number 
engaged in firms with ten or more employees—79,800 in 1979—did not rise between 
that year and 1984. The reason for this is that between 1979 and 1984, formal 
Ghanaian industry collapsed. By 1983, output in this sector had fallen to only 35 per
51 Ghana, Central Bureau of Statistics, Area Sample Survey of Small Manufacturing Establishments- 
1963 (Accra: State Publishing Corporation, 1965), table 2, p. 17.
52 Unpublished but cited in Kodwo Ewusi, The Size of the Labour Force and Structure of 
Employment in Ghana (Legon: ISSER 1978), table 2.15, p. 84.
53 Ghana, Central Bureau of Statistics, Labour Statistics 1970, Series III (1973) no. 15, table 13,
p. 16.
54 Ghana, Statistical Service, 1984, Population Census o f Ghana: Demographic and Economic 
Characteristics (Accra: Statistical Service, 1987), table 11, pp. 57-65.
55 Ghana, Statistical Service, Quarterly Digest o f Statistics, June 1986, 4 (1986) no. 2, table 42, 
p. 47.
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cent of its 1977 level,56 while the number of workers in industrial establishments 
with thirty or more employees fell 31 per cent between 1980 and 1984.57 Even in 
1987, after three years of rapid economic recovery, it was estimated that there were 
only 87,577 employees in industrial firms with ten or more workers.58 Thus, it is 
unlikely that more than 79,800 persons were engaged in industrial firms with ten or 
more employees in 1984. Taking this into account, the number of workers in small- 
scale industries can be estimated at 508,618 in 1984. This figure was equal 86 per 
cent of the total number engaged in industry in that year, 24 per cent of the total 
employed in the secondary and tertiary sectors of the economy, and 9 per cent of 
Ghana’s economically active population.
It is possible to estimate the sectoral distribution of small-scale industrial 
employment in 1960 and 1984 by using a similar methodology. For 1960, this can 
be done by comparing tallies for occupational sub-categories in the population census 
of that year59 with material from the Department of Labour, which enumerated the 
number engaged in industrial firms with ten or more workers by occupational sub- 
category.60 Using these two sources, it is estimated that, of the 212,836 workers 
employed in the small industry sector in 1960, there were: 89,474 in textile and 
garment manufacture; 34,220 in food-processing and beverage production; 26,245 in 
furniture and fixtures making; 8,254 in clay and clay product manufacture; 8,158 in 
vehicle repair; 8,144 in metal products manufacture; 7,502 in chemical manufacture; 
6,293 in saw-milling and other milling; 2,464 in the repair of footwear; 530 in 
printing, publishing and allied industries; and 21,552 in miscellaneous industrial 
activities. Thus, in 1960, the most important small-scale industries from an 
employment-generation perspective were weaving and tailoring, food-processing, and
56 Ghana, Central Bureau of Statistics, Quarterly Digest o f Statistics, June 1984, 2 (1984) no. 2, 
table 9A, p. 10.
57 Ghana, Central Bureau of Statistics, Industrial Statistics 1979-81 (Accra: Central Bureau of 
Statistics, 1983), table 1.1, p. S. Ghana, Central Bureau of Statistics, Industrial Statistics, 1982-84 
(Accra: Central Bureau of Statistics, 1986), table 3.26, p. 62.
58 Ghana, Statistical Service, Ghana National Industrial Census, 1987. Phase II Report. 
Background and Results (Accra: Statistical Service, 1991), table 1, p. 3.
59 Ghana, 1960 Population Census, table 3, pp. 17-28.
60 Office of the Government Statistician, Labour Statistics, 1959 (Accra: Office of the Government 
Statistician, 1960), table 5, p. 7.
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furniture manufacture. Indeed, the 1963 Sample Survey confirms that these sectors 
were the largest providers of small industrial employment.61
Using the same technique, and comparing the 1984 population census62 with 
the industrial census of 1987,63 it is possible to estimate the sectoral distribution of 
employment in the small-scale industrial sector in the mid 1980s. To be sure, this 
estimate is liable to be somewhat inaccurate since the population census was 
conducted in 1984, while the industrial census was carried out in 1987. Nonetheless, 
by using these sources, it is possible to form a general idea of the sectoral distribution 
of small industry employment in the mid 1980s. It is estimated that, between 1984 
and 1987, total employment in the small-scale industrial sector was in the region of 
500,841. Encouragingly, this is close to the 508,618 figure obtained above using the 
1984 population census and the CBS data (p. 70). Of these, 292,858 were engaged 
in food- and tobacco-processing and beverage manufacture; 120,282 in textile and 
garment manufacture; 36,638 in wood-processing; 17,783 in non-metallic mineral 
industries; 17,150 in chemical manufacture; 10,732 in basic metal industries; 2,184 
in printing, publishing and allied industries and 3,214 in miscellaneous industries. 
Thus, in employment terms, the main small-scale industries in the mid 1980s were 
food- and tobacco-processing and beverage manufacture, followed by textiles and 
garment manufacture, and wood-processing. Comparing these figures with those for 
1960, the most important small industries in terms of employment in 1960 remained 
the most important in the mid 1980s. What is striking, though, is the exceptionally 
rapid growth of the food, drink and tobacco sector. While in 1960 these industries 
provided 34,220 jobs or 16 per cent of all small industry jobs, by the mid 1980s these 
figures had jumped to 292,858 and 58 per cent respectively.
The picture that emerges from the official statistics is of a growing absolute 
number of people engaged in small-scale industries since the 1950s. Yet, given the 
poor quality of all African official data and the widespread shift of economic activity
61 Ghana, Area Sample Survey, table 2, p. 4.
62 Ghana, 1984 Population Census, table 11, pp. 57-65.
63 Ghana, Ghana National Industrial Census, table A.3.1., pp. 92-7.
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into the parallel market during the 1970s,64 it is worth seeking independent 
verification of this. In fact, independent sources confirm the picture from the official 
statistics. For example, in 1974, Steel conducted a survey of small-scale industries 
(defined as employing fewer than 30 workers) in Nsawam, a small town to the north 
of Accra.65 In 1989, Steel revisited the town and conducted a similar survey.66 
These two surveys confirm the findings from the official statistics: between 1973 and 
1989, the number of workers in Nsawam’s small-scale industrial sector increased 
from 689 to 1,132,67 or almost 65 per cent.
Within this picture of general employment growth, it is possible to discern 
certain geographical differences. One area that has seen particularly rapid growth has 
been the industrial ‘shanty town* of Suame, on the outskirts of Kumasi. The number 
of workers in Suame’s small industry sector is estimated to have increased more than 
seven-fold, from 5,500 in 1971, to 40,000 in 1984.68 If there were about 510,000 
small industry workers in 1984 (p. 70), then in that year, Suame was home to about 
8 per cent of them. Suame’s growth has outpaced that of the small industry sector 
overall, and today, Suame houses one of the greatest concentrations of small-scale 
industries in Africa. However, rapid growth of the type witnessed by Suame is not 
known to have occurred in other regions of Ghana, such as in the market town of 
Techiman in the Brong-Ahafo region.69
Before leaving the issue of small industry employment, it is useful to consider 
whether there have been any significant gender issues relating to employment growth 
in this sector. Steel argues that, during the 1960s and 1970s, the dearth of modem-
64 Victor Azarya and Naomi Chazan, ‘Disengagement from the State in Africa: Reflections on the 
Experience of Ghana and Guinea’, Comparative Studies in Society and History, 29 (1987) no. 1, pp. 
106-31.
65 William F. Steel, Small-Scale Employment and Production in Developing Countries. Evidence 
from Ghana (New York: Praeger Publications, 1977).
66 William F. Steel and Leila M. Webster, Small Enterprises Under Adjustment in Ghana 
(Washington D.C.: World Bank, 1991).
67 Ibid., table 11, p. 23.
68 John Powell, ‘Kumasi University’s involvement in grassroots industrial development’, Small 
Enterprise Development, 2 (1991) no. 2, pp. 35, 37.
69 Jurgen Riedel and Hubert Schmitz, Grass-Root Industrialization in a Ghanaian Town (Munich: 
Weltforum Verlag, 1989).
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sector industrial jobs for women, combined with the expanding female labour force, 
resulted in increasing numbers of women seeking small-scale industrial 
employment.70 The evidence available suggests that Steel’s hypothesis can be 
refined somewhat: in those instances where women have been engaged in small-scale 
industrial work, it generally has been in activities such as dress-making, pito-brewing, 
baking and oil-processing.71 In these activities, the industrial skills required usually 
have been simple.
Changes in Output in the Small-scale Industrial Sector
Estimating changes in the output of the small-scale industrial sector is more difficult 
than calculating changes in employment. One problem is that the CBS only keeps 
data on net value-added in firms with thirty or more persons. Since these are the 
only time-series data for output in the Ghanaian economy by size of firm, it is 
necessary to redefine ‘small-scale* to include firms with fewer than thirty workers if 
any time series data are to be constructed.
Another problem is that firms often have attempted to conceal the true value 
of their production, so as to evade taxes and government censure. Indeed, most 
Ghanaian small industries have not been registered with the government.72 
Therefore, the figures on small-scale industrial output generated here are extremely 
tentative. With this in mind, table 3.2 charts the growth of net value-added in 
industries employing fewer than thirty persons since the 1960s. The technique used 
is to subtract the documented net value-added in firms with thirty or more persons 
from the total contribution of the industrial sector to national income.
70 William F. Steel, ‘Female and Small-scale Employment Under Modernization in Ghana’, 
Economic Development and Cultural Change, 30 (1981) no. 1, pp. 153-67.
71 Riedel and Schmitz, Grass-Root Industrialization, p. 83.
72 Sowa et al., Small Enterprises, p. 25. Anheier and Seibel, Small-Scale Industries, p. 9.
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Table 3.2. Net Value-added in Industrial Establishments Employing fewer than 
Thirty Workers, 1965-84.
Year Net Value- 
added (C 
Millions)
Net Value-added in 
Small Industry/ 
Total Industrial Net 
Value-added
Net Value-added in 
Small Industry/ 
National Income
1965 73 51 5.3
1970 102 40 4.5
1984 7,036 41 2.6
Sources: Kodwo Ewusi, Statistical Tables on the Economy of Ghana, 1950-85 (Accra: 
University o f  Ghana, 1986), table 6. Central Bureau o f  Statistics, 1965-66 Statistical 
Yearbook (Accra: Central Bureau o f  Statistics, 1969), table 50, p. 87. Ghana, Central Bureau 
o f Statistics, Economic Survey, 1972-74 (Accra: Central Bureau o f  Statistics, 1971), table 1.3, 
p. 5. Central Bureau o f  Statistics, Industrial Statistics, 1970-71 (Accra: Central Bureau o f  
Statistics, 1980), table 2 , p. 8. Ghana, Statistical Service, Quarterly Digest of Statistics, 
December 1988, 6 (1988) no. 4 , table 75, p. 83. Ghana, Statistical Service, Industrial 
Statistics, 1982-84 (Accra: Statistical Service, 1986), table 3 .5 , p. 20.
At first sight, the conclusion to be drawn from these figures is that small industry’s 
share of industrial value-added has fallen drastically between 1965 and 1984. 
However, such a conclusion is too pessimistic. A more appropriate one would be 
that, despite the state industrialization programmes of the 1960s and 1970s which 
sought to develop large-scale industrial concerns,73 more than two-fifths of net 
industrial value-added has been taking place in enterprises employing fewer than 
thirty persons. Although small-scale industrial net-value added as a proportion of 
national income did fall to about half of its 1965 level by 1984, this was probably a 
consequence of the collapse of the Ghanaian economy as a whole (pp. 29-30). After 
all, this collapse led to a fall in the demand for industrial products generally, as per 
capita income edged back towards subsistence levels.
Whatever the case, it is almost certain that during the collapse of the economy 
in the late 1970s and early 1980s, small-scale industries started to assume a major 
importance in the provision of manufactures in urban areas. As Anheier and Seibel
73 Douglas Rimmer, Staying Poor. Ghana’s Political Economy, 1950-1990 (Oxford: Pergamon 
Press, 1992), chs. 5, 6. Tony Killick, Development Economics in Action. A Study o f Economic 
Policies in Ghana (London: Heinemann, 1978), chs. 3, 11.
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observe:
It was the small-scale industrialists in the urban areas who saved Ghana’s 
urban economy from total collapse, when formal sector firms were either 
bankrupt or on the brink o f becoming so .74
In rural areas too, small industries expanded during the 1970s. This is evident from
Posnansky’s study of Hani, a village in the Brong-Ahafo Region, between 1970 and
1980.75 In 1970, indigenous earthenware pot-making was ‘near extinction’, but by
1980, it was replacing enamelware, as well as plastic and aluminium pots.76
Likewise, blacksmiths were a ‘doomed breed* in 1972, but by 1980, they were
expanding their enterprises and taking on new apprentices.77
Qualitative Changes in the Small-scale Industrial Sector
To complete the outline of developments in Ghana’s small industries since the 1950s, 
it is worth examining not just ‘quantitative’ indices such as employment and output, 
but ‘qualitative* indices as well. By ‘qualitative’ is meant the sophistication of 
products being manufactured and the technology being employed in the manufacturing 
process.
Official statistics are of little help here, since they have tracked only
quantitative indices. In the dearth of data, some have argued that small-scale
industries have experienced little qualitative development. For instance, Ninsin, who
classifies small-scale industries as members of the ‘informal sector’ (p. 21), argues
with reference to the period 1983-87:
the fact is, qualitative growth in the informal sector is impossible under an 
economic regime that caters primarily for the interest o f  big capital, and big 
business.78
However, there is some evidence which suggests the opposite conclusion.
A general impression of qualitative development can be formed by comparing 
two surveys of small industries in the Suame Magazine, one conducted by Aryee in
74 Anheier and Seibel, Small-Scale Industries, pp. 23-4.
75 Merrick Posnansky, ‘How Ghana’s crisis affects a village’, West Africa, 1/12/1980, pp. 2418- 
2420.
76 Ibid., p. 2419.
77 Ibid.
78 Ninsin, Informal Sector, p. 81.
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1977,79 the other by Dawson in 1987-8.80 In ,1977 Aryee found that only the 
formal sector had ‘the capacity to produce essential primary and intermediate inputs’, 
while buildings were ‘the only type of fixed asset which is largely self-constructed, 
or constructed by other informal sector enterprise’. In addition, there were few 
salaried workers and, in general, no records of transactions were kept.81 In 
contrast, Dawson’s survey of 1987-8 paints a substantially different picture. Dawson 
found that 45 per cent of the sampled firms had at least one power machine, many 
of which were produced by other small firms in the Kumasi area.82 These machines 
included benches, lathes, oxy-acetylene torches, drills, grinders, compressors and 
battery chargers.83 Of the firms surveyed by Dawson, 18 per cent employed 
salaried workers,84 while there were ‘signs* of a growing division of labour within 
enterprises and an increasing number of entrepreneurs keeping written records.85
Admittedly, the experience of Suame may not be representative of trends in 
the small industry sector as a whole. It could be that the concentration of small firms 
in Suame has generated a dynamic of its own, perhaps through the creation of 
external economies. This issue will be returned to later in the thesis (pp. 269-271). 
Nonetheless, when taking a broader, Ghana-wide view, the impression that there has 
been a significant degree of qualitative development since c.1945 cannot be avoided. 
Simply comparing the range of products being manufactured by small industrialists 
today with those manufactured four decades ago, generates a sense of this. In the 
immediate postwar decades, there is no evidence to suggest that small-scale industries 
were producing anything but relatively simple consumer goods. By contrast, in the 
late 1980s and early 1990s, some were manufacturing machines,86 while others were
79 G.A. Aryee, Small-Scale Manufacturing Activities: A Study o f Interrelationships Between the 
Formal and the Informal Sectors in Kumasi, Ghana (Geneva: International Labour Organization, 1977), 
cited in Dawson, ‘Development of Small-scale Industry’, p. 184.
80 Dawson, ibid.
81 Aryee, Small-Scale Manufacturing, pp. 5, 2, 22, cited in Dawson, ibid.
82 Dawson, ‘Development of Small-scale Industry’, p. 182.
83 Ibid.
84 Ibid., p. 181.
85 Ibid., p. 184.
86 Ibid., p. 195.
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producing inputs for the construction industry.87
Another indicator of qualitative development has been electricity use. In the 
1960s, only a small proportion of small industrial firms used electricity. According 
to the 1963 sample survey, a mere 4.6 per cent of small industries used this.88 By 
the 1980s and 1990s, this figure was considerably higher. Huq’s survey of 60 small 
industries in the Ashanti, Central and Volta Regions in 1981 revealed that 10 per cent 
of sampled firms used electricity.89 From a survey of 933 small-scale industries in 
36 towns across Ghana in 1984, Thomi and Yankson found that 19 per cent of small 
industries used power-transmitted machines.90 Similarly, a World Bank survey of 
79 Ghanaian small industries in 1989-91 revealed that 62 per cent of them used 
electricity.91 Thus, it would appear that small-scale industries have become more 
dependent on electrical power since the 1960s as power tools have replaced hand 
tools. This suggests a definite qualitative improvement in the technology being used 
in this sector.
This chapter has demonstrated that, since the 1950s, Ghanaian small industries have 
provided more employment, have been able to produce an increasingly sophisticated 
range of products, and have increased the level of technology in their production 
processes. In output terms, small-scale industries have accounted for a significant 
proportion of net industrial value-added. In short, the small industry sector in Ghana 
has developed rapidly since the 1950s. The next chapter starts to consider the role 
of postwar governments in this process.
87 Sowa et al., Small Enterprises, p. 21.
88 Ghana, Area Sample Survey, table 19, p. 21.
89 M.M. Huq, The Economy of Ghana. The First 25 Years since Independence (London:
Macmillan, 1989), table 6.7, p. 137.
90 Thomi and Yankson, Small Scale Industries, table 9, p. 36.
91 Ronald L. Parker, Randall Riopelle and William F. Steel, Small Enterprises Adjusting to
Liberalization in Five African Countries (Washington D.C.: World Bank, 1995), table A l, p. 68.
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4 THE BIRTH OF A SMALL INDUSTRY POLICY, 
c.1945-1951
This chapter examines government policy towards small-scale industries from c. 1945 
to 1951. The first of these years marks the end of the Second World War, and the 
opening of a new era of state expansion into investment, planning and crop marketing 
across West Africa.1 The latter year represents the beginning of the close of colonial 
rule, with the Gold Coast being granted limited internal self-government.2
Section One examines government policy towards small industries before 
c.1945, in order to establish the historical context for the ensuing discussion. It is 
argued that, before c.1945, the colonial government did attempt to foster small 
industry development, although these attempts were generally ad hoc and piecemeal. 
Section Two outlines the various ideas on small industry promotion which were 
circulating after the War and Section Three analyzes how these ideas were formulated 
into actual policy. Section Four investigates the rationale behind the policy itself, 
while the final section assesses the factors which prevented the government from 
adopting a more aggressive strategy of small industry promotion. The central 
argument of this chapter is that, by 1951, a clear and permanent policy of small 
industry development had emerged.
4.1 Small-scale Entrepreneurs and Colonial Rule before c.1945
The Critics o f Colonial Government Policy
It often has been claimed that colonial governments across Africa failed to assist 
African entrepreneurs in anything but the export of cash crops. Dependency theorists 
such as Amin and Rodney argue that colonialism sought to transfer economic surplus 
from the periphery to the colonial power. As a result, the emergence of indigenous
1 A.G. Hopkins, An Economic History of West Africa (London: Longman, 1973), pp. 279-81.
2 Richard Rathbone (ed.), Ghana. Part I. 1941-52 (London: HMSO, 1992), p. lii.
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industrial activity in the periphery was impeded.3 Sometimes, non-Dependency 
theorists have arrived at the same conclusion. According to Fieldhouse, neither 
French nor British colonialism ‘stimulated investment in local manufactures in the 
colonies’.4 Munro asserts that the ‘open economy’ model favoured by British policy­
makers and businessmen:
did not necessarily preclude the emergence o f some modem manufacturing 
industry in Africa ... but any industrialization would have to come about 
spontaneously, as a result o f  market forces exploiting conditions o f  
comparative advantage, and should not be ‘artificially’ induced by the state.5
From the particular experience of the Gold Coast, Frimpong-Ansah contends that the
Colonial Office in London had:
a conservatively detached approach to the general economic welfare o f the 
colonies except where the objectives related to the development o f  production 
for imperial trade.6
The idea that colonial governments in Africa were hostile towards indigenous 
industrialists derives in part from the claims of Africans at the time. Few felt that 
their governments were interested in promoting industrial development. Gold Coast 
Africans were no exception. For example, an African delegation visiting the Colonial 
Office in London in 1934 argued that a wide range of products could be manufactured 
in the Gold Coast, and that the main impediment to local industrial development was 
the absence of a protective tariff.7 The delegation suggested that the British 
government appoint a ‘special commissioner ... to find a way of adding to the wealth 
of the country in addition to the cocoa they now cultivate’.8
During and after the War, African critics of the Gold Coast government
3 Samir Amin, ‘Underdevelopment and Dependence in Black Africa—their Historical Origins and 
Contemporary Forms’, Social and Economic Studies, 22 (1973) no. 1, pp. 177-96. Walter Rodney, 
How Europe Underdeveloped Africa (Washington D.C.: Howard University Press, 1982), ch. 6.
4 David K. Fieldhouse, Colonialism 1870-1945. An Introduction (London: Weidenfeld and 
Nicolson, 1981), p. 57.
5 J. Forbes Munro, Britain in Tropical Africa, 1880-1960. Economic Relationships and Impact 
(London: Macmillan, 1984), p. 62.
6 Jonathan H. Frimpong-Ansah, The Vampire State in Africa. The Political Economy o f Decline 
in Africa (London: James Currey, 1991), p. 23.
7 PRO CO 96/718/9, Extract from the Gold Coast and Ashanti Delegation’s Memorandum on 
Trade and Industry, 1934.
8 Ibid.
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industrial policy became increasingly outspoken. J.B. Danquah, one of the leading
African nationalists in the Gold Coast, argued in 1943 that ‘It is not enough ... to live
in the old agricultural economy. We must manufacture and buy our own goods. We
must industrialise our country*.9 William Ofori-Atta, a high-ranking member of the
United Gold Coast Convention, made a similar case:
the economic penetration o f  ‘foreigners’ into the territories o f  small local 
industries increases in momentum, but it must stop. The Government must 
... adopt a constructive and bold policy o f ‘Protection o f  Infant Local 
Industries’.10
Government Policies Towards Small-scale Industries Before 1939
When analyzing the prewar period, the conclusion that the government was hostile
to small industry development is justified, but only to an extent. It is true that many
colonial administrators were sceptical about the benefits of encouraging African small
industries. This sentiment was expressed on numerous occasions. For instance, in
1934, the Acting Director of the Medical and Sanitary Service claimed that, in the
Gold Coast, ‘most of these arts and crafts are moribund in spite of the fact that
Government has done a great deal to try to keep them alive and to develop them*.11
In the same year, the Chief Commissioner of the Northern Territories argued:
I know o f no article at present manufactured or capable o f being 
manufactured in the Gold Coast, the imported counterpart o f  which is not 
only cheaper but o f  better quality. The only possible exception are 
straw-mats and baskets.12
But to conclude that the government was persistently hostile towards small- 
scale African entrepreneurs would be to conclude too much. This is because there 
are clear examples of government attempts to promote indigenous industries. For
9 J.B. Danquah, Self-Help and Expansion (Accra, 1943), p. 15, cited in Hopkins, Economic History 
of West Africa, p. 267.
10 Watson Commission, Written Depositions (Dr. Murray’s Collection), deposited with Richard 
Rathbone, School of Oriental and African Studies, London, ‘Memorandum Submitted to the Watson 
Commission on the Industrial and Agricultural Development of the Gold Coast by William Ofori Atta 
of the United Gold Coast Convention’ (not dated, but probably 1948), p. 11.
11 NAGA CSO 6/6/151, Minute by The Acting Director of Medical and Sanitary Service, 
7/6/1934.
12 NAGA CSO 6/6/151, Chief Commissioner, Northern Territories, to the Acting Colonial 
Secretary, 29/8/1934.
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example, in 1921, the Colonial Secretary wrote to the Chief Commissioner of the
Northern Territories noting that:
in order to encourage the native industries o f  the Protectorate, I ... request 
that you will cause to be collected and sent here 2 specimens o f each variety 
o f  basket made in the Northern Territories, including ... earth baskets, waste 
paper baskets and also ones o f  an ornamental nature.13
Furthermore, the Colonial Secretary requested information on ‘any native industries
which ... could be usefully exploited outside the Protectorate’.14
Another example of government efforts to promote African industries was the
Bureau of African Industries at Takoradi. In 1933, the government established a
committee to investigate the possibility of developing a permanent institution to
advertise and develop African craftwork.15 In its report, the committee observed
that it had ‘been impressed by the large number of local crafts and industries the
germs of which already exist in the Gold Coast’. Moreover, the committee felt that
‘The Gold Coast has for too long relied on imported goods paid for by the export of
one major crop, and attention should be given to supplying local need from local
sources’.16 Thus, it recommended that a Bureau of African Industries be established
out of public money. The Bureau would act as a liaison between small industrialists
and the buying public, arrange for the co-operative purchase and sale of produce, and
organize the training of producers.17 Subsequently, the Bureau of African Industries
was established in Takoradi in 1938 and had some immediate success: within a month
of its opening, it had attracted 24 interested craftsmen and 15 trade enquiries from
the United Kingdom.18
To be sure, such measures to develop local small-scale industries need to be
seen in perspective. In general, they were isolated, ad hoc efforts which did not
13 NAGA ADM 56/1/273, Colonial Secretary’s Office to the Chief Commissioner, Northern 
Territories, 16/3/1921.
14 Ibid.
15 Gold Coast, Report o f the Committee appointed to investigate the Possibility o f Establishing a 
Permanent Bureau o f African Industries (Accra: Government Printing Office, 1934), p. 1.
16 /bid., p. 3.
17 Ibid., p. 2.
18 PRO CO 96/761/4, Enclosure to Despatch from the Colonial Secretary to the Colonial Office, 
20/1/1939.
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make a significant call on government resources. The Bureau of African Industries
was estimated to have cost the government a mere £1,550 in the ten years between
1937 and 1946.19 This was hardly a sum which could have had a large impact on
the small industry sector. Also, there was some substance in the Echo's complaint
of 1946 that the Bureau was:
. ..  only a convenient collection depot for furniture and various African 
bric-a-brac ... What the people wish is such things as pottery, weaving, 
leatherwork, cabinet making, fish canneries and brick and tile making.20
Moreover, it is evident that expatriate businesses were in a better position to influence
government policy than African themselves. For example, in 1916, the Seccondee
Chamber of Commerce, a body dominated by expatriate interests, lobbied the Sekondi
Town Council for seats in the Council Chamber. In the words of the Secretary of the
Seccondee Chamber of Commerce:
in view o f the many important commercial questions which come under the 
consideration o f  the Seccondee Town Council, it should have some voice in 
the control o f  the Council’s affairs.21
The request was granted quickly and a representative of the Chamber was installed
in the Council.22 It is unlikely that African business interests were treated so
favourably.
The Second World War and the Promotion o f Small-scale Industries 
During the Second World War, government policy towards indigenous industries was 
transformed. With the outbreak of hostilities in 1939, Britain sought to secure 
maximum resources from the Empire for the war effort, while shipping space for 
imports became scarce.23 Under these circumstances, the Gold Coast government
19 NAGA RG 7/1/79, Minute by Assistant Commissioner of Industry?, 15/10/1957.
20 NAGA ADM 1/2/286, Echo, 4/11/1946, cited in Savingram from the Officer Administering 
Government to the Secretary of State, London, 13/11/1946.
21 NAGCC ADM 23/1/255, C. Richards, Secretary of the Seccondee Chamber of Commerce, to 
the Colonial Secretary, Accra, 26/1/1916.
22 NAGCC ADM 23/1/255, H.W. Thomas, Acting Commissioner, Central Province, to the Acting 
Colonial Secretary, 8/3/1916.
23 Michael Crowder, ‘The 1939-45 War and West Africa’, in J.F.A. Ajayi and Michael Crowder 
(eds.), History o f West Africa, Volume Two (Harlow, Essex, 2nd ed.: Longman, 1987), pp. 678-9, 681.
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(and indeed governments across West Africa)24 sought to make full use of local 
resources. This policy received the complete support of the Colonial Office in 
London. As the Secretary of State for the Colonies explained, in a circular telegram 
to Governors in British West Africa in 1941, any welfare schemes which utilized 
local funds would receive his ‘sympathetic consideration’.23
A prime example of the effects of the War on industrial policy was the attempt 
by the Gold Coast government to develop a roofing tile industry. In June 1939, much 
of Accra was destroyed by an earthquake,26 and pressure mounted on the 
government to find accommodation for those who had been rendered homeless.27 
The Principal of Achimota College suggested that his college might be able to 
produce clay roofing tiles. Such tiles would cost £9.11.3d to roof a typical house, 
compared to £7.16.0d for the standard, imported, corrugated iron equivalent.28 The 
starting costs of the scheme were estimated to be £4,800.29 The proposal aroused 
the interest of the Governor, who submitted the plan to the Colonial Office in 
London. In his submission, the Governor noted that, although roofing tiles were 
more expensive than corrugated iron, the scheme had two main advantages. On the 
one hand, roofing tiles had a longer life than corrugated iron in Accra’s salty, coastal 
air. On the other hand, the persons trained in tile-making at Achimota would ‘be able 
to set up similar industries on a small scale in other parts of the Gold Coast’.30
The response from London was favourable, with the Colonial Office granting 
£4,800 with which to launch the project.31 What appears to have influenced the 
Colonial Office’s decision was the outbreak of the War. As the Colonial Secretary
24 Ibid., pp. 665-92.
25 NAGA CSO 1/3/393, Circular Telegram from the Secretary of State, London, to the Governor, 
Gold Coast, 22/5/1941.
26 Gold Coast, Report of the Accra Earthquake Rehousing Committee (Accra: Gold Coast 
Government, 1940), para. 1.
27 PRO CO 96/762/10, Despatch from the Governor, Gold Coast, to the Colonial Office, 
18/9/1939.
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid.
30 Ibid.
31 PRO CO 96/762/10, Colonial Office to the Governor, Gold Coast, 11/11/1939.
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indicated in his reply to the Governor, air-raid precautions in Britain had increased 
the demand for, and the price of, iron sheets.32 Moreover, on account of the 
shortage of shipping space, the position as regards delivery was ‘likely to continue 
to be difficult for several months*.33 In the event, the Achimota tile scheme was 
unsuccessful, because the college failed to obtain secure title to the land containing 
the necessary clay.34 Nonetheless, the Achimota tile scheme demonstrates vividly 
the impact of wartime realities on the government’s industrial policy.
Another example of wartime import-substitution can be found in wood­
working. During the War, the military was particularly eager to make full use of 
local wood products. To this end, it used the Forestry Department to send samples 
of its requirements to African wood-workers.35 These samples were reproduced,36 
resulting in a considerable benefit to the war effort. As the Governor noted in 1942, 
for the past two years, ‘numerous wood-workers* had been producing ‘furniture and 
other wooden articles for the use of the fighting services*, including ‘tens of 
thousands of chairs, tables, tool handles, and other things’.37
During the War, the government took other initiatives to promote domestic 
industries. One of them was the establishment of the Institute of West African Arts, 
Industries and Social Science, otherwise known as the West African Institute (WAI). 
The WAI was funded by a £127,000 grant from the Colonial Development and 
Welfare Fund.38 According to the Governor, the purpose of the Institute was ‘to 
conduct research and experiment in secondary industries and the training of Africans 
for management of these industries* and to determine ‘the conditions in which local 
industries can be developed*.39 Already by 1944, the WAI was having an impact
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid.
34 Gold Coast, Report o f the Accra Earthquake, para. 14.
35 NAGA ADM 1/2/268, Governor, Gold Coast, to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 
15/12/1942, para. 1.
36 Ibid.
37 Ibid.
38 Gold Coast, Legislative Council Debates, session 1943, issue no. 2 (Accra: Government Printing
Department, n.d.), col. 3, Governor’s address, 17/8/1943.
39 Ibid.
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on the small-scale industrial landscape in the Gold Coast. Some of those trained in 
brick- and tile-making at the Institute in 1943, later returned to Hohoe in Togoland 
to set up their own small businesses, using a £50 government loan.40 Also, the WAI 
was involved in the development of the Awatime weaving industry. This venture 
consisted of the Institute and the government pooling resources to administer the 
Awatime Textile Unit. By 1945, the Awatime Unit consisted of 84 hand-spinning 
wheels and 31 hand-looms, and produced cloth with a market value of £1,200 per 
annum.41
Another wartime government industrial initiative was the creation of a Local 
Industries Depot in Accra. Proposals for the establishment of this Depot dated back 
to 1943, when the Director of Agriculture suggested that African manufactures could 
be sold through such an institution. Possible products for sales included: ropes, 
string, string waist belts, brooms, brushes, whitewash brushes, native cloths, flower 
pots, cooking pots, bowls, agricultural tools, mosquito boots, shoes, slippers, 
tobacco, cigars and wooden articles.42 The Director of the WAI was also a keen 
supporter of the project, remarking in 1943 that ‘if it is not dealt with quickly it may 
result in the loss of potential markets’ for small industries.43 The Accra Local 
Industries Depot eventually was established in October 194444 and served as an 
outlet for the products of local small industries.
4.2 The Postwar Period: Ideas on Small Industry Promotion
As the War drew to a close, the issue arose of how government policy towards small- 
scale industries would evolve after hostilities had ended.
40 NAGA ADM 39/1/415, ‘Petition of Brick and Tile Makers, Hohoe, to the Commissioner, 
Eastern Province and the Industries Development Board’, 26/2/1946.
41 NAGA ADM 39/1/654, ‘Report of the Industrial Development Sub-Committee of the Economic 
Development Committee’, para. 6.
42 NAGA CSO 6/6/212, Director of Agriculture, to the Secretary for Social Services, 4/8/1943.
43 NAGA CSO 6/6/212, Director of the Institute of West African Arts, Industries and Social 
Science, to the Secretary for Social Services, 20/12/1943.
44 NAGA CSO 6/6/212, Minute to p. 59.
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The Colonial Government and Its Advisors
There are indications that the government expected to continue to promote small
industries after the cessation of hostilities. As early as 1943, the Governor told the
Legislative Council in his Sessional Address:
I am considering what steps can be taken to improve, after the war, the 
economic condition of the Gold Coast ... it appears to me that there are 
numerous small industries which could be developed to the benefit of this 
country.45
These were probably not just hollow words, for in 1944, the Governor prepared a 
detailed plan on the postwar economic development of the Gold Coast. This Plan 
envisaged, among other things, a possible future r61e for the government in the 
expansion of indigenous fish-curing, brick- and tile-making, wood-working, soap 
production and weaving;46 in an earlier draft of the Plan, salt-making was mentioned 
as well.47 Furniture-making was singled out for particular government support after 
the War. Already in 1942, it was thought that small African wood-workers could 
produce affordable, high-quality furniture, suitable for middle-class European 
homes.48 The Governor even had plans to build up stocks of such furniture, in 
preparation for its export to Europe once the War was over and shipping space was 
available.49
One of the key elements in the government’s vision of postwar small industry 
development was the co-operative. It was envisaged that co-operative action would 
enable African petty industrialists to join together to secure better terms of trade, 
technical assistance and other advantages. Thus, according to the Governor’s Plan 
of 1944, small-scale fish curing would benefit from more organization, while soap- 
making would be encouraged through co-operative societies.50 Similarly, the
45 Gold Coast, Legislative Council Debates, session 1943, issue no. 1 (Accra: Government Printing 
Department, n.d.), col. 6, Governor’s address, 23/2/1943.
46 Gold Coast, General Plan for the Development o f the Gold Coast (Accra: Government Printer, 
1944), paras. 19-24.
47 NAGA ADM 1/2/275, ‘General Plan for the Development of the Gold Coast (draft)*, para. 23.
48 NAGA ADM 1/2/268, E. Maxwell Fry, ‘Memorandum on Furniture Making in the Gold Coast 
for the European Market’, enclosure to Gold Coast No. 346, 15/12/1942.
49 NAGA ADM 1/2/268, ‘Furniture Making in the Gold Coast for the European Market’, Gold 
Coast No. 346 of 15/12/1942.
50 Gold Coast, General Plan, paras. 19, 23.
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Governor announced to the Legislative Council in 1944 that he was ‘strongly of the 
opinion that economic development in this country ... can be attained largely through 
the medium of co-operative societies’.51
This emphasis on the development of small-scale industries along co-operative 
lines was supported by some of those advising the government. For instance, the 
Watson Commission, which had been charged with investigating the causes of the 
riots in the Gold Coast in 1948, concluded in its Report that ‘the intense individuality 
of the Africans notwithstanding, unbridled private enterprise would at least lay the 
foundation of future social strife*.52 On this account, co-operative lines of 
development should be encouraged, especially in fish canning, furniture manufacture, 
native cloth weaving, vegetable oil refining and soap-making.53
However, although the government did have plans to assist small industrialists, 
it is important to realize that, like before the War, other issues dominated the 
government’s agenda. The Sessional Address of 1943, in which the Governor raised 
the possibility of developing small-scale industries after the War, actually was 
concerned in the most part with other issues, ranging from the course of the fighting 
in Europe to the provision in medical services.54 Similarly, the Development Plan 
of 1944 addressed the issue of the future growth in social services above all else: 42 
paragraphs of the Plan were devoted to this subject alone, against only 9 paragraphs 
on industrial development.55
The African Perspective
After the War, Gold Coast Africans were vocal in demanding aggressive small 
industry promotion. In the Legislative Council in 1947, Nana Frempong Manso II
51 Gold Coast, Legislative Council Debates, session 1944, issue no. 2 (Accra: Government Printing 
Department, n.d.), col. 7, Governor’s Opening Address to the Session, 13/3/1944.
52 Colonial Office, The Report o f the Commission of Enquiry into Disturbances in the Gold Coast, 
1948 (London: Colonial Office, 1948), para. 301, cited in G.B. Kay (ed.), The Political Economy of 
Colonialism in Ghana: a Collection o f Documents and Statistics, 1900-1960 (London: Cambridge 
University Press, 1972), p. 78.
53 Colonial Office, ibid., para. 302, cited in Kay, ibid.
54 Gold Coast, Legislative Council Debates, session 1943, issue no. 1, cols. 1 ff.
55 Gold Coast, General Plan.
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protested that rules preventing Africans from brewing their own spirits were too
restrictive and that:
Unless it is a laid-down policy that we West Africans are destined for ever 
to buy every manufactured article from Europeans ... and unless this country 
is intended never to be industrialised there is no reason why the manufacture 
and traffic of local gin should not be encouraged.56
In the same year, another African member of the Legislative Council complained that:
for all the hundred and more years of our contact with our European friends 
we have never been properly taught to cure Tobacco which probably grows 
much better in the Gold Coast than in some parts of America—for all those 
years we have never been taught to improve our weaving industry ...57
These grievances were shared by many ordinary Africans. This is evident
from the various memoranda submitted to the Watson Commission by the African
public. A frequent complaint was the government’s policy towards indigenous
alcohol manufacture.58 As one Joseph K.B. Pobee charged:
... after a hundred years with the British—owing to lack of enthusiasm of the 
officers brought to govern us the country still lacks INDUSTRIES. 
Bomkutuku—a sort of whisky—manufactured by people of the land is 
considered illicit on the score that it is injurious to health. Whilst we agree 
to its injuriousness I fail to see why the Gold Coast Government should not 
patronise to make the industry a respectable one.59
There were also complaints about the perceived failure of the government to provide
adequate technical education facilities as well as controls over native goldsmithing.
According to another submission:
You would expect the Government to have first class polytechnic institutes 
spread over the country to teach efficiently the various trades such as 
tailoring, ship building, leather tanning, soap making and similar industries 
... Our Government had always lacked vision in these things as the 
responsible officers of Government live in a world apart and know little of 
the needs of the people ... Another astonishing issue is that Government 
interest in established local industries is absolutely negative and particularly 
destructive in the case of the Goldsmith’s industry ... Our Goldsmiths are
56 Gold Coast Legislative Council Debates, session 1947, issue no. 1 (Accra: Government Printing 
Department, n.d.), col. 210, Nana Frempong Manso II to the Legislative Council, 28/3/1947.
57 Gold Coast Legislative Council Debates, session 1947, issue no. 2 (Accra: Government Printing 
Department, n.d.), col. 97, Nana Frempong Manso II, Gold Coast Industrial Development Corporation 
Ordinance, 18/9/1947.
58 Emmanuel Akyeampong, ‘What’s in a Drink? Class Struggle, Popular Culture and the Politics 
of Akpeteshie (Local Gin) in Ghana, 1930-67’, Journal o f African History, 37 (1996), pp. 215-36.
59 PRO CO 964/15, ‘Memorandum submitted to the Watson Commission by Joseph K.B. Pobee’ 
(undated, but probably May 1948).
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first class craftsmen, second to none in West Africa.60
Although African members of the Legislative Council and the public were 
more eager to extend government assistance to local industrialists than the colonial 
administration itself, one point which both groups agreed upon was the need for co­
operative development. African members of the Legislative Council largely echoed 
the Governor’s views on this issue. For example, in 1947, Nene Azzu Mate Kole 
told the Legislative Council that ‘It is my ardent desire ... that co-operation be 
fittingly made the keystone of our economic development*.61 In the same year, 
another African member of the Legislative Council implored that industrial promotion 
‘be on such lines as they can eventually fall into the hands of co-operative 
societies’.62
4.3 From Ideas to Policy
Having analyzed government and African ideas on small-scale industrial development 
in the mid 1940s, it is now possible to turn the issue of policy itself. Government 
policy towards small-scale industry can be examined on two administrative levels: 
central government and local government.
Central Government Policy
To comprehend central government policy towards small-scale industry in this period, 
it is necessary to examine the activities of the Economic Development Committee. 
This was constituted at the Governor’s request in 1945 and consisted of African and 
European members.63 Its main function was to act as one of the Governor’s 
principal sources of advice on economic policy.64 Many of the debates and
60 PRO CO 964/15, ‘Memorandum Submitted to the Watson Commission by G.N. Alema of G.N. 
Alema and Co, 6 May 1948’.
61 Gold Coast, Legislative Council Debates, session 1947, issue no. 1, col. 224, Nene Azzu Mate 
Kole to the Executive Council, 28/3/1947.
62 Ibid., col. 247, Mr. Ollenu, 28/3/1947.
63 NAGA RG 7/1/1216, ‘Minutes of the First Meeting, 16/1/1945’.
64 Ibid.
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decisions which influenced industrial policy in the Gold Coast after 1945 took place 
in this committee. Most of the committee’s time was taken up by discussions of how 
to improve transport facilities in the Gold Coast.65 Nevertheless, at its first meeting 
in January 1945, a decision was taken to form an Industrial Development Sub- 
Committee. This Sub-Committee was given the specific task of reporting on the 
prospects for industrial development.66
By May 1945, the Industrial Development Sub-Committee had prepared a 
detailed report on prospects for, and the government’s role in, industrial 
development.67 The report started by noting that there were two types of industry 
in the Gold Coast, factory industry and village/craft industry. The latter offered ‘the 
wider field for development by way of Government assistance*. Of the various 
village/craft industries, the ones with the most potential for growth were wood­
working, weaving and boot-making. To develop these industries, the Sub-Committee 
recommended the creation of an ‘Industrial Development Board’, arguing that 
industrial promotion neither could be pursued by a Government department alone, nor 
could be ‘left as a part-time side-line of some enthusiastic individual*. The Board 
would be funded by grants from the Legislature, and:
it should be required also to keep its eyes open for other opportunities for 
assistance to promising local industries: it should make and publish periodical 
reports on its activities: and generally study and watch the field of 
development of manufacturing industries by private enterprise and guide it, 
as far as possible, in the interests of the people.68
The Sub-Committee’s proposals subsequently received the approval of the Colonial
Office in London. The Secretary of State for the Colonies called it a ‘practical initial
move towards stimulating the development of local industries’,69 and, by the end of
1945, the Industrial Development Board (IDB) was operational. Two years later, the
IDB was reconstituted as the Industrial Development Corporation (IDC), with
increased financial resources and a broader remit to pursue matters relating to
65 Ibid. NAGA RG 7/1/1216, ‘Minutes of the Second Meeting, 9/5/1945’.
66 NAGA RG 7/1/1216, ‘Minutes of the First Meeting, 16/1/1945’.
67 NAGK D 2767, ‘Report of the Industrial Development Sub-Committee’.
68 Ibid.
69 NAGA RG 7/1/1216, ‘Appendix A, to Report of Action of the Second Meeting of the Economic 
Development Committee of 9/5/1945’.
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industrial development.70
Between 1945 and 1947, the IDB was the government’s principal institution
for the promotion of small industries. Although working with only a skeletal staff
(in November 1946, it had only one European officer)71 the Board had managed, by
1947, to initiate several schemes which were having a direct impact on small
industries. For example, the Board organized an eight-month course in cabinet-
making at its own furniture workshop. At the end of this course, graduating
participants received a package of tools and a guarantee of work for a further two
years.72 The Board also had a programme of financial support for spinners and
weavers in Awatime, and offered sales advice to native weavers in Vane, Amedzofe,
Gbandzeme, Biakpa, Dzokpe and Dzogbefeme.73 In addition, the Board was
experimenting with a brick-making machine which, if successful, could be fabricated
‘by any carpenter and a blacksmith’, would use local raw materials and would cost
no more than £5 each.74 The Board was providing financial support to a small
burnt-brick making enterprise in Dzokpe which already had produced 13,000 bricks
by 1947.75 Furthermore, the IDB had organized a training course in beeswax
production, through which 60 trainees had passed.76 According to Acting Secretary
and Executive Officer of the Board:
these men are now going round stimulating the expansion of the industry by 
advising and teaching people how to make beeswax. There is a ready market 
for beeswax here—many firms in this country will gladly give a good price 
for it.77
Finally, the Board had taken over the management of the Local Industries Depot in
70 NAGA RG 7/1/1216, ‘Fifth Meeting of the Economic Development Committee, 25/3/1947’.
71 NAGA ADM 36/1/140, Kenneth Bradley, Chairman of the Industrial Development Board, to 
the Chief Commissioner, Colony, 4/11/1946.
72 NAGA ADM 39/1/91, ‘Radio Interview with A.E.S. Alcock, Acting Secretary and Executive 
Officer, conducted by W. Eduful’, Gold Coast Bulletin, 11 (1947) no. 4, p. 7.
73 Ibid., p. 7.
74 NAGA ADM 39/1/592, H.A.S. Fraser to the Acting Commissioner, Colony, 1/8/1947.
75 NAGA ADM 39/1/91, ‘Radio Interview with A.E.S. Alcock, Acting Secretary and Executive 
Officer, conducted by W. Eduful’, Gold Coast Bulletin, 11 (1947) no. 4, p. 7.
76 Ibid.
77 Ibid., p. 8.
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Accra which was proving quite a success. During the six months from January to 
June 1946, 120 craftsmen had supplied craft articles to the Depot and the total value 
of sales had amounted to £679.78
Between 1947 and 1951, the IDC was active in small industry development, 
although other activities (such as the creation of subsidiary companies in saw-milling 
and construction)79 were starting to draw on its resources. The small industry 
development activities of the Corporation were three-fold. First, the Corporation’s 
furniture workshop was expanded and fitted with modem machinery. By 1951, this 
business was providing employment for almost 350 craftsmen with turnover of 
£40,000 per year.80 Second, the Accra Local Industries Depot continued to grow 
with turnover reaching £14,100 by 1950.81 Third, the Corporation made a start on 
a small loans policy by lending a total of £13,251 to 8 concerns in brick and tile 
manufacture, cassava processing, printing, soap and chocolate production, corn- 
milling, baking and confectionary manufacture, and wood-working.82
However, to place these efforts into context, it is necessary to appreciate that 
the total resources devoted to small industry promotion were still relatively small. 
As of November 1946, it was estimated that the IDB had cost the government only 
£1,500 net,83 which was hardly a large sum. Moreover, not all of the Board’s 
projects had been successful. The Awatime weaving project (p. 85) was on the verge 
of collapse in 1947, with the Board recommending that it be wound up because of its
78 NAGA CSO 6/6/212, ‘Minutes of the Fifth Meeting of the Industrial Development Board, 
10/8/1946’.
79 NAGA ADM 13/2/1, E. Norton Jones, ‘Report of the Gold Coast Industrial Development 
Corporation Limited’, submitted to the Governor, 26/2/1951 and reproduced as enclosure to the 
Memorandum submitted to the Cabinet meeting of 9/8/1951 by the Minister Commerce, Industry and 
Mines.
80 Ibid.
81 NAGA RG 7/1/476, ‘Local Industries Salesroom Project: a Project Proposal to expand the Accra 
salesroom’ (n.d.).
82 NAGA ADM 13/2/1, E. Norton Jones, ‘Report of the Gold Coast Industrial Development 
Corporation Limited’, submitted to the Governor, 26/2/1951 and reproduced as enclosure to the 
Memorandum submitted to the Cabinet meeting of 9/8/1951 by the Minister Commerce, Industry and 
Mines.
83 NAGA ADM 36/1/140, Kenneth Bradley, Chairman of the Industrial Development Board, to 
the Chief Commissioner, Colony, 4/11/1946.
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high supervision and overhead costs.84 The attempt to promote the beeswax industry
ended in failure as well, because those who had received training did not have the
equipment to put their skills into use. Moreover, the price for beeswax proved too
low to solicit any real interest from producers.83 In addition, the Corporation itself
was criticized in Cabinet for being:
almost entirely passive rather than active in its operations, waiting for 
applicants to come to it for financial assistance, instead of going out, 
exploring possibilities, seeking the right men to carry them out and giving 
them all necessary guidance.86
Finally, it was alleged that the Corporation was over-centralized and thus unable to
make any real contribution to small-scale industrial development in the localities.87
Local Government Policy
In the localities themselves, small-scale industries probably were affected more by the 
actions of local government than by the institutions of central government. With the 
exception of writers such as Robertson or Hill,88 local area studies as an approach 
has received relatively little attention from historians of colonialism. Yet local history 
offers a potentially rewarding avenue for examining the impact of government policy 
on small-scale industries.
To analyze local government policy towards small African industries in the 
period from 1945 to 1951, it is necessary to focus on the activities of the District 
Commissioners (DCs). The DCs were the colonial government’s representatives in 
the localities and they held considerable executive power. The evidence suggests that 
these D.C.s played a positive role in local small-scale industrial development and in
84 NAGA ADM 39/1/654, The Industrial Development Board, to the District Commissioner, Ho, 
15/2/1947.
85 NAGA ADM 36/1/140, Assistant District Commissioner, Oda, to the Secretary and Executive 
Officer, Industrial Development Board, 13/1/1948.
86 NAGA ADM 13/2/1, Memorandum from the Minister of Commerce, Industry and Mines on 
the Industrial Development Corporation—Annual Report and Accounts, for the Cabinet Meeting of 
9/8/1951.
87 Ibid.
88 Claire C. Robertson, Sharing the Same Bowl. A Socioeconomic History o f Women and Class in 
Accra, Ghana (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984). Polly Hill, The Migrant Cocoa-Farmers 
of Southern Ghana. A Study in Rural Capitalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1963).
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several ways.
First, some DCs assisted their local small-scale industries directly. A case in
point was the Awatime textile project. Although this was a joint-venture between the
government and the WAI, in the early years of the scheme, the contribution of the
local DC for Kpandu was critical.89 Indeed, when a new DC for Kpandu took office
in June 1945, he found himself over-burdened with the work of the textile unit. As
he protested to the Commissioner of the Eastern Province:
I was being asked to take over as a sort of combined textile manager, 
accountant, ledger clerk, store-keeper, packer and despatch clerk, tout for 
orders, butt for rude comment by dissatisfied customers, foreman of works 
to supervise manufacture of looms and spinning wheels and to erect several 
large buildings, and a few other odd jobs.90
The Assistant DC for Ho also took a direct role in the activities of local small
industries. For example, in 1944, he tried to use his contacts in the Administration
to locate supplies of scrap steel for the town’s blacksmiths. As he wrote to the DC
in Accra:
There is a shortage of matchets in this area at present, and the blacksmiths 
are unable to get enough scrap steel to make good the deficiency ... I shall 
be very grateful if you could find out whether there is any good quality scrap 
steel with firms like U.T.C. and at what price they would sell it.91
The response from Accra was favourable and the Assistant DC sent a representative 
of the blacksmiths to collect the scrap.92
A second manner in which DCs assisted small industrialists was by attracting 
central government attention to potential projects in their localities. The DC of 
Sunyani appears to have been particularly active in this field. In early 1948, he wrote 
to the IDB, noting, ‘I am anxious to encourage the development... of cotton growing 
and weaving, among other things, since this is a backward area, having no cocoa’.93
89 NAGA ADM 39/1/654, Oliver Stanley, Colonial Office, to the Governor, Sir Alan Bums, 
1/5/1945.
90 NAGA ADM 39/1/654, District Commissioner, Kpandu, to the Commissioner of the Eastern 
Province, 12/6/1945.
91 NAGA ADM 39/1/415, Assistant District Commissioner’s Office, Ho, to the District 
Commissioner, Accra, 15/3/1944.
92 NAGA ADM 39/1/415, Assistant District Commissioner, Ho, to the District Commissioner, 
Accra, 4/5/1944.
93 NAGS DAOS 1/10, Acting District Commissioner, Wenchi/Sunyani District, to the Secretary 
and Executive Officer, Industrial Development Board, 22/1/1948.
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He went on to observe that a certain amount of cotton was grown in the locality and 
used for weaving, while the one weaver in the area who had managed to obtain a 
loom from the IDB found that he ‘could not produce enough to meet his demands*.94
A final, indirect manner in which some DCs assisted local small industries was 
through the organization of agricultural and craft shows. Such events brought 
publicity to local craftsmen, thereby increasing the market for their products. A 
typical example of a DC’s contribution here was that of R.J. Moxon, the DC for 
Akuse, who played a leading part in the organization of the Odumase Agricultural and 
Commercial Show in 1947.95 According to Moxon, this show lasted two days, 
attracted thousands of visitors, and had on display ‘a great variety of excellent 
exhibits both in the crafts and produce sections*.96
4.4 Reasons for Policy
Pushed by international opinion, Britain began to accept the need for more economic
development in the colonies after the War.97 Thus, with regard to industrial
development, Lord Trefgame, the Chairman of the Colonial Development
Corporation (a supra-Empire version of the IDC) boasted in 1948:
No single industrial project which had come before the Corporation had been 
rejected on the ground that industrial production was the prerogative of the 
United Kingdom. That obsolete theory died fifty years ago in relation to the 
Dominions, and never existed in relation to the Colonies.98
Yet the government did not have to assist small-scale industries. After all, the Gold
Coast had no institutions which could bring African pressure for small industry
development to bear on the government. Nevertheless, while a recent acceptance of
the right of the colonies to industrialize may have created the enabling environment
94 Ibid.
95 NAGA ADM 39/1/91, District Commissioner’s Office to the Commissioner, Eastern Province, 
19/3/1947.
96 NAGA ADM 39/1/91, R.J. Moxon, writing in Gold Coast Bulletin, 11 (1947) no. 4.
97 Jane Helen Bowden, ‘Development and Control in British Colonial Policy, with reference to 
Nigeria and the Gold Coast: 1935-1948’, University of Birmingham, PhD, 1980, pp. 303-4.
98 NAGA ADM 5/4/70, ‘Means of Development’, sixth communique of the African Conference, 
afternoon of 5th October.
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within which the government encouraged small industry development, there were
several more positive reasons behind the government’s policy as well.
First, there is clear evidence that African pressure for small industry
development actually did have an influence on policy-makers, despite the absence of
institutions of representative government. Members of the administration often
remarked in private on the need not to appear hostile towards indigenous industries.
In 1945, when the Awatime weaving project was passing through a period of financial
difficulty, the Chief Commissioner of the Colony advised the Colonial Secretary to
keep alive the industry, noting:
I can imagine nothing more calculated to destroy faith in Government by the 
people concerned than the complete abandonment of an industry which has 
been so fostered, and rather than close it down altogether I think that every 
endeavour should be made by Government to utilize the product itself ..."
Similarly, in 1949, when the distillation industry was still under strict government
control, the Acting District Commissioner for Bekwai remarked:
In principle I suggest that it is desirable to encourage a local industry to 
manufacture a product which can be made in the country. Any other attitude 
on the part of Government might foster the suspicion that imported goods and 
importing firms are favoured.100
Clearly then, the Gold Coast government—and indeed the government in
London101—were not completely immune to popular African sentiment.
This pressure was particularly acute given that the government had
administered some quite successful programmes of industrial development during the
War (pp. 82-85). The War experience had demonstrated that, even with limited
resources, measures could be taken to assist local industrialists. As a result, the
government had little justification for claiming that these measures could not be
replicated under peacetime conditions. The Echo made exactly this point in a
scathing attack on the government in 1946:
Government’s procrastination is the stumbling block to development. Their 
refusal to take elementary and perfectly reasonable risks sets the country 
back. Had the war continued for another five years they would have been
99 NAGA ADM 39/1/654, T.R.O. Mangin, Chief Commissioner Colony, to the Colonial Secretary, 
Accra, 22/6/1945.
100 NAGK D 1987, Acting District Commissioner, Bekwai, to the Chief Commissioner, Ashanti, 
9/11/1949.
101 Bowden, ‘Development and Control’, p. 305.
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forced to do something about their schemes for developing African Industries 
in spite of any alleged shortages and now that the war is over we see no 
reason why they should not make some kind of start ...1Q2
The War experience pushed the government to assist small African industries 
in two other ways. First, there was concern about the employment prospects of those 
who had worked in the import-substituting industries of the War years. As early as 
1942, while local wood-workers were turning out products for the military, the 
Governor was thinking ahead to the postwar situation and the fate of these wood­
workers. The problem was that, with the changing military situation in Africa, 
demand for wood products probably would fall. ‘In these circumstances’, wrote the 
Governor to the Colonial Secretary in London, ‘it is necessary to consider the future 
of those local workers who have learnt by experience the trades of carpentry and 
joinery*.103
At the same time, there was considerable concern about the fate of ex- 
servicemen, many of whom had valuable industrial skills.104 As the Central 
Committee for Demobilization had remarked in 1943, ‘the problem which presented 
the greatest difficulty was the employment and resettlement of the large number of 
artisans now in the army*.105 After the War, government officials made every 
effort to find jobs for ex-servicemen. Hence, when the Chief Commissioner of 
Ashanti sought participants for the IDB’s beeswax development scheme in 1946 (p. 
91), he wrote to the Asantehene asking him to suggest names of possible candidates, 
remarking ‘I think the claims of suitable ex-servicemen ... should be borne in 
mind*.106 In the same year, the IDB attempted to place some ex-servicemen into
102 NAGA ADM 1/2/286, Echo, 4/11/1946, cited in a Savingram from the Officer Administering 
Government to the Secretary of State, London, 13/11/1946.
103 NAGA ADM 1/2/268, Covering letter to ‘Furniture Making in the Gold Coast for the European 
Market’ from Sir Alan Bums, the Governor, to Oliver Stanley, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 
para. 2, 15/12/1942.
104 NAGA ADM 11/1/1893, M.F.G. Wentworth, ‘Demobilization Scheme for West Africa (secret 
memorandum) 6/10/1944?’, appendices D and G.
105 NAGA ADM 11/1/1893, ‘Minutes of Second Meeting of the Central Committee for 
Demobilisation, 16/4/1943’.
106 MRO SB 45, Chief Commissioner, Ashanti, to the Asantehene, 30/8/1946.
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the Awatime weaving project.107
A final pressure on the government to act was external in the form of the 
Watson Commission (p. 87). One of the issues which the Commission addressed was 
the possibility of industrial development in the Gold Coast. Generally, the 
Commission was sceptical about the prospects of large-scale industrial development, 
recording that:
while there is clearly room for many secondary industries which would enrich 
the country, we are unable to foresee, in any circumstances, the Gold Coast 
emerging as a unit of heavy industries in the world markets.108
However, with regards to small-scale industrial development, the Commission was
more optimistic. In connection with the distillation of spirits, it argued that, given
a reasonable degree of control to prevent distilled alcohol reaching human
consumption, there was ‘no reason why an African with the necessary capital should
not be permitted to develop such a business’.109 The Commission also agreed with
the complaints of goldsmiths that restrictions on the recovery and treatment of gold
had ‘brought about a situation in which an ancient and worthy craft was in danger of
extinction’.110
4.5 Limits on Government Assistance to Small-scale Industries
Previous sections have demonstrated that the government and its advisors took a more 
optimistic view of the potential for small-scale rather than large-scale industrial 
development. This was certainly the thinking of the Industrial Development Sub- 
Committee and the Watson Commission. Yet, it also has been shown that the 
government’s small industry development efforts were relatively modest after 1945. 
Why did the government refrain from a more aggressive policy of small industry 
promotion?
107 NAGA ADM 39/1/415, Secretary and Executive Officer of the Industrial Development Board, 
to the Paramount Chief, Awatime State, 5/6/1946.
108 Colonial Office, Report o f the Commission of Enquiry, para. 300, cited in Kay, Political 
Economy of Colonialism, p. 78.
109 Colonial Office, ibid., para. 305, cited in Kay, ibid.
1,0 Colonial Office, ibid., para. 306 cited in Kay, ibid., p. 79.
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A primary consideration here is that some in the administration questioned the 
utility of assisting African entrepreneurs. At one of the meetings of the Economic 
Development Committee, the Colonial Secretary argued against establishing textile 
factories partly because it was ‘most undesirable to attempt to convert the people of 
the Gold Coast from an agricultural to a factory population*.111 At the same 
meeting, another member of the Committee claimed that whichever course industrial 
development took, it should not react adversely on the cocoa trade; thus weaving 
should be confined to cloths of native types only.112 The Awatime weaving project 
also had numerous critics. One of them was Mangin, the Chief Commissioner of the 
Colony. In 1948, when the Awatime project was going through a period of renewed 
financial difficulty, Mangin contended that government subsidies to assist the weavers 
could not be justified since ‘the plain truth of the matter is that the Awatime Weavers 
cannot and probably never will compete in the open market in utility weaving’.113 
Mangin added:
I realize that it is a great ‘pity’ and that there is a sort of arty sentimentality 
attached to ‘homespuns’, but Government financial assistance to foster the 
industry simply for this purpose would not in my view be justified.114
Alongside the scepticism and conservatism of some members of the
government, was the lack of any clear idea about what course a policy of small
industry development could follow. The government had no real experience of
industrial policy-making from which it could draw. Therefore, in the immediate
postwar years, there had to be a certain degree of improvization and experiment. The
early years of the Awatime weaving project demonstrates this clearly. During the
War, the project was being administered directly by the DC at Kpandu (p. 94).
However, such a form of organization could not continue in the long run. As the
Chief Commissioner for the Colony argued in despair:
It is quite preposterous that a District Commissioner should have to spend his 
time seeing to orders placed by the wife of the Colonial Secretary of Sierra-
1.1 NAGA RG 7/1/1216, ‘Discussion of the Report of the Industrial Development Sub-Committee’.
1.2 Ibid.
1.3 NAGA ADM 39/1/654, Minute by Chief Commissioner, Colony, 19/10/1948.
114 Ibid.
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Leone and trying to collect money from customers who fail to pay.115
It was only after the creation of the IDB in 1945, and the subsequent transfer of the
responsibility for the Awatime project to the Board, that the institutional arrangements
for administering the Awatime project were placed on a more effective foundation.
Yet even after the IDB had been created, its relationship with other institutions
of government took time to define. For example, in November 1946, when the IDB
established its beeswax course, the Chairman of the Board remarked in
correspondence with the Chief Commissioner of the Colony, that:
The Board realises that this proposal raises the big question of policy as to 
whether the Political Administration is able and willing to co-operate with the 
Board in the spread of industries over the country.116
With regard to DCs, the Chairman expressed the hope that ‘we can receive an
assurance of their willingness to co-operate as opportunities arise*.117 This was a
clear indication that the Board’s relationship with the administration was still in its
infant stages. The relationship between the Board and the Native Authorities—the
British institutions of indirect rule—was in a similar state of immaturity. In 1947, the
Board had plans to sell brick-making machines on hire purchase to Native Authorities,
but such an arrangement did not meet with the approval of all DCs. The DC for Keta
was apprehensive about the proposals arguing:
At first sight I do not like the idea at all—the Anlo State has not in my 
opinion reached that state of development when it could enter such an 
undertaking without the practical certainty of a ‘racket’ ensuing.118
Part of the reason for such experimentation was the lack of administrative
capacity with which to plan properly. The economic development plans which the
Governor prepared in 1944 were sketchy because of the acute staff shortage which
the government faced.119 This problem was alleviated somewhat by the arrival of
an Economic Advisor, Professor J.H. Richardson, at the end of 1944. It was
115 NAGA ADM 39/1/654, Chief Commissioner, Colony, to Commissioner, Eastern Province, 
24/5/1945.
116 NAGA ADM 36/1/140, Kenneth Bradley, Chairman of the Industrial Development Board, to 
the Chief Commissioner, Colony, 4/11/1946.
117 Ibid.
118 NAGA ADM 39/1/592, District Commissioner, Keta to the Commissioner, Eastern Province, 
12/4/1947.
119 Gold Coast, General Plan, paras. 2, 74.
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expected that Richardson would be consulted ‘in connection with all new proposals 
and any schemes for the extension of existing activities in the economic field’.120 
However, Richardson failed to have any significant impact on the government’s 
planning capacity since he was taken ill while on leave in January 1945121 and 
subsequently had to retire. It was not until 1946 that a replacement could be 
found.122
When examining government policy towards small-scale industries in the period from 
1945 to 1951, the picture which emerges is one of initial, tentative efforts at nurturing 
petty African industrial enterprise. Admittedly, government schemes were small and 
under-funded. At times, they were poorly thought-through and lacking the full 
support of the administration. Nevertheless, by falling under the remit of the IDB, 
they did have a semblance of permanence. This permanence was a clear departure 
from the more ad hoc measures which had characterized government efforts at small 
industry development in the past.
120 NAGK D 2767, Circular no. 32/44 from the Acting Colonial Secretary to the Chief 
Commissioner, Ashanti?, 15/8/1944.
121 NAGA RG 7/1/1216, ‘Minutes of the First Meeting of the Economic Development Committee, 
16/1/1945’.
122 NAGA RG 7/1/1216, ‘Minutes of the Fourth Meeting of the Economic Development 
Committee, 20/12/1946’.
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5 VACILLATION: THE STATE AND SMALL-SCALE
INDUSTRIES, 1951-66
Bowing to nationalist sentiment, which was energized and directed by Kwame 
Nkrumah and his Convention People’s Party (CPP), Britain conceded a limited degree 
of self-rule to the Gold Coast in 1951.1 Internal self-government followed in 19542 
and full independence arrived in 1957. Nkrumah became Leader of Government 
Business in 1951, Prime Minister in 1957 and Head of State from 1960 until army 
and police factions overthrew him in a coup d ’etat in February 1966.
This chapter analyzes government policy towards small industries during the 
Nkrumah years. Section One outlines conventional interpretations of the 
government’s relationship with Ghanaian industrialists. Section Two argues that, to 
understand the policies of the Ghanaian state between 1951 and 1966, it is necessary 
to focus on Nkrumah himself. This is because, by 1966, the state was functioning 
on the orders of this one man and his close colleagues. Section Three examines the 
state’s relationship with small-scale Ghanaian industrialists. It is argued that this was 
ambiguous, though on balance generally negative: there were occasions when the 
Nkrumah regime spoke in their favour and promoted them; however, most of the 
time, the government was critical of them, failed to assist them and undermined them, 
intentionally or otherwise. In any case, the government could have done more to 
promote small industries if it wished. Section Four considers the government’s small 
industry development programme in the context of wider government industrial 
policy. Sections Five and Six analyze the reasons for the government’s reluctance to 
engage in a more comprehensive programme of small industry development.
5.1 Interpretations of the State-Private Sector Relationship
Since 1966, it has been usual to assert that Nkrumah sought to suppress African 
businessmen, be they industrialists or traders, large- or small-scale. These allegations
1 Richard Rathbone (ed.), Ghana. Part I. 1941-52 (London: HMSO, 1992), p. lii-lvii.
2 Ibid. , p. lvii.
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surfaced within months of the coup when Ayeh-Kumi, one of Nkrumah’s senior
economic advisors, wrote that Nkrumah had felt that:
if he permitted African business to grow, it will grow to the extent of 
becoming a rival power to his and the party’s prestige and he would do 
everything to stop it, which he actually did ... what was done was to place 
a squeeze on them and their operations. The banks were not to offer them 
credit ... They were not to be issued with enough licences for importation, 
they should buy through the large firms or Government agencies.3
Generally, historians agree that the Nkrumah government disfavoured local
businessmen.4 Wilks has suggested that Nkrumah, like Asantehene Osei Bonsu
before him, was hostile to the development of an entrepreneurial middle class.5
According to Esseks, the position of all African businesses was one of weakness
during the Nkrumah years.6 However, there has not been any study which addresses
the specific issue of the state’s relations with small industries. This chapter starts to
remedy this deficiency.
5.2 The CPP and Nkrumah’s Domination of the Ghanaian State
Any analysis of government policy between 1951 and 1966 must consider the 
influence of the CPP and Nkrumah. This is because, between 1949 (when Nkrumah 
broke with the United Gold Coast Convention and created the CPP) and the 1966 
coup, the CPP and Nkrumah increasingly dominated Ghanaian society.
Admittedly, the CPP’s political position during the so-called ‘dyarchy’ from
3 ‘Statement by Mr. E. Ayeh-Kumi, Economic Adviser to the Ex-President*, in National Liberation 
Council, The Rebirth o f Ghana. The End of Tyranny (Accra: Ministry of Information, n.d.), pp. 42, 
43.
4 Paul Kennedy, African Capitalism. The Struggle fo r Ascendency (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1988), p. 98. Tony Killick, Development Economics in Action. A Study o f Economic 
Policies in Ghana (London: Heinemann, 1978). Douglas Rimmer, Staying Poor. Ghana's Political 
Economy, 1950-1990 (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1992). John Iliffe, The Emergence o f African 
Capitalism (London: Macmillan, 1983), p. 77. A.N. Hakam, ‘Impediments to the Growth of 
Indigenous Industrial Entrepreneurship in Ghana: 1946-1968’, The Economic Bulletin o f Ghana, 2 
(1972) no. 2, p. 13.
5 Ivor Wilks, Asante in the nineteenth century. The structure and evolution o f a political order 
(London: Cambridge University Press, 1975), p. 721.
6 John D. Esseks, ‘Government and Indigenous Private Enterprise in Ghana’, Journal o f Modem 
African Studies, 9 (1971) no. 1, pp. 11-29.
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1951 to 1954, when Britain still held some political power,7 was by no means 
supreme. In the 1954 elections, the CPP took 55 per cent of the total vote and 72 of 
the 104 seats in the Legislature; in the 1956 elections these figures were 57 per cent 
and 71 seats respectively.8 However, there were still real threats to the position of 
the Party. The Ashanti-based National Liberation Movement was a major political 
force from 1954 to 1956, while the unification of all opposition parties under the 
banner of Kofi Busia’s United Party in 1957 represented a considerable threat to the 
CPP’s political status.9
However, the CPP increased its command over the Ghanaian political system 
after 1957. The Opposition, having been defeated in the elections, was intimidated 
into submission.10 Potential institutions of dissent such as the Trades’ and Students* 
Unions were ‘internalized* as ‘Wings of the Party*.11 The United Ghana Farmers* 
Council (UGFC), the farmers* wing of the CPP, was made the sole buyer of 
Ghanaian cocoa in 1961, thus fortifying the CPP’s political and economic position.12 
Newspapers critical of the government either were subjected to censorship (as in the 
case of the Ashanti Pioneer from August 1960) or were bought out and placed under 
government control (such as the Daily Graphic in 1962).13 Following a referendum 
in 1964, the CPP became the sole political party.
Within this CPP state system, power was centralized in the person of 
Nkrumah, so that, by the mid 1960s, there was ‘The complete domination of the man 
over his government and party*.14 In 1960, a new constitution, officially approved
7 Rathbone, Ghana, p. lii.
8 Roger Genoud, Nationalism and Economic Development in Ghana (New York: Praeger, 1969), 
pp. 87-8.
9 Ibid., p. 92.
10 Richard Rathbone, ‘Businessmen in Politics: Party Struggle in Ghana, 1949-57’, Journal o f  
Development Studies, 9 (1973) no. 3, p. 391.
11 Jonathan H. Frimpong-Ansah, The Vampire State in Africa. The Political Economy o f Decline 
in Africa (London: James Currey, 1991), pp. 97-8.
12 Bjom Beckman, Organising the Farmers. Cocoa Politics and National Development in Ghana 
(Uppsala: The Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1976), pp. 232-3.
13 John Dixon Esseks, ‘Economic Independence in a New African State. Ghana: 1956-65’, 
Harvard University, PhD, 1967, p. 206.
14 Killick, Development Economics, p. 33.
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by 90 per cent of voters, empowered Nkrumah to rule ‘until some other person
assumes office* and furthermore ‘to give directions by legislative instrument*.15 In
his ‘Dawn Broadcast* of 1961, Nkrumah even told Ghanaians that:
Statements which may be regarded as Government policy statements are those 
which I make myself, personally, and those which are clearly stated in the 
text to be the official policy of the Government.16
In private, Nkrumah manipulated government appointments and institutions in 
order to fortify his own hand. The State Planning Commission and the State Control 
Commission, both created by Nkrumah in 1961 and subsequently chaired by him, 
were authorized to review all development projects.17 At meetings of the Cabinet, 
Nkrumah often neglected the advice of his ministers;18 at other times his ideas were 
accepted unopposed as the Cabinet Minutes for the years 1960-66 reveal on numerous 
occasions.19
Thus, by 1966 and arguably even by 1960, Nkrumah was the locus of power 
within the CPP government. Omaboe, the Government Statistician during the 
Nkrumah years, observed after the coup that the Nkrumah state had been 
characterized by ‘the extreme centralization of the decision-making process at the 
political top while the various agencies were isolated at the bottom*.20 Esseks 
arrives at a similar conclusion.21 Therefore, any analysis of government policy in 
the period 1951-66 must place considerable emphasis on the ideas and actions of 
Nkrumah and his party.
15 Rimmer, Staying Poor, pp. 70-1.
16 Kwame Nkrumah, Dawn Broadcast. Osagyefo Calls a Halt to Self-Seeking (Accra: Ministry of 
Information and Broadcasting, n.d.), p. 4.
17 NAGA RG 7/1/1956, Press Release from the Office of the President, 2/10/1961.
18 Frimpong-Ansah, Vampire State, p. 98.
19 NAGA ADM 13/1/30, Industrial Promotion, item 29 (viii) of the Cabinet Meeting of 30- 
1/5/1961. NAGA ADM 13/1/31, Industrial Hall, item 3 of Notes of an Informal Cabinet Meeting of 
16/2/1962. NAGA ADM 13/1/33, Industrial Development and Tax Relief Measures, item 16 (v) of 
the Cabinet Meeting of 25/2/1964.
20 ‘Mr. E.N. Omaboe, Commissioner for Economic Affairs and the Chairman of the National 
Liberation Council, at the 5th Annual ‘Bu Bere’ School, organized by the National Institute of Adult 
Education of the University of Ghana at Kumasi, August 29 1967’, in Ghana, The State o f Ghana’s 
Economy Today (Accra-Tema: State Publishing Corporation, n.d), p. 2.
21 Esseks, ‘Economic Independence’, p. 29.
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5.3 The State and Small-scale Industries
When examining the state’s relationship with small industries, the picture which 
emerges is unclear. There were times when the government supported them, both in 
public and in private, and took measures to assist them. However, occasionally, the 
regime’s rhetoric was condescending and its actions, both deliberate and 
unintentional, injured the prospects for small industry development.
Government Rhetoric
The government voiced support for small-scale industries on several occasions. The
Second Development Plan of 1959, while arguing that foreign private industrial firms
would be ‘the principal agents of industrialisation*,22 also remarked that small-scale
Ghanaian industries had the potential for development and would be given financial
assistance.23 The Plan allocated £250,000 to this end and noted that a Committee
had been established ‘to consider ways in which Ghanaian business of all kinds can
be effectively strengthened by government action*.24 At the Stone Laying Ceremony
of the Kumasi Hotel in March 1962, Nkrumah expressed strong support for small
Ghanaian businesses, and promised them protection from foreign competition.
According to Nkrumah:
In future the private small-scale personal enterprise sector will be exclusively 
reserved for Ghanaians. Foreign concerns already established in this sector 
will be allowed to continue operation, on condition that they do not expand 
... In future, therefore, there will be no room for overseas interests in the 
small-scale enterprises sector in Ghana.25
The Seven Year Plan of 1963 acknowledged that private Ghanaian investors 
had an ‘important role to play’ in industrial development.26 In the words of the
22 Ghana, Second Development Plan, 1959-64 (Accra: Government Printer, n.d.), pp. 16-7.
23 Ibid., p. 22.
24 Ibid., p. 20.
25 Kwame Nkrumah, Overseas Capital and Investment in Ghana (London: Ghana High Commission 
Information Section, n.d.).
26 Office of the Planning Commission, Seven Year Plan for National Reconstruction and 
Development, Financial Years 1963/4-1969/70 (Accra: Office of the Planning Commission, 1963), p. 
47.
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Plan:
There is immense scope for small scale Ghanaian industrial establishments 
supplying many of the vital needs of the economy. Repair and maintenance, 
food processing and the production of numerous household necessities—all 
these are fields waiting for the enterprising Ghanaian businessman. 
Government will intensify its efforts in supplying all the assistance that it can 
command to any such businessman who comes to it with sound schemes and 
the ability to implement them.27
Furthermore, the Plan promised that ‘the successful small businessman with potential
for growth’ would be ‘sought out and offered a wide variety of assistance’.28
It is unlikely that these expressions of support were just rhetoric for public
consumption because Nkrumah and government officials often voiced their support
for small-scale industries in private too. The Cabinet Minutes for the 1960s record
the discussions of several initiatives to promote small-scale industries. For instance,
at the Cabinet Meeting of 16 February 1962:
... the President suggested and the Cabinet AGREED that private enterprise 
particularly in small industries should be encouraged. In this connection it 
was AGREED that a central Industrial Hall should be provided for those 
engaged in small industries for the manufacture of their products.29
In the same month, the Cabinet declared its support for the development of craft
industries through the creation of a Ghana Crafts Centre:
It was DECIDED that in order to encourage craftsmen and assist them to 
display and sell their products on a wider scale a suitable site should be 
selected as soon as possible for the construction of a Crafts Centre and sales 
depot. Space would be allocated in the Centre for workers in the various 
crafts, and ample space would be provided for the display of the 
manufactured articles.30
Later that year, it was decided that the government should promote small industries
in the Northern Region:
The Regional Commissioner of the Northern Region circulated to members 
of the Cabinet specimens of cotton prints, pottery and drawings produced by 
people in the Northern Region. The Cabinet DECIDED that the Ministry of 
Industries should take steps to establish Arts and Crafts Industries in the 
Northern Region so as to harness the potentialities of artists and craftsmen in
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid., p. 90.
29 NAGA ADM 13/1/31, Industrial Hall, item 3 of Notes of an Informal Cabinet Meeting of 
16/2/1962.
30 NAGA ADM 13/1/31, Ghana Craft Centre, item 15 (xiii) of the Cabinet Meeting of 20/2/1962.
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that Region ...31
Moreover, these discussions were not simply left for the record. After the Cabinet 
decision to promote craft industries in the Northern Region, the Ministry of Industries 
sought the advice of a U.N. economist, and soon had a short report on the prospects 
of craft development in the North of Ghana.32
One particularly interesting episode in the Cabinet Meetings, which 
demonstrates beyond question that the Nkrumah government was not entirely hostile 
towards small industries, was the cabinet stages of the National Investment Bank Bill. 
The government had hoped that the National Investment Bank (NIB) would fund 
industrial development in general, and small industries in particular. In the Draft 
Bill, it was envisaged that the NIB would provide funding to industries of all types: 
Clause three of the Draft proposed that the bank be able to provide ‘funds in the form 
of loans of any description’.33 However, the Cabinet rejected the Draft Bill because 
it did not make specific provision for credit to small businesses. According to the 
Cabinet Minutes:
It was AGREED in discussion that the objects of the National Investment 
Bank Bill circulated with the memorandum as stated in Clause 3 of the Bill, 
did not provide sufficiently clearly that loans would be granted in respect of 
small Ghanaian Private Enterprises ... In the absence of this provision, the 
loans of the Bank would be limited to large scale Private Enterprises and 
Co-operative Enterprises.34
Subsequently, the Minister of Trade and Finance re-submitted the Bill, this time
inserting a clause that the NIB be engaged in the ‘counselling and encouraging of
small Ghanaian business concerns’.35
Thus, from one reading of rhetoric and intent, it is difficult to avoid the
31 NAGA ADM 13/1/31, Establishment of Arts and Crafts Industries in Northern Ghana, item 14 
(iii) of the Cabinet Meeting of 24/4/1962.
32 NAGA RG 7/1/1956, M. Franek to J. Therson-Cofie, Chief Industrial Promotion Officer, 
Ministry of Industries, May 1962.
33 NAGA ADM 13/2/93, ‘Draft National Investment Bank Act, 1962’, in a Memorandum 
submitted by the Minister of Finance and Trade, National Investment Bank Bill, for the Cabinet 
Meeting of 12/6/1962.
34 NAGA ADM 13/1/31, ‘National Investment Bank Bill’, item 2 of the Cabinet Meeting of 
12/6/1962.
35 NAGA ADM 13/2/101, ‘National Investment Bank Bill’, Memorandum submitted by the 
Minister of Finance and Trade for the Cabinet Meeting of 5/2/1963.
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impression that the government sought to promote the small industry sector. Such
a stance was spelt out clearly during a meeting of the government and the
International Monetary Fund which took place sometime in 1962. The minutes of the
meeting read in part:
Question 9: Please review developments in, and official policy towards, 
manufacturing industry during 1961?
The present policy of the Government is to limit Ghana enterprises to the 
smaller units employing, in most cases, 10 or less.36
Yet while there was rhetoric in support of small-scale industries, there was
also rhetoric of the opposite nature. For example, in October 1960, Nkrumah
appeared to register opposition towards small-scale Ghanaian enterprises.
Recognizing that the economy consisted of four sectors—the state sector, the state-
private sector, the co-operative sector and the private sector—Nkrumah remarked that
the co-operative sector was:
intended to build up Ghanaian enterprise in all fields. In the past, the 
Government has given considerable assistance to Ghanaian private enterprise 
but the result has been negligible and disappointing. So disappointing in fact 
that the Government feels its assistance must be channelled in a more 
productive manner ... [this] does not mean that Ghanaian private enterprise 
is to be nationalised, but it must now stand on its own feet and not rely on 
the Government for its development.37
In Cabinet, small industries often were treated in a condescending fashion. 
A case in point was in 1962 when Imoru Egala, the Minister of Industries, urged the 
Cabinet to define what a small-scale industry was. By doing so, it was hoped that 
programmes of assistance could be focused more effectively. Egala noted that any 
definition of a small-scale industry ‘should give a fair scope for Ghanaian 
entrepreneurship and reinvestment of capital*.38 Nevertheless, the Minister 
suggested that the definition ‘must exclude industries which are markedly significant 
from the point of view of employment, output, investment, foreign exchange earning,
36 NAGA RG 7/1/1957, Minutes of the International Monetary Fund’s meeting with the Ghana 
Government (1962).
37 NAGA RG 7/1/1956, ‘Statement on Ghana’s Economic Policy by Nkrumah in a Broadcast to 
the Nation on Sunday 9 October, I960’.
38 NAGA ADM 13/2/95, Memorandum entitled ‘Small Scale Industries’, submitted by the Minister 
of Industries for the Cabinet Meeting of 21/8/1962.
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interest of consumers, etc.*.39 Therefore, in the Minister’s opinion, small-scale 
industries were not of ‘marked significance* to the economy as a whole.
On occasions, the government expressed both support for, and hostility 
towards, the small industry sector. The Seven Year Plan pledged that small industries 
would be given assistance,40 but also envisaged that they had a minor part in future 
economic development. According to the Plan, small-scale industries had ‘hitherto 
constituted the characteristic type of industry in Ghana*.41 However, although 
incomes had expanded, these small producers had failed to supply goods to meet the 
demand. Thus:
In order to correct this imbalance between domestic production and demand 
therefore, the types of industry that will be promoted under this and 
subsequent development plans will in general be on a larger scale than the 
types that have hitherto characterised industrial activity in Ghana.42
In effect, this meant that industrialization would be based on the state and private
foreign sectors.43
The Industrial Development Corporation
Government rhetoric wavered between encouragement and discouragement of the 
small industry sector. Such a policy of vacillation is evident in the actions of the 
government as well, although, on balance, policy typically did little to promote small 
industries and often harmed them.
To analyze the actions of the government, it is necessary to focus on the 
Industrial Development Corporation (IDC). Although the Ministry of Commerce and 
Industry held general responsibility for industrial promotion,44 the IDC was ‘charged 
with the statutory duty of securing the investigation, formulation and carrying out of
39 Ibid.
40 Office of the Planning Commission, Seven Year Plan, p. 90.
41 Ibid.
42 Ibid., p. 90.
43 Ibid., pp. 108, 48.
44 Gold Coast, Legislative Assembly Debates, 1953: Official Report, vol. 3, 9/3/1953-18/3/1952 
(Accra: Government Printing Department, n.d.), col. 1969, Mr. Gbedemah, Minister of Commerce 
and Industry, written answer to Mr. Ofori Atta.
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projects for developing industries*.45 Therefore, small industry development fell 
under the IDC*s remit. To this end, the IDC operated a sales depot in Accra (and 
one in Tamale from 1956)46 through which the products of small-scale industries 
gained market exposure. According to the Managing Director of the IDC, the sales 
depot had ‘kept alive and strengthened many individual craftsmen*.47 The IDC also 
helped small industries to gain exposure abroad by organizing their participation in 
expositions such as the Handicrafts, Homecrafts and Hobbies Exhibition in London 
in the mid 1950s.48
However, the centrepiece of the IDC’s small industry promotion strategy was 
the Small Loans Scheme. Although the technical details of this scheme changed over 
time, the basic principle of small industry promotion through credit provision 
remained constant. Through its Small Loans Scheme, the IDC disbursed an average 
of £G46,845 a year to small industrial firms between 1955 and 1958.49
The Small Loans Scheme did have some successes, most notably when it 
worked in partnership with another government scheme for the training of artisans 
abroad. In the early 1950s, the government was training Gold Coast artisans in 
Britain. In 1953, it was estimated that there were 103 such artisans being trained in 
bricklaying, moulding, electrical repair and installation work, motor engine 
maintenance and laundry work.50 Returning artisans were offered special IDC 
financial assistance. As Nkrumah noted:
45 Industrial Development Committee Reports and Accounts, 1955-6, para. 4, cited in G.B. Kay 
(ed.), The Political Economy of Colonialism in Ghana: a Collection o f Documents and Statistics, 1900- 
1960 (London: Cambridge University Press, 1972), p. 92.
46 NAGA RG 7/1/26, ‘Industrial Development Corporation’s Quarterly Development Progress 
Report, Third Quarter, 1955/56’.
47 NAGA RG 7/1/26, Managing Director, IDC, to D.C. Ferguson, Commissioner o f Commerce, 
20/1/1955.
48 NAGA RG 7/1/26, Press Release ‘Local Industries and Handicrafts’.
49 Calculated from Ghana, Industrial Development Corporation, Report and Accounts, 1954-55 
(Accra: Department of Information Services, 1955), appendix I, p. 27. Ghana, Industrial Development 
Corporation, Report and Accounts, 1955-56 (Accra: Department o f Information Services, 1956), 
statement F. Ghana, Industrial Development Corporation, Reports and Accounts, 1956-57 (Accra: 
Guinea Press, 1957), p. 28. Ghana, Industrial Development Corporation, Reports and Accounts, 1957- 
58 (Accra: Guinea Press, 1958), statement 5, p. 34.
50 NAGA RG 7/1/1056, Minute by the Prime Minister, Kwame Nkrumah (undated, but probably 
1953).
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It would be a mistake to invest over £1,000 in the training of a person and 
then to lose the advantage of that training by failing to help him with the 
funds required to establish him.51
Such a package of training and financial assistance had a positive impact on the
development of the small industry sector. For example, G.K.B. Acquaah, an artisan
trained in Britain and then given IDC fmancial aid, had established his own shoe and
leather works in Kumasi in 1954. By the end of 1954, Acquaah’s firm had capital
valued at £600, power machinery and annual turnover of 60 pairs of shoes worth
£132.52
Yet for all the good intentions of the Small Loans Scheme, there were some 
major failings. These became apparent in August 1955 during a Legislative Assembly 
debate on the IDC’s loan policy.53 First, there were widespread claims of 
irregularities in the distribution of loans, with one member of the Assembly alleging 
that the two loans that had been approved for small industries in the Northern 
Territories had both gone to CPP members.54 Second, it was contended that the 
IDC was ineffective in reaching those who required its assistance most. The example 
was offered of an industrialist who was told that his ‘very decent swish building* 
could not be considered adequate security for a loan, and that a concrete building 
would be required instead.55 Third, repayment criteria were considered excessively 
stringent, especially the requirement that interest on loans be repaid within three 
years. As one Assemblyman explained to the House, ‘Is it ... possible for a small 
business man who started with £500 to be able to pay interest on £500 in three 
years?*.56 A fourth criticism was that the actual amounts loaned were inadequate 
and disproportionate to the IDC’s potential lending capacity. It was pointed out that, 
as of 1955, the IDC had spent £571,000 on 26 expatriate members of staff; by
51 Ibid.
52 NAGA RG 7/1/28, Schedule of Local Industries in the Ashanti Regional Area, 1954.
53 Gold Coast, Legislative Assembly Debates, 1955: Official Report, vol. 1, 26/7/1955-12/8/1955 
(Accra: Government Printer, n.d), cols. 244-78, Private Motions: Review of I.D.C. Loan Policy, 
4/8/1955.
54 Ibid., col. 253, Mr. Mumuni Bawumia, N.P.P., South Mamprusi East.
55 Ibid., col. 256, Mr. A.J. Dowuona-Hammond, C.P.P., Awutu.
56 Ibid., col. 247, A.S. Abban, C.P.P., Ajumako-Asikuma.
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contrast, 67 loans had been disbursed to Africans totalling only £63,265.57
The problem of ‘irregularities* within the IDC was indeed grave. Government
and party officials regularly pressed the IDC into disbursing loans to their proteges.
Arthur Lewis, reporting on the IDC in 1958, observed that it had:
... greatly suffered from outside interference, in the shape of members of 
Parliament and other influential persons expecting staff appointments to be 
made irrespective of merit, redundant staff to be kept on the payroll, 
disciplinary measures to be relaxed in favour of constituents, business to be 
purchased at inflated prices, loans to be made irrespective of security, etc.58
Because of such ‘irregularities*, it is likely that many undeserving small industrialists 
obtained loans, to the detriment of those who required them.
The allegation that the IDC’s Small Loans Scheme was under-funded and 
under-staffed recurred throughout the 1950s. On several occasions, the loans process 
had to be frozen because of a lack of funds. According to IDC internal memoranda, 
this happened in July 1953,59 March 195660 and September 1957.61 The under­
funding and under-staffing of the Small Loans Scheme was common knowledge, as 
the following notes of an interview with Mr. Alibah, a member of Small Loans 
Section of the IDC, suggest:
[Mr. Alibah] emphasised that the Small Loans* Section is inadequately staffed 
and cannot cover the country satisfactorily. It is particularly difficult to 
cover the Northern Region; with so small a staff supervision of the use of 
loans granted and guidance to borrowers becomes virtually impossible ...6Z
Outsiders also recognized the lack of administrative capacity within the IDC more
generally, with a British trade delegation report of 1959 remarking that ‘we cannot
escape the conclusion th a t... the managerial resources of the corporation have been
57 Ibid., col. 251, W.A. Wiafe, C.P.P., Kwahu South.
58 Tony Killick, ‘The State Promotion of Industry: The Case of the Ghana Industrial Development 
Corporation’, Ghana Social Science Journal 2 (1972) no. 1 and 3 (1973) no. 1, part II, cited in Killick, 
Development Economics, p. 245.
59 NAGA RG 7/1/26, General Manager, IDC, to the Permanent Secretary, Ministry o f Trade and 
Labour, 24/9/1954.
60 NAGA RG 7/1/26, Project Officer, IDC, to the Commissioner for Commerce, 9/3/1956.
61 NAGA RG 7/1/1819, Memo from the General Manager, IDC, to the Small Loans Officer, IDC, 
14/9/1957.
62 NAGA RG 7/1/260, Interview with Mr. Alibah, Small Loans Section, Industrial Development 
Corporation, in Accra, 8/6/1959, in P.S. Wright, ‘Draft Report on Small Scale Industrial Development 
in Ghana’.
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inadequate’.63
The IDC’s efforts to promote small-scale industries were not, then, very
effective. In this connection, it is worth citing two examples of potentially successful
small industrialists having to struggle to obtain loans from the Corporation. The first
was Mr. A.E. Asare, a textile manufacturer. Asare had taken a four-year textile
course at Achimota, served as head teacher of the Ghana Art and Crafts School at
Juaso, and had been employed as manager of the Awatime Weaving Industry (p. 94).
He had spent three years in Britain, one year of which was on a Textile Diploma
Course, another studying Business Administration.64 Following this impressive
record of training and work-experience, Asare returned to Ghana in the early 1950s,
established a small weaving factory at Nsawam, and started producing Kente, light
material and heavy curtains. Asare’s cloth was sold through Kingsway Stores, the
Bureau of African Industries at Takoradi, the Lisbon Hotel at Accra Airport and a
sales room at Nsawam.65 In 1959, Asare applied to the IDC for a £3,000 loan to
place his business ‘on a sound and commercial footing’,66 and was willing to offer
a building as collateral.67 Asare’s application received a frosty reception at the
Ministry of Trade and Industries. According to one official there:
The stumbling block which wrecks one-man businesses and family 
partnerships in every land is the owner’s freedom to draw money from the 
business for his ever increasing living expenses, whenever he feels like it, 
without let or hindrance to anyone.68
Miss Ester Nkulenu faced similar problems in obtaining a loan from the IDC. 
Nkulenu had studied in Britain and later established her own fruit juice and 
marmalade factory in 1943.69 By 1951, this had four employees and was producing
63 Board of Trade, Report of the United Kingdom Trade and Industrial Mission to Ghana (London: 
HMSO, 1959), p. 12.
64 NAGA RG 7/1/1752, A.E. Asare to the Minister, Ministry of Commerce and Industries, 
18/3/1959.
65 Ibid.
66 Ibid.
67 NAGA RG 7/1/1752, ‘Report of the Project Officer, IDC Small Loans Division’ (1959?).
68 NAGA RG 7/1/1752, Minute by unidentified official at the Ministry of Trade and Industries, 
6/4/1959.
69 NAGA RG 7/1/260, P.S. Wright, ‘Small Scale Industrial Development in Ghana’ (1959), p. 25.
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orange juice and about 120 lbs of marmalade per week, with the potential for 
expansion.70 In 1952, Nkulenu made an application to the IDC for a loan of £3,000 
to expand her works.71 Of this amount, only £1,000 was granted which apparently 
included a second-hand van valued at £460.72 Throughout the 1950s, Nkulenu 
lobbied the government for assistance, but without success. Despite her failure to 
secure an IDC loan, Nkulenu eventually succeeded in developing a thriving business. 
In 1996, Nkulenu Industries employed over 50 workers and manufactured jam, fruit 
juice, beverages and palm products for markets in Ghana, Europe and North 
America.73
In certain instances, the actions of the IDC actually caused considerable harm
to small-scale industries. In particular, the Corporation’s encouragement of foreign
industrialists resulted in increased competition for some local small industrialists.
Thus, one government report into the small industry sector found:
apprehension lest Government’s industrialisation policy should result in the 
establishment, with the help of largely foreign capitals of large scale 
industries which would drive small Ghanaian concerns in the same line of 
manufacture out of business.74
The report continued by suggesting that small industries be given at ‘least as much
encouragement as foreign manufacturers’, and some of them be accorded ‘pioneer
status*.75 This was a clear reference to the ‘pioneer status’ and concomitant
financial benefits which were being lavished on foreign firms investing in Ghana.
The prolific role of the state as an industrial entrepreneur itself, had a
perceived as well as real deterrent effect on small industry development. The same
government report found:
Certain small concerns... regard some of the existing Industrial Development 
Corporation industries as their rivals and in consequence do not believe that
70 NAGA RG 7/1/32, Miss Esther Nkulenu to the Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Mines 
(1951) ‘Memorandum on Lime Juice, Orange Squash and Marmalade Submitted by Miss Esther 
Nkulenu, Food Industry, Christianborg’.
71 NAGA RG 7/1/260, P.S. Wright, ‘Small Scale Industrial Development in Ghana’ (1959), p. 25.
72 Ibid.
73 Interview with Miss Ester Nkulenu, founder of Nkulenu Enterprises, conducted in Madina on 
23/4/1996.
74 NAGA RG 7/1/260, P.S. Wright, ‘Small Scale Industrial Development in Ghana’ (1959), p. 26.
75 Ibid. , Summary to Report.
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the Industrial Development Corporation can render them disinterested 
assistance. They fail to understand why the Industrial Development 
Corporation should enter into the manufacture of goods in competition with 
already long established Ghanaian firms.76
Indeed, Nkulenu’s plans to build a cannery received no support from the IDC because
the government already had plans to establish one itself.77
The Ministry o f Trade and Industry and the Ministry o f Finance 
The operations of the IDC fell under the oversight of the Ministry of Trade and 
Industry (or, at various times in the 1950s, the Ministry of Commerce, Industry and 
Mines and the Ministry of Commerce and Industry). This Ministry did take certain 
steps to promote small-scale industries. In 1962, on the initiative of Imoru Egala, the 
Minister of Industries, the Cabinet reached a decision on what actually constituted a 
small industry.78 This was a first step in assisting the small industry sector, because 
without a definition, it was impossible to focus any schemes of assistance. In the 
past, there had been the absurd case of the Rural Industries Division of the IDC—the 
function of which was to promote rural small industries—actually undertaking the 
initial development of a sugar scheme, with a fixed capital investment of over £1.4 
million, on the grounds that the project was sited in a rural area.79
However, two serious problems diminished the Ministry’s ability to lead 
industrial development. First, there was the lack of administrative capacity which 
was the result of a shortage of skilled staff.80 Second, the division of responsibility 
between the Ministry and the IDC was often unclear. For example, in 1959, there 
was confusion within the Ministry about the respective r61es of the Ministry’s own 
Investment Promotions Division and that of the IDC.81
76 Ibid. , p. 26.
77 NAGA RG 7/1/32, The General Manager, Industrial Development Corporation, to Miss Esther 
Nkulenu, 27/6/1954.
78 NAGA ADM 13/1/31, Small Scale Industries, item 10 of the Cabinet Meeting of 21/8/1962.
79 NAGA RG 7/1/1958, ‘Draft Cabinet Memorandum by Imoru Egala, Minister of Industries, on 
the Definition of Small-Scale Industry’, 1962.
80 NAGA RG 7/1/1884, Draft Memorandum submitted to the Cabinet by the Minister of Commerce 
and Industry, September 1959.
81 NAGA RG 7/1/1884, Minute by Assistant Commissioner, Industries, 1/12/1959.
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The problem of corruption dogged both the Ministry of Trade and Industry 
and the Ministry of Finance. In the case of the Ministry of Finance, this was 
particularly detrimental to small industry expansion because some small industries 
were dependent on imports. For example, the Acquaah shoe and leatherworks in 
Kumasi (p. 112) had imported £45 of goods between 1951 and 1954.82 From 1961, 
imports were under strict Ministry of Finance control because of the shortage of 
foreign exchange. This control bred corruption. As the official report into 
‘irregularities and malpractices* at the Ministry of Finance made clear, officials had 
encouraged ‘friends and favourites to see them in person for licences’, while 
importers were obliged to employ ‘contact men* in order to secure import permits.83 
The ‘large sums of money’84 need to pay such ‘contact men’ probably disadvantaged 
smaller importers vis-a-vis larger importers. After all, larger importers had the 
money to pay their ‘contact men’, something which smaller players, by their very 
nature, were less able to do. Indeed, allegations of large Levantine businesses using 
corrupt means to secure import licences were common during the Nkrumah years.85
The National Investment Bank
The NIB was established by the government in 1963 and, as the discussion of the 
Cabinet minutes has demonstrated (p. 108), one of its main functions was to disburse 
credit and technical assistance to small industries. However, these expectations were 
not realized, at least during the Nkrumah years.
It appears that from 1963-66, the NIB was too under-capitalized to influence 
small industry development in any significant way. This is evident from table 5.1.
82 NAGA RG 7/1/28, Schedule of Local Industries in the Ashanti Regional Area, 1954.
83 Ghana, Report o f Commission of Enquiry into Alleged Irregularities and Malpractices in 
Connection with the Issue of Import Licences (Accra: Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, n.d.), 
para. 41.
84 Ibid.
85 Hakam, ‘Impediments’, p. 12.
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Table 5.1 NIB, 1963-66: Applications, Loans and Credits (Small and Large-scale 
Industries).
Year Number of 
Applications
Number
Approved
Amount Approved (C)
1963 209 3 971,000
1964 100 11 1,822,000
1965 109 5 797,000
1966 90 5 360,000
Source: National Investment Bank, Annual Report o f  the Board o f  Directors, 1963-75 , cited 
in Stephen Sekyere-Abankwa, ‘Development Banking in Ghana. A Case Study o f the 
National Investment Bank’, University o f Ghana, School o f  Administration, MBA, 1981, 
appendix 7, p. 210.
Table 5.1 shows that the total industrial promotion activities of the NIB were tiny. 
Even if all this activity was directed to the small industry sector, its effects would not 
have been substantial. Expressed in hard currency terms,86 in 1964, only $1.56 
million of loans were approved by the NIB. Thus, despite the demands made in 
Cabinet that the NIB counsel and encourage small Ghanaian businesses, this appears 
not to have happened.
5.4 Assistance to Small Industries in the Context of General Government 
Policy
Within the context of wider industrial policy, it is apparent that small industry 
development was a low priority. A top priority was the development of the state 
industrial sector. This was endowed considerable privileges. Thus, from 1963 to 
1965, the NIB actually invested 91 per cent of its loanable funds in state 
enterprises,87 while, between 1962 and 1966, the state’s share of manufacturing
86 Rimmer, Staying Poor, p. xi.
87 Esseks, ‘Government and Private Enterprise’, p. 22.
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output increased from 12 per cent to 20 per cent.88
The encouragement of the foreign industrial sector was also a high priority. 
The 1959 Development Plan allocated £G15.5 million for general industrial and trade 
promotion, but only £G500,000 of this was earmarked as aid for African business.89 
In the words of the Plan itself, this was only a ‘token sum*.90 By contrast, large- 
scale foreign industrialists investing in Ghana received lucrative financial incentives. 
One Western analyst at the time felt that these were so generous that they proved 
Ghana’s ‘sincere desire to do all in her power to encourage foreign investment*.91 
Ultimately, while African businessmen received an estimated £825,064 of government 
loans in the period 1957-60, the government offered a single £2 million loan to A.G. 
Leventis, a Greek-Cypriot businessman with close ties to Nkrumah.92
The government also provided the co-operative sector with considerable 
support. African nationalists frequently had urged the colonial government to 
promote industrial co-operatives (p. 89) and, once in power, the CPP did just that. 
Government ministers spoke glowingly about the prospects for the co-operative 
sector. At one Cabinet Meeting in 1961, the Minister of Trade went as far as to 
suggest that co-operatives were an effective form of business organization in almost 
all branches of industry. Indeed, the state sector needed to be confined only to those 
industries:
which produce war equipment (including secret and atomic weapons), 
ballistic missiles and space ships. The Government should also be solely 
responsible for the supply of potable water and electricity on a non-profit 
making basis.93
The government’s guidelines on the implementation of the Seven Year Plan noted that 
the Plan’s three main goals were to increase the rate of growth in the economy, to
88 Central Bureau of Statistics, Industrial Statistics, cited in Killick, Development Economics, table 
5.7, p. 126.
89 Ghana, Second Development Plan, appendix, section 2.
90 Ibid., p. 20.
91 Alan H. Smith, ‘Tax Relief for New Industries in Ghana’, National Tax Journal, 10 (1958) no. 
4, p. 370.
92 Esseks, ‘Government and Private Enterprise’, p. 14.
93 NAGA ADM 13/2/78, ‘Promotion of Industrial Projects in Ghana’, Memorandum Submitted by 
the Minister of Trade, item 6 of the Cabinet Meeting of 24/1/1961.
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‘liquidate the colonial structure of the economy by the development of modem 
industry’ and to ‘embark on the socialist transformation of the economy through the 
development of the state and co-operative sector’.94
One example of assistance to the co-operative sector was the so-called 
Japanese small-scale industries episode. Following a trade and goodwill delegation 
visit to the Far East in 1959, machines were ordered for small-scale industries in 
Ghana.95 These industries included rice-milling, bamboo-matting and blind 
production, shirt and blouse sewing, coir processing, as well as rattan, copra, peanut 
and bamboo-processing.96 The machines, together with Japanese technicians, 
arrived in Ghana in I960.97 The workings of the project were outlined in a letter 
from the Chairman of the IDC to Regional Commissioners. First, it was ‘intended 
that the operators of each plant should be organised into a co-operative unit*. The 
National Co-operative Council would help in this. Thereafter, the IDC would loan 
capital to the co-operative unit, establish the plant and provide technical assistance. 
The Corporation would ‘supervise and exercise some measure of control* until the 
loans were repaid. Finally, co-operative members would ‘make their minimum 
financial contributions for shares* so as to have a stake in the enterprise.98
It is interesting to note that, while cooperatives were encouraged in small 
industry, in cocoa farming they were smashed and subsumed under the UGFC in 
1961." The explanation for this may have much to do with power-political 
considerations. The cocoa co-operatives’ economic power represented a considerable 
threat to the CPP state,100 since by the 1952/53 season, co-operatives had 20 per
94 Ghana, Guide to the Implementation o f the Seven-Year Plan (Accra: Office of the Planning 
Commission, n.d.), p. 3.
95 NAGA RG 7/1/464, ‘Report of a Trade/Goodwill Mission and GATT Delegation to the Far 
East, September 28-November 21, 1959’.
96 NAGA RG 7/1/153, Memo from V.D. Adu, Senior Projects Officer, Ghana Rural Industries 
Ltd., to the General Manager, Ghana Rural Industries Ltd., 13/7/1961.
97 NAGA RG 7/1/153, General Manager, Ghana Rural Industries Ltd., to the Permanent Secretary, 
Ministry of Light and Heavy Industries, 9/10/1961.
98 NAGA RG 7/1/153, J. Mensa Bonsu, Chairman of the Ghana Industrial Development 
Corporation, to E.H.T. Korboe, Regional Commissioner for the Eastern Region, 8/6/1961.
99 Beckman, Organising the Farmers, pp. 91-102, ch. 5.
100 Ibid., p. 92.
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cent of the cocoa market.101 By contrast, small industry cooperatives were 
comparatively undeveloped and posed no such threat to the CPP’s political position.
5.5 The Appeal of Small Industry Development
The government could have done more to assist small African businesses if it wished. 
In the event, it chose not to do so. For example, the government ignored the findings 
of the McCarthy Committee on Aid to Ghanaian Businessmen.102 The McCarthy 
Committee had been established in May 1959 to consider ways in which Ghanaian 
businesses could be ‘strengthened by government action’.103 The committee had 
prepared its Report by July of that year.104 However, no White Paper on the 
Report was published and its recommendations (which included a proposal to reserve 
a proportion of the retail trade for Ghanaians) were never implemented. In addition, 
offers of technical assistance from abroad were turned down. An offer from the 
Netherlands in 1962 to provide fellowships to Ghanaian students to study small 
industry development and management in Delft,105 was rejected on the grounds that 
there was no suitable candidate for the course.106 Why then was the government 
was so reluctant to develop small industry?
At first sight the reluctance is difficult to understand because the government 
had good reasons for aggressive small industry promotion. In addition, Ghanaian 
businessmen were vocal agitators for their rights and had channels through which to 
lobby the government for assistance.
101 J.C. DeGraft-Johnson, African Experiment: Co-operative Agriculture and Banking in British 
West Africa (London, 1958), p. 78, cited in ibid.
m  IRS ADM 2616 (original file number C2500), ‘The Report of the Chairman of the Committee 
on Aid to Ghanaian Business’. Esseks, ‘Economic Independence’, p. 88.
103 NAGA RG 6/2/9, Memorandum by the Minister of Trade on the Committee on Aid to African 
Business submitted to the Cabinet, 1960?
104 NAGA RG 6/2/9, Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Finance, to the Ministry of Commerce and 
Industry, 29/7/1959.
105 NAGA RG 7/1/671, The Royal Netherlands Embassy, Accra, to the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, Accra, 25/10/1962.
106 NAGA RG 7/1/671, Principal Secretary, Ministry of Industries to the Principal Secretary, 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 31/10/1962.
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\Government Awareness o f Small Industry Promotion
The benefits of small industry promotion were known to the government by the late 
1950s. The Wright Report of 1959, details of which reached the Permanent Secretary 
at the Ministry of Industries,107 expounded at length the economic benefits of small 
industries108 and noted that they had made a valuable contribution to economic 
development in Japan and India.109
The government was also aware of the conditions facing Ghana’s existing 
small-scale industrialists. In other words, these enterprises were not hidden from, 
and unknown to, government officials. In 1962, the government conducted a large 
sample survey of the country’s small-scale industrial sector which found that small 
industries provided the bulk of industrial employment.110 In the following year, the 
Seven Year Plan actually drew on some of the survey’s findings.111 Thus, the 
government knew that there was a small industry sector in Ghana which could be 
supported. By contrast, the large-scale Ghanaian industrial sector was virtually non­
existent at the time, and supporting it may not have been a viable policy option 
anyway.
At times, there were also practical reasons for the promotion of small 
industries. The events surrounding the Second Development Plan demonstrate this. 
The Plan called specifically for the creation of 600 new factories between 1959 and 
1964.112 Most of these were to be modem and large-scale. Yet, by the end of 
1959, government finances were in crisis. Thus, proposals were mooted that 
cheaper, smaller and more traditional industrial enterprises could be established so 
as to meet the 600 factory target. According to one official:
in order to comply with the Prime Minister’s direction that 600 factories must
107 NAGA RG 7/1/260, Assistant Commissioner, Industries, to the Permanent Secretary, Ministry 
of Industries, 14/9/1959.
108 NAGA RG 7/1/260, P.S. Wright, ‘Small Scale Industrial Development in Ghana’ (1959), pp. 
37-8.
109 Ibid., p. 39.
110 Ghana, Central Bureau of Statistics, Area Sample Survey o f Small Manufacturing Establishments- 
1963 (Accra: State Publishing Corporation, 1965).
111 Office of the Planning Commission, Seven Year Plan, p. 90.
112 Ghana, Second Development Plan, p. 16.
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be established in Ghana ... it might be necessary for the IDC to concentrate 
on the promotion of and development of small industries, preferably in the 
rural areas ... with the background knowledge that only about £G200,000 
was uncommitted in the Second Development Plan allocation of £G10 
millions set aside for Industries ... future Government financial participation 
in the promotion of large scale industries must be drastically cut down and 
IDC activities must be adapted accordingly.113
The Lobbying Capacity o f Ghanaian Businessmen
In addition to these positive reasons for small industry support, it is pertinent to note 
that Ghanaian businessmen did have the capacity to lobby the government. This 
ability may not have been as great as some business groups, such as those which 
contributed visibly to foreign exchange earnings.114 Local businessmen were also 
disadvantaged by their relatively low social status.115 Nonetheless, Ghanaian 
businessmen did have access to the corridors of power.
Before independence, the CPP had received substantial support from ‘aspirant 
businessmen’ who were mainly small-scale.116 During the 1950s, such businessmen 
had adequate representation within the government and Legislative Assembly. Komla 
Gbedemah, the Finance Minister, was a businessman, as were several back-benchers. 
As one Member of Parliament noted during a Legislative Assembly debate on the 
IDC’s loan policy in August 1955, ‘We are all business men ... *.117 W.A. Wiafe, 
the CPP Member of Parliament for Kwahu South, was particularly active in lobbying 
for trade protection and government commitments to patronize African businesses, 
as the 1950s Parliamentary Debates demonstrate on numerous occasions.118
113 NAGA RG 7/1/1884, Minute by unidentified official, 4/12/1959.
114 Esseks, ‘Government and Private Enterprise’, pp. 15-6.
1.5 Ibid., p. 16.
1.6 Rathbone, ‘Businessmen in Politics’, pp. 395-6.
117 Gold Coast, Legislative Assembly Debates, 4/8/1955, col. 247, A.S. Abban, C.P.P., Ajumako- 
Asikuma, Review of I.D.C. Loan Policy, 4/8/1955.
118 Gold Coast, Legislative Assembly Debates, 1955, vol. 1, 26/7/1955-12/8/1955, cols. 250-1. 
Ghana, Parliamentary Debates, 1st series, vol. 6, 23/4/1957-12/7/1957 (Accra: Government Printing 
Department, n.d.), cols. 582-7. Ghana, Parliamentary Debates. Official Reports, Is* series, vol. 14, 
19/2/1959-20/3/1959 (Accra: Government Printing Department, n.d.), cols. 278-86.
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5.6 The Problems of the Small Industry Promotion Case 
However, there were several reasons why the Ghanaian business community did not 
receive the assistance which it sought. These included prevailing political conditions 
and economic theories, the perceived inadequacies of local entrepreneurs, the 
government’s ‘modernistic’ approach to development and, especially after 1960, the 
limits to the lobbying capacity of African businesses.
The 1950s: Political Pragmatism and Laisser-Faire Economics 
During and after the Second World War, colonial governments across West Africa 
began to control imports and exports, together with the marketing of cash crops.119 
However, in the 1950s, the state refrained from playing an active part in industrial 
development for several reasons.
First, in the 1950s, securing the country’s political independence was the over­
riding objective of the time. The CPP’s constitution, passed at the Party’s first 
national conference in 1949, made no reference to economic policy, but aspired to 
‘To fight relentlessly by all constitutional means to achieve and maintain full Self- 
Government for the people of this Country and their Chiefs’.120 Likewise, the 
CPP’s 1951 election manifesto argued that the CPP stood for ‘Self-Government Now 
and the end of foreign control of our affairs*.121 The manifesto made few 
references to economic policy, observing only in passing that industrialization 
required that the Gold Coast be self-governing. Independence was clearly the issue 
of the day and this was summed up neatly in the manifesto slogan ‘seek ye first the 
political kingdom and all things will be added unto it*.122 This lack of ideological 
baggage, in combination with the fact that the economy was expanding at a robust
1,9 Michael Crowder, ‘The 1939-45 War and West Africa’, in J.F.A. Ajayi and Michael Crowder 
(eds.), History o f West Africa, Volume Two (Harlow, Essex, 2nd ed.: Longman, 1987), p. 679.
120 NAGK D 1952, ‘Constitution of the Convention People’s Party, passed at the First Party 
Conference in Sekondi, 17/7/1949’.
121 National Executive of the Convention People’s Party, Towards the Goal. The Manifesto o f the 
Convention People’s Party for the Forthcoming General Election (February, 1951) (Accra: Arrow 
Press, n.d.), p. viii.
122 Ibid., p. ix.
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rate of over 4 per cent a year during the 1950s,123 meant that the CPP had no 
reason to change the economic and industrial policy status quo which it had inherited 
from the colonial administration. The Opposition exerted little pressure for change 
either. The United Gold Coast Convention’s (UGCC) Plan fo r the Nation of 1951 
urged that ‘the optimum diffusion of private enterprise and ownership of property 
shall be developed alongside the maximum attainment of personal liberty, within the 
framework of a welfare state*,124 and demanded the creation of a national bank as 
well as a reduction in manufactured imports.125 In all these ways, the UGCC’s 
economic agenda was similar to the CPP’s.
Second, Nkrumah and the CPP were conscious that any radical break with the 
economic policy of the past probably would have met with British disapproval. This 
was something which Nkrumah sought to avoid, because it could have jeopardized the 
prospects for full self-government: until 1954, the Governor still retained his veto 
over policy, the key ministries of Law and Order and Finance were held by the 
British, while the Constitution could be withdrawn, in extremis.126 In any case, to 
have embarked on a policy of socialism and statism would have alienated foreign 
capital which was needed desperately. For example, the Volta River Project, a 
scheme to dam the River Volta and generate hydro-electricity for the whole of Ghana 
(and a project particularly dear to Nkrumah),127 was almost entirely dependent on 
foreign money.128
A third reason why ‘orthodoxy’ prevailed was that such a policy was 
consistent with the advice being given to Nkrumah by his economic advisors. Seers 
and Ross, reporting on the problems of development in the Gold Coast in 1952, 
recommended a concerted effort to support agriculture, suggesting that ‘only by
123 World Bank, World Tables 1976 (Washington D.C., 1980), cited in Rimmer, Staying Poor, p.
59.
124 Quoted in Dennis Austin, Politics in Ghana, 1946-1960 (London: Oxford University Press, 
1964), p. 137 and cited in Genoud, Nationalism and Economic Development, p. 95.
125 Genoud, ibid.
126 Rathbone, Ghana, p. lii.
127 Esseks, ‘Economic Independence’, pp. 53-4.
128 Ibid., p. 55.
125
increasing agricultural output more rapidly than the rate of growth of population can
rapid development take place*.129 Arthur Lewis epitomized the advice being offered
to the government during the 1950s when he argued that the:
number one priority is ... a concentrated attack on the system of growing 
food in the Gold Coast so as to set in motion an ever increasing productivity.
This is the way to provide the market, the capital and the labour force for 
industrialisation ... Priority number two is to improve the public services.
To do this will reduce the cost of manufacturing in the Gold Coast, and will 
thus automatically attract new industries without the government having to 
offer special favours.130
The government appears to have concurred with Lewis* thinking in the
1950s.131 As the Ministerial Secretary at the Ministry of Trade and Labour told the
Legislative Assembly in 1955:
the Government is in general agreement with Professor Lewis’s conclusion 
that priority must be given to the increase of agricultural productivity which 
alone can provide the economic conditions necessary to support industrial 
development.132
In short, industrial development would be based on private enterprise, not on
government subsidy. Within the government, some were hostile to the idea of using
subsidies to promote small industries. For instance, in 1955, A.T. Anaffu brought
a motion to the Legislative Assembly that ‘this House do request Government to help
develop Local and Traditional Industries*.133 In preparing a government response
to this motion, D.C. Ferguson, the Commissioner for Commerce, noted that the
government would not be prepared to offer subsidies to local industries, especially
after the problems of the Awatime weaving industry (p. 93):
It will be necessary ... to guard against a repetition of the position which 
arose with the Togoland Weavers ... where Government in an attempt to 
assist a traditional industry found itself saddled with a large stock of 
merchandise produced at uneconomic prices ... It is no service to persons
129 D. Seers and C.R. Ross, Report on Financial and Physical Problems o f Development in the 
Gold Coast (Accra: Office of the Government Statistician, 1952), para. 368.
130 W. Arthur Lewis, Report on Industrialization and the Gold Coast (Accra: State Publishing 
Corporation, 1953), paras. 252, 254.
131 Sarah Stockwell, ‘British Business, Politics and Deconolisation in the Gold Coast c. 1945-60’, 
University of Oxford, D.Phil., 1993, pp. 97-8.
132 Gold Coast, Legislative Assembly Debates, vol. 1,26/7/1955-12/8/1955, col. 53, E.K. Bensah, 
Ministerial Secretary to the Ministry of Trade and Labour, to J.R. Asiedu, 28/7/1955.
133 NAGA ADM 13/2/20, ‘Private Members’ Motions’ in the Cabinet Agenda, 8/2/1955.
126
engaged in traditional industries to increase their production to a point where 
the products become unsaleable at commercial rates. This invariably leads 
to disappointment and to unwarranted criticism of Government for having left 
producers in difficulty ...134
The 1960s: New Theories and Etatist Economics
If the laisser-faire ‘orthodoxy* of the 1950s offered little impetus for small industry
promotion, then the new orthodoxies of the 1960s offered less still. By the end of
the 1950s, the first generation of development economists were advocating a prolific
role for the state in developing countries. This advice had a major influence on
government policy.135 In his 1957 Christmas Eve broadcast to the nation, Nkrumah
told Ghanaians that:
most of our major development so far has had to be carried out by the 
government itself. There is no other way out for our people lack the capital 
and technical know-how to embark on great industrial undertakings.136
Nkrumah*s words here were virtually identical to those of the development economist
Gunner Myrdal who observed in the same year:
Because of the various deficiencies in a backward country it is ... accepted 
by everyone that the government will have to take over many functions which 
in most advanced countries in the Western World were left to private 
businesses.137
In other words, the prevailing economic orthodoxy of the 1960s encouraged the 
Ghanaian state to undertake industrial development itself, at the expense of private, 
African entrepreneurs.
Socialist Ideology and Etatism
Socialism and Dependency theories also encouraged the state to assume an active part 
in economic development. Nkrumah espoused the socialist cause on many occasions 
in the 1960s, and this led him to argue for a large state presence in the economy. In 
April 1961, Nkrumah told a CPP study group that:
134 NAGA RG 7/1/26, Minute by D.C. Ferguson (1955).
135 Killick, Development Economics, ch. 2.
136 ‘Nkramah’s Christmas Eve broadcast to the nation’, in E.D. Ziorklui, Ghana: Nkrumah to 
Rawlings (Accra: Ed-Zem Books, 1988), p. 21.
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p. 79, cited in Killick, Development Economics, p. 22.
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Socialism is the only pattern that can within the shortest possible time bring 
the good life to the people. For socialism assumes the public ownership of 
the means of production—the land and its resources—and the use of those 
means for production that will bring benefit to the people.138
Although sympathetic to Marx and Lenin’s teachings,139 Nkrumah reasoned,
nonetheless, that ‘colonial rule precluded that accumulation of capital among our
private citizens which would have assisted thorough-going private investment in
industrial construction*.140 Thus:
Because colonialism prevented the emergence of a strong local capitalist 
class, because production for profit is based on exploitation, and because the 
less developed nations need a high rate of economic growth, the government 
is obliged to play the role of main entrepreneur in laying the basis of national 
economic and social advancement.141
During the 1950s, many of these ideas were suppressed, for fear of provoking
British hostility (p. 125). However, by the early 1960s, the situation was quite
different because Ghana was independent while the ‘liberal* economic policies of
Seers and Ross and Lewis had failed to deliver sustainable growth.142 Thus,
Nkrumah pushed for a more socialist, state-led economy.143 Certainly, the CPP’s
rhetoric after 1960 became more statist than before. As the Party’s Programme for
Work and Happiness, endorsed by the CPP party convention of 1962, argued:
Imperialism-colonialism left Ghana without the accumulation of capital in 
private hands which assisted the Western world to make its industrial 
revolution. Only Government therefore can find the means to promote those 
basic services and industries which are basic prerequisites to intensive, 
diversified agriculture, speedy industrialization and increased economic 
productivity.144
138 ‘An Address by Osagyefo, Dr Kwame Nkrumah, to the CPP Study Group at Flagstaff House, 
Accra, 22 April, 1961’, in S. Obeng (ed.), Selected Speeches o f Osagyefo, D r Kwame Nkrumah, First 
President o f the Republic o f Ghana, vol. 2 (Accra: Afram Publications, 1961), p. 82.
139 K. Nkrumah, Towards Colonial Freedom (1947), p. 11, cited in Spark, Some Essential Features 
ofNkrumaism. A Compilation o f Articles from ‘The Spark’ (Accra: Spark Publications, 1964), p. 5.
140 K. Nkrumah, Africa Must Unite, p. 119, cited in Spark, ibid., p. 20.
141 Nkrumah, ibid., cited in Spark, ibid., p. 22.
142 Beckman, Organising the Farmers, p. 16.
143 Robert Fitch and Mary Oppenheimer, ‘Ghana: End of an Illusion', Monthly Review, 18 (1966) 
no. 3, cited in Genoud, Nationalism and Economic Development, p. 78.
144 Convention People’s Party, Programme of the Convention People's Party fo r  Work and 
Happiness (Accra: Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, n.d.), para. 8.
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Perceived Weaknesses o f Indigenous Businessmen
In the context of the prevailing economic thinking which encouraged the state to don 
the mantle of industrial development, there was also the perceived weakness of 
African businessmen.145 Studies conducted in the 1950s appeared to confirm their 
entrepreneurial deficiencies. For example, Peter Garlick conducted research into 
African traders between 1957 and 1962 and concluded that their potential for long­
term accumulation was low:
the problems of finding business associates and reliable subordinates, the 
demands of the family, and indeed the whole social structure and ethos 
reinforced this tendency to keep business to within the size which one man 
could manage and, what was at least as important, to cream off profits into 
areas where they could not be lost.146
The government knew of Garlick’s work in the 1950s,147 with the McCarthy
Commission (p. 121) drawing on it.148 These perceived deficiencies explain, in
part, the government’s reluctance to aid African businesses. Thus, in 1959, the
Minister of Finance, Gbedemah, defended his government’s record on small industry
promotion, charging that African businessmen ‘should not expect assistance from the
Government all the time when they are so obviously not doing those things which will
mean that they are helping themselves*.149
In addition, the move towards a one-party state meant that, for Nkrumah,
small-scale industrialists became an liability not an asset. According to a government
report on small industries in 1959, small industry promotion helped ‘to develop a
middle class group of independent, smaller businessmen ... a desirable and much
needed element in a society which values democratic self-rule’.150 Therefore, after
1960, small industry promotion lay at odds with Nkrumah’s wider political objective
145 Esseks, ‘Government and Private Enterprise’, p. 15.
146 Peter C. Garlick, African Traders and Economic Development in Ghana (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1971), p. 139.
147 Esseks, ‘Economic Independence’, p. 254.
148 IRS ADM 2616 (original file number C2500), ‘The Report of the Chairman of the Committee 
on Aid to Ghanaian Business’, p. 5.
149 Ghana, Parliamentary Debates, vol. 14, 19/2/1959-20/3/1959, col. 296, K.A. Gbedemah, 
Minister of Finance, Summing up Debate of the Second Development Plan, 5/3/1959.
150 NAGA RG 7/1/260, P.S. Wright, ‘Small Scale Industrial Development in Ghana’ (1959), p.
37.
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of creating a one-party state.
Modernization and Urgency
The government’s development plans had a sense of both modernization and urgency,
and these factors also worked against a comprehensive package of assistance to small
industries. On countless occasions, Nkrumah made explicit his desire to modernize
Ghanaian society completely. In his speech to the nation on the inauguration of the
Republic in 1960, Nkrumah argued that:
Our plan ... must be to build up industries, heavy and basic, and to diversify 
and mechanise our agriculture, and we must do this with the utmost speed ... 
our nation must throw in everything into this economic and social revolution, 
and make sure that Ghana comes out a winner. We must fight relentlessly 
to uproot backward conceptions and negative phenomena.151
The CPP’s Programme of 1961 observed that ‘Electricity and steel make the modem
industrialised state*.152 In the foreword to the Seven Year Plan of 1963, Nkrumah
argued that the Plan represented ‘a programme of social and economic development
based on the use of science and technology to revolutionise our agriculture and our
industry*.153 In such a strive for modernization, small-scale units of production
with their manual power, rudimentary tools and basic management practices
inevitably were ‘considered to be signs of under-development and backwardness’,154
and therefore unworthy of government assistance.
The urgency with which the government pursued its development agenda also
worked against small industry support. Before independence, the CPP had won
popular support by promising that there would be a substantial increase in living
standards after independence.155 After 1957, the pressure mounted on the Nkrumah
151 ‘Speech to the Nation on the Inauguration of the Republic, 1 July I960’, in S. Obeng (ed.), 
Selected Speeches o f Dr Kwame Nkrumah, First President o f the Republic o f Ghana (Accra: Advance 
Press, n.d.), p. 93.
152 CPP, Programme for Work and Happiness, para. 87.
153 Office of the Planning Commission, Seven Year Development Plan: A Brief Outline (Accra: 
Government Printing Department, 1963), foreword.
154 A.K. Appiah, ‘Lending to Small Scale Enterprises (SSE)’, Journal of the Ghana Institute of 
Bankers, 2 (1987) no. 2, p. 1.
155 CPP, Towards the Goal, p. ix.
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government to deliver on this promise.156 Moreover, Nkrumah wanted to prove to
other countries still under colonial rule that independence was the panacea for
Africa’s economic backwardness. As Nkrumah is alleged to have said, ‘every
African who visited Ghana ... should be made to see the fruits of independence’.157
Thus, the pace of development policy was stepped up. A British trade
delegation, which visited the Gold Coast in 1958, observed that an ‘overwhelming
and infectious sense of urgency has built-up in Ghana to accelerate the tempo of
industrialisation’.158 Nkrumah remarked in 1961 that:
Modem life has become so complex that we can no longer rely on the stone 
implements and simple tools which were adequate for the needs of our 
ancestors ... we must move swiftly from the stone age to the age of the atom.
What has taken other peoples and nations centuries to achieve, we have to 
carry out in a decade.159
On another occasion, Nkrumah is said to have remarked, ‘We are running against
time in Africa ... we must also in the shortest possible time attempt to catch up with
modem techniques’.160
With this in mind, it is understandable that the government preferred large-
scale, prestige projects, which were tangible signs of progress (such as the Volta
River Project) to programmes of small industry development. In the ‘overwhelming
and infectious sense of urgency* of the 1960s there was little concern for small-scale
industries.
Limits on the Lobbying Capacity o f African Businessmen
Although it has been argued that African businessmen had the capacity to lobby the 
government for assistance (p. 123), it is evident that this became limited over time. 
From around 1960, some of the champions of the African businessmen’s cause
156 Frimpong-Ansah, Vampire State, p. 75.
157 K. Nkrumah, quoted in Frimpong-Ansah, ibid., p. 76.
158 Board of Trade, United Kingdom Trade and Industrial Mission, p. 10.
159 ‘Speech by Osagyefo at his Installation as First Chancellor of the Kwame Nkrumah University 
of Science and Technology, Kumasi, during the Inauguration of the University, 29 November, 1961’, 
in Obeng, Selected Speeches, p. 166.
160 The Editors of Panaf Books, Forward Ever. The Life o f Kwame Nkrumah (London: Panaf 
Books, 1977), pp. 43-4.
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were removed from positions of political influence. P.K.K. Quaidoo, the Minister 
of Commerce and Industry, and Kojo Botsio, the Minister of Economic Affairs, both 
prominent supporters of African business, were demoted to less influential Cabinet 
posts.161 The lobbying capacity of African businessmen was reduced further 
following Nkrumah’s ‘Dawn Broadcast* of April 1961, when he prohibited Members 
of Parliament from undertaking any industrial or commercial activities.162 
According to Nkrumah, the purpose of this move was to prevent government officials 
from exploiting their positions for ‘personal gain or for the amassing of wealth’.163 
The most famous casualty of the ‘Dawn Broadcast* was Komla Gbedemah, the 
businessman and Finance Minister, who was forced to resign from the Cabinet in 
September 1961.164 W.A. Wiafe, the prominent Kwahu businessman, CPP Member 
of Parliament for Kwahu South and outspoken critic of the government’s policy 
towards African business (p. 123), was imprisoned without trial under the Preventive 
Detention Act.165
The harassment of the opposition from the late 1950s, and the establishment 
of the one-party state in 1964, reduced the lobbying capacity of African businessmen 
even more. The one-party state reserved political decision-making for the CPP 
leadership and, by consequence, for Nkrumah himself.166 Therefore, the ability of 
African businessmen to influence policy-making was curbed drastically.
To return to the Iliffe schema of state-private capitalist relations (pp. 26-27), it would 
appear that the Nkrumah state was both ‘nurturist’ and ‘suppressive’ in its dealings 
with small-scale industries. There were times when the regime spoke in favour of
161 Esseks, ‘Economic Independence’, pp. 88-9.
162 Nkrumah, Dawn Broadcast, pp. 2-3.
163 Ibid., p. 2.
164 K.A. Gbedemah, It will not be ‘Work and Happiness for All!’. An Open Letter. Being also an 
appeal to D r Kwame Nkrumah (First President of the Republic o f Ghana) and comment on, and 
criticism of the proposed new 7 year Ghana Development Plan by K.A. Gbedemah (Ghana’s former 
Finance Minister). Submitted and Published on September 29,1962 (no publication details), appendices 
a and b, pp. 29-30.
165 Garlick, African Traders, p. 121.
166 Esseks, ‘Government and Private Enterprise’, p. 19.
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them and took steps to encourage them. However, most of the time, the state ignored
the case for small industry promotion, spoke out against local industrialists and
encouraged the state and foreign-owned sectors instead.
To be sure, small industries were not ostracized to the same extent as large
Ghanaian industrialists. In March 1961, Nkrumah expressed his unequivocal hostility
to this sector, noting:
The only form of private enterprise to which my Government is not prepared 
to give any positive encouragement is large-scale private investment by 
Ghanaian nationals ... We do not want to encourage Ghanaian capitalism in 
Ghana. Ghanaians can invest their money without being capitalists.167
Nonetheless, this chapter has demonstrated that the conclusion that the state was
consistently and unwaveringly hostile towards Ghanaian private business cannot be
sustained, at least with regard to the state's relationship with small-scale industries.
167 NAGA RG 7/1/1956, ‘Speech by President of Ghana at the West Africa Committee Dinner on 
14 March, 1961’.
6 ‘NURTURE CAPITALISM’, 1966-72
1966 marked the beginning of an era of profound political turbulence in Ghana, with 
seven different governments, five of them military, ruling between then and 1992. 
In the period from 1966 to 1972 there were two governments. Initially, there was 
the army and police regime of the National Liberation Council (NLC) under the 
leadership of General Joseph Ankrah and later Lieutenant-General Akwasi Afrifa. 
In 1969, the NLC transferred power to the democratically-elected civilian government 
of Professor Kofi Busia’s Progress Party (PP). In January 1972, the PP itself was 
ousted in another military coup d ’etat.
Studies have tended to treat the years 1966 to 1972 as one distinct era in 
Ghanaian history, even though there were two governments.1 There is some 
justification for doing this, because both the NLC and PP followed economic policies 
which were liberal in comparison to those of Nkrumah and those of the military after 
1972. For this reason, the years 1966 to 1972 are considered together in this chapter.
Most post-1966 internal government documents are still closed to the public. 
Therefore, this chapter broadens the discussion to include the state’s dealings with the 
private sector (p. 31). Section One outlines conventional interpretations of the state’s 
relationship with small-scale industries and the private sector. Sections Two and 
Three examine this relationship in more detail, using published primary sources as 
well as the little archival material which is available. Section Four analyzes the 
forces that shaped government policy during these years. The chapter’s central 
argument is that a comprehensive policy to assist Ghanaian businessmen evolved after 
1966. Generally, this assistance was limited to small-scale businessmen in the service 
sector; small-scale industries received little government aid. Nevertheless, there was 
a clear break from the policies of the Nkrumah years.
1 Jonathan H. Frimpong-Ansah, The Vampire State in Africa. The Political Economy of Decline 
in Africa (London: James Currey, 1991), pp. 99-107. Tony Killick, Development Economics in Action. 
A Study o f Economic Policies in Ghana (London: Heinemann, 1978), ch. 11. Douglas Rimmer, 
Staying Poor. Ghana’s Political Economy, 1950-1990 (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1992), ch. 6.
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6.1 Historiography
Although there has been research into general industrial policy during the NLC-PP 
era,2 there has not been any specific analysis of the state and its relationship with 
small-scale industries. The one exception is Hart’s work on Accra’s informal sector 
in the early 1970s,3 which included occasional references to small industries.4 Hart 
argued, in an implicit attack on the inadequacy of Ghanaian government support for 
small enterprises at the time, that ‘attention to "indigenous” as well as Western forms 
of economic organization [should be] incorporated into the plans which are adopted 
by the governments of less developed countries’.5
There is a larger historiography on the state and its relationship with the 
private sector. There are generally two views. On the one hand, Esseks argues that 
the NLC and PP encouraged private sector development.6 Esseks asserts that, while 
the later Nkrumah years saw ‘state expansion at the expense of private enterprise*,7 
economic policy between 1966 and 1969 was characterized by ‘state sector 
retrenchment and promotion of Ghanaian business’.8 Hence, according to Esseks, 
1966 represented a ‘very marked’ break with the policies of the past:9 the state’s 
share of fixed capital formation fell from 66 per cent in 1965 to only 20 per cent by 
1968;10 private Ghanaian firms were given easier access to public building contracts 
and foreign exchange.11
Against this, Frimpong-Ansah, Killick and Rimmer contend that general
2 Frimpong-Ansah, ibid. Killick, ibid. Rimmer, ibid.
3 Keith Hart, ‘Small-Scale Entrepreneurs in Ghana and Development Planning’, Journal of 
Development Studies, 6 (1970) no. 4, pp. 104-20. Keith Hart, ‘Informal Income Opportunities and 
Urban Employment in Ghana’, Journal o f Modem African Studies, 11 (1973) no. 1, pp. 61-89.
4 Hart, ‘Informal Income’, ibid., pp. 68-9.
5 Hart, ‘Small-Scale Entrepreneurs’, p. 118.
6 J.D. Esseks, ‘Economic Policies’, in Dennis Austin and Robin Luckham (eds.), Politicians and 
Soldiers in Ghana 1966-1972 (London: Frank Cass, 1975), pp. 37-61.
7 John D. Esseks, ‘Government and Indigenous Private Enterprise in Ghana’, Journal o f Modem  
African Studies, 9 (1971) no. 1, p. 22.
8 Ibid., p. 24.
9 Esseks ‘Economic Policies’, p. 51.
10 Economic Survey, 1968, pp. 120-3, cited in ibid., p. 46.
11 Esseks, ibid., p. 47.
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economic policy changed relatively little after 1966. Frimpong-Ansah concedes that 
the NLC and PP sought fundamental economic reform, but suggests that they were 
thwarted by the ‘entrenched* Nkrumah state.12 Killick writes that ‘there remained 
much continuity after 1966; attempts to move towards the greater use of the market 
mechanism were half-hearted and partial’.13 According to Rimmer, the years 1966- 
72 represented ‘reform at half-cock*,14 implying that economic policies changed, but 
not radically.
There is some evidence that the policies of state-led industrialization and 
economic autarky continued after 1966. Of the 53 public enterprises in existence at 
the end of 1965, 43 remained wholly state-owned at the end of 1971, and 5 new state 
enterprises had been created.15 Nevertheless, although general economic policy may 
have changed little after 1966, policy towards the private sector and small-scale 
industries did change quite considerably. The next section starts to explain why.
6.2 NLC Policy
Public Rhetoric
The NLC voiced support for the private sector and a desire to roll back the economic
frontiers of the state on numerous occasions. For instance, in March 1966, just a
month after the coup, General Ankrah argued that ‘all existing corporations will be
reviewed as a matter of urgency and some of the corporations turned back to the
private sector*.16 Unlike before 1966, when numerous benefits had been showered
on state industries, Ankrah promised:
... fair treatment between the four sectors of our economy [private, 
private/public, state, co-operative]. Healthy competition will be encouraged 
to the advantage of the national economy. The National Liberation Council
12 Frimpong-Ansah, Vampire State, p. 99.
13 Killick, Development Economics, p. 58.
14 Rimmer, Staying Poor, ch. 6.
15 Killick, Development Economics, p. 313.
16 ‘Broadcast by the Chairman of the National Liberation Council on Wednesday 2 March, 1966’, 
in National Liberation Council, The Rebirth o f Ghana. Die End o f Tyranny (Accra: Ministry of 
Information, n.d.), p. 34.
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has no plans for nationalization.17
With regard to the promotion of Ghanaian private enterprises, General Ankrah 
pledged that:
... every effort and encouragement will be given to Ghanaians to organise 
themselves better and more efficiently so that they will be able to assume an 
increasingly large share of the sector.18
Within this general rhetoric of private sector promotion, small industries were
targeted for particular attention. The NLC’s Two Year Development Plan of 1968
acknowledged that there were small-scale industries which were ‘economically viable*
but held back by ‘institutional difficulties’. These industries offered ‘promising areas
for government to promote entrepreneurship’, through credit provision and training
programmes. The Plan promised that the NLC would prepare a ‘comprehensive
programme for the development of small industries’.19
To be fair, this apparent support did not mean that the state would take no
major role in industrial development at all. As the NLC suggested in 1969, there was
justification for government participation in public utilities, industries of ‘strategic
importance* and infant industries.20 Also, the NLC’s general support for the private
sector was tempered by an occasional high-handedness, particularly when the
regime’s popularity was threatened. To a large extent, this popularity rested on the
NLC’s ability to fill the shops with consumer goods, generate jobs for the expanding
labour force and keep prices low. When these objectives were endangered, the NLC
did not shirk from blaming the private sector and threatening to interfere in its
activities. Thus, in a speech to businessmen in March 1966, E.N. Omaboe, the
Chairman of the NLC’s National Economic Committee, pledged to close down any
factory which did not produce goods of a high standard:
we want you to produce goods of high quality. The Ghanaian consumer likes 
good things ... the NLC will not hesitate to order the closing down of any 
factory which cannot justify its existence by producing high quality goods at
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid., p. 33.
19 Ghana, Two Year Development Plan: From Stabilization to Development; A Plan for the Period 
Mid-1968 to Mid-1970 (Accra: State Publishing Corporation, 1968), pp. 55-6.
20 Ghana, Ghana’s Economy and Aid Requirements, January, 1969-June 7970(Accra-Tema: Ghana 
Publishing Corporation, n.d.), p. 7.
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reasonable and competitive prices.21 
Moreover, Omaboe argued that, in return for government assistance, businesses 
should not shed jobs. According to Omaboe, there was an ‘informal standstill 
understanding’ on this matter. If business broke this agreement, then the state would 
act accordingly.22 Following the devaluation of the cedi in 1967, Brigadier Afrifa, 
the NLC Commissioner for Finance, displayed similar high-handedness when he 
threatened ‘stem action in defence of the people of this country’ against businessmen 
who were found ‘profiteering from the change in the exchange rate at the expense of 
the general public*.23
However, despite these instances, what is striking is the general consistency 
with which the NLC’s public rhetoric favoured private sector development. A similar 
consistency is evident in the NLC’s private language.
Private Language
The limited archival material which is available suggests that, behind the scenes, the 
NLC’s private language was congruous with its professed public support for small 
industry promotion.
First, offers of foreign assistance for small industry development were sought 
out and followed up. In 1967, the NLC approved the Chief Industrial Promotion 
Officer’s application to attend a symposium on small-scale industries in Denmark.24 
In 1966 and 1967, the Ministry of Industries, working on its own initiative, registered 
interest in small industry development courses in the Netherlands, Japan, and 
India.25
21 ‘Meeting of E.N. Omaboe, Chairman of the National Economic Committee, with Businesses, 
12 March, 1966’, in Ghana, Rebuilding the National Economy (Accra: State Publishing Corporation, 
1966), p. 12.
22 Ibid.
23 ‘Radio Announcement by Brigadier A. A. Afrifa, NLC Member and Commissioner of Finance, 
8 July, 1967’, in Ghana, New Deal For Ghana’s Economy (Accra: State Publishing Corporation, n.d.), 
p. 4.
24 NAGA RG 7/1/1354, G.G. Mortty, Secretary of the National Liberation Council, to the 
Principal Secretary, Ministry of Industries, 8/3/1967.
25 NAGA RG 7/1/1354, R. Quist-Arcton for the Principal Secretary, Ministry of Industries, to the 
Principal Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 25/4/1967. NAGA RG 7/1/1354, J.F. Halm, for the 
Principal Secretary, Ministry of Industries, to the Principal Secretary, Establishment Secretariat,
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This attempt to identify sources of foreign assistance for small industry
development was a direct result of a shift in general government policy. According
to J. Therson-Cofie, the Principal Secretary at the Ministry of Industries, the
Nkrumah government:
... decided to embark upon a programme for the development of rural 
industries. At the time of the decision the policy was that these industries 
were all to be state-operated and controlled. General government policy has 
changed with the change of government, and the attitude now favours the 
establishment of small industries by nationals of this country.26
This new interest in foreign assistance for small enterprise development was in stark
contrast to Ministry of Industry policy before 1966, when offers of foreign assistance
were rejected (p. 121).
Second, after 1966, there was a fundamental reconsideration of the small
industry development strategy of the past. Nkrumah’s policy of creating state-owned
small industries and then transferring them to the co-operative sector (p. 120) was
dismissed as unworkable, with one official of the Ministry of Industries writing:
... in 1965 the ousted regime created a Ministry of Rural Industries and 
charged it with the responsibility of establishing, by totalitarian means, a 
large number of small resource-based industries in the rural areas of the 
country. The experience over two years of operation has shown that it is 
uneconomic to operate small industries as state-owned enterprises. Due to 
several disadvantages and difficulties inherent in their smallness, small 
industries tend to demand personal interest, closer attention to detail, the 
mastery of special skills and a special method of administrative handling.27
In a similar shift in policy, the Chief Industrial Promotion Officer reasoned that the
state should equip Ghanaian entrepreneurs with the skills necessary for successful
small business development. To do this, the Ministry of Industry’s own
administrative capacity had to be improved:
To encourage participation of Ghanaians in industrial development of the 
country, therefore, amounts to stimulating the development of Ghanaian 
entrepreneurship. To accomplish this objective, it is necessary for the 
Ministry of Industries to provide the kind of staff trained in the special
5/7/1967. NAGA RG 7/1/504, Minister of Industries?, ‘Draft memorandum to the Economic 
Committee of the N.L.C. on Training in India in Small Industry Promotion’, n.d., but probably 1966.
26 NAGA RG 7/1/504, Application of Mr. J. Therson-Cofie, the Principal Secretary, Ministry of 
Industries, for the Small Industry Training Course in Hyderabad, India, n.d., but probably 1966.
27 NAGA RG 7/1/504, Minister of Industries?, ‘Draft memorandum to the Economic Committee 
of the N.L.C. on Training in India in Small Industry Promotion’, n.d., but probably late 1966.
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disciplines and techniques of small-scale industry promotion . . .28
The Harley Committee, the Major Report and Decree 323
The NLC’s public rhetoric was supported by concrete actions as well. In August
1966, the NLC established a committee to report on possible measures for Ghanaian
business promotion.29 This committee was chaired by G.C.K. Harley, a lecturer at
the University of Ghana’s School of Administration, and included a private
businessman and an official of the National Investment Bank.30 Its terms of
reference were to ‘investigate the problems which impede the progress of Ghanaian
Business’, and to ‘advise on what measures should be taken to provide advice and
assistance which can strengthen their management and production capabilities*.31
The Harley Committee spent more than six months collecting and analyzing
evidence. In the main, the committee was concerned with issues relating to Ghanaian
traders and industrialists were given only passing consideration. In its final report,
which was submitted to the government in April 1967, the committee concluded that
the underlying problem facing Ghanaian businessmen was foreign competition.32
This was because:
while the Ghanaian entrepreneur has been gradually increasing his expertise 
and capital funds, the relevant demands o f  international trade and domestic 
manufacturing activities have increased even more rapidly.
As a result, there was a growing ‘gap between the skill and capital o f  the Ghanaian and that
o f  his non-Ghanaian competitors’.33
In considering what measures the government could adopt to assist Ghanaian
businessmen, the committee warned that a careful path needed to be followed between
encouraging and over-assisting entrepreneurs. Any assistance programme should aid
Ghanaian businessmen in the ‘acquisition of improved competitive capabilities’, but
28 NAGA RG 7/1/1354, Minute by the Chief Industrial Promotion Officer to the P.S. (Principal 
Secretary, Ministry of Industries?), 28/8/1967.
29 NAGA ADM 5/3/166, Report o f Committee appointed by the National Liberation Council for  
the Promotion o f Ghanaian Business Enterprises (1967), pp. i-ii.
30 Ibid., p. ii.
31 Ibid., p. v.
32 Ibid., pp. vi-vii.
33 Ibid., p. vii.
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should not consist simply of government grants.34 First, the government should 
reserve wholesale and retail trading below a certain threshold to native-born 
Ghanaians.35 Although the committee did not specify a threshold, it did suggest that 
this should be quite low, because it was ‘in the smaller size enterprises that the entree 
is most needed’, while the continuation of open competition among larger enterprises 
preserved ‘the price competition needed to protect the consumer and the economy as 
a whole’.36 Second, Ghanaian businessmen should be given the opportunity of 
improving their management and technical expertise through a programme of 
government-subsidized education. This education would be through evening classes, 
one-off seminars and consultation services.37 Third, to increase credit flow to small 
businesses, the government, through the Central Bank, should create a Ghana 
Guarantee Fund, to guarantee small loans made by commercial banks to indigenous 
businessmen.38 Finally, Ghanaian businessmen engaged in the import trade should 
be assisted by quotas, among other things.39
The Harley Committee’s recommendation that the government provide 
management and technical education to Ghanaian businessmen was supported by Alan 
Major, an International Labour Office (ILO) specialist in small enterprise 
development.40 Following discussions between the NLC and the ILO in 1967, it 
was decided that the Ghanaian government needed a special advisor on small industry 
development. According to the ILO, this was because the NLC was trying to ‘rectify 
the omissions of the previous plans and give prominent attention to the development 
of small scale enterprises of local ownership’.41 Major was chosen as the special
34 Ibid., p. 33.
35 Ibid., ch. 2, pp. 2-3.
36 Ibid., p. 1.
37 Ibid., ch. 3, p. 8.
38 Ibid., ch. 5, pp. 18-9.
39 Ibid., ch. 6, pp. 22-6.
40 NAGA RG 7/1/504, G. Alan Major (I.L.O. Regional Adviser, Africa, Small Enterprise 
Development), ‘Report to the Republic of Ghana on the Development of Ghanaian Small Enterprises 
(1968)’.
41 NAGA RG 7/1/1354, Draft job description for a post of small-scale enterprises expert/adviser, 
in Marcel Latour, Resident Representative of the United Nations Development Programme, to H.P. 
Nelson, Principal Secretary, External Aid Division, Ministry of Economic Affairs, 3/2/1968.
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advisor and arrived in Ghana in December 1967.42 His brief was to report on the
situation regarding small enterprise development and to advise on possible measures
of assistance.43 Unlike the Harley Committee, Major focused on small-scale
industries.44 In his report, Major argued that, although the climate for small
enterprise development in Ghana had been negative in the past, policy had changed
substantially after 1966.45 However, to support small enterprises further, Major
recommended that the government establish a network of advice centres which could
provide an ‘integrated service* to small entrepreneurs.46
Most of the recommendations of the Harley Committee were accepted by the
NLC and incorporated into Decree 323 of 1968, the Ghanaian Enterprises Decree.47
This Decree reserved several sectors of the economy for Ghanaians from 1 July 1968,
including: retail trade with a turnover of up to 0500,000 per year; wholesale trade
with a turnover of up to 01 million per year; taxi services; manufacturer’s
representation; and other small-scale business defined as:
any establishment engaged in the extractive, processing, or manufacturing 
business, or in any other approved business (including transportation in 
Ghana) employing less than 30 persons (including working proprietors) and 
requiring simple unsophisticated production techniques and/or with a fixed 
capital investment o f  less than CIOO.OOO.48
Furthermore, the government promised to prompt foreign firms operating outside
reserved fields to offer participation to Ghanaians,49 and not to encourage foreign
businesses to enter trading of any sort.50
42 NAGA RG 7/1/1354, Marcel Latour, Resident Representative, United Nations Development 
Programme, to the Principal Secretary, Ministry of Industries, 12/2/1968.
43 NAGA RG 7/1/504, G. Alan Major (l.L.O. Regional Adviser, Africa, Small Enterprise 
Development), ‘Report to the Republic of Ghana on the Development of Ghanaian Small Enterprises 
(1968)’, pp. 1-2.
44 Ibid.
45 Ibid., p. 12.
46 Ibid., p. 21.
47 Ghana, Government Policy on the Promotion of Ghanaian Business Enterprises (Accra: State 
Publishing Corporation, 1968).
48 Ibid., para. 9.
49 Ibid., para. 14.
50 Ibid., para. 11.
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In addition to this policy of reservation, Decree 323 outlined a programme of 
education, credit and institutional support, so as to create ‘a comprehensive and 
integrated programme of assistance to Ghanaian businessmen*.51 The Management 
Development and Productivity Institute (MDPI), created with United Nations 
Development Programme and ILO assistance in 1967,52 was to offer training 
programmes, while ‘development centres* were to be established in major towns.53 
To help Ghanaian businessmen acquire credit, plans were mooted for a Stock 
Exchange to ‘provide an effective channel through which Ghanaian savers and 
investors can pool together scarce financial resources for the establishment of new 
business concerns*.54 To develop the institutional framework for business support, 
the Ministry of Industry’s Small Industries Division would be strengthened, and a new 
‘Special Division* within the Ministry of Economic Affairs would be created.55
The Effectiveness o f NLC Policy
Compared to the late Nkrumah era, the NLC years do mark a distinct new period, 
and in two ways. On the one hand, the Nkrumah government typically refused to 
support Ghanaian private businessmen (Chapter Five). By contrast, more often that 
not, the NLC’s rhetoric was in favour of private sector development. On the other 
hand, the NLC’s policy of reservation marked a clear break with past policies. As 
early as 1957, W.A. Wiafe, the Convention People’s Party (CPP) Member of 
Parliament for Kwahu South, had lobbied the government for trade reservation, 
arguing:
What do we need? We need trade protection ... Since 1951 when this
Government came into power not a single legislation has been passed to
51 Ibid., para. 19.
32 W.H. Thomi and P.W.K. Yankson, Small Scale Industries and Decentralization in Ghana. A
Preliminary Report on Small Scale Industries in Small and Medium Sized Towns in Ghana (Legon:
Department of Geography, University of Ghana, 1985), p. 87.
33 Ghana, Government Policy on Promotion, para. 22.
54 Ibid., para. 28.
33 Ibid., para. 30.
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protect the African merchants in this country.56 
The McCarthy Committee on Aid to Ghanaian Businessmen had also recommend 
trade reservation in 1959 (p. 121). However, despite Nkrumah*s professed 
nationalism, Ghanaian businessmen had received no such assistance and the 
government’s small industry promotion programme had been weak and ineffective.
To be sure, after 1966, policy took time to develop and government initiatives 
were slow to materialize. Hence, as late as 1968, an official at the Ministry of 
Industries felt that ‘a clear-cut policy and programme in small Ghanaian enterprises 
dev. is long over due*.57 In the same year, an ILO initiative to develop local small 
businesses almost was passed on to another West African country, apparently because 
of government procrastination.58 As the frustrated Chief Industrial Officer fumed, 
‘this is a question I have raised ... many times. I have even put up brief papers on 
the subject, but no action was taken on them’.59
With regard to NLC policy towards the small industry sector in particular, 
there were a number of limitations. First, Decree 323*s impact was mainly on the 
trading sector; the industrial sector was affected only slightly. This is because, in the 
1960s, foreign industries were generally large-scale,60 with most having either 30 
or more workers or greater than 0100,000 in fixed capital. As a result, although 
Decree 323 is known to have assisted the Ghanaian spare parts industry,61 it is 
unlikely that it affected most small-scale industries since these were in Ghanaian 
hands already. In any case, it is likely that this measure was mitigated, in part, by 
the naturalization of hundreds of Levantines after 1967. According to one estimate,
56 Ghana, Parliamentary Debates, 1st series, vol. 6, 23/4/1957-12/7/1957 (Accra: Government 
Printing Department, n.d.), col. 582, W.A. Wiafe, CPP, Kwahu South, Consideration of the 1957-8 
Appropriation Bill, 6/6/1957.
57 NAGA RG 7/1/1354, R. Quist-Arcton to the Chief Industrial Promotion Officer, 12/2/1968.
58 NAGA RG 7/1/1354, R. Quist-Arcton to the Chief Industrial Promotion Officer, 15/3/1968.
59 NAGA RG 7/1/1354, J. Therson-Cofie, Chief Industrial Officer, to the Principal Secretary 
Ministry of Industries?, 15/3/1968.
60 A.N. Hakam, ‘Impediments to the Growth of Indigenous Industrial Entrepreneurship in Ghana: 
1946-1968’, The Economic Bulletin o f Ghana, 2 (1972) no. 2, pp. 9-10, 14.
61 Ghana, Parliamentary Debates. Official Report, 2nd series, vol. 3 (Accra: Ghana Publishing 
Corporation, n.d.), col. 1083, Mr. Alex Hutton-Mills, U.N.P., Ga, Debate on the Ghanaian Business 
(Promotion) Bill, Second Reading and Consideration, 23/6/1970.
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1,350 Syrians and Lebanese obtained Ghanaian nationality between 1967 and 1969,62 
thereby diminishing the effectiveness of the Decree’s provisions.
In addition, many of the initiatives promised by the NLC were never realized. 
The network of ‘development centres’ in major cities did not materialize until the 
Ghana Regional Appropriate Technology Industrial Service (GRATIS) project of the 
1980s. Major had estimated that such centres would cost only $1.85 million build,63 
but evidently, the NLC’s spending priorities lay elsewhere. Similarly, plans to create 
a Stock Exchange came to nothing, as did pledges to strengthen the Small Industries 
Division of the Ministry of Industries.
6.3 The Busia Years
Within two days of the 1966 coup, the NLC had pledged unequivocally to return
Ghana to a ‘duly constituted representative civil government as soon as possible*.64
To this end, elections were held in 1969. Two main parties contested these elections, 
Kofi Busia’s PP, and Komla Gbedemah’s National Alliance of Liberals (NAL). The 
PP emerged victorious with 105 of the 140 seats in Parliament65 and Busia became 
Prime Minister.
Public Rhetoric
During the election campaign, the PP made repeated pledges to change the political 
economy which had been inherited from the Nkrumah era. The party manifesto was 
politically liberal and laisser-faire in character, arguing both for the ‘absolute 
necessity’ of press freedom66 and for the liberalization of external trade.67 The
62 Ibid., col. 1102, Mr. Alex Hutton-Mills, U.N.P., Ga, Consideration Stage o f the Ghanaian 
Business (Promotion) Bill, 23/6/1970.
63 NAGA RG 7/1/504, G. Alan Major (I.L.O. Regional Adviser, Africa, Small Enterprise 
Development), ‘Report to the Republic of Ghana on the Development of Ghanaian Small Enterprises 
(1968)’, pp. 44-5.
64 NLC, Rebirth, p. 21.
65 Yaw Twumasi, ‘The 1969 Election’, in Austin and Luckham, Politicians and Soldiers, table I, 
p. 141.
66 Progress Party, The 1969 Manifesto, in Ray Kakrabah-Quarshie, Achievements o f the Progress 
Party, 1969-1971 (Accra: Bekumah Agencies, 1971), p. 45.
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manifesto emphasized the PP’s support for Ghanaian businessmen, noting that ‘a
vigorous internal trade predominantly in the hands of Ghanaians is essential to the
economic well-being of the country*.68 The manifesto continued:
THE PROGRESS PARTY affirms its support for and confidence in private
enterprise. Our government will constantly search for and devise other
schemes to promote, assist, reward and encourage private risk taking.69
To realize these objectives, the PP pledged to extend the NLC’s policy of
reservation,70 and planned a study into establishing a Trade and Development Bank
to ‘specialise in the provision of higher risk-loans especially to small-scale Ghanaian
businessmen*.71 In short, the PP’s manifesto had all the hallmarks of a ‘nurture
capitalist* party.
Unlike for previous periods, internal government documents are not available
to confirm whether the government’s private language matched its public rhetoric.
Nevertheless, the consistency with which the government voiced support for Ghanaian
businessmen, both during and after the election campaign, suggests that these
pronouncements were genuine. For instance, at the state opening of Parliament in
October 1969, Busia reiterated that his government was:
committed to a policy o f  helping Ghanaian businessmen to have a bigger and 
bigger share in the country’s trade and economic enterprises ... Appropriate 
measures, including financial backing, will be taken so that sons and 
daughters o f this country can take over this very important sector o f  our 
national economy.72
Likewise, the PP argued in 1970 that it sought to ‘ensure that Ghanaian enterprises 
receive the maximum encouragement’, so that there was ‘no excessive concentration 
or control by foreign enterprises in any economic sector’.73
In Parliament, the PP spoke out for small-scale enterprises and the private
67 Ibid., p. 43.
68 Ibid., p. 46.
69 Progress Party, The Progress Party Manifesto (Accra: New Times Press, 1969), p. 7.
70 Ibid., p. 8.
71 Quarshie, Achievements, p. 45.
72 ‘Address by Dr. K.A. Busia at the State Opening of the Second Republic’s First Parliament, 2 
October, 1969’, in E.D. Ziorklui, Ghana: Nkrumah to Rawlings (Accra: Em-Zed Books, 1988), p. 
148.
73 Ghana, Business Openings for All (Accra: Ministry of Information, n.d.), p. 8.
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sector on several occasions. In June 1970, the Ministerial Secretary at the Ministry 
of Finance and Economic Planning argued that the government was making a ‘strong 
effort to promote the growth of small-scale enterprises*.74 In August 1970, J.H. 
Mensah, the Minister of Finance and Economic Planning, observed that his 
government’s policies were ‘designed to stimulate the private sector principally by 
freeing it of a number of administrative constraints*.75
Therefore, in terms of public rhetoric towards small-scale industries and the 
private sector, the PP was very different from the government of Nkrumah, and 
almost identical to the NLC.
Act 334
Within two months of arriving in office, the PP began realizing its promise of 
increasing Ghanaian participation in the economy by demanding that all aliens without 
residence and work permits leave the country. As a result, 155,000 illegal aliens, 
mainly traders, artisans and labourers, left Ghana between December 1969 and April 
1970.76
However, the centrepiece of the Busia government’s private sector promotion 
policy was Act 334, the Ghanaian Business (Promotion) Act. This Act became law 
in August 1970, repealed NLC Decree 323, and had several features.77 In the 
wholesale and retail trade, aliens were prohibited from owning firms which either had 
a turnover of less than NC500,000 (as per the tax returns of the tax year 1967-68) or 
had not been in existence in the tax year 1967-8. This measure broadened the 
parameters of the reserved trading sectors which had been established by the 1968 
Decree (p. 142). In addition, aliens were excluded from selling in markets or from 
kiosks, petty trading and hawking, and were barred from providing overseas business
74 Ghana, Parliamentary Debates, 2nd series, vol. 3, cols. 673-4, Question from Mr. E.K. Narter- 
Olaga (on behalf of Miss Lydia Akanbodiipo, N.A.L., Sandema) to C.O. Nyanor, Ministerial 
Secretary, Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, 12/6/1970.
75 Ghana, Parliamentary Debates. Official Report, 2nd series, vol. 4 (Accra: Ghana Publishing 
Corporation, n.d.), col. 706, Budget introduced by J.H. Mensah, Minister of Finance and Economic 
Planning, 25/8/1970.
76 Esseks, ‘Economic Policies’, p. 50.
77 Ghana, Act 334. Ghanaian Business (Promotion) Act, 1970 (Accra-Tema: Ghana Publishing 
Corporation, n.d.), pp. 5-6.
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representation, taxi services and selling taxis under hire purchase. Commercial 
transportation by land, baking, printing (other than the printing of textiles), beauty 
culture, produce brokerage, advertising and publicity, as well as the manufacture of 
cement blocks were all reserved for Ghanaians. Finally, to oversee the execution of 
the Act, an Office for Business Promotion was created within the Ministry of Finance 
and a Ghanaian Enterprises Advisory Committee was established to advise the 
government on Ghanaian business promotion policy.78
In the industrial sector, the Act probably increased the scope of reservation. 
At first sight, this may seem a false conclusion: while Decree 323 had reserved for 
Ghanaians any ‘manufacturing business ... employing less than 30 persons ... and/or 
with a fixed capital investment of less than 0100,000*,79 Act 334 reserved only 
‘baking, printing (other than the printing of textiles) ... and the manufacture of 
cement blocks*.80 However, it has been noted already that since most foreign 
industrial firms were large-scale, they probably had fallen outside the provisions of 
Decree 323 anyway (p. 144). By contrast, the Act’s sector-specific approach to 
reservation affected all foreign industries in baking, printing and cement block 
manufacture.
It is worth considering the drafting and passage of the Ghanaian Business 
(Promotion) Bill in detail, because this helps to illuminate more clearly the PP’s 
policy. First, it is important to note the extent to which the business community was 
consulted in the formulation of the Act. Before 1966, the private sector had had only 
restricted access to government: during the colonial period, this had been limited 
mainly to expatriate interests (p. 82); during the Nkrumah period, the state virtually 
cut itself off from Ghanaian businessmen (Chapter Five). However, the PP’s 
approach was different. Some critics did claim that the party failed to consult the 
private sector adequately.81 However, Mensah defended his government’s record 
with specific reference to the formulation of the Business Promotion Act. As Mensah
78 Ghana, Business Openings for All, pp. 33-6.
79 Ghana, Promotion o f Ghanaian Business, para. 9.
80 Ghana, Act 334, p. 5.
81 NAGA RG 6/1/190, E.B.B. Ofori-Atta in Daily Graphic, 12/8/1970, cited in J.H Mensah, 
Minister of Finance and Economic Planning, to the Editor, the Daily Graphic, 19/8/1970.
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observed:
numerous Ghanaian businessmen made known their views during the period 
when the act was being drafted through direct representation to me, through 
their members o f  Parliament and through my colleagues in the Cabinet, not 
excluding the Prime Minister who was in touch with a wide range o f  opinion 
in the business community.82
Second, the bill was introduced to Parliament in an unorthodox manner. 
Instead of a White Paper being published in advance, the government opted to by-pass 
the White Paper stage and introduce the bill straight to the House.83 This unusual 
step was taken in order to bring forward the bill’s enactment. This suggests that 
Ghanaian business promotion was indeed a top priority for the PP. Moreover, the 
Act was one of only six pieces of major legislation during the PP years.84 Again, 
this confirms that Ghanaian business promotion was important for the party.
Third, the general contents of the bill received cross-party support,85 although 
there was criticism of some specific aspects. One was the Minister’s executive power 
to exempt businessmen from the provisions of the Act. According to R.T. Seglah, 
the NAL member for Anlo, such executive power was likely to lead to speculation 
and corruption.86 Another point of disagreement was the parameters of the 
reservation policy. Several members of Parliament argued that more manufacturing 
industries should be reserved. F.A. Cobbah contended that the manufacture of 
baskets, furniture, hand bags and travel goods should be reserved since their 
production did ‘not need any complicated machinery, and Ghanaians are known to be 
operating these efficiently’.87 Another Member called for the manufacture of soap,
82 Mensah, ibid.
83 Ghana, Parliamentary Debates, 2nd series, vol. 3, col. 1048, J.H. Mensah, Minister of Finance 
and Economic Planning, Second Reading and Consideration Stage of the Ghanaian Business 
(Promotion) Bill, 23/6/1970.
84 ‘Legislation for Social Change’, in Quarshie, Achievements, pp. 4-5.
85 Ghana, Parliamentary Debates, 2nd series, vol. 3, col. 1061, Dr. G.K. Agama, the Leader of 
the Opposition, Debate on the Ghanaian Business (Promotion) Bill, 23/6/1970.
86 Ibid., col. 1070, Mr. R.T. Seglah, N.A.L., Anlo, Debate on the Ghanaian Business (Promotion) 
Bill, 23/6/1970.
87 Ibid., col. 1108, Mr. F.A. Essel Cobbah, P.P., Gomoa Assin-Ajumako, Consideration Stage 
of the Ghanaian Business (Promotion) Bill, 23/6/1970.
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cloth, garments, bed sheets and pillow cases to be set aside for Ghanaians,88 asking:
The manufacturing o f  these items ... does not require any special technical 
knowhow. W e have tailors, we have the machinists and we have the brains 
... Why should we leave these small industries to those Lebanese, Syrians 
and Indians when these could be done in our backyard? Why?89
There were also demands for Ghanaians to have the exclusive right to engage in tyre
remoulding and vulcanization, and the manufacture of cosmetics, polythene bags, ice
blocks and distilled water.90 However, the government voted down these apparently
reasonable demands, with Mensah arguing that ‘When we see where we are going we
can re-plan*.91
Credit Schemes and Business Promotion Schemes
The policy of reservation under Act 334 was part of a wider package of Ghanaian 
business support, encompassing credit provision for small businesses, the creation of 
a small industries centre in Tema, the strengthening of the MDPI and enhanced 
vocational training.
The two main pillars of the government’s credit provision programme were 
the Bank of Ghana’s Credit Guarantee Scheme and the Small Business Credit Scheme. 
The Credit Guarantee Scheme was established in December 1969,92 and provided 
commercial banks with a guarantee of up to 66.6 per cent of any amount that they 
lent to small businessmen (small defined as those requiring loans under NC75,000) 
engaged in agriculture, the extractive industries, transportation, manufacturing and 
trading.93 For those Ghanaians who were taking over alien enterprises, a further
88 Ibid., col. 1112, Mr. Bliss Ackuaku, N.A.L., Dzodze, Consideration Stage of the Ghanaian 
Business (Promotion) Bill, 23/6/1970.
89 Ibid.
90 Ibid., col. 1115, Mr. P.K.K. Quaidoo, A.P.R.P., Amenfi, Consideration Stage of the Ghanaian 
Business (Promotion) Bill, 23/6/1970.
91 Ibid. , col. 1108, Mr. J.H. Mensah, Minister of Finance and Economic Planning, in reply to Mr. 
F.A. Essel Cobbah, P.P., Gomoa Assin-Ajumako, Consideration Stage of the Ghanaian Business 
(Promotion) Bill, 23/6/1970.
92 Ibid. , C.O. Nyanor, Ministerial Secretary, Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning to Mr. 
E.K. Narter-Olaga (on behalf of Miss Lydia Akanbodiipo, N.A.L., Sandema), 12/6/1970.
93 NAGA RG 6/1/189, Enclosure to letter from J.S. Addo, Deputy Governor of the Bank of 
Ghana, to C.O. Nyanor, Ministerial Secretary, Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, 
11/8/1970.
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8.33 per cent of the value of the loan was guaranteed by the government.94 The 
initial sum allocated to the Credit Guarantee Scheme was NC6.5 million.95 It was 
hoped that this guarantee facility would make commercial banks more amenable to 
lending to small enterprises.
The Small Business Credit Scheme was established in December 1970, with 
a budget of NCI.5 million.96 According to the Minister of Finance and Economic 
Planning, the purpose of the Scheme was to ‘enable local businessmen with ability, 
drive, imagination and sound business ideas, but lacking adequate funds, to start 
business in a small way*.97 There were three categories of loan on offer: type ‘A* 
loans were below C500 and were administered by Regional Committees which were 
chaired by Regional Chief Executives; type ‘B’ loans were in excess of C500 and 
managed by a National Loans Committee; and so-called ‘Medium Term Loans* were 
above 050,000 and distributed directly by the Ministry of Finance.98 The terms and 
conditions of the loans were generous: interest rates were pegged at 6.5 per cent 
initially (against 14 per cent in the commercial banking sector) and repayment periods 
were typically 12 to 60 months (against 24 months for a commercial bank loan).99 
In addition, each region had a team of consultants to assist local businessmen. Each 
team comprised a professional accountant, a lawyer and a specialist in small business 
management.100
Alongside this attempt to increase the flow of credit to small Ghanaian 
businesses, the government embarked upon the creation of a Small-scale Industries
94 Ibid.
95 NAGA RG 6/1/190, J.H. Mensah, Minister of Finance and Economic Planning, to the Editor, 
Daily Graphic, 19/8/1970.
96 NAGA RG 6/1/189, ‘Press Release by the Minister of Finance and Economic Planning on the 
Small Business Credit Scheme (9/12/1970)’.
97 Ibid.
98 Ghana, Report o f the Commission of Enquiry into the Operations o f the Office o f Business 
Promotion and the Small Business Loans Scheme (Accra-Tema: Ghana Publishing Corporation, n.d.), 
p. 4.
99 Ibid., p. 3.
100 NAGA RG 6/1/189, ‘Press Release by the Minister of Finance and Economic Planning on the 
Small Business Credit Scheme (9/12/1970)’.
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Centre in Tema in 1970.101 This Centre was projected to cost NC80,000 and was 
financed by the Ghanaian government, the Government of India and multilateral 
donors.102 The purpose of the Centre was ‘to assume the role of an Industrial 
Research Centre to identify small industries which will be viable when established and 
to provide for their growth needs*.103 Meanwhile, the MDPI was instructed to 
focus its assistance on small businessmen,104 and was given a government grant of 
NC69,000 to establish a Ghanaian Business Bureau which would offer assistance to 
local businessmen.105 Finally, the National Vocational Training Institute (NVTI) 
was formed in 1969 with technical assistance from the United Nations Development 
Programme and the ILO.106 The NVTI was charged with standardizing the ‘in- 
plant’ training of apprentices and with expanding links between educators and 
employers,107 with the ultimate goal of adding to the industrial skills of the 
Ghanaian workforce.
The Effectiveness o f PP Policy
Clearly, the PP adopted several measures to assist Ghanaian businessmen. How 
effective were these in promoting the private sector and small industries?
It is clear that there were several positive developments. First, the 
government’s rhetoric expounded consistently the benefits of private sector 
development. It is difficult to find any occasion when the PP spoke critically of the
101 Ghana, Parliamentary Debates, 2nd series, vol. 4, col. 1195, Introduction to the Estimates of 
the Ministry of Trade, Industries and Tourism, R.A. Quarshie, Minister for Trade, Industries and 
Tourism, 9/9/1970.
102 Ibid., cols. 1195 & 1220.
103 Ghana, Parliamentary Debates. Official Reports, 2nd series, vol. 8 (Accra: Ghana Publishing 
Corporation, n.d.), col. 1138, Mr. R.A. Quarshie, Minister of Trade, Industries and Tourism, 
Introduction to the 1971/2 Estimates of the Ministry of Trade, Industries and Tourism, 3/9/1971.
104 Thomi and Yankson, Small Scale Industries, p. 87.
105 NAGA RG 6/1/190, G.A. Boateng, Chief Executive of the Office of Business Promotion, ‘First 
Report on Implementation of the Ghanaian Business (Promotion) Act’, dated 1/9/1970, but probably 
actually 1/9/1971, p. 4.
106 National Vocational Training Institute, What is the NVTI? (Accra: Public Relations Department 
of the NVTI, n.d.), p. 6.
107 Terrence S. Smutylo, ‘Apprenticeship in the Wayside Workshops of an Accra Neighbourhood’, 
Institute of African Studies, University of Ghana, MA, 1973, p. 14.
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private sector. Second, the Busia government extended the parameters of the NLC’s
reservation policy, particularly in the trading sector. In doing so, it gave a clear
signal to the business community that it sought to nurture Ghanaian entrepreneurship
where this was feasible. Ghanaian commentators and businessmen reacted with
gratitude. For instance, E.K. Adu, the PP Member of Parliament for Kwahu North,
told his colleagues in September 1970 that:
when some o f  us started our businesses, we had to struggle while 
unscrupulous aliens thrived, and the Government o f  the day looked on ... But 
now, it is the opposite. Our progressive Government is helping Ghanaian 
businessmen.108
Yao Dankyi-Awere, President of the National Crusade for Protection of Ghanaian
Enterprises, also commended the reservation policy. Writing to the Ministry of
Finance and Economic Planning in October 1970, Dankyi-Awere expressed:
. ..  tons o f  sincerest thanks to you, on behalf o f  all Ghanaian (small-scale) 
business operators, the direct victims o f  the aliens’ interferences, 
mischievousness, and dubious business practices.109
Third, the PP’s policy of credit provision to small Ghanaian businessmen via
the Small Business Credit Scheme had certain successes. According to some
members of the Anin Committee, which was formed in 1972 to investigate the
workings of the Small Business Credit Scheme:
the Scheme ... has enabled many dedicated Ghanaian business-minded people 
to start business from very modest beginning [«c], which are now booming.
But for the Scheme, they would have found it almost impossible to launch out 
successfully into a business career.110
Finally, the small industry centre in Tema, although not ready to contribute to small
industry development during Busia years, did form the basis for the highly successful
GRATIS project of 1980s and 1990s (pp. 206-208).
Yet although these policies made a positive contribution to the development
of small industries, it is also true that more could have been done, and that which was
done, could have been done better. The policy on reservation is a case in point. It
108 Ghana, Parliamentary Debates, 2nd series, vol. 4, col. 1235, Mr. E.K. Adu, PP Kwahu North, 
Estimates for 1970/1 of the Ministry of Trade, Industries and Tourism, 9/9/1970.
109 NAGA RG 6/1/189, Yao Dankyi-Awere, the National President o f the National Crusade for 
Protection of Ghanaian Enterprises, to Mr. C.O. Nyanor, Ministerial Secretary, Ministry of Finance 
and Economic Planning, 19/10/1970.
110 Ghana, Commission of Enquiry, p. 19.
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was observed earlier that reservation was limited mainly to the trade sector (pp. 147-
148). Two points are relevant here. First, the impact on the trade sector itself was
not expected to be substantial. Even by the government’s own estimate, only about
600 alien enterprises, employing 4,000 workers were to be affected by the Business
Promotion Act.111 Evidently then, the Act was not about a mass transfer of assets
from foreign to local businessmen.
Second, the impact of the Act on the industrial sector was limited. Hence, the
PP’s voting down of proposed amendments to the Business Promotion Act, which
would have extended the reservation policy further into the industrial sector, caused
much resentment. As P.K.K. Quaidoo told Parliament in March 1971:
. ..  the Ghanaian Business (Promotion) Act was restricted only to a small 
section ... Indigenous manufacturing industries have not got any provision for 
their encouragement or their promotion. People tell us, ‘It is the survival o f  
the fittest’. That is all right. Survival o f  the fittest, but they will find to 
their dismay that the fittest will always be foreigners.112
In other words, the Business Promotion Act was concerned only marginally with the
small industry sector.
Turning to the activities of the Small Business Credit Scheme, it is evident
that, despite some successes, this failed to make a major impact on the small-scale
industrial landscape and for three reasons: its orientation towards non-industrial
sectors; its concentration on large firms; and the corruption of the loans process. The
bulk of loans disbursed under the Scheme between 1970 and December 1973 went to
traders and transporters. These two sectors alone received NC8.3 million—or 81 per
cent—of the NC10.2 million which was loaned under the Scheme during this
period.113 At the same time, most loans were so large that they probably did not
involve small firms: between December 1970 and December 1973, only Cl.4 million
worth of loans under NC500 were disbursed to 5,294 successful applicants, while C8.4
111 Ghana, Burning Questions. Ghanaian Business Promotion (Act 334) (Accra: Ministry of 
Information, 1970), p. 9.
112 Ghana, Parliamentary Debates. Official Reports, 2nd series, vol. 6, no. 13 (Accra: Ghana 
Publishing Corporation, n.d.), col. 516, Mr. P.K.K. Quaidoo, Justice Party, Amenfi, Second Reading 
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113 Ghana, Report on the Role and Activities o f the Office o f Business Promotion, August 1970-June 
1974 (Accra: Ghana Publishing Division, n.d.), table I, pp. 11-2.
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million in loans above NC500 were distributed to 1,174 borrowers.114 Indeed, there 
was even a case of the Small Business Credit Scheme loaning 0350,000 to just one 
applicant.115 Thus, as the Anin Commission pointed out, ‘a loan of 0350,000 
granted to one person under the Small Business Loan Scheme can benefit 350 people 
if the upper limit is 01,000*.116 Finally, it was common knowledge that the loans 
process of the Small Business Credit Scheme had become corrupted.117 This 
corruption probably meant that undeserving candidates obtained loans at the expense 
of those who were in real need.
Similar charges of corruption were levelled against other institutions which 
disbursed loans to small businesses. The National Investment Bank appears to have 
attracted particular criticism, with one irate businessman, a Mr. Mensah of Accra, 
complaining:
I must be frank that I have all along resisted an attempt to part with a pesewa 
in a form o f  a bribe to any official working on my loan, and this is the major 
contributory factor leading to the refusal o f  my application ... Is it a fact that 
no one can obtain Investment Bank loan without offering a bribe?118
As a result, it is likely that genuinely needy small businessmen found it difficult to
receive much assistance with credit. As one writer in the Daily Graphic observed
during this time:
[I have] been in the business community for almost four years. I know those 
who are genuinely in need o f money for expanding their businesses, and 
these people never had the access to these monies. I know some people too, 
who have good training and good intentions and who wanted to receive this 
money and use it properly. Their hopes were shattered.119
In short, although government policies may have had a significant effect on
the development of Ghanaian entrepreneurship in trading, with regard to small-scale
industries specifically, the Busia government’s efforts were generally ineffective. In
114 ‘A Report on the Role and Activities of the Office of Business Promotion in the Implementation 
of the Ghanaian Business (Promotion) Act, 1970 (Act 334) From August, 1970 to December, 1973’, 
in Ghana, Report o f the Commission o f Enquiry, appendix A, table IV, p. 42.
115 Ghana, ibid., p. 6.
116 Ibid., p. 21.
117 Ibid., p. 12.
118 NAGA RG 6/1/189, E. de C. Mensah to the Prime Minister, Kofi Busia, 10/7/1970.
119 Peter Doe Dzilah, ‘Promotion of Indigenous Entrepreneurs’ p. 8, Supplement to Daily Graphic, 
4/1/1972.
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fact, some of the government’s actions actually harmed the small industry sector. A
case in point is the Manufacturing Industries Act of 1971. This Act required all
manufacturing industries to be registered with the government. According to the
Minister of Trade, Industries and Tourism, the Act was necessary ‘not only to ensure
the even distribution of manufacturing industries throughout the country but also to
ensure that our scarce resources are carefully husbanded*.120 However, the Act
probably had negative implications for small industries, since it introduced a new
level of bureaucracy and political control. As Mr. F.P. Segbefia surmised, during
the Second Reading of the Manufacturing Industries Bill:
If the Minister is allowed to take over control o f  our industries and have the 
power to issue licences, he may tend to use the power ... only in the interest 
o f  his party members, and he may even victimise the industrialists who do 
not share the same political views with the Government.121
6.4 Reasons for Policy
On balance, it would appear then that there was a clear shift in government policy 
towards Ghanaian business promotion after 1966. There may have been flaws in the 
new policy and small-scale industries may not have been affected significantly. 
Nonetheless, compared to the Nkrumah years, there was a clear change, at least in 
the government’s intentions. This section considers why this occurred.
The Failure o f Statism and the Pragmatic NLC
Nkrumah had sought state-led industrial development from the late 1950s, in part, 
because this was what development economists were recommending (p. 127). 
However, by 1966, it was quite clear that this strategy was not working. In fact, 
between 1960 and 1966, per capita income actually fell.122
120 Ghana, Parliamentary Debates, 2nd series, vol. 6, no. 13, col. 496, R.A. Quarshie, Minister 
of Trade, Industries and Tourism, Second Reading of the Manufacturing Industries Bill, 12/3/1971.
121 Ghana, Parliamentary Debates. Official Reports, 2nd series, vol. 6, no. 14 (Accra: Ghana 
Publishing Corporation, n.d.), col. 539, Mr. F.P. Segbefia, Justice Party, Avenour, Winding Up for 
the Opposition, Second Reading of the Manufacturing Industries Bill, 15/3/1971.
122 M.M. Huq, The Economy of Ghana. The First 25 Years since Independence (London: 
Macmillan, 1989), table A.2, p. 288.
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Therefore, with the Nkrumahan etatist model of industrial development
discredited,123 there was a general consensus that private sector-led industrialization
would be more effective. Hence both the main parties fighting the 1969 elections had
distinctly pro-business economic policies.124 This was the ideological background
within which the NLC’s policies were constructed.
After the coup, the NLC was quick to criticize Nkrumah*s political and
economic record. For example, in an address to the Nation on 28 February
1966—just four days after the coup—General Ankrah charged that Nkrumah:
took advantage o f  the pure faith o f  his people to establish by intimidation, 
exemplified in the pernicious weapon o f detention, a one-man dictatorship 
based on a so-called democratic centralism ... It was never anticipated nor 
was it the wish o f  the Ghanaian people that the powers o f  the State should 
derive from one man . . . 125
Moreover, Nkrumah had taken Ghana:
to the brink o f  economic disaster by mismanagement, waste and unwise 
spending. Incomes are falling, the cost o f  living is rising, unemployment has 
struck many families. The basic necessities o f  life are often either 
unavailable or can be obtained only at cut throat prices.126
To remedy the political situation, the NLC had a clear agenda. This was to
govern until the restoration of ‘true democracy based on the popular will of the
people, and not on the will of one man alone*.127 However, the regime did not
have such a clear economic agenda. According to Ankrah:
The National Economic Committee is carrying out a complete rethinking o f  
the economic set-up o f  the country and a major economic policy decision will 
be announced within the next few days.12*
The only definite economic policy was to ‘do everything to maintain the value of the
Cedi at its present level*.129
Therefore, given that statism had proved unsuccessful in the past and the NLC
123 Esseks, ‘Economic Policies’, p. 48.
124 Ibid., p. 51.
125 ‘Broadcast to the Nation by the Chairman of the National Liberation Council, Lt.-Gen. 
J.A.Ankrah, on Monday, 28 February, 1966’, in NLC, Rebirth, pp. 23-4.
126 Ibid., p. 24.
127 Ibid., p. 22.
128 Ibid., p. 26.
129 Ibid., p. 25.
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had little economic ideology, it is likely that a policy of private sector promotion was
the most pragmatic option for the NLC. The policy of promoting the Ghanaian
private sector was certainly popular. Foreigners still played a major part in the
country’s trading system and this was resented.130 The policy of Ghanaian business
promotion played to this sentiment. As a member of the NLC’s Executive Council
commented later, in relation to the Ghanaian Enterprises Decree:
It is no secret that this legislation was directed against the Lebanese and 
Indians ... They were here doing things which Ghanaians can easily do, like 
buying and selling goods. They came with little capital. They do not train 
Ghanaians to succeed them ... They are a serious drain on our balance o f  
payments with their personal remittance quotas, and they have been deeply 
involved in illegal transfers and currency smuggling.131
Busia and the Political Economy
For the PP, Ghanaian business promotion was a preferred policy for two reasons.
First, Busia, a distinguished social scientist in his own right,132 was convinced by
the economic arguments for small industry development. Speaking to the Legislative
Assembly during the debate on the Finance Bill for 1957-8, Busia had condemned the
Nkrumah government for trying to industrialize too quickly:
So they [foreign investors] come and start industries on a large scale and then 
tell us that in order to be successful in industry, we want the latest 
equipment, we want skill, we want the formation o f capital, we want 
managerial experience and things which we have not got. So they come here 
not only to start the industries but also to man them. This is where we are 
going wrong. We are going one step too far ... We want the Government to 
be able to assist small industries not just by lending them money, but by 
giving them equipment, technical supervision, training and enabling them to 
form capital. Then we shall be ready for larger schemes.133
In addition, the policy of Ghanian business development was a natural
corollary of the PP’s efforts to construct a democratic political system. According
130 Esseks, ‘Economic Policies’, p. 48.
131 Interviewed in Accra, July 1970 and cited in ibid.
132 K.A. Busia, Report on a Social Survey o f Sekondi-Takoradi (London: Crown Agent for the 
Colonies, 1950). K.A. Busia, The position of the chief in the modem political system of Ashanti. A 
study of the influence of contemporary social changes on Ashanti political institutions (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1951).
133 Ghana, Parliamentary Debates, 23/4/1957-12/7/1957, cols. 612-3, K.A. Busia, Consideration 
of the 1957-8 Appropriation Bill, 6/6/1957.
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to the PP, a democratic political system could not function without a strong capitalist
class. The PP alluded to this point on several occasions. In its manifesto for the
1969 elections, the Party pledged:
. .. maximum support for Ghanaian businessmen to ensure that Ghanaians 
themselves acquire greater stake in the economy o f  their own country and 
thus provide the economic basis for viable democracy in Ghana.134
In introducing the Second Reading of the Business Promotion Bill in 1970, the
Minister of Finance and Economic Planning returned to this theme, observing that the
‘spreading of ownership of business capital is one of the foundations of the
democratic system which we seek to establish in this country*.135 In the ensuing
debate on the bill, Dr. Jones Ofori Atta, the Ministerial Secretary at the Ministry of
Finance and Economic Planning, told Parliament that:
In my view , as has been said, no viable democracy can be created in this 
country if  the nationals o f  the country have no stake in maintaining and 
supporting the democratic system ... [the Ghanaian Business (Promotion) Bill 
represented] the economic underpinning for our system o f  government by 
ensuring that the people have deep economic stakes in the maintenance o f  
democracy.136
Thus, the promotion of Ghanaian business complemented closely the PP’s policy of 
creating and maintaining a democratic political system, just as the opposite had been 
true before 1966 (p. 129).
Interest Groups and the Post-1966 Political System
After 1966, the political system changed considerably. While Nkrumah had ejected 
businessmen from the political system following his ‘Dawn Broadcast’ (p. 132), many 
businessmen re-entered the political arena after the coup. From instance, P.K.K. 
Quaidoo was appointed Chairman of the Black Star Line in 1966. The businessman 
E.K. Dadson, who had been a Parliamentary Secretary from 1957-61, became 
Chairman of the State Gold Mining Corporation.137
134 PP, Progress Party Manifesto, p. 5.
135 Ghana, Parliamentary Debates, 2nd series, vol. 3, col. 1051, J.H. Mensah, Minister of Finance 
and Economic Planning, Second Reading and Consideration Stages of the Ghanaian Business 
(Promotion) Bill, 23/6/1970.
136 Ibid. , col. 1074, Dr. Jones Ofori Atta, Ministerial Secretary to the Ministry of Finance and 
Economic Planning, Debate on the Ghanaian Business (Promotion) Bill, 23/6/1970.
137 Esseks, ‘Economic Policies’, p. 49.
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Although the NLC suspended the Republican Constitution, dissolved the CPP 
and issued laws by decree,138 the political environment became considerably more 
open after 1966. This permitted old associations which had represented 
businessmen’s interests to be revived (like the Ghana Contractors’ Association), while 
new interest groups were formed, such as the Association of Ghanaian Businessmen, 
the Indigenous Ghanaian Manufacturers* Association and the Crusade for the 
Protection of Ghanaian Enterprises.139 The new political environment was clearly 
responsible for these developments: as Mrs. Esther Ocloo, President of the 
Indigenous Ghanaian Manufacturers* Association, remarked in 1970, her organization 
had been transformed from a ‘dinner club’ into a formal interest group in response 
to the Ghanaian Enterprises Decree and its promise of protection for ‘indigenous 
entrepreneurs’.140
Within this new political environment, Ghanaian businessmen lobbied
aggressively for support. In September 1967, Quaidoo renewed his calls for trade
protection, charging that:
under no circumstances should a foreign investor be encouraged directly or 
indirectly to permanently oust the citizen from the trade and industry o f  the 
country or to confine him to a narrow section o f it.141
The new climate of political openness not only allowed Ghanaian businessmen to
voice their interests, but also made the NLC more sensitive to them. A prime
example of this can be found in the case of an editorial from The Pioneer, in
September 1967, which criticized the NLC’s efforts at Ghanaian business promotion
and called for ‘substantial encouragement’ to be given to Ghanaian enterprises.142
Compared to the Nkrumah era, what is striking about this editorial is not only its
open criticism of the government, but also the fact that it actually had an effect on
policy itself. The editorial elicited a series of initiatives, and not just public rhetoric,
from officials within the Ministry of Industries. The Senior Industrial Promotion
138 NLC, ‘Proclamation’, 26/2/1966, in NLC, Rebirth, pp. 2-3.
139 Esseks, ‘Economic Policies’, p. 49.
140 Interview with Mrs. Esther Ocloo, Madina, Ghana, 10 July 1970, cited in ibid.
141 NAGA RG 7/1/1354, P.K.K. Quaidoo, in The Legon Observer, 15/9/1967.
142 NAGA RG 7/1/1354, Editorial from The Pioneer, 11/9/1967.
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Officer argued on the basis of it that:
It is my considered opinion that this Ministry should boldly formulate plans 
or proposals on entrepreneurial development and industrial extension service 
work in small-scale industries for consideration by the Government.143
In turn, this provoked the Chief Industrial Promotion Officer to observe, ‘I am
putting up proposals and recommendations for the development of Ghanaian
industries. This will be ready for consideration shortly’.144
Turning to the Busia years, there was again a clear relationship between the
democratic political system established in 1969 and the PP’s efforts to promote
Ghanaian business. Businessmen continued to return to politics in large numbers.
In 1969, Esther Ocloo ran for Parliament, together with E. Acquah-Harrison
(President of the Ghana Manufacturers’ Association), K. Amuah-Seki (Treasurer of
the Association of Ghanaian Businessmen) and J.C. Yeboah (Secretary of the Ghana
National Contractors* Association).145 In the post-‘Dawn Broadcast’ Nkrumah
period, all of these businessmen would have been barred from standing for office.
Moreover, like the NLC, the PP realized how popular the policy of Ghanaian
business promotion could be. Thus, the PP aimed to throw its populist net as widely
as possible by pledging support for both businessmen and businesswomen. As the
Party promised in its manifesto, it would ‘ENSURE that increasingly the control of
the economy shall be in the hands of Ghanaians (market-women and Ghanaian
businessmen)’.146 The PP’s actions after 1969 stemmed from its populist campaign
promises. In introducing the Ghanaian Business (Promotion) Bill to Parliament for
its Second Reading, the Minister of Finance and Economic Planning observed that the
bill followed from the PP’s specific manifesto pledge to ‘provide maximum support
for Ghanaian businessmen to ensure that Ghanaians themselves acquire greater stake
in the economy of their country’.147
143 NAGA RG 7/1/1354, R. Quist-Arcton, Senior Industrial Promotion Officer, to the Chief 
Industrial Promotion Officer, 18/9/1967.
144 NAGA RG 7/1/1354, Chief Industrial Promotion Officer to the PAS and PS, 18/9/1967.
145 Esseks, ‘Economic Policies’, p. 49.
146 PP, Progress Party Manifesto, p. 2.
147 Ghana, Parliamentary Debates, 2nd series, vol. 3, col. 1046, J.H. Mensah, Minister of Finance 
and Economic Planning, Second Reading and Consideration Stage o f the Ghanaian Business 
(Promotion) Bill, 23/6/1970.
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This chapter has used some new archival material, together with published sources, 
to argue that a comprehensive policy to assist Ghanaian businessmen evolved between 
1966 and 1972. Admittedly, most of the government’s efforts were directed towards 
Ghanaian traders. The link between trading and small industry development will be 
analyzed in more detail later (pp. 244-245, 249-250). Nevertheless, for the 
meantime, it is difficult to avoid the impression that the NLC and PP states were both 
‘nurturist’.
This conclusion is at odds with the general view in the literature as represented 
by Frimpong-Ansah, Killick and Rimmer.148 Nonetheless, it lends support to 
Esseks’ view that 1966 marked a distinct break in the Ghanaian state’s relationship 
with private businessmen.149 It is interesting that Esseks, writing closer to the time, 
was more positive about the NLC and PP’s record on private sector promotion than 
later historians. This could be because, on a longer-term view, Esseks* argument 
loses its appeal, since after 1972, many of the NLC-PP reforms were reversed 
quickly and the economy went into acute collapse.
148 Frimpong-Ansah, Vampire State, pp. 99-107. Killick, Development Economics, ch. 11. 
Rimmer, Staying Poor, ch. 6.
149 Esseks, ‘Government and Indigenous Private Enterprise’, pp. 22, 24.
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7 ‘MICRO’ NURTURING, ‘MACRO’ SUPPRESSION,
1972-79
In a coup d ’etat in January 1972, Colonel Ignatius Acheampong dismissed the Busia 
government and established a military regime. This was known as the National 
Redemption Council (NRC) until 1975, and the Supreme Military Council (SMC) 
thereafter. In 1978, Colonel Acheampong himself was overthrown in a palace coup 
by Lieutenant-General Fred Akuffo. Under popular pressure to concede power to a 
democratically-elected government, Akuffo lifted the ban on multi-party politics in 
January 1979 and permitted the formation of a Constituent Assembly. Elections were 
scheduled for June 1979, but before then, disaffected members of the military, calling 
themselves the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC), overthrew the 
government again. The AFRC was led by Flight-Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings. 
Rawlings sought a ‘house-cleaning exercise’,1 and executed several members of the 
ancien regime, including Acheampong and Akuffo. Nevertheless, elections were held 
as planned in June 1979.2
This chapter examines government policy towards small-scale industries during 
these military years. The analysis is based on published government material in the 
main, since most post-1972 internal government documents in the National Archives 
of Ghana remain closed to the public (p. 31). However, I have found some internal 
documents and these have been used. Information from interviews with small-scale 
industrialists which I conducted in the Suame Magazine in 1996 (pp. 223-227) has 
been included as well. Because of the dearth of archival material, this chapter has 
no section on private government language and the analysis of the reasons for policy 
is less extensive than in previous chapters. Also, with limited material on 
government policy towards small-scale industries specifically, there is more discussion 
of policy towards the private sector in general, just like in Chapter Six.
1 Douglas Rimmer, Staying Poor. Ghana's Political Economy, 1950-1990 (Oxford: Pergamon 
Press, 1992), p. 138.
2 Richard Jeffries, ‘Ghana: the political economy of personal rule’, in Donal B. Cruise O’Brien, 
John Dunn and Richard Rathbone (eds.), Contemporary West African States (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1989), pp. 84-7.
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The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. In Section One, the 
historiography of state-private sector relations during the period 1972-79 is examined. 
Sections Two and Three outline the NRC/SMC’s rhetoric and policies towards the 
private sector and small-scale industries respectively. Section Four documents the 
reasons for the NRC/SMC’s policies, while Section Five deals with the short period 
of the AFRC government. The main conclusion of this chapter is that the NRC/SMC 
encouraged small industry development. Moreover, while government policy before 
1972 had concentrated on assisting Ghanaian traders, after 1972, there was a clear 
redirection of assistance towards small-scale industrialists. However, during the 
AFRC period, policy changed significantly as small-scale industrialists came under 
intense government hostility.
7.1 Historiography
Ghana’s economic collapse during the 1970s has been documented extensively, 
together with the policies which caused this plunge ‘into the abyss*.3 However, there 
has been no research on specific government policy towards small-scale industry. 
The one exception is Appiah, who contends that the Five Year Plan of 1975 marked 
a break with previous policy because it singled out the small-scale industrial sector 
for government support.4
Despite the dearth of a specific historiography, the wider literature on 
Ghanaian economic policy provides some clues to the government’s relationship with 
small industries. For instance, Hutchful argues that 1972 marked no break with 
previous economic policy. According to Hutchful, the Acheampong and Akuffo 
regimes preached a policy of ‘national self-reliance’ and ‘capturing the commanding 
heights of the economy’, but in reality, few foreign debts were repudiated and foreign 
investment was courted actively. Thus, despite the military’s anti-imperialist rhetoric,
3 Rimmer, Staying Poor, ch. 7. Jonathan H. Frimpong-Ansah, The Vampire State in Africa. The 
Political Economy of Decline in Africa (London: James Currey, 1991), pp. 108-112.
4 A.K. Appiah, ‘Lending to Small Scale Enterprises (SSE)’, Journal o f the Ghana Institute of 
Bankers, 2 (1987) no. 2, pp. 1, 2.
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Ghana’s neo-colonial status remained in 1979.5 The implication here is that 
economic policy, as before 1972, continued to favour the private sector.
There is no extensive literature on economic policy during the AFRC months, 
although conventional wisdom has it that the AFRC was hostile to the private sector. 
Frimpong-Ansah writes that the economic policies of the AFRC meant that 
‘Substantial production and working capital were lost through confiscation of goods 
and arbitrary sales at below cost*.6 According to the World Bank, the AFRC 
‘reacted strongly against corruption and profiteering with measures aimed at tightly 
restricting, and essentially suppressing the private sector’.7
7.2 Rhetoric and Policies towards the Private Sector
At first sight, there are two reasons for suspecting that the military’s rhetoric and
policies were hostile to the private sector. First, Acheampong appeared to discredit
completely the laisser-faire, liberal ideology which he claimed had prevailed between
1966 and 1972. In a speech to the staff of the Ministry of Finance and Economic
Planning in February 1972, Acheampong warned:
. ..  we cannot proceed as a nation on the same basis on which previous 
governments have operated. The political frame o f reference which has 
guided your actions and your advice especially in the past two years must be 
cast into the rubbish heap o f history. This means a departure from the 
laissez-faire, so called free market economy and the institution o f  effective 
planning in the allocation and utilisation o f resources.8
Indeed, planning would permeate all levels of the economy. As Acheampong
observed in a speech to the State Insurance Company shortly after the coup, ‘We
should plan the allocation and utilisation of all our resources and seal all the areas of
5 Eboe Hutchful, ‘A Tale of Two Regimes: Imperialism, the Military and Class in Ghana’, Review 
of African Political Economy, 14 (1979), pp. 39-40.
6 Frimpong-Ansah, Vampire State, p. 112.
7 NAGA RG 6/6/146, World Bank (Western Africa Region and Industry Department), ‘Ghana: 
Industrial Policy, Performance and Recovery (Report No 5716-GH)’ (1985), p. 63.
8 NAGA ADM 5/4/358, ‘Address by Col. I.K. Acheampong, Chairman of the N.R.C. and 
Commissioner for Finance, Economic Planning and Defence, to the Staff of the Ministry of Finance 
and Economic Planning on Monday February 7, 1972’, p. 10.
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possible drain’.9
The corollary of planning appeared to be private sector suppression.
Acheampong delivered an attack on private businessmen in August 1972, claiming
that the private sector had ‘not as yet found it convenient to marry their profit
maximisation criterion with the social desirability of having certain projects*10 and
had sought ‘a kind of world of Adam Smith* where regulation was minimal.11 In
view of these circumstances, Acheampong promised that his Government would ‘be
the first to adopt a hands-off policy as soon as our business friends learn to strike this
happy balance between private profit maximisation and social profit maximisation*.12
At times, the military interfered directly in the activities of the private sector.
Shortly after coming to power, the military ordered all major manufacturing industries
to develop backward linkages with the local economy. As the NRC put it:
all major manufacturing industries in the country, which depend solely on 
imported agricultural raw materials are directed to undertake farming projects 
to produce their own raw materials.13
This policy caused serious grievances among private businessmen, with David Andoh,
the Chairman of the United Africa Company, Ghana, complaining in 1978 that:
An enterprise engaged in industry may have no skills nor expertise in 
agriculture, and, in my opinion, it is a waste o f  resources to compel any such 
enterprise to go into agriculture. It is no answer to say in that case they 
should invest in agriculture.14
Apart from discrediting laisser-faire and liberalism, the military often attacked 
the small-scale private sector directly. Immediately after the coup, Acheampong 
lashed out at private traders and middlemen whom he accused of perpetuating
9 NAGA ADM 5/4/358, ‘Address by Col. I.K. Acheampong, Chairman of the National 
Redemption Council, and Commissioner for Defence, Finance and Economic Planning on his First 
Visit to the State Insurance Corporation’, p. 2.
10 ‘Colonel I.K. Acheampong’s address at the beginning of negotiations between BASCOL and the 
Government of Ghana, on the possibility of establishing a bauxite mine in the Kibi area, 18/8/1972’, 
in Capital Investments Board (Ghana Investments Centre), A Brief Guide for Prospective Investors 
(Accra-Tema: Ghana Publishing Corporation, n.d.), p. 4.
11 Ibid., p. 5.
12 Ibid.
13 National Redemption Council, First Hundred Days of the National Redemption Council. The Fall 
of the Second Republic (Accra-Tema: Ghana Publishing Corporation, 1972), p. 3.
14 David Andoh, The Private Sector: A Case (Accra: Ghana Universities Press, 1980), p. 7.
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Ghana’s economic crisis:
Much of the waste on our foreign exchange on consumer goods, has been due 
to the large number of importers and middlemen. Most of these persons do 
nothing more than ordering goods and piling their profits on when these 
goods arrive ... This must stop! ... Anyone caught hoarding, or smuggling 
or speculating in such goods would be regarded as an economic prisoner of 
war, and dealt with accordingly.15
To rectify this situation, Acheampong announced that the state would establish
a central depot which would have a monopoly on the importation and ex-factory
purchase of rice, sugar, corned beef, milk, codfish, matchets and sardines,16 thus
cutting out the ‘hoarding* private middleman. Later that month, there were reports
of soldiers entering shops and bringing out ‘hoarded* goods for sale at pre-devaluation
prices.17 Acheampong was still denouncing private traders a year after the coup,
when he told them:
Our students, school children, military personnel have offered free and 
voluntary service to the nation by harvesting sugar cane, com and rice.
What can you offer to the nation? Are hoarding, profiteering, smuggling and 
refusing to sell at controlled prices all you can offer your suffering brothers 
and sisters? ... Are you with us or against us? Ponder about these very 
seriously. Examine your conscience and change now.18
Thus, from the military’s anii-laisser-faire and anti-private sector rhetoric, as 
well as its words and actions against private traders, there is prima facie evidence that 
its policy towards small-scale industries was ‘suppressive*. However, this would be 
a false conclusion because, at the same time, the regime pursued the twin policies of 
self-reliance and Ghanaianization.
Self-Reliance
At Acheampong’s first press conference after the coup, he told assembled reporters
15 ‘Radio and Television Broadcast by the Chairman of the National Redemption Council, 20 
January, 1972’, in Ghana, Good Tidings o f Redemption. Official Statements Made by Colonel I.K. 
Acheampong, Chairman, National Redemption Council (Accra: Public Relations Directorate of the 
Ghana Armed Forces, n.d.), p. 16.
16 Ibid.
17 ‘Forced Selling at Old Prices’, Daily Graphic, 28/1/1972.
18 Colonel Acheampong, ‘First Anniversary Broadcast Speech’ 13/1/1973, in Office of the Press 
Secretary to the National Redemption Council, Two Years in Office o f Colonel Ignatius Kutu 
Acheampong, 13th January 1972-12th January 1974 (Accra-Tema: Ghana Publishing Corporation, 
n.d.), p. 101.
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that, although the military had not yet formulated an economic policy, whichever one
it constructed would have as its ‘bedrock the principle of self-reliance\ 19 Later in
1972, in its first ‘White Paper* on economic policy, the NRC declared that it had set
Ghana on an economic war to raise living standards, and that:
The guiding principle in this economic war is self-reliance ... Ghana must 
make full use of its total human and material resources and should not depend 
upon external assistance for its survival.20
It is highly probable that this rhetoric of self-reliance was genuine, because it
was supported by policies such as yentua, or repudiating some of Ghana’s foreign
debts, and attempting to decouple Ghana’s economy from that of the West.21 In
addition, the consistency with which the military repeated this mantra of self-reliance
suggests that this was, in fact, government policy. For example, in 1974, the military
launched its National Charter which embodied seven ‘goals of action*22 that
Ghanaians were urged to embrace. One of these was self-reliance. As the Charter
declared, ‘Our national regeneration depends on our own efforts. We must stand for
self-reliance. We must want and strive to solve our own problems’.23 Similarly,
the aim of the Five Year Plan for 1975-80 was:
to build an independent national economy firmly structured on the resource 
potentials of our land and the culture of our peoples in the context of the 
stated Government principle of Self-Reliance.24
The pursuit of self-reliance probably had a positive significance for small 
industries since these firms have been dependent on local factor and product
19 ‘First Press Conference Given by the Chairman of the N.R.C. on 17 January, 1972’, in Ghana, 
Good Tidings, p. 8.
20 Ghana, Outline o f Government Economic Policy (no publication details), p. 4.
21 Kodwo Ewusi, The Political Economy of Ghana in the Post Independence Period: Description 
and Analysis o f the Decadence o f the Political Economy of Ghana and the Survival Techniques o f Her 
Citizens (Legon: ISSER, 1984), p. 18.
22 ‘Charter of Our National Redemption’, in Office of the Press Secretary to the NRC, Two Years 
in Office, p. 15.
23 Ibid., p. 19.
24 Ghana (Supreme Military Council), Five-Year Development Plan, 1975/76-1979/80, Part I 
(Accra: Ministry of Economic Planning, 1977), p. 26.
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markets.25 Hence, when addressing a group of way-side fitters in Suame in June
1973, Acheampong drew a direct link between promoting indigenous enterprise and
increasing self-reliance. As the Daily Graphic recorded, Acheampong:
said that the Government had the welfare of wayside fitters at heart and 
would provide them with every assistance to enable them to make use of their 
talents to make Ghana a self-reliant country.26
Ghanaianization
Closely associated with this policy of self-reliance, was that of Ghanaianization, or 
increasing Ghanaian control over the economy. This idea was mooted shortly after 
the coup and was referred to on several occasions. Thus, Acheampong observed in 
1972 that:
We should seek to place the commanding heights of the economy in the 
hands of our people so that the profits from the toil of our workers shall 
remain with us and be ploughed back for greater development and not 
repatriated, as of now, to foreign lands.27
Later that year, in its ‘White Paper* on economic policy, the military confirmed that:
The National Redemption Council is ... determined to work towards the 
Ghanaianisation of the economy by ensuring that the greater share of 
economic activity in the country passes into Ghanaian hands, both in the 
private and public sectors.28
Similarly, the Five Year Plan of 1975-80 sought ‘to increase the capacity of
Ghanaians to participate actively and meaningfully in the country’s industrial
development* .29
This rhetoric on Ghanaianization was followed up with several actions. The 
most important of these was Decree 329, The Investment Policy Decree, which 
became law in 1975. Decree 329 maintained the areas of reservation which had been
25 W.H. Thomi and P.W.K. Yankson, Small Scale Industries and Decentralization in Ghana. A 
Preliminary Report on Small Scale Industries in Small and Medium Sized Towns in Ghana (Legon: 
Department of Geography, University of Ghana, 1985), pp. 37-8, 51.
26 Kidd Darko, ‘Aid for Fitters’, Daily Graphic, 16/6/1973, p. 1.
27 NAGA ADM 5/4/358, ‘Address by Col. I.K. Acheampong, Chairman of the N.R.C. and 
Commissioner for Finance, Economic Planning and Defence, to the Staff of the Ministry of Finance 
and Economic Planning on Monday February 7, 1972’, p. 12.
28 Ghana, Outline, p. 5.
29 Ghana (Supreme Military Council), Five-Year Development Plan, 1975/76-1979/80, Part II 
(Accra: Ministry of Economic Planning, 1977), p. 192.
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inherited from the Progress Party (PP) and added new ones. In the industrial sector, 
reserved areas were broadened to include the manufacture and tailoring of garments, 
textile screen hand printing and tyre retreading, as well as the manufacture of suit 
cases, brief-cases, portfolios, hand bags, shopping bags, purses and wallets.30 To 
be sure, the military’s reservation policy did not cover as many sectors as in Nigeria 
at the time.31 Nevertheless, it was in stark contrast with the actions of the Nkrumah 
government, which had no reservation policy at all. It also contrasted with that of 
the PP which had voted down proposals to extend reservation to sectors such as hand 
bag manufacture and tyre retreading (pp. 149-150). Thus, while the PP claimed that 
its Ghanaian Business Promotion Act ‘invites foreigners to shift into industry and 
manufacturing and beckons Ghanaians to enter the retail and wholesale business’,32 
it would appear that the military’s reservation policy beckoned Ghanaians to move 
into industry and manufacturing as well.
Thus, while there may be prima facie evidence for supposing that the military 
was hostile to the domestic private sector, the policies of self-reliance and 
Ghanaianization probably benefitted small industries. With this in mind, the next 
section considers the military’s specific policy towards the small industry sector.
7.3 Policy towards Small-scale Industries
It is apparent that the military was eager to portray itself as the champion of small 
industries, and this eagerness was demonstrated on several occasions. The Five Year 
Plan is a case in point. The Plan both expounded the virtues of small-scale 
industrialization and promised assistance to Ghana’s small industries—in sharp 
contrast to the sometimes dismissive rhetoric of Nkrumah’s Seven Year Plan of 1963
30 ‘Report of the Address of Lt.-Col. R. J. A. Felli, Commissioner for Economic Planning, delivered 
at GIMPA on 4 September, 1975’, in National Committee for the Implementation of the National 
Charter/Ministry of Information, Report of the First Conference on the National Charter o f Redemption 
(Accra-Tema: Ghana Publishing Corporation, 1976), pp. 35-6.
31 NAGA RG 6/9/125, Agenda of the Meeting of the Ghanaian Enterprises Development 
Commission, 25/8/1977, Appendix 2B, ‘Implementation of the Investment Policy Decree and the New 
Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decree, 1977’.
32 Ghana, Burning Questions. Ghanaian Business Promotion (Act 334) (Accra: Ministry of 
Information, 1970), p. 16.
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(p. 110). For example, the Plan acknowledged that:
Small-scale industries play an important role in the development of 
indigenous entrepreneurship and technical skills, in the creation of job 
opportunities and in correcting imbalances in the dispersal of industries ... 
appropriate programmes, embracing financial and technical assistance, 
training and procurement of equipment and other inputs, for the development 
of small-scale industries are being worked out ...33
According to the Plan, small industries would be developed through a five 
point programme. First, such firms would ‘be encouraged, wherever possible, to 
organise into viable groups and co-operatives in order to reap the benefits of 
economies of scale in all spheres of their activities’.34 Second, the government 
would build industrial zones equipped with roads, electricity, water, telephones and 
extension facilities, and let these to small industrialists ‘on reasonable rental 
terms’.35 Third, small-scale industrial training centres such as that in Tema (p. 152) 
would be encouraged to provide training, advisory and other extension services to 
Ghanaian businessmen.36 Fourth, the government pledged to collaborate with the 
Ghana Manufacturers* Association to establish a research and technical services centre 
in Accra, which would guide and assist small manufacturers.37 Finally, and most 
importantly, the recently-established Ghanaian Enterprises Development Commission 
would ‘draw up and implement a comprehensive programme, embracing financial, 
commercial and technical assistance schemes, aimed at the development of small-scale 
Ghanaian enterprises*.38
The Successes o f Government Policy
Not all of the pledges contained in the Five Year Plan were fulfilled. For example, 
the government’s record on industrial training was particularly poor. By the end of 
1977, only a handful of the 3,720 apprentices registered under the apprenticeship 
contract of the National Vocational Training Institute were from the small industry
33 Ghana, Five-Year Plan, Part II, p. 199.
34 Ibid., p. 197.
35 Ibid., p. 199.
36 Ibid.
37 Ibid.
38 Ibid.
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sector.39 Of the 2,029 persons trained in-plant between 1969 and 1977, only 513 
were small industrialists.40 Nevertheless, many of the other promises made in the 
Five Year Plan were realized.
First, the military did encourage small industrialists to group together in co­
operatives. In June 1976, the SMC wrote to the Commissioner for Industries and the 
Commissioner for Labour, Social Welfare and Co-operatives remarking:
The Chairman of the Supreme Military Council is concerned about the 
difficulties being experienced by Ghanaian fitters who have sizeable 
workshops in securing their raw material requirements for their operation.
It is understood that, on account of lack of proper organisation, it has not 
been possible to secure import licences for these requirements.41
It was recommended that such fitters be encouraged to form co-operatives in order
to increase the viability of their enterprises. As a first step, the Commissioner for
Industries ordered a survey of all fitters, to be conducted in co-operation with
Regional Commissioners.42
Second, the government did attempt to develop industrial zones for small
producers. In Suame, on the outskirts of Kumasi, the government embarked on a C3
million light industrial project in 1973, which, according to the Daily Graphic, was
designed to provide fitters ‘with modem facilities to boost their work’.43 The Suame
light industrial project included a vocational training centre where fitters would be
taught auto-body repair, together with auto-electrical and auto-mechanical
engineering.44 Similarly, in Sunyani, the government mooted plans for transferring
local fitters to a permanent site in 1976.45 By early 1979, some fitters had been
39 J.K. Akushie, ‘Apprenticeship Training in Ghana’, Seminar Paper on Modules of Employable 
Skills Concept, NVTI, 6-8 December, 1977, p. 7, cited inThomi and Yankson, Small Scale Industries, 
p. 89
40 JASPA/ILO, ‘Employment Problems in the Rural and Informal Sector in Ghana’ (Addis Ababa, 
1977), 4.10, cited in Thomi and Yankson, ibid., p. 89.
41 NAGS RAO 12/16, F.W. Beecham, the Secretary of the Supreme Military Council, to the 
Commissioner for Industries and the Commissioner for Labour, Social Welfare and Co-operatives, 
1/6/1976.
42 Ibid.
43 Darko, ‘Aid for Fitters’, p. 1.
44 Ibid., p. 3.
45 NAGS RAO 12/16, G.D.K. Fianu, Chief Executive, Wenchi District Council, to the Regional 
Administrative Officer, Sunyani, 28/6/1976.
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moved to a new location and attempts were being made to provide them with 
electricity.46
Third, the small-scale industrial centre in Tema, which had been established 
with Indian assistance in the early 1970s, was maintained. Thus, in the estimates for 
the 1976-77 financial year, the government earmarked 0225,000 for this purpose.47 
Fourth, the government did collaborate with the Ghana Manufacturers’ Association 
to create a research and technical services centre for small-scale industrialists in 
Accra. According to the estimates for the 1975-76 financial year, 075,000 was set 
aside for this scheme,48 with this figure projected to increase to 0182,000 in the 
1976-77 financial year.49
Clearly, there was some substance behind the military’s pro-small industry 
rhetoric. However, perhaps the most important initiative was the reform of the Small 
Business Credit Scheme through the establishment of the Ghanaian Enterprises 
Development Commission.
The Ghanaian Enterprises Development Commission
The Small Business Credit Scheme, the centrepiece of the PP’s small industry 
development strategy, had had only a marginal impact on the small industry sector. 
This was because the loans process was corrupted, while most of the loanable funds 
was disbursed either in large sums, or to non-industrial sectors (pp. 154-155).
After 1972, the Small Business Credit Scheme was reformed substantially. 
The impetus for reform can be traced to April 1972, when Acheampong appointed 
a commission to review the operations of the Scheme.50 The Commission of 
Enquiry into the Operations of the Office of Business Promotion and the Small
46 NAGS RAO 12/16, O.Y. Sarkodie, District Chief Executive, Sunyani District Council, to the 
Regional Administrative Officer, Sunyani, 9/1/1979.
47 Ghana, The Annual Estimates for 1976-77. Part I, vol. VI, Industries (Accra: Ministry of 
Finance, 1976), p. 8.
48 Ghana, The Annual Estimates for 1975-76. Part I, vol. VI, Industries (Accra: Ministry of 
Finance, n.d.), p. 8.
49 Ghana, Annual Estimates for 1976-77, p. 8.
50 Ghana, Report o f the Commission o f Enquiry into the Operations o f the Office o f Business 
Promotion and the Small Business Loans Scheme (Accra-Tema: Ghana Publishing Corporation, n.d.), 
p. v.
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Business Loans Scheme, otherwise known as the Anin Commission, published its
final report almost two years later. In it, the Commission criticized the Small
Business Credit Scheme on two counts. First, it charged that the loans process was
opaque, since there was ‘a lack of any consistent criteria* for deciding who should be
given a loan.51 Moreover, the fact that politicians dominated the loan disbursement
committees ‘tilted the grant of loans in favour of party members*.52 To rectify this
problem, the Commission recommended that an independent board should preside
over the loans process. This would remove the ‘stigma of political patronage* from
which the Scheme had suffered since its inception.53 Second, the Commission
condemned the fact that a high proportion of credit had been disbursed in the form
of large loans. In this connection, it recommended that a:
clear policy decision should be taken by the Government about the optimum 
upper ceiling of this Small Loans Scheme before the Scheme escalates into 
a Big Loans Scheme, which presumably was never the ideal envisaged ...54
The military concurred with these findings. In a ‘White Paper* on the Anin
Commission’s Report, it accepted, as an ‘irresistible conclusion*,55 that the loans
process had been corrupted, and agreed to limit the size of loans.56 As a first
measure, it proposed transferring the administration of the scheme to the Ghanaian
Enterprises Development Commission (GEDC). The GEDC had been established by
the terms of Decree 330 of 1975, the Ghanaian Enterprises Development Decree.57
It was the government’s ‘key agency’ for ensuring that Ghanaians exerted ‘their
rightful roles in the management and control of the national economy*.58 To this
51 Ibid., p. 17.
52 Ibid., p. 12.
53 Ibid., p. 18.
54 Ibid., p. 5.
55 Ghana, White Paper on the Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Operations o f the Office 
o f Business Promotion and the Small Business Loans Scheme (Accra-Tema: Ghana Publishing 
Corporation, n.d.), p. 2.
56 Ibid.
57 Ibid., pp. 2-3.
58 Ghanaian Enterprises Development Commission, First Annual Report o f the Ghanaian 
Enterprises Development Commission and the Office o f the Ghanaian Enterprises Commission, for the 
Period July 1, 1975 to June 30, 1976 (Accra-Tema: Ghana Publishing Corporation, n.d.), p. 1.
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end, the GEDC’s main function was to provide Ghanaian businessmen with technical 
and financial assistance, as well as a ‘general advisory service’.59
With regard to small-scale industries, the GEDC had two notable achievements 
during the NRC-SMC period: placing a ceiling on the size of loans and reorienting 
the Credit Scheme towards the industrial sector. In preparation for the fiscal year 
1978-79, the GEDC decided that only firms with less than 0300,000 in fixed assets 
would be eligible for its loans.60 In addition, the GEDC acknowledged that, in the 
past, most of money disbursed under the Small Business Credit Scheme had been 
directed towards non-industrial sectors. This is evident from table 7.1.
Table 7.1. Small Business Credit Scheme, Loan Disbursements by Sector, 1970- 
June 1978.
Sector Number of 
Loans
Amount (C)
General Trading 9,468 10,161,598
Commercial Transport 525 7,712,132
Manufacturing 604 3,022,260
Services (including repair) 367 2,427,012
Farming 26 122,989
Exports (coffee, lumber) 19 225,500
Totals 11,009 23,671,491
Source: GEDC, Third Annual Report, part II.
Hence, it was decided that, in future, loans would be re-directed towards the
industrial sector. As the GEDC observed:
In the light of the current economic situation and fiscal policies of the 
government which places emphasis on the productive sector and export 
promotion, there is ample justification for the suspension of loans for
59 Ibid.
60 Ghanaian Enterprises Development Commission, Third Annual Report, 1977/78 (Accra: Ghana 
Publishing Corporation, n.d.), p. 1.
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trading.61
This decision marked a significant break with previous government policy. For the 
most part, business lobbyists and Ghanaian governments before 1978 had sought to 
promote Ghanaian traders. This had been the agenda of veteran lobbyists such as 
W.A. Wiafe, the CPP Member of Parliament for Kwahu South, in the 1950s (p. 
143). It had also been the agenda of the PP (Chapter Six). By contrast, the GEDC’s 
decision to alter its loans policy signalled that the government no longer considered 
Ghanaian participation in trading to be a critical issue. Instead, Ghanaian business 
promotion efforts would be targeted at the small industry sector.
There is evidence that this new policy was implemented successfully. In the 
1980-81 financial year, the GEDC granted 166 loans, 90 of which were for 
manufacturing, 49 for services, 22 for agriculture and 5 for trade, commerce and 
transport.62 In money terms, manufacturing accounted for 68 per cent of the total 
credit disbursed in that year, while the share of trading, commerce and transport had 
fallen to a mere 1.3 per cent.63 In short, the GEDC’s reform of 1978 marked a 
definite watershed in the loans policy of the Small Business Credit Scheme.
Policy Towards Small-scale Industry: Failures
Despite these developments, there are grounds for questioning the depth of the 
government’s real commitment to assisting small industries. In addition, the military 
actually worsened the climate for small-industries in many ways.
First, if the government was committed to small industry promotion, then it 
is reasonable to expect that significant resources would have been earmarked for this 
purpose. However, an analysis of government spending intentions shows that this 
was not the case. For example, the Five Year Plan seemed to promise substantial 
assistance for small industrialists but, in reality, did nothing of the sort. Over the 
Plan period, 1975-80, it was estimated that 0745,438 would be spent on the 
reactivation of cottage industries which had fallen into decay since the Nkrumah
61 Ibid., p. 7.
62 Ghanaian Enterprises Development Commission, Annual Report, 1980/81 (Accra, 1981), cited 
in Thomi and Yankson, Small Scale Industries, p. 86.
63 Ibid.
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years, C2 million would be spent on small-scale industrial sites, and C2.5 million
would be used to construct a small-scale industrial training centre.64 Yet such
figures were trivial in comparison to the government’s other industrial spending plans
which included: C6 million on the establishment of a steel mill in Kumasi with a
capacity of 30,000 tons per annum;65 C18.6 million on a joint venture between
Ghana, Togo and the Ivory Coast to produce 200,000 tons of clinker per year;66 and
C50 million for GIHOC, the huge state industrial conglomerate.67 Evidently, if
small industry development was a priority, then the government was certainly not
putting its money where its mouth was.
There is also reason to doubt the vitality of the government’s small industry
development strategy. This is apparent from an examination of the annual estimates
of the Ministry of Industries in the 1970s. Each annual estimate provides a good
summary of the Ministry of Industries* activities in small industry promotion. These
summaries suggest strongly that the Ministry’s small industry development division
was characterized by severe inertia. For instance, in 1974, the Ministry described
its Small-Scale and Rural Industries Division as being:
responsible for the maintenance o f  16 small-scale industries which were 
closed down in 1968 and whose re-activation is under active consideration.
The Division is also responsible for rural industries and the Small-Scale 
Industrial Training Centre which has been established at Tema under a 
programme sponsored jointly by E .C.A. and U .N .I.D .O .. The Centre, 
which is to train Ghanaians in the techniques o f handling small plant and 
machinery necessary for small-scale industries, is manned by three Indian 
technical experts. The centre will also be used as a repair workshop for 
small-scale industries.68
Four years later, using virtually identical words, the Ministry described this Division
as being:
responsible for the maintenance o f small scale industries which were closed  
in 1968 and whose re-activation is under active consideration. The Division  
is also responsible for rural industries and the Small-Scale Industrial Training
64 Ghana, Five-Year Plan, Part II, p. 203.
65 Ibid., p. 201.
66 Ibid., p. 202.
67 Ibid., p. 204.
68 Ghana, The Annual Estimates for 1974-75. Part I, vol. V, Industries (Accra: Ministry of 
Finance, 1974), p. 6.
Centre which has been established in Tema under Indian Government 
Technical Aid. The Centre, manned by three Indian technicians has started 
training Ghanaians in techniques o f handling small plant and machinery 
necessary for small-scale industries. The centre will also be used as a repair 
workshop for small-scale industries.69
What these extracts suggest is serious administrative lethargy in the Small-Scale and
Rural Industries Division of the Ministry of Industries. Over the four year period
from 1974 to 1978, the re-activation of the small industries which had been closed
in 1968 was still ‘under active consideration*, while there were still plans to use the
Tema Centre as a ‘repair workshop for small-scale industries’.
In contrast to the government’s failure to develop the Tema Centre further, the
Technology Consultancy Centre (TCC), an initiative of the University of Science and
Technology (UST) in Kumasi, was a real success. The TCC had been established in
1969, when the UST first developed informal links with small-scale manufacturers
in the Suame Magazine.70 In 1972, these links were formalized through the creation
of a Technology Consultancy Centre, which sought to develop technology to suit
Ghana’s factor endowments.71 Some of these attempts were quite successful. For
instance, during the 1970s, the TCC developed a technology for producing nuts and
bolts which was taken up later by a local entrepreneur, and used as the basis for a
successful business.72 The development of a saw bench manufacturing capacity at
Anloga revolutionized wood-working there, by making cheap saw benches readily
available.73
Certain broader government policies probably worsened the environment for 
small industries. A prime case of this can be found in the growth of the parallel 
market or kalabule. Government policies after 1972 distorted prices within the 
economy. For example, the government’s refusal to devalue the cedi, despite high 
domestic inflation, resulted in the cedi’s real exchange rate appreciating more than
69 Ghana, The Annual Estimates for 1978-79. Part I, vol. 6, Industries (Accra: Ministry of 
Finance, 1978), p. 6.
70 John Powell, ‘Kumasi University’s Involvement in Grassroots Industrial Development’, Small 
Enterprise Development, 2 (1991) no. 2, p. 37.
71 Ibid.
72 Ibid.
73 Ibid., p. 38.
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three-fold between 1973 and 1979.74 These price distortions stimulated the growth 
of the parallel market, where prices were determined freely by supply and demand. 
As the economy collapsed during the 1970s, people sought to buy goods at the 
official, distorted price, and sell them in the parallel market where prices were 
higher. In other words, the incentive for arbitrage and trading between the controlled 
and parallel markets was immense.
Trading between these markets became a national obsession during the military 
years, and not just for the wealthy. An ordinary farmer could buy a bag of fertilizer 
at the official government price, smuggle it into the CFA zone, sell the fertilizer for 
CFA francs, and then return to Ghana to sell the bag, in the process earning more 
than the original cost of the bag and fertilizer.75 Likewise, a cocoa farmer could 
smuggle produce into the CFA zone, where cocoa could be sold for CFA Francs 
which, when converted back into cedis, yielded much more than the government rate 
for cocoa. Accordingly, by the early 1980s, a significant proportion of the Ghanaian 
cocoa crop was being smuggled out of the country.76
While there was every incentive to trade, for small-scale industries the price 
incentives were different. Although industrialists could produce for the parallel 
market directly and thereby secure high prices for finished products, quite often, they 
had to buy their inputs from this parallel market as well. Thus, the military’s policy 
of controlling the economy created price distortions which resulted in there being 
relatively greater incentives to trade than to engage in small industrial activities. To 
be sure, the military did try and ease controls over the economy from 1977. The 
budget of that year was meant to be ‘a major attempt to move away from stringent 
controls*,77 and in 1978, the cedi was finally devalued, albeit by only 58 per cent. 
Nevertheless, kalabule persisted and so did incentives to trade.
74 World Bank, Ghana: Policies and Program for Adjustment (Washington, D.C., 1984), statistical 
appendix, table 7.1 and table 5, cited in Rimmer, Staying Poor, table 7.4, p. 149.
75 Ewusi, Political Economy, p. 29.
76 Victor Azarya and Naomi Chazan, ‘Disengagement from the State in Africa: Reflections on the 
Experience of Ghana and Guinea’, Comparative Studies in Society and History, 29 (1987) no. 1, p. 
121.
77 Ghana, Supreme Military Council, Budget Statement fo r Fiscal Year 1977-78, by General I.K. 
Acheampong, Chairman of the Supreme Military Council (Accra: Ministry of Finance, 1977), p. 17.
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The growth of corruption and the arbitrary use of government power also 
worsened the climate for small-scale industries. Corruption had been prevalent before 
1972 in the Industrial Development Corporation and the Ministry of Finance (pp. 
113, 117). However, it multiplied after 197278 and infiltrated many of the 
institutions which assisted Ghanaian businessmen. The National Investment Bank 
(NIB) appears to have been affected particularly severely. One of the objectives of 
the NIB was the ‘counselling and encouraging of small Ghanaian business 
concerns*,79 in particular, through the provision of loans. Yet military interference 
in the day-to-day operations of the NIB became ‘rampant* after 1972.80 As Sekyere- 
Abankwa writes:
The management o f  the Bank has often come under pressure to assist and 
give loans to specified clients despite that such clients by the Bank’s criteria 
do not qualify for financial assistance.81
In this corrupted loans process, it is likely that small-scale industrialists who
genuinely required loans were at a disadvantage compared to those who could acquire
them through their ‘connections*.
The growth of the arbitrary use of government power probably worsened the
climate for small industrialists as well. For business to prosper, it generally is agreed
that governments need to establish a legal system which enforces contracts quickly
and fairly. As the World Bank observes:
A simple and transparent legal framework, properly enforced, is 
indispensable for the long-term success [of a business] ... Such conditions, 
in which the official rules o f the game are uncertain, exact a heavy price 
from firms and the economies in which they operate. Entrepreneurs need 
consistent and enforceable laws, which subject all parties—from the politically 
or economically powerful to the microentrepreneur—equally to the rule o f  
law.82
After 1972, the ‘official rules of the game’ were uncertain. The military government
78 Jeffries, ‘Ghana’, pp. 77-81.
79 NAGA ADM 13/2/101, ‘National Investment Bank Bill’, Memorandum submitted by the 
Minister of Finance and Trade for the Cabinet Meeting of 5/2/1963.
80 Stephen Sekyere-Abankwa, ‘Development Banking in Ghana. A Case Study of the National 
Investment Bank’, University of Ghana, School of Administration, MBA, 1981, p. 144.
81 Ibid.
82 World Bank, Sub-Saharan Africa: from crisis to sustainable growth (Washington D.C.: World 
Bank, 1989), pp. 143-4.
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by-passed the judiciary on numerous occasions. For instance, ‘Army-cum-Police 
intervention*, rather than court action, was used to pursue those who had defaulted 
on loans provided under the Small Business Loans Scheme.83 Meanwhile, soldiers 
on the ground frequently took the law into their own hands. Numerous cases of this 
are on the record, such as that of Asante Kusi from Sunyani. Writing in a petition 
to the Regional Commissioner of Sunyani in July 1976, Kusi claimed that, in an 
argument over payment of a particular public levy, a soldier from the Sunyani 
Barracks had beaten him with a gun and then shaved his head bald while slapping 
him.84 Thus, as state power was wielded in an increasingly indiscriminate fashion 
after 1972, the climate for small industrialists worsened.
7.4 Reasons for Policy
Government policy to small industries then, was not wholly negative. Yet at the 
same time, the military refused to commit significant resources to small industry 
development and, in many ways, the environment from small industries worsened. 
Why did government policy take this form?
While the military may have preferred planning and harboured suspicions of 
the private sector, these were not ideals which were adhered to dogmatically. Unlike 
Nkrumah, who was a committed socialist (pp. 127-128), Acheampong and the 
military had no definite economic agenda when they ousted the Busia government. 
The NRC did argue that ‘The bizarre economic policies of the Busia Government 
could only, given a few more months, have led to a total collapse of the national 
economy’.85 However, the military, like the National Liberation Council in 1966 
(p. 157), had no clear idea of what policies to pursue. Hence, in the new regime’s 
first press conference, four days after the coup, Acheampong offered some broad 
ideas on economic policy, but nothing definite:
83 Ghana, Commission o f Enquiry, p. 21. GEDC, First Annual Report, pp. 10-11.
84 NAGS RAO 6/4, Petition of Asante Kusi ... In Respect to the Behaviour of N.N. Danquah of 
the 3rd Battalion of Infantry, Liberation Barracks, Sunyani, to the Regional Commissioner, Regional 
Office, Sunyani, 21/7/1976.
85 NRC, First Hundred Days, p. 10.
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We have taken steps to initiate a number of measures aimed at reviewing the 
various aspects of this crisis with a view to suitable solutions being evolved 
for them. I would like to emphasize, however, that whatever measures we 
evolve for dealing with our national problems will be national in scope and 
character; will be based on hard work and will have as their bedrock the 
principle of self-reliance.86
Acheampong’s remarks suggest clearly that economic policy was still being
formulated and that the military was being flexible about it, so long as it conformed
to the principle of self-reliance, among other things.
Given that self-reliance was to be central to economic policy, and considering
that the repudiation of some foreign debts had alienated Ghana from the international
financial community, the military had to exploit the totality of domestic
resources—including those in the hands of Ghanaian entrepreneurs—if it was to revive
the economy. This explains the Acheampong regime’s particular emphasis on
developing agriculture through ‘Operation Feed Yourself and other programmes.87
It also explains the GEDC’s decision in 1978 to reduce loans to traders and increase
those to industrialists (pp. 175-176): this was a direct attempt to increase the
productive base of the economy, at a time when output was contracting sharply.
Hence, Acheampong was eager not to portray himself as hostile towards Ghanaian
businessmen, when interviewed by Africa magazine:
Africa: Your Excellency, the entrepreneurial spirit seems very strong in 
Ghana. Do you think that a more socialist system would be acceptable? 
Acheampong: I am reluctant to talk in terms of labels, but I do believe that 
the state is bound to play a forceful role, a leadership role in the development 
of the economy. I have said that a country with our limited resources cannot 
leave everything to market forces, and I have said that we have to use state 
power to capture the commanding heights of the economy for Ghanaians.
We can do this without curbing the entrepreneurial spirit of Ghanaians.88
In any case, just as the PP had associated Ghanaian business promotion with
the political goal of building a democratic society, so Acheampong appears to have
associated Ghanaian business promotion with the broader social goal of creating a
better, happier society. As he noted in March 1972, private investment would be
86 ‘First Press Conference Given by the Chairman of the N.R.C. on 17 January 1972’, in Ghana, 
Good Tidings, p. 8.
87 Rimmer, Staying Poor, pp. 163-4. Frimpong-Ansah, Vampire State, p. 109.
88 ‘Why I Sacked Busia’, Col. I.K. Acheampong in an Interview with Africa (n.d., but probably 
early 1970s), in E.D. Ziorklui, Ghana: Nkrumah to Rawlings (Accra: Em-Zed Books, 1988), p. 208.
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encouraged since:
It has been our belief that a system, which permits individuals to show 
initiative and to develop a sense of pride in their achievement, is bound to 
yield maximum benefits for the country.89
Why did the military not develop more dynamic policies for small industry 
development? The explanation for this probably lies in the government’s 
administrative collapse after 1972. Unlike in Nigeria, where the ‘oil boom’ increased 
the disposable resources of the federal government,90 the Ghanaian state became 
increasingly impoverished and impotent during the 1970s.91 Consequently, its 
administrative capacity withered. Thus, the NRC published outlines of its Five Year 
Plan in 1975, but failed to start implementing them until two years later.92 By the 
late 1970s, the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning was releasing 
departmental budgets several months after the commencement of the financial year 
to which they related.93 Small industry development plans suffered in this 
environment of administrative impotence. As a result, plans to extend the field of 
reserved industries, which had been mooted as early as December 1977, were still 
being considered by the government in 1981.94
7.5 AFRC Rhetoric and Policies
The AFRC period lasted only three months, but, during this time, the environment 
for small-scale industrialists worsened dramatically. There were three reasons for 
this.
89 ‘Speech delivered at the Offices of the Capital Investments Board’, in CIB, Brief Guide, p. 2.
90 Tom Forrest, ‘State Capital, Capitalist Development, and Class Formation in Nigeria’, in Paul 
M. Lubeck (ed.), The African Bourgeoisie. Capitalist Development in Nigeria, Kenya and the Ivory 
Coast (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1987), p. 315.
91 Azarya and Chazan, ‘Disengagement’, pp. 129-30.
92 M.M. Huq, The Economy of Ghana. The First 25 Years since Independence (London: 
Macmillan, 1989), p. 10.
93 ‘Editorial: Reckless Dissipation of Public Funds’, TheLegon Observer, vol. xii, no. 5, 14-27 
March, 1980, p. 97.
94 NAG A RG 6/7/83, Investment Policy Implementation Committee, ‘Report on the Implementation 
of the Investment Policy Decree for the Period January 1977 to May 1981’ (1981), p. 5.
183
First, the AFRC launched a ‘moral revolution’95 against corruption and
profit-making, and lashed out against all manifestations of kalabule. It is known that
traders were particular targets of this ‘moral revolution’, because the AFRC perceived
them as being the linchpin of kalabule. One measure to curb kalabule was the forced
reduction of prices. Thus, following the coup, the price of bread was pegged at
C2.30.96 Traders who resisted, and even those who did not, were harassed, as The
Legon Observer recorded at the time:
if  the forced price cuts did not please business and, especially, market 
women, they were in for a more mind-boggling experience. Makola women 
(or generally market w om en )... practically saw their nakedness in public as 
many were whipped (by men), their hair shaven and forced to roll in odorous 
gutters as punishment for their alleged leading role in the unscientifically 
defined mess o f  ‘kalabule’. To cap it all, the citadel o f  the Accra Market 
women, Makola No. 1, was demolished on September 20 ... Four days later, 
the sprawling Kantamanto market in Accra was also pulled down.97
Although traders bore the brant of government actions against kalabule, the
interviews which I conducted in Kumasi in 1996 suggest that small-scale industrialists
were affected as well. A small-scale nut and bolt manufacturer in Suame provided
this vivid account of working conditions during the ‘moral revolution*:
Q But then what happened during the Uprising Time, 1979?
A That one there I would say was a Revolution.
Q A what?
A  It’s a Revolution. So, I can’t blame. A Revolution, I can’t blame. The 
man there, I can’t blame. The word Revolution there, say, big changes.
Q What sort o f change happened?
A  During the Revolution time? They say everything must come down.
Q The price?
A Eh ... men o f  integrity. No Kalabule. That was the Revolution time 
w e’re talking about. So that time, it’s a Revolution time.
Q And did the soldiers come—
A Hey! Harassment! I won’t lie. I won’t lie. If you don’t sell your thing 
at the appropriate price, they will harass you. That time. At that time. That 
time I’m talking about, not now.
Q  Not now. No. Now what sort o f harass—
A Because by that time, they need us to obey the law. And do everything 
and at that moment. That was my mind. So that time. So it’s harassment, 
just harassment. They used to come and force us: sell this thing at this.
95 ‘Observer Leader: The Year 1979 in Retrospect’, The Legon Observer, vol. xii, no. 1, 18-31 
January, 1980, pp. 1, 4.
96 Ibid.
97 Ibid.
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That’s all.
Q  Now, if  you refused to do that, what would they do?
A They harass you. They harass you. Harassment. My friend why they 
selling this thing, C100, you sell them for 150? My friend sell them for 
C100. If you say, no sell, they will take you away. They will organize 
many people and come and buy the goods the C100. Because they say that 
is the control price we want to sell at. You, you should have sell it. So that 
so, that time, that was the main problem. That’s all.
Q So they said no Kalabule?
A That time now they say they are sending Kalabule away. That time. That 
time, 1979 [laughter] they say they don’t mean any Kalabule again. If you 
buy something C100, at least percentage you get you must watch out. No  
good. You can’t double the percentage. That time, that was they were 
telling us. By that time, 79
To what extent the experience of this particular respondent is representative of others
at the time is unclear. Nevertheless, it does indicate that the AFRC’s attack on
kalabule was not limited to the petty trading sector.
A second reason for the deterioration of the environment for small-scale
industrialists was that the indiscriminate use of state power, which had increased in
the Acheampong-Akuffo years, reached new peaks during the AFRC months. Several
small-scale industrialists narrated their fear of military harassment in 1979. One
agricultural machinery manufacturer recollected being harassed by the military for
working on a holiday:
Q In what way were you affected?
A They told us, not to come on holiday and I came. That day, they came 
and arrest me. So, instead to send me to prison, they rather gave me some 
jobs to be done. To manufacture some com mill machine, which is very 
cheating ...
Q For them?
A For them.
Q And free?
A Free. So I just manufacture it and they release me.
Q When was that? Which year?
A It was 79 ."
This picture is confirmed by the recollections of another respondent:
Q Did other people in the Magazine get in trouble? Do you know anybody 
who did get in trouble with the soldiers [in 1979]?
A I can’t point to, let’s say, this man or that man. But all that I heard is, 
let’s say, this much like this, you have to stay home for holiday. And you 
are working on a roadside, and you will soldiers passing by and you are still
98 Metal 7.
"  Metal 3.
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working, maybe they will come and beat you. I’ve heard such things that 
they have been beating some people in the Magazine inside, while working 
on holiday.100
Finally, the AFRC targeted the self-employed for tax revenue, thereby
bringing more small-scale industrialists into the tax net and diminishing the incentive
for small industry work. The collection of tax from the self-employed had been a
major problem for the government, even in the early 1970s. As the Central Revenue
Department had noted in 1973, ‘the greatest difficulty in tax collection lay with the
self-employed’.101 In June 1979, the AFRC observed that revenue collection for
the year lay ‘far behind expectations* on account of tax evasion, poor collection as
well as corruption,102 and mounted a major tax collection drive:
So as to leave no stone unturned, the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council 
has directed the Military Intelligence and other security agencies ... to mount 
a special exercise to expose all companies and self-employed people, 
including the professionals, artisans, trader, businessmen etc. who contravene 
existing legislation. As already indicated all those caught infringing tax laws 
and regulations will be made to face the full rigours o f the law ... No mercy 
will be shown when dealing with those caught either evading or refusing to 
pay taxes.103
This tax collection drive is likely to have brought many small industrialists into the 
tax net. After all, in 1980, there were only 1,122 registered small-scale industries 
in Ghana.104 It is highly probably that the many thousands of non-registered firms 
were paying no tax at all.
Using the little archival material which is available, together with interview data and 
published primary sources, this chapter has arrived at several important conclusions. 
First, despite the anti-private sector rhetoric and actions of the NRC and SMC, small-
100 Metal 6.
101 IRS ADM 2605 (Original File No. 2280), Minutes of a Meeting of the Heads of the Major 
Revenue Departments, held in the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, 13/2/1973.
102 NAGS RAO 15/15, ‘Serious Short Fall in Revenue Collection and Measures to Arrest the 
Situation’, Circular from E.K. Minta, Secretary to the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council to 
Commissioners, Senior Principal Secretaries, Principal Secretaries, Regional Administrative Officers, 
Heads of Departments, Public Boards and Corporations, 21/6/1979.
103 Ibid.
104 NAGA RG 6/6/174, Ghana, ‘Government’s Economic Programme, 1981/82-1985/86. 
Annexure I. Sectoral Plans (Part A)’ (1981), p. 117.
186
scale industrialists actually benefitted from the regime’s policies of self-sufficiency 
and Ghanaianization. In this respect, the experience of small industries mirrored that 
of the agricultural sector, the output of which expanded between 1970 and 1974 
because of self-sufficiency programmes like ‘Operation Feed Yourself.105 Thus, 
ironically, the military’s policy of self-sufficiency, which was itself an anti-market 
impulse, actually encouraged small-scale industrialization.
Second, the NRC inherited a programme of Ghanaian business promotion from 
the PP. However, the GEDC’s decision to re-direct loans from traders and 
transporters and towards industrialists marked a significant shift in policy, and one 
which the literature to date has ignored. By the mid 1970s, Ghanaian traders were 
well-established, as their active participation in kalabule demonstrated. Thus the 
government legitimately could focus its efforts on Ghanaian small industrialists 
instead.
Third, general economic and political developments worked against the 
military’s specific efforts to promote small industries. On the one hand, general 
economic policy encouraged kalabule and shifted incentives from manufacturing to 
trading. On the other, general administrative collapse, corruption and the arbitrary 
use of state power all worsened the climate for small industrialists. Thus, the NRC- 
SMC years can be thought of as constituting ‘micro’ nurturism, but ‘macro’ 
suppression.
Finally, this chapter has provided a different perspective to industrial policy 
during the AFRC months. While the AFRC’s hostility towards traders is well- 
documented, it has been demonstrated that this hostility extended to small industries 
as well. In other words, this chapter supports and extends the conventional literature 
which suggests that the AFRC was hostile to the private sector.
105 Huq, Economy of Ghana, table 4.1, p. 82.
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8 THE BIRTH OF NURTURE CAPITALISM? 1979-92
In the 1979 elections, the People’s National Party (PNP) won 71 seats in the 140 seat 
legislature and Dr. Hilla Limann became President.1 The Armed Forces 
Revolutionary Council (AFRC) transferred power to the PNP, with Rawlings claiming 
that the military had ‘every confidence’ that it would never regret its ‘decision to go 
back to the barracks*.2 However, in 1981, Rawlings returned to mainstream 
Ghanaian political life by deposing the Limann government and establishing a new 
regime called the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC). The PNDC ruled 
until 1992.
This chapter completes the discussion of government policy towards small- 
scale industries since c. 1945. Like in Chapters Six and Seven, the analysis continues 
to include the state’s relationship with the private sector. Section One reviews the 
historiography for this period. Sections Two and Three examine government rhetoric 
and policies during the PNP and PNDC periods respectively. The chapter’s central 
conclusion is that, by 1992, institutional support for small industries had become so 
effective that Ghana’s model of small industry promotion was being exported to other 
African countries. In addition, the macro-economic climate in which small industries 
operated had improved considerably.
8.1 Historiography
The PNP years have not attracted much academic interest. Perhaps this is because, 
as Jeffries writes, there have been ‘few regimes, in Africa or elsewhere, about which 
it is so difficult to find anything interesting to say’.3 With regard to economic 
policies, Jeffries contends that, apart from soliciting grants and accumulating debts
1 Douglas Rimmer, Staying Poor. Ghana’s Political Economy, 1950-1990 (Oxford: Pergamon 
Press, 1992), p. 139.
2 Ghana, Parliamentary Debates. Official Report, 3rd series, vol. 1, no. 1 (Accra, n.d.), col. 10, 
J.J. Rawlings, Inauguration of the Third Republic, 24/9/1979.
3 Richard Jeffries, ‘Ghana: the political economy of personal rule’, in Donal B. Cruise O’Brien, 
John Dunn and Richard Rathbone (eds.), Contemporary West African States (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1989), p. 92.
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from abroad, the Limann government sought just to muddle through.4 Ewusi argues 
that the Limann regime ‘fumbled with its economic policies*5: its first Minister of 
Finance and Economic Planning was dismissed after a year and Parliament almost 
rejected its second budget. Nevertheless, according to Ewusi, Limann tried to pursue 
an agenda of trade and price liberalization, complemented by the formulation of a 
liberal investment code.6
The relationship between the state and the private sector during the PNDC era 
has been analyzed in more detail. Most studies contend that the PNDC attempted to 
suppress the private sector until 1983. Thereafter, in a Damascene conversion, it 
embraced free-market, laisser-faire capitalism and supported private enterprise.7 
Although this is the general consensus, there are some divergent views. Tangri 
contends that the PNDC’s pro-private sector credentials were weak, even after 1983,8 
and that the regime was not ‘perceived by Ghanaian business as being a strong and 
unequivocal supporter of the private sector’.9 According to Tangri, ‘ambiguity and 
equivocation* were ‘marked features of the attitudes of PNDC leaders towards local 
entrepreneurs*.10
With regard to the PNDC’s post 1983 assistance programmes for small 
industry, it generally is thought that, although the PNDC was sympathetic to the case 
for small industry encouragement, in reality, direct assistance to this sector was 
small. Dawson suggests that the PNDC’s small industry promotion programmes
4 Ibid.
5 Kodwo Ewusi, The Political Economy of Ghana in the Post Independence Period: Description 
and Analysis o f the Decadence o f the Political Economy of Ghana and the Survival Techniques o f Her 
Citizens (Legon: ISSER, 1984), p. 19.
6 Ibid.
1 Rimmer, Staying Poor, ch. 8. Baffour Agyeman-Duah, ‘Ghana, 1982-6: the Politics of the 
P.N .D .C .’, Journal o f Modem African Studies, 24 (1987) no. 4, pp. 613-42. James C.W. Ahiakpor, 
‘Rawlings, Economic Policy Reform and the Poor: Consistency or Betrayal?’, Journal o f Modem 
African Studies, 29 (1991) no. 4, pp. 583-600. Jonathan H. Frimpong-Ansah, The Vampire State in 
Africa. The Political Economy of Decline in Africa (London: James Currey, 1991), p. 153.
8 Roger Tangri, ‘The Politics of Govemment-Business Relations in Ghana’, Journal o f Modem 
African Studies, 30 (1992) no. 1, pp. 97-111.
9 Ibid., p. 99.
10 Ibid., p. 104.
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achieved little,11 as does Fischer-Quincke.12
8.2 The Limann Years
In many ways, the PNP was a resurrection of Nkrumah’s Convention People’s Party
(CPP). Nkrumah’s former Minister of Industries, Imoru Egala, led the PNP until his
disqualification from holding public office in 1979. The PNP also exploited old CPP
networks to mobilize popular support during the election campaign.13
Yet the CPP and PNP shared not only personalities and institutions but also
ideas. This is evident from the PNP’s manifesto for the 1979 election, which had
striking parallels to the CPP’s Programme for Work and Happiness of 1962 and the
CPP’s Seven Year Plan of 1963. For example, the manifesto observed that:
The Government o f  the first republic, inherited in 1957, a considerable 
legacy o f  poverty, disease and illiteracy. It had to grapple quickly with the 
problem o f re-organising the whole o f the life o f the nation based on 
improvements in agriculture, communications, health, commerce, industry, 
finance, education, housing, energy and social services.14
This was virtually identical to the CPP’s own assessment of the colonial inheritance
in its Programme for Work and Happiness:
The Party and Government ... inherited a miserable legacy o f poverty, 
disease and illiteracy and had to grapple quickly with the problem o f  
reorganising the whole o f  the life o f the nation based on improvements in 
agriculture, commerce and industry, finance, education, communications, 
housing and health services.15
The PNP manifesto promised that ‘science and technology* would be the basis o f its
agricultural, industrial and energy policies,16 just as the Seven Year Plan had pledged
‘social and economic development based on the use of science and technology to
11 Jonathan Dawson, ‘Small-Scale Adjustment’, West Africa, 28/12/1988, p. 2440.
12 G. Fischer-Quincke, ‘Small Enterprises for the Needs of the People: Ghana’s "Small-Scale 
Industrial ‘Take-Off"’, in Karl Wohlmuth et al. (eds.), African Development Perspectives Yearbook, 
1989. Vol. 1: Human Dimensions o f Adjustment (Berlin: Scholzky and Jeep, 1990), pp. 233-47.
13 Jeffries, ‘Ghana’, pp. 88-91.
14 People’s National Party, Manifesto of the People’s National Party (no publication details), p. 9.
15 C.P.P., Programme of the Convention People’s Party fo r Work and Happiness (Accra: Ministry 
of Information and Broadcasting, n.d.), para. 32.
16 PNP, Manifesto, p. 23.
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revolutionise our industry’.17
Many of the PNP’s leaders had socialist sympathies. For example, in an
interview with the BBC in April 1979, Egala argued that private capitalism had to be
controlled and that all Ghanaians were socialist at heart:
BBC You’re not hostile then in principle to private capital and private 
investment?
IMORU EGALA No, no, no, not at all. I think ... er ... it’s a good thing, 
once it’s under control. You see, some of our people call Ghanaians 
capitalists ... I don’t see any capitalists in Ghana. They are all living on 
overdrafts ... There are no capitalists. We are all background socialists ...,8
Similarly, Limann spoke in typical socialist fashion of reducing ‘inequalities and
inequities*. As Limann told Parliament at the official inauguration of the Third
Republic, his vision of Ghana was one in which ‘the majority of our people shall not
be reduced to grinding poverty again* and where ‘Crying inequalities and inequities
shall be drastically curbed*.19
Clearly, the PNP had socialist leanings. This would suggest, primafacie, that
the PNP was hostile to the Ghanaian private sector, just like the CPP had been
(Chapter Five). However, this was probably not the case, because although the PNP
did express socialist leanings, it had none of the CPP’s socialist dogma. This is
evident from the PNP’s manifesto. In it, economic policy was nebulous, containing
promises to eliminate hoarding, profiteering and smuggling,20 while increasing
industrial capacity utilization by improving the distribution of import licences.21 In
contrast to Nkrumah’s clear policy of state-led, import-substituting industrialization,
the manifesto had few concrete policies, except to promise that the PNP would
establish iron and steel and heavy chemical industries.22 One of the manifesto’s only
clear pledges on general economic policy was to promote self-sustaining development,
17 Office of the Planning Commission, Seven Year Development Plan: A Brief Outline (Accra: 
Government Printing Department, 1963), foreword.
18 ‘We Are All Socialists’, Interview by BBC Network Africa with Imoru Egala, Leader of the 
People’s Nationalist Party (PNP), West Africa, 30/4/1979, p. 741.
19 Ghana, Parliamentary Debates, 3rd series, vol. 1, no. 1., col. 14, President Limann at the 
Inauguration of the Third Republic, 24/9/1979.
20 PNP, Manifesto, p. 13.
21 Ibid., p. 25.
22 Ibid., pp. 25-6.
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by ‘making agriculture feed our industry, and industry feed our agriculture*.23
With regard to small industry development, it is clear that the PNP had none
of the bold plans for Ghanaian business promotion which the Progress Party had in
1969 (pp. 145-147). Nevertheless, it had none of the CPP’s ‘doctrinaire socialism’24
either. As a result, the Limann government was generally sympathetic towards small-
scale industrial development. This is evident in the Five Year Economic Programme
of 1981.25 Although this programme was neither published nor implemented
because of the fall of the government,26 it does give an insight into the PNP’s
intentions. In the programme, the government recognized:
the importance o f small scale industries and its contribution to employment 
and to the industrial development o f the country in the production and 
processing o f  food, manufacture o f consumer goods and the repair o f  
transport and other mechanical facilities in the system.27
It argued that, in the past, the industrial sector had developed through import-
substitution, but this strategy had suffered from its over-reliance on imported
inputs.28 By contrast, small-scale industries used local raw materials, employed
simple technology and were labour-intensive.29 Nevertheless, previous governments
had neither promoted nor co-ordinated their development:
The country’s industrialization efforts have concentrated mainly on the 
establishment o f  large-scale manufacturing industries. Consequently, there 
has been a complete lack o f a co-ordinated programme for the promotion o f  
rural and small-scale industries ... Responsibility for rural and small-scale 
industries development is diffused, fiscal incentives are non-existent, 
infrastructural and physical facilities are not well developed and extension 
services are lacking.30
23 Ibid., p. 26.
24 ‘Observer Leader: The Year 1979 in Retrospect’, The Legon Observer, vol. xii, no. 1, 18-31 
January, 1980, p. 2.
25 NAGA RG 6/6/174, Ghana, ‘Government’s Economic Programme, 1981/82-1985/86. Annexure 
I. Sectoral Plans (Part A)’ (1981).
26 M.M. Huq, The Economy o f Ghana. The First 25 Years since Independence (London: 
Macmillan, 1989), p. 11.
27 NAGA RG 6/6/174, Ghana, ‘Government’s Economic Programme, 1981/82-1985/86. Annexure 
I. Sectoral Plans (Part A)’ (1981), p. 22.
™ Ibid., p. 116.
29 Ibid., p. 122.
30 Ibid., p. 120.
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To rectify past failings, the programme envisaged that various government 
institutions would increase training for small industrialists. It was estimated that the 
number of participants on Management Development and Productivity Institute 
(MDPI) training programmes would increase from 1,170 in 1981-82 to 1,320 in 
1985-86,31 while the number on National Vocational Training Institute training 
schemes would rise from 2,037 to 2,779.32 In addition, the Programme proposed 
to improve the co-ordination of government institutions engaged in small industry 
development by establishing a ‘Small-Scale Industries Promotion and Development 
Board* within the Ministry of Industries. This Board would ‘plan and execute a 
strategy for the accelerated growth of the cottage and small-scale industries sector*.33
It would appear that the PNP’s private language, as expressed in the Plan, was 
not entirely hollow. In the 1979-80 Settlement, 13.5 per cent of the budget of the 
Ministry of Industries, Science and Technology was earmarked for small industry 
development projects.34 This was up from 12.7 per cent in 1978-7935 and a 
considerable jump on the 1.8 per cent spent on small industry programmes in 1972- 
3.36 In real terms, this represented a three-fold increase in the amount being 
devoted to small industry promotion between 1972 and 1979.37
However, perhaps the biggest achievement of the Limann years lay in 
producing legislation for the creation of the National Board for Small-Scale 
Industries.
31 Ibid., table 4.7, p. 83.
32 Ibid., table 4.8, p. 84.
33 Ibid., p. 122.
34 Ghana, Annual Estimates for 1979-80. Part I, vol. V, Ministries o f Industries, Science and 
Technology (Accra: Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, 1979), p. 8.
35 Ghana, The Annual Estimates for 1978-79. Part I, vol. 6, Industries (Accra: Ministry of 
Finance, 1978) pp. 2-10.
36 Ghana, The Annual Estimates for 1973-74. Parti, vol. V, Industries (Accra: Ministry of Finance 
and Economic Planning, 1973), pp. 2-8.
37 Ibid., pp. 2-8. Rimmer, Staying Poor, table 7.4, p. 149. Ghana, Annual Estimates fo r 1979-80,
p. 8.
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The National Board For Small-Scale Industries
There had been calls for a more co-ordinated approach to small industry development 
as early as 1978,38 but little action was taken until the establishment of the National 
Board for Small-Scale Industries (NBSSI) by Act of Parliament in June 1981. 
According to the National Board for Small-Scale Industries Act, the main functions 
of the NBSSI were to: establish the criteria that constitute a small-scale industry; 
identify the types of small-scale industries in the country; assist the government on 
issues relating to the development and support of small industries; implement 
government policies with regard to small-scale industries; render general support 
(such as infrastructure and extension services) to small industries; co-ordinate the 
‘efforts of all agencies ... to ensure proper flow of information and avoidance of 
duplication of efforts and waste of material resources’; and control foreign aid and 
Ghana Government spending on the small-scale industrial sector.39 Further, the Act 
prohibited other organizations from engaging in small industry promotion without the 
prior consultation and approval of the NBSSI.40 In other words, the NBSSI was to 
be the umbrella institution under which all small industry promotion would take place.
In its passage through Parliament, there was criticism of particulars of the 
National Board for Small-Scale Industries Bill. For example, P.K. Owusu-Ansah 
argued that ‘small-scale* should be defined by the Act itself and not left to the ‘whims 
and caprices of the Board’.41 However, the key points of the Bill had cross-party 
support42 for numerous reasons. First, there appeared to be a clear-cut case for 
having an umbrella institution to promote small industries, since this sector had 
received inadequate institutional support in the past. As Nenyi Arkaah, Chairman of 
the Parliamentary Committee which had considered the Bill, explained to the House,
38 Ghana Enterprise Development Commission, Third Annual Report, 1977/78 (Accra: Ghana 
Publishing Corporation, n.d.), p. 24.
39 Ghana, The National Board for Small-Scale Industries Act, 1981 (Act 434) (Accra-Tema: Ghana 
Publishing Corporation, 1981), pp. 3-4.
40 Ibid., p. 4.
41 Ghana, Parliamentary Debates. Official Report, 3rd series, vol. 6, 29/4/1981-21/9/1981, col. 
700, Dr. P.K. Owusu-Ansah, P.F.P., Wenchi-East, Second Reading of The National Board for Small- 
Scale Industries Bill, 12/6/1981.
42 Ibid., cols. 690-710.
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in the deliberations of his committee:
It was realised that studies conducted by international organisations, aid donor 
countries, and Ghanaian agencies, pointed to the fact that although the 
country had the institutional infrastructure and hence the capability to achieve 
a sustainable growth and development through small-scale industries (S .S .I.), 
inadequate attention had been given to this subsector. Among the studies 
referred to were those submitted to the Government by the World Bank, the 
Canadian International Development Agency, Indian Government Mission o f  
experts, and local governmental and private agencies.43
Second, the idea of having one, co-ordinating institution for small industry 
development was particularly attractive to foreign donors. By the early 1980s, 
foreign donors were deeply involved in small industry promotion: the MDPI had been 
created with International Labour Office and United Nations Development Programme 
support in 1967 (p. 143), while the Tema small industries centre had been established 
in 1970 as a joint Ghanaian-Indian-foreign donor project (p. 152). Thus, Arkaah 
observed:
international organisations, notably the United Nations Development 
Programme, the European Economic Community, and the World Bank 
preferred channelling aid for the promotion o f  small-scale industries through 
a national body such as the proposed board.44
Third, it was realized that small-scale industries not only made a major
contribution to the economy, but also that they had the potential for further
expansion. One Member of Parliament told the House that:
small-scale industries have contributed in no small measure to the economy 
o f this country, but it looks as if  they are not being recognised and put in 
their proper places. For example, the shoes and sandals industry at the 
Kantamanto market. These small-scale industries have been able to support 
the poor worker in a way and this is one o f  the reasons why I think it is time 
now to give them recognition.45
Another member, Owusu-Ansah, took the argument further by pointing to the
‘stupendous success* of Indian small-scale industrialization, and noting that ‘Our
problems are not dissimilar, and I would strongly urge that we can learn from the
43 Ibid., cols. 690-1, Nenyi Nkensen Arkaah, P.N.P., Efutu-Ewutu-Senya, Chairman of the 
Committee on Trade, Tourism, Industry, Science and Technology, The National Board for Small-Scale 
Industries Bill, Second Reading, 11/6/1981.
44 Ibid., col. 693.
45 Ibid., cols. 693-4, W.N. Grant, A.C.P., Takoradi, The National Board for Small-Scale 
Industries Bill, Second Reading, 11/6/1981.
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Indian experience’.46
Finally, small industry promotion had cross-party support because there was
a consensus that state-led, import-substituting industrialization a la Nkrumah was
impossible in Ghana’s economic circumstances. In the immediate post-colonial years,
there had been a tendency to think about development in terms of reproducing the
technological achievements of the West (p. 130). By the early 1980s, the economy
was on the verge of complete collapse,47 and such a strategy was clearly unfeasible.
Members of Parliament knew this reality. As Nana Akuoku-Sarpong remarked:
At long last by the introduction o f this Bill, we are now making an open 
admission that we cannot turn this country into an industrial giant overnight 
. ..  After two decades o f  attempts at development in Ghana, there has been a 
sense o f  disappointment and frustration. We have painfully realised that we 
have to be creative in the sense o f developing models and providing solutions 
which are indigenous. We have, so to speak, to go back to our roots and 
ensure that whatever solutions we evolve for our development problems are 
related to our experience.48
Evidently, in clear distinction to the situation in the immediate post-colonial years,
the ideological undercurrent in early 1980s Ghana favoured small-scale and organic,
rather than large-scale and ‘turn-key*, industrial development.
The Failures o f the PNP
Although the National Board for Small-Scale Industries Bill was enacted in 1981, the 
NBSSI did not actually become operational until 1985. Thus, the Limann government 
did not survive to witness its most important measure for small industry promotion.
Besides the NBSSI Act, the achievements of the government were minimal. 
Many of the factors which had worsened the environment for small-scale industrialists 
during the Acheampong-Akuffo period remained. Price distortions continued to 
grow. By 1983, the parallel, market rate for the cedi reached 22 times the official,
46 Ibid., col. 698, Dr. P.K. Owusu-Ansah, P.F.P., Wenchi-East, The National Board for Small- 
Scale Industries Bill, Second Reading, 11/6/1981.
47 World Bank, Ghana: Policies and Program for Adjustment (Washington D.C., 1984), p. xvi, 
cited in Rimmer, Staying Poor, p. 133.
48 Ghana, Parliamentary Debates. Official Report, 3rd series, vol. 6, cols. 702-3, Nana Akuoku- 
Sarpong, P.F.P., Asante-Akim North, The National Board for Small-Scale Industries Bill, Second 
Reading, 12/6/1981.
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controlled rate49 and, according to the World Bank, Ghana had become one of the
world’s most ‘distorted* economies.50 Therefore, kalabule remained, and with it the
incentive to engage in trading rather than production (pp. 178-179). Furthermore,
the Limann regime continued with the AFRC policy of increasing the tax burden on
the self-employed. In the budget for the financial year 1979-80, taxes on the self-
employed were raised.51 It is likely that this diminished the expansion potential of
small-scale entrepreneurs. As The Legon Observer remarked:
how can the government seek to foster the growth o f small scale enterprises 
by going to such great lengths to provide them with access to credit, among 
other things, and yet wish to reduce own-savings in so drastic a fashion? 
Own-savings after all are the primary sources o f  investment funds for small 
enterprises.52
Finally, the government’s financial position remained precarious. With this financial 
fragility, the administrative inertia which had characterized government in the 
Acheampong-Akuffo years remained. By 1981, government revenue had fallen to 
only 4.5 per cent of national income53 and the state’s capacity to administer a 
programme of small industry development—let alone carry out more important 
functions of government—was impaired seriously.
8.3 The Provisional National Defence Council
In 1979, Rawlings had few economic policies, except to stamp out all manifestations 
of kalabule (p. 184). However, between 1979 and 1981, Rawlings had come under 
the influence of a group of Dependency theorists at the University of Ghana.54 As 
a result, in 1982, Rawlings was preaching the doctrine of Dependency theory and was 
blaming Ghana’s economic condition on neo-colonialism.
49 Rimmer, Staying Poor, p. 168.
30 World Bank, World Development Report 1983 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), table
6.1, pp. 60-1.
51 ‘The Political Economy of the 1980 Budget’, 77te Legon Observer, vol. xii, no. 5,14-27 March, 
1980, p. 100.
52 Ibid., pp. 101-2.
53 Frimpong-Ansah, Vampire State, table 6.2, p. 95.
54 Jeffries, ‘Ghana’, pp. 92-3.
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The PNDC’s attachment to Dependency theory is evident from many of its 
pronouncements. In its major economic policy statement of 1982, the PNDC 
reasoned:
The historical roots o f  our present state o f  underdevelopment stem from 
British colonialism which bequeathed a set pattern o f economic development, 
social structures, attitudes and an oppressive and parasitic state machinery.55
Thus, Ghana was a ‘neo-colony*,56 and the PNDC proposed to eliminate ‘foreign
monopoly control over the economy and the social life’, and to pursue a goal of ‘total
economic independence’.57
Following from the PNDC’s ideological convictions, the private sector was
suppressed. Government rhetoric turned against it. The PNDC condemned the
‘phony businessmen and lazy annuitants’58 and the ‘corrupt company officials and
profiteering middlemen* who used their ‘connections* to obtain goods at official prices
for resale at ‘cut throat prices*.59 Farmers and market women who refused to accept
official prices were harassed physically, while controlling shares in foreign-owned
commercial and manufacturing enterprises either were threatened with confiscation
or confiscated.60 House rents were reduced, thus cutting the incomes of private
landlords, and Citizens Vetting Committees were established to ‘investigate and
punish economic crimes and corruption’.61 In 1982, a network of ‘Peoples* Shops’
was planned to ‘facilitate the popular control over the distribution of basic goods’62
and so eliminate the private trade sector. A Tax Court was planned to reinforce the
55 Ghana, Policy Guidelines of the Provisional National Defence Council (Accra: Ghana Information 
Services, 1982), pp. 2-3.
56 Ibid., p. 3.
57 Ibid., pp. 5, 6.
58 Ghana, The PNDC’s Programme for Reconstruction and Development. Statement by the PNDC 
Secretary for Finance and Economic Planning on Radio and Television on December 30, 1982 (Accra: 
Information Services Department, n.d.), p. 2.
59 Ibid., p. 3.
60 Ahiakpor, ‘Rawlings’, p. 589.
61 Zaya Yeebo, Ghana: The Struggle for Popular Power. Rawlings: Saviour or Demagogue 
(London: New Beacon Books, 1991), p. 62.
62 Ghana, PNDC’s Programme, p. 7.
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tax collection drive.63 Workers Defence Committees were formed to defend 
workers’ rights in businesses. All the while, the judicial system was by-passed and 
the system of law and order became increasingly partial.64
Some of these measures worsened the environment for small-scale 
industrialists. For example, the drive to increase tax collection affected small 
industries. Van Ommering and van der Ree, who were conducting fieldwork on 
small-scale industries in May and June of 1982, found that soldiers were forcing 
small industrialists to register their businesses and pay income tax.65 Similarly, the 
forced reduction of prices is likely to have affected small-scale industrialists, just as 
it had in 1979 (pp. 184-185).
The Volte Face o f 1983
In 1983, the PNDC’s economic policies changed completely. From that year, the
PNDC embraced laisser-faire and free markets, supported the private sector and came
to terms with the West. This was symbolized by the PNDC’s decision to follow an
‘orthodox’ Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) developed in conjunction with
the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF).
The shift in the PNDC’s policies was expressed in numerous policy
statements. In 1983, the regime conceded that a ‘series of past policy decisions and
actions* had had a ‘cumulative adverse effect on the economy*.66 These included
an overvalued cedi, fiscal deficits, price controls and import licensing.67 As far as
the industrial sector was concerned, the PNDC would let inefficient industries
collapse, including:
those industries which were not economically viable, are a net drain on 
foreign exchange, provide few employment opportunities, are based on highly 
capital intensive techniques o f production, generate almost no revenues for
63 Ibid., p. 19.
64 Agyeman-Duah, ‘Ghana, 1982-6’, p. 629.
65 Addie van Ommering and Kees van der Ree, ‘Small-Scale Industries in Ghana. Past, present 
and possible role in economic growth and spread of development’, University of Amsterdam, 
Department of Human Geography, MA, 1983, p. 60.
66 Ghana, Economic Recovery Programme, 1984-1986. Vol I (Accra: Government of Ghana, 
1983), para. 26.
67 Ibid.
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the Government or can only operate behind excessive tariff protection.68 
Accordingly, the SAP after 1983 consisted of a classic World Bank/IMF package of 
price and trade liberalization together with public sector reform.69
The reasons for Rawlings* volte face are numerous. By 1983, the policies 
recommended by Dependency theorists were failing to revitalize the economy70 and, 
given the precarious economic situation at that time, the likelihood of the PNDC 
being toppled was great.71 Also, substantial external backing from the Soviet Union 
and Libya for the PNDC’s original policies were not forthcoming.72 Whatever the 
reasons, it is clear that the SAP embodied several moves to support the private sector. 
For instance, institutional links between the PNDC and the private sector were 
cultivated. Thus, by the early 1990s, the Association of Ghana Industries was having 
‘regular meetings* with government ministers, as well as the Governor of the Bank 
of Ghana.73
After 1983, the PNDC’s rhetoric towards the private sector became positive, 
and there are countless examples of this. The Economic Reform Programme of 1984- 
86, noted that:
The Government recognizes that the private sector has a distinct role to play 
in successfully implementing the ERP. Accordingly, the Government is now  
in the process o f finalizing a revised investment code so as to attract more 
private investment into the country.74
In 1984, the Governor of the Bank of Ghana gave notice that the PNDC was relying
on the private sector to revitalize the economy. In Addo’s words:
given the dismal performance o f the public sector, there is need for greater 
reliance on private investment in the Government’s efforts to resuscitate the
68 Ibid., para. 86.
69 Rimmer, Staying Poor, pp. 183-85. Kodwo Ewusi, Structural Adjustment and Stabilization 
Policies in Developing Countries. A Case Study o f Ghana’s Experience in 1983-86 (Tema: Ghana 
Publishing Corporation, 1987), pp. 17-8.
70 Ahiakpor, ‘Rawlings’, p. 598.
71 Frimpong-Ansah, Vampire State, p. 112.
72 Jeffries, ‘Ghana’, pp. 94-7.
73 The Secretariat of the Association of Ghana Industries, ‘The Association of Ghana Industries’ 
(Accra: typescript, 1993), p. 2.
74 Ghana, Economic Recovery Programme, 1984-86: Review of Progress in 1984, and Goals for  
1985, 1986 (Accra: Ghana Publishing Corporation, 1984), p. 7.
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econom y.75
In 1986, Rawlings himself promised a new era of government-private sector relations,
arguing that ‘we are depending on the private sector to play a dynamic role in the
resuscitation of our industries’.76 Similarly in 1992, K.A. Butah, the PNDC
Secretary for Industries, Science and Technology, observed that the private sector
would be the ‘prime mover’ of industrialization, with the government playing ‘a
largely supportive role’.77
To be sure, the PNDC was not always as pro-private sector as might first
appear. As late as 1990, the private sector felt that the government was not being as
supportive as it could be. Among the private sector’s complaints were:
the need for officials o f  the highest echelons o f the government machinery to 
acknowledge the efforts o f  the private sector through their pronouncements 
and actions, and to give due recognition o f  the role being played by the 
private sector in Ghana’s economic recovery efforts ... [private 
entrepreneurs] observed with great concern that the harassment o f investors 
by organs o f  the revolution/security agencies has not changed much.78
Tangri claims that ‘In all the years of economic reform since 1983, the private sector
has not felt adequately consulted*.79 In addition, the PNDC’s anti-private sector
stance before the SAP remained etched in the memories of businessmen during the
1980s.80 Indeed, these memories still haunted the private sector in the mid
1990s.81
Nevertheless, these problems need to be seen in historical perspective. The
75 J.S. Addo, ‘The Role of Private Investment in Ghana’, Ghana Manufacturers’ Association, 
Accra, 24 February 1984, cited in Tangri, ‘Politics of Govemment-Business Relations’, p. 97.
76 J.J Rawlings, ‘Keynote Address at the Opening of the First Ghana Industry and Technology Fair, 
1 March, 1986’, in Ghana, The New Direction and Purpose: Selected Speeches o f Fit. Lt. J.J. 
Rawlings, vol. 5 (Accra: Information Services Department, 1987), p. 17.
77 ‘Foreword by Captain (GN) K.A. Butah (PNDC Secretary for Industries, Science and 
Technology)’, in Ghana, Industrial Policy Statement. A Strategy for Industrial Regeneration (Accra: 
Ministry of Industries, Science and Technology, 1992), p. ii.
78 Ghana Investments Centre, ‘Discussion Paper on Private Sector Development Issues, 1989/90’
(1990), p. 3, cited in Tangri, ‘Politics of Govemment-Business Relations’, p. 99.
79 Tangri, ibid. , p. 102.
80 Ibid.t pp. 101-3. NAGA RG 6/6/146, World Bank (Western Africa Region and Industry 
Department), ‘Ghana: Industrial Policy, Performance and Recovery (Report No 5716-GH)’ (1985), pp. 
41-2.
81 Andrew Album and Andrew Lycett, ‘Taking Stock of Africa’, African Business, 206 (1996), p.
31.
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PNDC’s rhetoric of private sector support was more pronounced than any postwar 
government in Ghana with the possible exception of the Busia regime (Chapter Six). 
Consultation with the private sector did occur. Although the private sector was 
harassed at times by the ‘organs of the revolution*, the situation was clearly better 
than during the Acheampong-Akuffo period (p. 180), and certainly an improvement 
on the AFRC’s own record in 1979 (pp. 184-186). By the standards of postwar 
Ghanaian history then, the PNDC was clearly pro-private sector.
The PNDC and Small-scale Industries: Rhetoric
Within this general policy of private sector support, the PNDC expressed its specific 
support for small industries. In 1986, Rawlings argued that Ghanaian industry had 
suffered from AIDS or ‘Acquired Imports Dependency Syndrome*.82 Hence, the 
PNDC was keen to stimulate small-scale industries which used locally-available 
inputs:
Encouragement is also being given to the establishment and growth o f small- 
scale, rural and agro-based industries which can take up the processing o f  
local raw materials and thereby gradually reduce to the minimum, industry's 
dependence on foreign exchange-consuming raw materials.83
In the same year, Rawlings again championed the cause of small industry, arguing
that:
we must not permit the situation to develop, where small industries using 
traditional methods o f production with low capital input will experience 
severe survival difficulties as the efficiency and privileged position o f more 
modern industries strangulates them without making any kind o f  provision to 
absorb the workers being put out o f a job .84
The PNDC’s rhetoric of small industry support continued into the 1990s. In an
industrial policy statement in 1992, the PNDC Secretary for Industries, Science and
Technology observed that small-scale industry, ‘a seed-bed for industrial
entrepreneurship and a large employer of labour’, would receive ‘special
attention*.85 Moreover, the PNDC’s policies would ‘give full rein to the latent
82 Rawlings, ‘Keynote Address’, p. 15.
83 Ibid., p. 16.
84 African Affairs, 178 (1986), p. 30, cited in Fischer-Quincke, ‘Small Enterprises’, p. 239.
85 Ghana, Industrial Policy Statement, p. ii.
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dynamism of entrepreneurs in the small-scale and informal sectors’.86
The Reconstruction o f the Incentive Structure
During the 1970s and early 1980s, price controls encouraged the growth of kalabule,
and thereby increased the incentive to trade rather than engage in production (pp.
178-179). After 1983, this incentive structure was reversed, as the PNDC discarded
the belief that prices could be decreased through price controls and the elimination
of kalabule by force.
On launching the SAP in 1983, the PNDC recognized that price incentives had
suppressed industrial activity in the past. Rawlings asked:
...  why has it become so profitable in this country simply to engage in trade 
instead o f  production? Why are the most productive and industrious people 
usually the poorest? Why do we make it less profitable for a person to 
produce maize here than for him to get an import licence to import it from  
abroad? Idleness and parasitism have become more rewarded in this 
economy than productive work.87
In an open admission of past policy failures, Rawlings explained how the incentives
structure had disfavoured production. For example, in 1983, a metric ton of salt
exported fetched C200 at the official rate, while the same quantity of salt could be
sold locally for Cl, 127. This gave entrepreneurs no incentive to export salt and
surrender foreign exchange to the Bank of Ghana.88 Conversely, there was every
incentive to import salt rather than produce it locally.
To restructure incentives in favour of production, the PNDC liberalized prices.
The cedi was devalued progressively until the official rate touched the market rate in
November 1990.89 The 1,000 per cent devaluation of the cedi between 1983 and
1990 gave many small-scale industries which used local inputs a competitive
advantage over larger industries using imported inputs.90 It also reduced
86 Ibid., pp. ii-iii.
87 J.J. Rawlings, ‘Ghana’s Moment of Truth. Radio and Television Broadcast to the Nation on the 
1983 Budget Statement, by Flt-Lt J.J. Rawlings, Chairman of the PNDC on Monday May 2, 1983’ 
(no publication details), pp. 4-5.
88 Ibid., p. 5.
89 Rimmer, Staying Poor, p. 184.
90 Jonathan Dawson, ‘The Wider Context: the Importance of the Macroeconomic Environment for 
Small Enterprise Development’, Small Enterprise Development, 1 (1990) no. 3, pp. 41-2.
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significantly the price advantage that foreign manufacturers held over local ones. 
External trade was liberalized as well, to the extent that, by 1989, the import 
licensing system had been scrapped.91 As a result of price and import liberalization, 
kalabule diminished together with the incentives for trading over industrial activity.
The NBSSI
Although the NBSSI was conceived during the last year of the Limann government, 
the Board did not actually come into existence until 1985, and then with a skeletal 
staff of only three.92 In part, the delay between conception and birth was a result 
of the chronic administrative collapse within government. Nevertheless, after 
absorbing the Ghanaian Enterprises Development Commission in 1991,93 the NBSSI 
became the apex government organization for the promotion of small industries in 
Ghana. By 1994, the NBSSI had become a sizable institution, with 184 members of 
staff.94
The NBSSI attempted to promote small-scale industries in three main ways: 
the Entrepreneurship Development Programme (EDP), Business Advisory Centres 
(BACs) and direct credit provision. Under the EDP, 10 ‘trainers* were sent to the 
Entrepreneurship Development Institute of India to learn entrepreneurship 
development skills. Using these trainers, 10 Entrepreneurship Development 
workshops were held in Ghana between 1988 and 1991.95 The EDP was targeted 
at graduates of tertiary education institutions, as well as retired and redeployed public 
officers, vocational and technical school leavers, and youth and school drop outs.96 
By 1994, 135 start-up entrepreneurs and 232 practising entrepreneurs had attended 
such workshops.97
91 Rimmer, Staying Poor, p. 184.
92 F.C. Nkuakotse, Chairman of the Board of Directors of the NBSSI, ‘Message Two’, in NBSSI, 
NBSSI News, 1 (1994) no. 1, p. 3.
93 ‘Restructuring of National Board for Small-Scale Industries’, in ibid., p. 13.
94 Nkuakotse, ‘Message Two’, p. 3.
95 NBSSI, NBSSI News, 1 (1994) no. 1, p. 6.
96 Ibid.
97 Ibid.
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BACs were established in large towns throughout Ghana from 1991. By 1994, 
there were Centres in Cape Coast, Kumasi, Accra, Koforidua, Sunyani and 
Tamale,98 offering training and counselling services to small entrepreneurs, together 
with advice on securing credit.99 Also, BACs acted as government centres where 
small businessmen could register their firms instead of having to do this in person at 
the Register-General*s Department in Accra.100
By 1994, the NBSSI was disbursing credit to small-scale enterprises directly 
under three schemes. The first was the PAMSCAD—Programmes of Action to 
Mitigate the Social Costs of Adjustment—credit scheme, which had been established 
in 1989.101 Under the PAMSCAD scheme, 570 entrepreneurs had received credit 
totalling C228 million by 1994.102 Unlike the Small Business Credit Scheme before 
1978 (table 7.1, p. 175), PAMSCAD targeted industrial entrepreneurs directly. Up 
to the end of 1992, 369 small industrialists had received C154.9 million of credit, 
compared to 154 service sector beneficiaries who had secured only C56.8.103 
Another credit scheme operated by the NBSSI was the Women in Development 
Project (WDP). This project was funded by foreign donors and was aimed at women 
entrepreneurs specifically. Between 1991 and 1993, over 3,600 women received 
C192 million under this initiative.104 Finally, the NBSSI administered its own 
‘Revolving Fund’, which offered credit to small-scale entrepreneurs. The Revolving 
Fund was capitalized out of a C80 million loan arranged in 1989.105 There were 
634 beneficiaries of the fund between 1989 and 1994.106
There are some tangible examples of how the NBSSI helped Ghana’s small- 
scale industrial sector. One was Mrs. Osafo-Addo. Mrs. Addo returned to Ghana
98 Ibid., p. 7.
99 Ibid., pp. 7-8.
100 Ibid., p. 7.
101 Ibid., p. 10.
102 Ibid.
103 Ibid.
104 Ibid.
105 Ibid.
106 Ibid.
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from Germany in 1982, having studied anaesthesia and intensive care therapy.107 
In 1987, using C2,600 of her own capital, she began growing peppers on a small plot 
of land and processed these peppers into shito, a hot sauce used to accompany a 
variety of Ghanaian dishes.108 At this point, Mrs. Addo approached the NBSSI for 
assistance and, using a loan from the Board, expanded her business. Having always 
repaid the Board promptly, she developed a good repayment record, and was able to 
approach the commercial banks for further loans.109 By 1993, Mrs. Addo’s annual 
turnover had reached C51 million and her products were being exported to Britain, 
Germany and Scandinavia.110
GRATIS
The Small-scale Industries Centre in Tema was intended to provide for the technical 
needs of small-scale industries (p. 152). The project was initiated by Indian 
technicians, but, once they had left, the centre fell into disrepair. By the mid 1980s, 
most of its equipment was broken and staff morale was low.111
By contrast, the Technology Consultancy Centre (TCC) of the University of 
Science and Technology was proving quite a success (p. 178). A major development 
in the TCC concept occurred in 1980, when an Intermediate Technology Transfer 
Unit (ITTU) was opened in the Suame Magazine.112 The Suame ITTU lobbied for 
the provision of an electricity supply to the Magazine, taught Suame businessmen 
industrial skills and identified ‘appropriate’ technologies for local small industries. 
Some of these technologies were imported and offered on hire-purchase to Suame 
businesses.113 The hire-purchasing of imported small-scale iron foundries was 
particularly successful. Using these imported foundries, a pair of com mill grinding
107 ‘Moving to the Top with NBSSI: interview with Mrs Leticia Osafo-Addo, proprietress of 
Processed Foods and Spices Ltd’, in NBSSI, NBSSI News, 1 (1994) no. 2, pp. 18-20.
108 Ibid.
109 Ibid.
110 Association of Ghana Industries, Newsletter, July-September, 1994, p. 10.
1.1 GRATIS, Annual Review, 1988 (Tema: GRATIS, n.d.), p. 26.
1.2 John Powell, ‘Kumasi University’s Involvement in Grassroots Industrial Development’, Small 
Enterprise Development, 2 (1991) no. 2, pp. 38-40.
113 Ibid., pp. 38-9.
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plates could be produced for 09,000 in 1990, while imported grinding plates of 
comparable quality from China and Britain cost 014,000 and 025,000 
respectively.114
Already in the PNP era, plans had been mooted to revitalize the Tema Centre
by making it a full ITTU.115 There also had been calls to establish a national
network of ITTUs. This idea was aired in Parliament in 1981, when one Member
of the House observed in relation to the NBSSI Bill that:
The Ministry o f  Industries, Science and Technology has a small-scale 
industrial training centre at Tema. I recommend that one o f such schools be 
opened in each region to cater for the development o f  specific technologies 
that are relevant to resources available in those regions.116
The impetus to develop a national network of small industry centres originated
from within the ITTU system as well. In 1982, small industry clients of the Suame
ITTU formed the TCC Clients’ Association.117 One year later, the Clients*
Association held an exhibition of locally-produced goods entitled ‘Ghana Can Make
It’.118 This exhibition was such a success that, in 1984, Dr Francis Acquah, the
PNDC Secretary for Industries, Science and Technology, called for the development
of a national ITTU network.119 The result of this initiative was the creation of the
Ghana Regional Appropriate Technology Industrial Service (GRATIS) in 1987.120
By 1993, GRATIS had established six ITTUs in regional capitals across Ghana.121
These were providing free-of-charge information, advice and training to established
small-scale industrialists, as well as importing and reselling cheap, second-hand
114 Ibid., p. 40.
115 Ghana, Parliamentary Debates, 3rd series, vol. 5,20/1/1981-27/3/1981 (no publication details), 
col. 686, Oral Answer by Mr. M.P. Ansah, Minister of Industries, Science and Technology, to Mr. 
B.K. Nyame, 4/3/1981.
116 Ghana, Parliamentary Debates, 3rd series, vol. 6, cols. 708-9, Mr. Martin Adane, P.F.P., 
Jaman, Second Reading of the National Board for Small-Scale Industries Bill, 12/6/1981.
117 John Powell, The Intermediate Technology Transfer Unit. A Handbook on Operations [no 
publication details, but probably] (London: Intermediate Technology Publications, 1995), p. 2.
118 Ibid.
119 Ibid.
120 Ibid.
121 GRATIS, GRATIS News, 21 (1993), cover page.
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machine tools.122 By the early 1990s, the ITTU concept had become so successful 
that it was being exported to other African countries: in 1991, a Kenyan team visited 
Ghana to experience the ITTU concept first-hand and to draw up plans to create an 
ITTU in Mombasa,123 while delegations had visited Ghana from Tanzania, Lesotho, 
Botswana, and Mali.124 In addition, international organizations such as the 
European Community, Canadian International Development Agency and Economic 
Commission for Africa had expressed interest in replicating the ITTU idea 
elsewhere.125
A powerful force which shaped GRATIS was foreign aid. Foreign aid had 
influenced government policy towards small industries before, such as in the 
establishment of the MDPI (p. 143), the development of the Tema Centre (p. 151), 
and the formulation of the NBSSI Act (p. 194). It was also crucial in the GRATIS 
project: the European Community’s European Development Fund provided ECU1.2 
million to initiate the project; after that, the Canadian International Development 
Agency contributed C$3.5 million to construct an ITTU in every region.126 Table
8.1 shows that foreign aid continued to finance GRATIS after its initial establishment.
Table 8.1. GRATIS’ Sources of Income, 1988.
Source C Million Per Cent of Total 
Income
Government Subvention 12.6 27
Foreign Support 28.0 61
Earned Income 5.5 12
Source: GRATIS, Annual Review, 1988, p. 18.
122 Powell, Intermediate Technology Transfer Unit, pp. 8-9.
123 Caroline Gockah, ‘ITTU idea glitters in the Mombasa "sun"’, in GRATIS, GRATIS News, 13
(1991), p. 2.
124 Ibid. Sabina Anokye Mensah and Patrick Nimo, ‘Rate of Exchange Rises for African Ideas’, 
in GRATIS, GRATIS News, 10 (1990), p. 7.
125 Ibid.
126 Powell, Intermediate Technology Transfer Unit, p. 3.
208
Policy Problems
So far it has been argued that, after 1983, the PNDC adopted a positive attitude to 
the private sector generally and small industries specifically. Nevertheless, there 
were several failings as well.
With regard to the PNDC’s efforts to promote small-scale industries, a case 
can be made that public money was not always spent efficiently. To develop effective 
policies for small industry promotion, enough needs to be known about the 
characteristics of the sector first. Yet actually, the PNDC knew very little about this. 
As a World Bank study observed in 1985, ‘Data on small-scale enterprises (fewer 
than 30 workers) are scarce, with little information gathered specifically on these 
enterprises since 1973*.127 The PNDC did embark on a National Survey of Small 
Scale Industries in 1989, similar to that which had been conducted in 1963 (p. 69). 
Although data for this Survey was collected, computer software problems prevented 
it from being processed and the project was scrapped.128 Therefore, it could be 
argued that without comprehensive information on the small-scale industrial sector, 
the PNDC framed its policies in the dark, or at least in the twilight.
There were also specific cases of public money not being spent cost- 
effectively. For example, the NBSSI Act set out that one of the primary functions 
of the NBSSI would be to define what constituted a small-scale industry.129 
However, as of 1990, the Board had failed to arrive at a definition.130 In its 
absence, it can be surmised that the policies of the NBSSI were not focused and 
therefore did not represent the most efficient use of public money. In addition, there 
were some clear cases where public money was wasted. The Suame Workshop is a 
good example of this. The Suame Workshop was built in 1984 using $400,000
127 NAGA RG 6/6/146, World Bank (Western Africa Region and Industry Department), ‘Ghana: 
Industrial Policy, Performance and Recovery (Report No 5716-GH)’ (1985), p. 35.
128 Informal discussion with staff at the Statistical Service, March 1996.
129 Ghana, NBSSI Act, p. 3.
130 Bridget Kyerematen, ‘Financing Small Scale Enterprises in Ghana’, University of Ghana, School 
of Administration, MBA, 1991, p. 39.
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provided by the Government of India.131 The workshop consisted of foundry 
equipment and machine tools,132 and its purpose was to introduce new skills and 
technologies to the Suame Magazine.133 The decision to establish the workshop had 
been taken before a proper feasibility study had been completed.134 In due course, 
the ‘feasibility study* found that the project would be ‘commercially unattractive’ 
because of its large overhead costs,135 and remarked diplomatically that ‘A political 
decision was made to proceed with this project before a feasibility study was 
completed ... only a political decision was appropriate’.136 Thus, it is certain that 
the $400,000 earmarked for the Suame Workshop could have been used more 
productively elsewhere.
Another important failing was the size of the PNDC’s initiatives. Although 
not much was known about Ghana’s small industries, what was certain was that this 
sector was large. In relation to the size of the sector, the PNDC’s assistance schemes 
were insignificant. According to Fischer-Quincke, less than $2 million was spent on 
direct small-scale industrial development programmes in 1987.137 GRATIS did not 
have a significant impact on the small-scale industrial landscape, providing training 
for only 637 people in 1989,138 against an estimated small-scale industrial 
population of 509,000 in 1984 (p. 70). In fact, comparatively few small businessmen 
had any idea that schemes for their assistance existed. In Sowa’s study of 1,365 
small businessmen conducted in 1990, it was found that 52 per cent of respondents 
were aware of the existence of the NBSSI, but only 25 per cent knew of GRATIS and
131 NAGA RG 6/6/120, Technology Consultancy Centre (J.W. Powell, S. Buatsi, M.N. 
Washington, R. Moshage), ‘Ghana Government Sponsored Workshop at Suame Magazine, Kumasi. 
A Feasibility Study’ (1984), p. 1.
132 Ibid.
133 Ibid., p. 17.
134 Ibid., p. 1.
135 Ibid., p. 17.
136 Ibid.
137 Fischer-Quincke, ‘Small Enterprises’, p. 239.
138 West Africa, 23/4/1990, p. 662.
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a mere 18 per cent had heard of a TCC.139 Even fewer actually benefitted from 
existing schemes. In a study of 672 small-scale industries in the Suame Magazine in 
1988, Dawson found that there was an ‘almost total absence of official assistance of 
any sort*.140 Only four firms had received any bank credit and fewer than ten had 
received any managerial training; only six firms had been assisted directly by the 
Suame TCC.141
Although the PNDC sought to increase credit to small enterprises, it would 
appear that this did not occur. Commercial banks continued to be wary of lending 
to small enterprises because of their high risk of default. As a result, by 1984, only 
Barclay’s and Standard Bank were still participating in the Bank of Ghana’s Credit 
Guarantee Scheme,142 while by 1990, even the National Investment Bank had 
abolished its Small Scale Enterprises Department.143 In contrast to the dearth of 
bank lending to small industries, banks ‘showered abundant credit on formal sector 
manufacturers’144 by recycling foreign loans secured by the government. As a 
result, between 1985 and 1990, lending to small manufacturing enterprises dropped 
as a share of total lending to manufacturing.145
Finally, it is possible that, although the PNDC did construct programmes for 
the promotion of small-scale industries, some of the PNDC’s general economic 
policies were unhelpful. For instance, the PNDC’s policy of public sector reform 
resulted in some 100,000 state employees being made redundant over the period
139 Nii K. Sowa, A. Baah-Nuakoh, K.A. Tutu and B. Osei, Small Enterprises and Adjustment. The 
Impact o f Ghana's Economic Recovery Programme on Small-Scale Industrial Enterprises (London: 
Overseas Development Institute, 1992), table 6, p. 24.
140 Dawson, ‘The Wider Context’, p. 43.
141 Ibid.
142 W.H. Thomi and P.W.K. Yankson, Small Scale Industries and Decentralization in Ghana. A 
Preliminary Report on Small Scale Industries in Small and Medium Sized Towns in Ghana (Legon: 
Department of Geography, University of Ghana, 1985), p. 83.
143 Kyerematen, ‘Financing Small Scale Enterprises’, p. 53.
144 Kwame A. Ninsin, The Informal Sector in Ghana’s Political Economy (Accra: Freedom 
Publications, 1991), p. 73.
145 Ernest Aryeetey, ‘Sectoral Credit Allocation Policy and Credit Flow to Small Enterprises in 
Ghana’, in A.H.J. Helmsing and Th. Kolstee (eds.), Small Enterprise and Changing Policies (London: 
IT Publications, 1993), fig. 10.1, p. 194.
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1983-89.146 In turn, this pushed labour into the small industry sector,147 increased 
competition, and may have reduced possibilities for capital accumulation and growth. 
Also, the rapid liberalization of imports after 1983 affected the market for some small 
industry products, by leading to a flood of cheap, foreign manufactures.
Nevertheless, despite all these failings, it is likely that the environment for 
small-scale industries was more friendly by the end of the PNDC era than at any 
other time since c.1945: the PNDC’s rhetoric was more positive than that of any 
other postwar government except possibly the Progress Party; incentives for trading 
relative to producing were reduced to a level last seen in the early Nkrumah years; 
and a host of sector-specific measures to assist small-scale industries had been 
instigated.
The Reasons fo r PNDC Small Industry Policy
There were at least three reasons why the PNDC was positive about the private sector 
and small industries after 1983: the new paradigm of economic development which 
stressed small-scale over large-scale; pressure from abroad to accept this new 
paradigm; and internal power-political considerations.
First, the paradigm of development which had stressed large-scale, statist, 
import-substituting industrialization in the 1960s (pp. 15-16) had given way to the 
paradigm of small-scale, private sector, ‘organic* industrial development. By the 
1980s, only a small minority of development economists were arguing for the 
Nkrumahan model of industrialization, and even fewer were doing so after the 
collapse of communism in Eastern Europe from 1989. Instead, small-scale industries 
were being seen as the vehicle for exploiting Third World factor endowments (p. 16). 
Moreover, the reality of Ghana’s economic conditions in the 1980s reinforced the 
belief that an Nkrumahan model of industrialization was unfeasible. By 1982, the 
public sector deficit had reached 14.6 per cent of national income, or 65 per cent of
146 EIU, Country Profile: Ghana, 1988-89 (London: 1987), cited in Dawson, ‘The Wider Context’, 
p. 43.
147 Dawson, ibid.
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government spending.148 In contrast, at the beginning of the Nkrumah period in
1951, the public sector actually had a surplus equal to almost 18 per cent of its
outlays.149 Therefore, it is important to remember that the ideological environment
and the economic realities in which the PNDC operated were very different from that
in which the Nkrumah regime found itself after independence.
Second, there was pressure from abroad to accept this paradigm of private
sector-led, small-scale, organic industrialization. From 1983, the PNDC followed a
World Bank and International Monetary Fund SAP. Although the focus of the SAP
was on macro-economic and public sector reform,150 it was envisaged that small
industries would play an important part in industrial regeneration. Hence, in 1984,
at the start of the SAP, the World Bank called on the PNDC to encourage indigenous
forms of production:
the indigenous markets, entrepreneurship and institutions o f  Ghana are well 
advanced compared with other African countries, and their positive 
encouragement rather than their suppression may yield better results in 
responding to changing economic opportunities.151
In this particular context, ‘indigenous entrepreneurship* was a clear reference to
small-scale forms of enterprise.
Third, the PNDC had domestic, power-political reasons for promoting the
private sector and small industries. Since one of the main elements of the SAP was
public sector reform, public sector job losses—or ‘redeployment’—increased. As
Rawlings observed in 1986, ‘We have said, and I will reiterate that, the public sector
will have to pay its way by becoming more efficient and productive*.152 In view
of the need to streamline the public sector, the PNDC sought to promote the private
sector, so as to provide jobs for these ex-government employees. Moreover, this was
exactly the policy which the World Bank and IMF were encouraging Ghana to follow.
According to a World Bank report in 1985, the unemployment created by the SAP
148 World Bank, Ghana: Policies and Program for Adjustment (Washington D.C., 1984), p. xvi, 
cited in Rimmer, Staying Poor, p. 133.
149 Rimmer, ibid., p. 40.
150 Ewusi, Structural Adjustment and Stabilization, pp. 17-8.
151 World Bank, Ghana: Policies and Program for Adjustment (Washington: World Bank, 1984), 
p. 47.
152 Rawlings, ‘Keynote Address’, p. 17.
213
could be offset by an increase in jobs in agriculture, while ‘Small (scale) industry
should also show dynamism in employment growth’.153
The necessity to provide jobs for ex-public sector employees was strong. As
the PNDC’s National Programme for Economic Development of 1987 noted:
Support will be given for the establishment o f  small-scale industries. The 
National Board for Small-Scale Industries has designed a project to identify 
potential entrepreneurs particularly from among personnel being redeployed 
from the public service.154
In an industrial policy statement in 1992, the PNDC argued, with regard to the
promotion of small industries, that ‘A particular priority is to create income
generating opportunities for people displaced by the down-sizing of the public
sector*.155 Indeed, some of the PNDC’s small industry promotion programmes
were solely for ‘redeployed’ workers. Thus, the NBSSI’s Entrepreneurship
Development Programme for Accra in 1989 was for ‘redeployees* only.156
In this chapter, the small industry development policies of the Limann government 
were examined in detail. From this, it is difficult to agree with Jeffries* contention 
that there is little of interest to say for the Limann years.157 Despite the PNP’s 
socialist leanings, the Five Year Economic Programme of 1981 was generally positive 
about small industry development. The same conclusion must be drawn from the 
NBSSI Act, which attempted to organize and simplify government institutions for 
small industry promotion. Nevertheless, just as in the years before 1979, price 
distortions grew and with it the incentive to trade rather than to produce.
For the PNDC years, this chapter has supported conventional interpretations, 
namely, that the PNDC was eager to promote the private sector and small-scale 
industries after 1983. Significant steps were taken to this end, although problems still 
remained. Two conclusions deserve to be highlighted. First, the restructuring of
153 World Bank, Country Report: Ghana (Washington D.C.: World Bank, 1985), cited in Ninsin, 
Informal Sector, p. 70.
154 Ghana, National Programme for Economic Development (Revised). Wednesday, 1st July, 1987 
(no publication details), pp. 16-17.
155 Ghana, Industrial Policy Statement, p. 9.
156 Kyerematen, ‘Financing Small Scale Enterprises’, pp. 41-2.
157 Jeffries, ‘Ghana’, p. 92.
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prices, and in particular, the external price of the cedi, gave a significant boost to 
production over trading. In 1990, thanks to the devaluation of the cedi, a pair of 
com mill grinding plates could be produced locally for C9,000, while the imported 
equivalent cost up to 025,000 (p. 206). In the 1970s, it is highly likely that the 
imported item would have been substantially cheaper than the locally-manufactured 
product. Second, this chapter has given a domestic perspective to the PNDC’s 
decision to promote the private sector after 1983. The PNDC genuinely was 
concerned about the effects of public sector job losses; the promotion of the private 
sector can be interpreted as a measure to mitigate the effects of this.
Examining the long period from c.1945 to c.1992, it is evident that 
government policy towards small industry has been both ‘nurturist’ and ‘repressive*, 
but never ‘parasitic*.158 However, government policies cannot account directly for 
the ‘explosion of small-scale industrial activity in Ghana*159 since 1945. This is 
because even the most ‘nurturist* governments (such as the Progress Party and the 
PNDC after 1983) had relatively minor small industry development programmes, 
which themselves were beset with problems. What can explain the ‘explosion* of 
small-scale industrial activity in Ghana since 1945? The next two chapters address 
this question.
158 John Iliffe, The Emergence o f African Capitalism (London: Macmillan, 1983), ch. 4.
159 Jonathan Dawson, ‘Development of Small-scale Industry in Ghana—A Case Study of Kumasi’, 
in Henk Thomas, Francisco Uribe-Echevarria and Henny Romijn (eds.), Small-Scale Production. 
Strategies fo r  Industrial Restructuring (London: Intermediate Technology Publications, 1991), p. 173.
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9 EXPLANATIONS FOR SMALL INDUSTRY 
GROWTH: ENTREPRENEURSHIP
Chapters Two and Three established that small industries survived the colonial period 
and that employment in them has expanded significantly since c.1945. Government 
policy towards this sector changed from ambivalence before 1966 into gentle 
encouragement by the late 1970s (Chapters Four to Eight). Nevertheless, direct 
government policy cannot explain fully the ‘explosion of small-scale industrial activity 
in Ghana’,1 not least because that ‘explosion* predated the change in policy. 
Similarly, Ninsin’s ‘supply-side* and Dawson’s ‘demand-side’ explanations are 
inadequate (pp. 21-25).
This chapter and the next broaden the discussion to consider what other factors 
may account for Ghana’s small industry growth. This is done by reviewing critically 
the data which have been generated from surveys of Ghana’s small-scale industrial 
sector already, and considering new material derived from a study of small-scale 
industries in Kumasi which I conducted in March 1996.
9.1 The dynamics of Small Industry Growth: the Steel Framework
To understand the dynamics of small firm establishment, it is useful to adopt a wide 
approach. The one employed in this chapter is based on the work of William Steel,2 
albeit with modifications. In its original context, Steel’s framework was designed to 
provide a vehicle for analyzing the impact of government policies on the small-scale 
industrial sector in Africa.3 The framework does not claim to be a theory for 
explaining small industry growth. Nevertheless, for the purpose of this thesis, it does
1 Jonathan Dawson, ‘Development of Small-scale Industry in Ghana—A Case Study of Kumasi’, 
in Henk Thomas, Francisco Uribe-Echevarrfa and Henny Romijn (eds.), Small-Scale Production. 
Strategies for Industrial Restructuring (London: Intermediate Technology Publications, 1991), p. 173.
2 William F. Steel, ‘Analysing the Policy Framework for Small Enterprise Development’, in 
A.H.J. Helmsing and Th. Kolstee (eds.), Small Enterprises and Changing Policies. Structural 
Adjustment, Financial Policy and Assistance Programmes in Africa (London: IT Publications, 1993), 
pp. 39-49.
3 Ibid. , p. 39.
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provide a useful organizing tool for examining the wide range of factors which 
determine small industry development.
Based on the Steel framework, three factors can be identified as being crucial 
for small-scale industrialization.4 First, agents or entrepreneurs with the necessary 
technical and managerial skills must be available to establish a firm. Second, such 
agents must have the requisite complementary resources (including capital, raw 
materials and labour) with which to create a firm. Finally, profitable opportunities 
must be available for small firms to exploit. In other words, there have to be 
incentives for small-scale industrial activity.
The value of Steel’s framework lies in the fact that it is broader than the 
supply-demand approaches of Ninsin and Dawson. Using the Steel framework, it is 
possible to scrutinize a whole range of issues affecting a small firm. For instance, 
the influence of government policy can be investigated when considering whether 
profitable business opportunities are available. The question of how industrialists 
acquire their skills can be examined when enquiring about the availability of agents 
willing and able to respond to profitable opportunities. The origins of the capital 
used for small firm creation can be explored when analyzing whether agents have the 
resources to respond to opportunities.
Admittedly, there are some overlaps among each of the factors in Steel’s 
framework. For example, the existence of a profitable opportunity may be a function 
of an industrialist’s technical skill and access to cheap complementary resources. 
This problem of overlap can be resolved by thinking of firm-creation as a two-stage 
process. In Stage One, the prospective industrialist acquires the ‘ingredients’ for 
small-firm creation by accumulating the necessary skills and capital, while 
establishing a supply of labour and raw materials. This stage can be thought of as 
relating to the first and second factors in Steel’s framework. In Stage Two, these 
ingredients are brought together in the form of a firm. In this stage, the firm must 
be producing goods which are competitive and in demand; in other words, there has 
to be an incentive for production. This second stage corresponds to the third factor 
in the Steel framework. By thinking of small firm creation in these terms, some of
4 Ibid., p. 40.
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the overlaps of the Steel framework may be avoided.
This chapter considers the first factor in the Steel framework, namely, the 
existence of entrepreneurs. Chapter Ten considers the issues of complementary 
resources and incentives. The next section introduces the sources to be used.
9.2 Introduction to the Sources
A wealth of data has been generated from surveys of Ghana’s small-scale industrial 
sector. These surveys can be divided into two categories: published surveys 
conducted by established social scientists and unpublished surveys conducted by 
bachelors and masters students. Tables 9.1 and 9.2 introduce these works.
Table 9.1. Published Surveys of Ghana’s Small-scale Industrial Sector.
Authors Date of 
Survey
Main Sectors Surveyed Survey
Location
Kennedy 1968-70 Saw milling, printing, furniture, 
textiles, garments, food- 
processing
Accra, Kumasi
Sunnu 1974 Auto repair Tema, Accra, 
Kumasi
Aryee 1975 Fitting, tailoring, leather 
manufacturing, metal- and 
wood-work
Kumasi
Kennedy 1977 Metal- and wood-work, auto 
repair, bags, footwear, 
upholstery, cement blocks
Accra
Thomi and 
Yankson
1984 Various 36 towns 
across Ghana
Anheier and 
Seibel
1985 Metal- and wood-work Accra, Kumasi
Riedel and 
Schmitz
1987 Textiles, food processing, 
metal- and wood-work, auto 
repair
Techiman
Dawson 1988 Auto repair, metal-work Kumasi
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Steel and 
Webster
1989 Food processing, textiles, 
toiletries, building materials, 
metal- and wood-work
Four regions 
of Ghana
Sowa et al. 1990 Auto repair, metal- and wood­
work, textiles, food processing
Accra, Ho 
Takoradi, 
Cape Coast, 
Kumasi, 
Tamale
Sources: Paul T. Kennedy, Ghanaian Businessmen. From artisan to capitalist entrepreneur 
in a dependent economy (Munich: Weltforum Verlag, 1980). Samuel Billy Kofi Sunnu, The 
Wayside Fitters. A Study of Small-Scale Vehicle Repair Activity in Urban Areas of Ghana 
(Kumasi: UST Department o f Planning, 1975). George Aryee, ‘The informal manufacturing 
sector in Kumasi’, in S .V . Sethuraman (ed.), The urban informal sector in developing 
countries. Employment, poverty and environment (Geneva: International Labour Office, 
1981), pp. 90-100. George Aryee, Small-Scale Manufacturing Activities: A Study of the Inter­
relationships Between the Formal and the Informal Sectors in Kumasi, Ghana (Geneva: 
International Labour Office, 1977). Paul Kennedy, ‘The Role and Position o f  Petty Producers 
in a W est African City’, Journal of Modem African Studies, 19 (1981) no. 4 , pp. 565-94. 
W .H. Thomi and P.W .K. Yankson, Small Scale Industries and Decentralization in Ghana. 
A Preliminary Report on Small Scale Industries in Small and Medium Sized Towns in Ghana 
(Legon: Department o f  Geography, University o f Ghana, 1985). Helmut K. Anheier and 
Hans Dieter Seibel, Small-Scale Industries and Economic Development in Ghana: Business 
Behavior and Strategies in Informal Sector Economies (Saarbrucken: Verlag breitenbach, 
1987). Jurgen Riedel and Hubert Schmitz, Grass-Root Industrialization in a Ghanaian Town 
(Munich: Weltforum-Verlag GmbH, 1989). Dawson, ‘Development o f  Small-scale Industry’. 
W illiam F. Steel and Leila M. Webster, Small Enterprises Under Adjustment in Ghana 
(Washington D .C .: World Bank, 1991). N ii K. Sowa, A. Baah-Nuakoh, K .A. Tutu and B. 
Osei, Small Enterprises and Adjustment. The Impact of Ghana's Economic Recovery 
Programme on Small-Scale Industrial Enterprises (London: Overseas Development Institute, 
1992).
Table 9.2. Unpublished Surveys of Ghana’s Small-scale Industrial Sector.
Authors Date of 
Survey
Main Sectors Surveyed Survey Location
van 
Ommering, 
van der Ree
1982 Oil- and soap-making, 
metal- and wood-work
Kumasi, Dunkwa- 
on-Offin, 4 
villages in 
Denkyira Local 
Council area
Nikoi 1985 Soap-making Accra
Domfeh 1987 Scrap metal products Wenchi
Koney 1987 Auto repair, metal-work Kumasi
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Effah 1988 Auto repair, metal-work Kumasi
Elleithy 1990 Carpentry, saw-milling, 
charcoal-making
Anloga, Kumasi
Kwame 1990 Auto repair, metal-work Kumasi
Sources: Addie van Ommering and Kees van der Ree, ‘Small-Scale Industries in Ghana. 
Past, Present and Possible Role in Economic Growth and Spread o f Development*, University 
o f Amsterdam, Department o f  Human Geography, MA, 1983. Samuel N ii Ashie Nikoi, 
‘Economic Problems o f  the Small-Scale Soap Manufacturing Industry in Accra’, UST, BA 
(Social Sciences) 1985. Samuel Djiabour Domfeh, ‘Problems and Prospects o f  Small Scale 
Scrap Metal Workshops in W enchi’, UST, BA (Social Sciences) 1987. Daniel Laryea Koney, 
‘The Role o f  Artisans in the Socio-Economic Development o f Ghana. A Case Study o f  
Suame Magazine in Kumasi*, UST, BA (Social Sciences) 1987. A lex Effah, ‘The Role o f  
Small-Scale Metal Industries In The National Economy. (A Case Study o f  Suame in Kumasi)’, 
UST, BSc (Development Planning) 1988. Amr Ali Elleithy, ‘Small Scale Industrial 
Agglomeration. A  Case Study o f  the Small Scale Wood Industry Spontaneous Agglomeration 
at Anloga, Kumasi’, UST, MSc (Development Planning and Management) 1990. Adjei 
Kwame, ‘Locational Analysis o f  Selected Informal Metal Industries in Kumasi’, UST, BSc 
(Development Planning) 1990.
Together, these surveys constitute a rich vein of information about small-scale 
industrial activity in Ghana since the 1960s. They have a wide geographical and 
temporal spread, with data covering around 4,800 small industrial firms from across 
the country between 1968 and 1990. There may be doubts about the quality of the 
unpublished surveys. However, most of these were conducted by students at 
Kumasi’s University of Science and Technology (UST), one of Ghana’s premier 
universities. Therefore, it is likely that they were supervised to a high standard. In 
any case, the unpublished surveys account for only 554—or about 12 per cent—of the 
total number of observations.
Two methodological issues need to be resolved before the data from these 
surveys can be analyzed. The first is what constitutes a small firm. The surveys 
have used a range of definitions. Table 9.3 gives an indication of this.
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Table 9.3. Definitions of Small-scale Industry Used in Selected Surveys.
Authors Definition of Small-scale Industry
Anheier and Seibel Fewer than 15 workers
Van Ommering and van 
der Ree
10 or fewer workers and less than 0234,000 of 
capital
Thomi and Yankson Up to 30 workers
Dawson Any firm located within the spatial boundaries of the 
Suame Magazine
Sources: Anheier and Seibel, Small-Scale Industries, p. 18. Van Ommering and van der Ree, 
‘Small-Scale Industries’, p. 55. Thomi and Yankson, Small Scale Industries, p. 15. Dawson, 
‘Development o f  Small-scale Industry’, p. 173.
The second issue is that each survey has its own methodology and none can 
claim to be truly representative of Ghana’s small-scale industrial landscape. For 
instance, Aryee first compiled a register of all small industrial firms in the Kumasi 
area and then drew a 10 per cent random sample for detailed analysis.5 Using data 
on small-scale metal industries registered with the Ghana National Association of 
Garages, Effah used stratified sampling to generate a 10 per cent sample of firms for 
further scrutiny.6 By contrast, Kennedy attempted to obtain interviews ‘wherever it 
was possible to do so while attempting to include firms from all industries and size 
groups*.7 Sowa et al. preselected certain industrial activities and then ensured that 
no more than 10 firms were chosen from any specific locality.8 Thus, given that the 
surveys were carried out under differing conditions, it is necessary to be cautious 
about generalizing from their data.
The methodological issues of definition and sampling technique are serious, 
but should be considered in perspective. Although the surveys use different 
definitions of a small firm, the vast majority of observations relate to firms with 30 
workers or fewer. This almost coincides with the definition used in Chapter Three
5 Aryee, Small-Scale Manufacturing, p. 22.
6 Effah, ‘Small-Scale Metal Industries’, pp. 6-8.
7 Kennedy, Ghanaian Businessmen, p. 33.
8 Sowa et al., Small Enterprises, p. 21.
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to measure changes in output from the small-firm industrial sector since the 1950s (p. 
67). In fact, only a small minority of the 4,800 or so observations relate to firms 
with more than 30 workers. Dawson’s survey9 probably includes a few large firms 
since some of the workshops in the Suame Magazine engage more than 30 workers. 
Steel and Webster also surveyed some large firms intentionally.10
On the question of sampling technique, it has to be remembered that the 
methodologies used in the surveys cannot claim to be representative of Ghanaian 
small industries generally. Hence, it is difficult to use the survey data to generalize 
about the reasons for the growth of small-scale industry in Ghana, which is the 
central task of this thesis. In theory, this problem could be solved by constructing 
a representative sample of small-scale industries. In practice, such an approach 
would be inferior to using the data produced by the surveys and on two counts. On 
the one hand, such a sample would capture only today’s small-scale industries. By 
contrast, the data from previous surveys provide information on firms operating as 
early as the 1960s. On the other hand, it would be impossible to create a perfect, 
representative sample. This could be done only if, first of all, a list of all small-scale 
industries in Ghana is made. From this list, a randomly selected sample would have 
to be drawn, with a statistically significant number of observations. Since the last 
major national survey of small-scale industries was conducted in 1963,11 no list of 
small-scale industrial firms exists. In any case, for the purposes of this thesis, 
resource constraints would not have permitted more than about 50 small-scale firms 
to have been surveyed, a number which is hardly sufficient to form a representative 
sample. Therefore, it is probably more useful to analyze the data from the 4,800 
observations which have been generated already than to attempt to generate a 
representative sample.
For the present purpose, a more serious deficiency with the surveys is that 
they do not address directly the question of why Ghana has so many small industries. 
In general, the surveys pose questions which are different from those in this thesis.
9 Dawson, ‘Development of Small-scale Industry’, p. 173.
10 Steel and Webster, Small Enterprises, pp. 14-5.
11 Ghana, Central Bureau of Statistics, Area Sample Survey of Small Manufacturing Establishments- 
1963 (Accra: State Publishing Corporation, 1965).
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Aryee’s work concentrates on the relationships between the formal and the informal 
manufacturing sectors in Kumasi,12 while Domfeh’s study concerns the problems and 
prospects of small-scale scrap metal-workers in Wenchi.13 Elleithy *s survey 
examines the specific agglomeration of small-scale wood-workers around Anloga,14 
and Sowa et al.*s central concern is the impact of the Structural Adjustment 
Programme on employment and output in the small firm sector.15 This is not to 
argue that the surveys offer no help in understanding the growth of small-scale 
industry in Ghana since c.1945; nevertheless, they do not address this issue directly.
With this problem in mind, I interviewed 40 small-scale industrialists in 
Kumasi in March 1996 (henceforth, the Kumasi Survey). The Kumasi Survey 
focused on two groups of small industries. The first comprised 20 metal-workers 
(table 9.4). All the metal-workers were located in the Suame Magazine, a vast 
industrial ‘shanty town* on the outskirts of Kumasi, Ghana’s second largest city. The 
metal industries were chosen to represent a small industry sector which makes 
intensive use of skills, capital and technology: today, small-scale metal-workers are 
producing not only consumer goods, but also capital goods for use in other industries.
Table 9.4. The Kumasi Survey: Small-scale Metal-workers.
Metal-
Worker
Number
Year of 
Estab­
lishment
Number of Workers 
Excluding Owner, 
March 1996
Branch
1 1993 6 Agricultural machinery
2 1978 6 Agricultural machinery
3 1964 25 Agricultural machinery
4 1977 4 Agricultural machinery
5 1988 11 Welded metal products
6 1991 2 Nuts and bolts
12 Aryee, Small-Scale Manufacturing.
13 Domfeh, ‘Problems and Prospects’.
14 Elleithy, ‘Small Scale Industrial Agglomeration’.
15 Sowa et al. , Small Enterprises.
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7 1968 4 Nuts and bolts
8 1971 1 Exhausts, auto body 
welding
9 1962 2 Exhausts, compressed 
gas cylinders
10 1988 12 Industrial machines
11 1988 6 Engine reboring and 
relining
12 1986 15 ‘Donkey carts’, trucks, 
block-making machines
13 1994 2 Ice trays, block-making 
machines
14 1988 7 Welded metal products
15 1984 0 Agricultural machinery, 
block-machines, trucks
16 1989 4 Welded metal products
17 1981 11 Exhausts
18 1993 10 ‘Donkey carts’, block- 
making machines, 
welded metal products
19 1989 2 Electrical engineering
20 1978 16 Electrical engineering
The second group in the Kumasi Survey (henceforth, miscellaneous workers) 
consisted of a variety of small-scale industries which were typified by their use of 
simple skills, little capital and basic technology. The 20 firms in this group were 
engaged in food-processing, brewing and soap manufacture (table 9.5) and were 
located across Kumasi.
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Table 9.5. The Kumasi Survey: Small-scale Miscellaneous Workers.
Misc-
W orker
Number
Year of 
Estab­
lishment
Number of Workers 
Excluding Owner, 
March 1996
Branch
1 1992 2 Orange juice
2 1993 10 Soap, detergents, 
cosmetics
3 1989 0 Palm oil
4 1988 2 Grinding
5 1984 5 Soap
6 1983 3 Soap
7 1990 0 Palm kernel oil
8 1981 0 Palm nut oil
9 1992 1 Grinding
10 1994 2 Palm nut cracking
11 1988 4 Soap
2 1966 7 Palm kernel oil, pito, 
nut cracking
13 1989 3 Ice cream
14 1988 6 Soap
15 1966 9 Pastries, shito, com 
flour
16 1995 3 Soap
17 1990 5 Bread
18 1970 2 Bread and doughnuts
19 1979 3 Bread and cakes
20 1986 4 Palm kernel oil, pito
It is important to note that the respondents in the Kumasi Survey were not 
selected with the aim of constructing a representative sample of Ghana’s small-scale 
industrial population. This would have been impossible given the methodological 
constraints discussed (p. 222). Since it was clear from the early stages of the Kumasi
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Survey that a representative sample could not be constructed, it was decided that a
case study approach would yield greater returns to the time invested. According to
Casley and Lury, the case study approach has the main advantage that:
it provides in-depth, detailed analysis ...  The method is indicated when it is 
necessary to probe deeply into systems governing behaviour ... and to show  
why certain behaviour occurs. Case studies are particularly appropriate when 
a high analytical content is required, such as the study o f causal 
relationships.16
In large part, small-scale industrialization relates to the behaviour of an entrepreneur.
For example, the first pillar of the Steel framework concerns how entrepreneurs
acquire the necessary technical and managerial skills for small industry activity. To
answer this question, which is essentially about the behaviour of the industrialist, a
case study approach is probably most suitable.
For a case study approach to be successful, it is necessary to select a wide
range of respondents so that all possible variables are included. In the Kumasi
Survey, respondents were chosen specifically along these lines. As tables 9.4 and 9.5
indicate, there were single-man firms, as well as firms with over 25 workers. The
oldest firm was established in 1962, the youngest in 1995. There were builders of
sophisticated capital goods such as industrial machines and producers of basic
consumer items such as orange juice.
A second requirement for a case study approach to be successful is a detailed
examination of issues. Hence, attempting to increase the number of respondents is
not the primary concern. As Casley and Lury note:
. .. if  the general structure o f  the survey is such that no statistically valid 
generalization o f the results to a wider population can be made, these 
measures may be fruitless, and nullify the advantage o f the case study 
method, if  the increase in the number o f interviews reduces the in-depth 
quality o f  the data.17
To this end, the emphasis in the Kumasi Survey was on the in-depth analysis of why 
Ghana has so many small-scale industries. The interviews were tape-recorded and 
lasted about 30 minutes on average. Nineteen interviews were conducted in English, 
with the remainder in Twi, the lingua franca in Kumasi. The Twi interviews were
16 D.J. Casley and D.A. Lury, Data Collection in Developing Countries (Oxford, 2nd ed.: Oxford 
University Press, 1987), p. 64.
17 Ibid. , p. 65.
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conducted through a Twi-speaking research assistant from the UST. Unlike in most 
previous surveys, respondents were not confronted with a specific list of questions 
with closed or multiple choice answers. Rather, the questions were open-ended in 
order to elicit responses which demonstrated the full range of variables involved in 
small-scale industrial growth, and the interactions among these variables.
In short, the Kumasi Survey represents an in-depth analysis of the factors 
behind Ghana’s small-scale industrial ‘explosion’. It may not be possible to 
generalize from its results, but, at the very least, its ‘qualitative* nature complements 
the ‘quantitative* character of previous studies.
9.3 Are there Agents Willing and Able to Respond?
It would appear that, since the end of the colonial period, there has been an increase 
in the number of Ghanaians possessing the technical and business skills for small 
industry work. Several ‘agents of skill transfer*18 have been responsible for this: 
general and technical education, work experience in large-scale industries, the 
apprenticeship system, learning by observation, and trading.
General and Technical Education
Some social scientists claim that general and technical education stimulates the
industrial-entrepreneurial capacity of the population at large. As Geiger and
Armstrong contend:
The expansion o f  vocational training in modem agricultural, industrial and 
commercial skills in the primary and secondary school curricula is essential 
for fostering the development o f African private enterprise o f all kinds. Over 
the long term, such changes in curricula and attitudes, combined with the 
growth o f  educational facilities generally, would result in a new generation 
o f Africans much better equipped for engaging in modem economic 
activities—as entrepreneurs, managers, and employees o f private and public 
enterprises—than are the great majority o f adult Africans today.19
18 Tidiane Boye, Allen Fenichel and Maimire Mennasemay, ‘Skill Transfer and African 
Development: a Conceptual Research Note’, Journal o f Modem African Studies, 26 (1988) no. 4, p. 
686.
19 Theodore Geiger and Winifred Armstrong, The Development o f African Private Enterprise 
(Washington D.C.: National Planning Association, 1964), pp. 96-7.
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The surveys show a very strong correlation between education and small-scale 
industrial activity, with the typical small industrialist being more literate, numerate 
and educated than the average Ghanaian. For example, only 21 per cent of 
respondents in Anheier and Seibel’s survey were illiterate, compared to the prevailing 
illiteracy rate of 49 per cent in Accra and 72 per cent in Kumasi.20 In addition, 15 
per cent of Anheier and Seibel’s respondents had received some sort of formal 
vocational training,21 a figure greater than that for the population as a whole. In 
Sowa et al.’s survey, 81 per cent of small-scale industrialists had received some 
formal education.22 From this, Sowa et al. estimate that at least 80 per cent of their 
respondents were literate, compared to a Ghana-wide literacy rate of 40 per cent at 
the time.23 Also, Sowa et al. found that 13 per cent of respondents had received 
some formal vocational or technical training.24
The other studies paint a similar picture. In Aryee’s survey, only 28 per cent 
of small industrialists interviewed had had no formal schooling, while 60 per cent had 
been to school for 10 or more years.25 Dawson found that just 23 per cent of 
respondents were without a formal education and that ‘A majority of the sample of 
entrepreneurs were found to be at least functionally literate and numerate*.26 Among 
engineering entrepreneurs, Dawson observed that 26 per cent had attended technical 
colleges.27 Similarly, only 11 per cent of Suame metal-workers interviewed by 
Effah had no formal education.28 In Steel and Webster’s study, small-scale 
industrialists had had 10 years of schooling on average. Indeed, 45 per cent of them 
had completed middle school and 17 per cent had finished post-secondary education;
20 Anheier and Seibel, Small-Scale Industries, table 5.4, p. 50.
21 Ibid., table 5.9, p. 52.
22 Sowa et a l., Small Enterprises, table 8a, p. 27.
23 Ibid., p. 26. World Bank, World Development Report 1991 (Washington D.C.: World Bank, 
1991) cited in ibid., p. 26.
24 Sowa et al., ibid., table 9, p. 28.
25 Aryee, ‘Informal manufacturing’, pp. 90-1.
26 Dawson, ‘Development of Small-scale Industry’, p. 180.
27 Ibid.
28 Effah, ‘Small-Scale Metal Industries’, p. 37.
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only 15 per cent had had no formal education at all.29
Clearly, the surveys show a strong correlation between the variables of general
or technical education on the one hand, and subsequent small-scale industrial activity
on the other. However, correlation does not necessarily imply causation: general and
technical education may have been a crucial determinant of small industry
entrepreneurship; it may have been insignificant. It is here that the Kumasi Survey,
with its in-depth analysis, is useful.
In the Kumasi Survey, 19 metal-workers had attended primary school and one
had remained at school until he was 15 years old. When asked if school had helped
them to establish a firm, most felt that it had. One metal-worker suggested that
attending secondary school had enhanced his ability to perform calculations.30
Another argued that school had taught him how to take measurements, a skill which
he required to manufacture exhausts and compressed gas cylinders.31 An exhaust
manufacturer reasoned that the art and craft courses which he had attended at school
had taught him how to mould objects, which increased his ability to design car
exhausts. Speaking through a translator, this respondent explained:
...  when he was in school, he was very interested in things, moulding things, 
art and craft. So he thinks that that helped him to learn the exhaust—the 
making o f exhaust—very quickly at the first attempt. Because he has some 
apprentices who have spent nearly 10 years and they aren’t as good as he was 
when he spent the 5 years.32
Likewise, a master electrical engineer felt that those with a school education had
more ‘sense* and an ability to learn the trade faster.33 Hence, he himself tried to
avoid taking on apprentices who were not ‘educated’.34
To be sure, not all those interviewed found that a formal education had been
useful. One respondent remembered with affection that history had been his ‘special
subject* at school, but admitted that it had not helped him much in his work as a
29 Steel and Webster, Small Enterprises, p. 11.
30 Metal 2.
31 Metal 9.
32 Metal 17.
33 Metal 20.
34 Ibid.
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producer of nuts and bolts.35 Several of the other metal-workers felt that attending 
school had been of no benefit to them whatsoever.36
With regard to technical school, the five metal-workers who had attended such 
institutions were quick to list a clutch of skills which they had acquired there. These 
included bench fitting, electric welding, technical drawing and metal fabrication.37 
Thus, the Kumasi Survey suggests that, for the metal-workers, there is a strong causal 
relationship between attending technical school and subsequent small-scale industrial 
activity. The causal relationship between general education and small industry 
activity appears weaker, but existent nonetheless.
Among the miscellaneous workers, none had attended vocational school, but 
ten had been to school. Of these, two claimed that it had not helped them in their 
business.38 The remainder found that school had been of considerable utility. For 
instance, one respondent felt that learning science at school was helping him to 
produce ice cream.39 Learning how to calculate was cited by four respondents as 
being useful,40 with one noting of her school education: ‘I think it has helped me in 
calculations. I don’t think people can’t cheat me when it comes to counting 
money’.41
A particularly interesting case is of a soap-maker, who first learnt about soap-
making during a chemistry class at school, and later built on this knowledge while
working in a large-scale soap factory. Recalling the experience of his school years,
this respondent observed:
I was good at chemistry, you see, in secondary school. I was so good, but 
somehow, I had forgotten about so many things, but, you see, when you’ve 
done something before and then you get the practical training, you see, it’s 
an intuition. Somehow, what you learnt, you seem to recall them, and then 
through reading and researching, you are in a better position to understand 
certain things than somebody who has had no contact at all with any textbook
35 Metal 7.
36 Metal 7, 11, 13, 15 and 18.
37 Metal 2, 5, 6, 10 and 14.
38 Misc 5 and 15.
39 Misc 13.
40 Misc 3, 6, 8 and 14.
41 Misc 8.
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on the subject!42
Clearly then, the Kumasi Survey suggests the existence of a causal relationship 
between school education and small-scale industrial activity among the miscellaneous 
workers as well.
Work Experience in Large-scale Industry
A second factor which has increased the stock of industrial entrepreneurs has been 
the transfer of skilled labour from large-scale to small-scale industries. During 
Nkrumah’s ‘big push’, the state led the industrialization drive by encouraging the 
creation of large factories (pp. 130-131). From the late 1960s, this ‘big push* turned 
sour because of poor planning, technology which failed to maximize returns from 
Ghana’s factor endowments, and a critical dependence on imported inputs.43
There is evidence that, as large industries collapsed, skilled labour migrated 
to small industries. In Anheier and Seibel’s survey, it was found that 29 per cent of 
respondents had held previous formal-sector industrial jobs.44 In Dawson’s survey, 
one third of engineering entrepreneurs formerly had undertaken an apprenticeship 
with a large industrial firm.45 Thus, Dawson writes that ‘with the crisis in large- 
scale industry there was a transfer of technology and skills from large to smaller 
enterprises’.46 In van Ommering and van der Ree’s study, 26 per cent of all 
entrepreneurs had had a previous job in either the large-scale industrial sector or the 
civil service.47 From this, van Ommering and van der Ree note that, as wages in 
the formal sector fell from the 1970s, ‘Apart from emigrating, a large number of 
persons apparently started a small-scale industry’.48 In Kennedy’s survey of petty 
producers in Accra in 1977, there was a car mechanic who had worked for 14 years
42 Misc 2.
43 Douglas Rimmer, Staying Poor. Ghana's Political Economy, 1950-1990 (Oxford: Pergamon 
Press, 1992), ch. 5.
44 Anheier and Seibel, Small-Scale Industries, table 5.10, p. 54.
45 Dawson, ‘Development of Small-scale Industry’, p. 181.
46 Ibid., p. 207.
47 Van Ommering and van der Ree, ‘Small-Scale Industries’, table 5.24, p. 104.
48 Ibid., p. 100.
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in a large expatriate firm before establishing his own business.49
Therefore, the surveys show a correlation between previous work in large-
scale industry, and subsequent small industry activity. Again, correlation does not
prove causation and it is possible that those leaving large industries took no skills
with them. In this regard, the Kumasi Survey is instructive in that it suggests that
work experience in large industries actually has been important in stimulating small-
scale industrial entrepreneurship.
Among the metal-workers, five had worked in a large industrial firm prior to
establishing their own enterprise.50 All of them had found this experience useful.
For instance, one manufacturer of agricultural machinery felt that his first job in a
large engineering company had provided him with a comprehensive introduction to
machine-building. As he narrated:
...  they taught me the mechanism o f a machine. So when I came to 
fabricating, it let me know how to assemble machines, or dismantle it and 
assemble it again. Because at that time, I was a pump mechanist. Then 
someone bought the pump for servicing, we assembled it and disassembled 
it and fixed it back. So, it let me know how to disassemble a thing and fix 
it back.51
Another respondent, who had never been to school, first acquired machine skills (and
in particular, lathe-turning) over a period of seven years while working for Pan
African Engineering, a large Lebanese engineering firm.52
Of the miscellaneous workers, two of the respondents had previous work
experience in large-scale Ghanaian industry. One, a manufacturer of orange juice,
had acquired managerial and accounting skills while working in Tema Food Complex,
a large parastatal.53 Another, who managed a small bakery, first had learnt to bake
while working as a domestic hand. Later, these baking skills were consolidated while
working in the canteen of the UST:
Now in the University I was cooking, but once in a while we could help in 
the baking o f  bread. Now what I learnt there: if  sometimes we were baking
49 Kennedy, ‘Role and Position’, p. 574.
50 Metal 1, 3, 6, 10 and 14.
51 Metal 1.
32 Metal 3.
33 Misc 1.
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bread, we were using ovens, electric ovens, and so you had to be very 
careful about the level, the heat level. So we knew where the heat level 
which was good for the bread ... I observed this very well, and if  I am 
baking bread here, I know how warm or hot the oven should be before I put 
in my bread.54
An interesting phenomenon, which previous surveys have failed to highlight, 
but which the Kumasi Survey reveals clearly, is the importance of work in large-scale 
industries abroad. Emigration was a typical response to the economic collapse of the 
1970s: at one time, there were more Ghanaian-trained doctors in West Germany than 
in Ghana, while Nigerian universities had more Ghanaian lecturers than Ghanaian 
higher education institutions themselves.55 Among the metal-workers, two 
respondents had developed industrial skills while working for a large-scale industry 
abroad. One had worked for Addis Engineering, a large manufacturing firm in 
Nigeria. He explained that, during his time there, he had practised using a centre 
lathe to produce pulleys for electric motors. This was a skill which he was using 
today to produce nuts and bolts for motor vehicles and agricultural machinery.56 
Another industrialist had worked as a welder for Brystyle Industries, a large Nigerian 
battery and light bulb manufacturer, and still worked as a welder, producing water 
coolers, water tanks and iron gates.57
Three of the miscellaneous workers had acquired skills while working in large 
industries abroad. The first, the orange juice-maker referred to already (p. 232), had 
worked in food-processing companies in Zambia and Uganda: in Zambia, he had 
conducted technical research into the manufacture of foodstuffs and drinks; in 
Uganda, he had learnt how to source machinery.58 Indeed, the plant which he was 
using to make orange juice had been found while sourcing machines for his Ugandan 
firm. In the words of the respondent:
I was the Manager for a company in Uganda. I went to establish that food-
54 Misc 17.
55 Victor Azarya and Naomi Chazan, ‘Disengagement from the State in Africa: Reflections on the 
Experience of Ghana and Guinea’, Comparative Studies in Society and History, 29 (1987) no. 1, p. 
118.
56 Metal 6.
57 Metal 14.
58 Misc 1.
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processing. So I was sourcing for equipments and so forth. Then I saw this 
one which was small, actually for restaurants and supermarkets: they stand 
and then they squeeze and so I thought that’s a good idea to have it. So 
when I came back home ... I ordered it.59
The second miscellaneous worker with experience of large-scale industry 
abroad was the manufacturer of soaps, detergents and cosmetics.60 This respondent 
had acquired some knowledge of soap-making from his school chemistry (p. 230), 
and later put this into practice while working in soap factories in Liberia, Nigeria and 
Cote d’Ivoire:
I already have some friends over there who were working in those factories, 
and through them I managed to work in the factories and you know, because 
o f  the background, the little chemistry I learnt [at school], you see, I was 
quick on the uptake in the formulation o f the chemicals and so on and so 
forth. And you know, the foreman saw that I was so good, so I quickly rose 
through the ranks ... when I thought I had learnt enough, I thought I will 
come back home and try to set up something o f  my ow n.61
The third miscellaneous worker with work experience in a large-scale industry
abroad was a palm oil-maker, who had worked in Germany as a kitchen hand in a
broadcasting firm and a hydraulics company. Although this respondent had not
acquired any specific industrial skills there, he claimed to have learned the value of
hard work. As he recollected:
. ..  what I can say I learnt there was hard working. Because you know these 
Germans work very hard ... you know, they don’t play with their time. Six 
o ’clock, you have to be there six o ’clock until you close, you know. So, 
hard working. So I’m a hard worker ... But what I can say I learnt proper 
from Germany was hard work. You know. I have to train my people to 
work hard!62
Evidently, work experience in large-scale businesses abroad has been of importance 
in the formulation of small-scale industrial skills. How widespread this phenomenon 
has been is unclear, since the Kumasi Survey cannot claim to be representative of all 
Ghanaian small industries. However, future surveys may want to consider this issue.
59 Ibid.
60 Misc 2.
61 Ibid.
62 Misc 3.
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Apprenticeship
A third factor expanding the pool of small industrial entrepreneurs has been the 
apprenticeship system. Typically, apprentices spend between a month and three years 
learning a trade under the supervision of a master. The length of the apprenticeship 
varies according to the trade. Those requiring relatively simple skills (such as 
baking, pito brewing and soap-making) undertake apprenticeships lasting for between 
one and six months.63 By contrast, apprenticeships in car fitting or vulcanizing are 
usually two or three years long.64 Being integrated fully into the firm’s production 
function,65 apprentices receive ample practical experience of their trade. In return, 
most apprentices are paid a ‘chop wage’ to cover their subsistence costs; many even 
pay a fee to the master before joining.66
The surveys agree that the majority of small industrialists have been 
apprentices at some point in their career. For example, 51 per cent of entrepreneurs 
sampled by Sowa et al. had received some training as apprentices,67 as had more 
than 60 per cent of those surveyed by Riedel and Schmitz.68 The surveys of Anheier 
and Seibel as well as Aryee yield similar results.69
In the Kumasi Survey, only 3 metal-workers had not undertaken an 
apprenticeship before starting their firm. For the other metal-workers, 
apprenticeships were crucial in developing small industry skills. A small-scale 
exhaust manufacturer is a case in point: with no formal school education at all, and 
only the experience of work on his family’s cocoa farm, this exhaust builder 
completed a two year apprenticeship and then established his own firm immediately 
thereafter.70 Given that this respondent had no previous formal education or
63 Thomi and Yankson, Small Scale Industries, p. 34.
64 Ibid.
65 Ibid.
66 Ann D. Velenchik, ‘Apprenticeship Contracts, Small Enterprises, and Credit Markets in Ghana’, 
The World Bank Economic Review, 9 (1995) no. 3, pp. 451-75.
67 Sowa et al., Small Enterprises, table 9, p. 28.
68 Riedel and Schmitz, Grass-Root Industrialization, p. 90.
69 Anheier and Seibel, Small-Scale Industries, table 5.9, p. 52. Aryee, ‘Informal manufacturing’, 
p. 91.
70 Metal 8.
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business experience, it is difficult to conceive that he would have been able to start 
his own firm had he not completed an apprenticeship.
In certain instances, an apprenticeship added to industrial experience already 
accumulated elsewhere. The agricultural machinery manufacturer, who first had 
learnt to assemble and disassemble machines in a large firm (p. 232), completed an 
apprenticeship with a ‘master* machine builder afterwards.71 During this time, 
customers who had problems with their machines would often ask for advice and ‘I 
correct the problem and let me get some experience’.72 In other cases, skills 
acquired during an apprenticeship were modified and then deployed to other fields. 
Thus, one metal-worker who had learnt burglar bar production during his 
apprenticeship, later realized that the burglar bar business was not particularly 
lucrative and used his skills to manufacture rice mills and nut crackers instead.73 
Similarly, a metal-worker who had undertaken a three year apprenticeship to a 
‘master’ blacksmith who used to produce hoes, later adapted his skills to manufacture 
nuts and bolts.74 An industrialist who had completed a three year apprenticeship in 
auto-electrics, went on to manufacture battery-chargers, transformers and welding 
machines.75
Among the miscellaneous-workers, only 5 respondents had undertaken an 
apprenticeship before starting their firm.76 All of these were soap-makers, for 
whom apprenticeships had been the key means of acquiring soap-making skills. 
Although four had been to school, none considered that that had endowed them with 
the specific technical skills for their trade.77 The fifth respondent had been farming 
and trading before starting her apprenticeship, but did not consider that these had 
been important in developing her soap-making skills either.78
71 Metal 1.
72 Ibid.
73 Metal 4.
74 Metal 7.
75 Metal 20.
76 Misc 5, 6, 11, 14, and 16.
77 Misc 5, 6, 11 and 14.
78 Misc 16.
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Development o f the Apprenticeship System
Given the importance of the apprenticeship system in the process of industrial skills
acquisition, it is useful to examine this phenomenon in more detail. Two questions
are worth considering. First, has the apprenticeship system in Ghana been similar to,
or different from, that in other African countries? Second, what are the origins of
apprenticeship in Ghana today?
The literature on apprenticeship in Africa is remarkably thin. However, it is
evident that apprenticeship systems resembling the Ghanaian one are prevalent across
Africa. As Bas contends:
The traditional apprenticeship system existing in all African countries, 
whether in rural areas or in the urban formal sector, is a good example of 
‘pure’ on-the-job training without organised theoretical courses following a 
planned sequence.79
Particular aspects of the Ghanaian apprenticeship system can be found elsewhere in 
Africa. Among the Yoruba of Nigeria, apprentice mechanics typically pay a fee to 
their masters and supply their labour virtually free of charge.80 In Yaounde, 
apprentices also pay a fee to their masters and receive ‘chop money* in return.81 
The payment of a joining fee is common in Malawi as well.82
However, despite these elements of similarity, it is likely that the 
apprenticeship system has been more prevalent in West Africa than in East Africa, 
and particularly common in Ghana. The results of a comparative survey of small 
industries in Mali, Senegal, Malawi and Tanzania conducted in 1989-91 supports the 
first contention.83 This study found that, while apprentices accounted for 17 per 
cent of the total sampled labour force in Mali and 26 per cent in Senegal, in Malawi
79 Daniel Bas, ‘On-the-job training in Africa’, International Labour Review, 128 (1989) no. 4, p. 
485.
80 Sara Berry, Fathers Work for Their Sons. Accumulation, Mobility and Class Formation in an 
Extended Yoruba Community (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), p. 142.
81 Erik Demol and Georges Nihan, ‘The Modem Informal Sector in Yaounde’, International 
Labour Review, 121 (1982) no. 1, p. 80.
82 Wim Ettema, ‘Small-Scale Industry In Malawi’, Journal of Modem African Studies, 22 (1984) 
no. 3, p. 502.
83 Ronald L. Parker, Randall Riopelle and William F. Steel, Small Enterprises Adjusting to 
Liberalization in Five African Countries (Washington D.C.: World Bank, 1995).
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and Tanzania, these figures were only 4 per cent and 3 per cent respectively.84 As 
Liedholm and Mead write, in East Africa, ‘the tradition of an organized, indigenous 
apprenticeship system is lacking*.85 Table 9.6, which is compiled from a number 
of secondary sources, confirms this finding and suggests that, within West Africa, the 
apprenticeship system has been particularly common in Ghana.
Table 9.6. Labour Force Characteristics of Small-Scale Manufacturing Firms in 
Africa (Percentages).
Country, Area and Date Proprietors and 
Family Workers
Hired
Workers
Appren­
tices
SIERRA LEONE 
Entire country (1976)
41 17 42
NIGERIA
Western Region (1970) 39 11 50
Mid-West Region (1971) 30 7 63
Lagos (1971) 33 10 57
GHANA
Kumasi (1975) 29 6 65
Accra (1972) 39 9 52
BURKINA FASO 
Eastern ORD (1980)
94 2 4
CAMEROON 
Yaounde (1978)
43 49
TANZANIA
Dar and 20 townships
(1967)
52 41 7
KENYA
Rural Industries (RIDC 
clients) (1977)
20 69 11
84 Ibid., p. 44.
85 Carl Liedholm and Donald C. Mead, ‘Small-Scale Industry’, in Robert J. Berg and Jennifer 
Seymour Whitaker (eds.), Strategies for African Development (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1986), p. 312.
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Sources: Demol and Nihan, ‘Modem Informal Sector’, table 1, p. 79. The following 
sources are all cited in Liedholm and Mead, ‘Small-Scale Industry*, table 11.1, p. 311. Carl 
Liedholm and Enyinna Chuta, ‘The Economics o f Rural and Urban Small Scale Industries in 
Sierra Leone’, East Lansing: Michigan State University, African Rural Economy Paper No. 
14, 1976. S .A . Aluko, O .A. Oguntoye, Y .A .O . Afonja, Small Scale Industries: Western 
State Nigeria (Ile-Ife: Industrial Research Unit, University o f  Ife, 1972). George Aryee, ‘The 
Inter-Relationships Between the Formal Sector and the Informal Manufacturing Sector in 
Kumasi, Ghana’ (Geneva: International Labour Office, 1976). William F. Steel, Small-Scale 
Employment and Production in Developing Countries: Evidence from Ghana (N ew  York: 
Praeger Publishers, 1977). E. Chuta and D. W ilcox, ‘Employment in Rural Industries in 
Eastern Upper Volta’, International Labour Review, 121 (1982) no. 1, pp. 455-68. Schadler 
(1968) (no further reference given). Frank C. Child, Small Scale Rural Industry in Kenya, 
Los Angeles, UCLA African Studies Center, Occasional Paper N o. 17, 1977.
Why has the apprenticeship system been so prevalent in Ghana? The literature 
on apprenticeship provides some clues as to explanations which are not likely. One 
unlikely explanation is that the apprenticeship system has evolved out of the need to 
develop a guild-like institution to regulate the recruitment and training of apprentices, 
so as to protect masters from price-cutting and other forms of competition. In Buenos 
Aires, in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century, the apprenticeship system 
performed exactly these functions.86 More recently, Igbo women weavers of 
Akwete, Nigeria, have restricted access to apprenticeships in order to protect their 
trade from infiltration by outsiders.87 However, there is no evidence that the 
Ghanaian apprenticeship system has functioned in a similar manner. Neither do the 
surveys support the reason given for the survival of the apprenticeship system until 
recent times in Britain, namely, the preference of British firms ‘to employ 
journeymen whose craft proficiency was certified by the completion of apprenticeship 
indenture’.88
A more plausible explanation for the widespread existence of the 
apprenticeship system in Ghana can be found with reference to developments in the 
economy before 1945. In precolonial times, most small industry products had been
86 Lyman L. Johnson, ‘The Role of Apprenticeship in Colonial Buenos Aires’, Revista de Historia 
de America, 103 (1987), pp. 7-30.
87 Lisa Aronson, ‘To Weave or Not to Weave: Apprenticeship Rules among the Akwete Igbo of 
Nigeria and the Baule of the Ivory Coast’, in Michael W. Coy (ed.), Apprenticeship: from theory to 
method and back again (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), pp. 149-53.
88 Bernard Elbaum, ‘Why Apprenticeship Persisted in Britain But Not in the United States’, Journal 
o f Economic History, 49 (1989) no. 2, p. 338.
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manufactured within the domestic household unit. In this system, as Goody notes:
economic roles are also kinship roles. Economic skills are learned within the 
domestic mode o f production through children working together with adult 
producers.89
During the colonial period, economic specialization and exchange increased and
probably more so in the Gold Coast than elsewhere in colonial Africa. After all, by
the early 1950s, the Gold Coast had one of the most advanced and commercialized
economies in Black Africa (p. 29). Specialization and exchange changed the
traditional domestic household unit as sons sought jobs other than with their
fathers.90 At the same time, the demand for small industry products—and thus,
small industry labour—remained high (Chapter Two). This probably led to the
emergence of the apprenticeship system as an institution for supplying and training
non-familial labour. According to Goody, apprenticeship emerges:
... through the learning o f occupational skills in a domestic unit o f  production 
within an expanding division o f  labor. In other words, it is not accidental 
that apprentices are not learning from their fathers, since the social structural 
conditions for apprenticeship—increasing complexity o f  the division o f labor, 
and entry o f  domestic production into the market—lead youths to seek to 
learn occupations different from those o f their fathers.91
In addition, modernization led to a demand for new industrial products (p. 48),
and this required small industrialists to learn and reproduce new skills. In the
absence of technical schools, the traditional apprenticeship system served this
purpose. Thus, according to Quartey-Papafio writing in 1914, traditional Ga
apprenticeships had been confined to farming, blacksmithing and trading.92 Then:
... Europeans and others came into the country and a good many other trades 
came into use in the Colony, e.g .: Carpenters, Bricklayers and Masons, 
Washermen, Coopers, Stone Plasterers, and such other trades and crafts as 
were know to people o f more advanced stage in civilization ... It therefore 
became necessary to apprentice some sons to people engaged in one or other 
o f the above trades . . .93
89 Esther N. Goody, ‘Learning, Apprenticeship and the Division of Labour’, in Coy, 
Apprenticeship, p. 233.
90 Ibid. , p. 245.
91 Ibid., p. 239.
92 A.B. Quartey-Papafio, ‘Apprenticeship amongst the Gas’, Journal o f the African Society, 13 
(1914) 52, p. 417.
93 Ibid., p. 419.
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It is highly probable that the apprenticeship system in contemporary Ghana has 
developed out of that existing in the colonial period. According to Robertson, most 
apprenticeships in Accra in the 1970s were organized informally, but apprentices in 
sewing ‘had to conform to the rules of Ga apprenticeship*, some of which dated back 
to 1913.94 In Adjei’s study of goldsmithing in Tarkwa, in the Western Region, it 
was found that apprenticeship fees often consisted of a token bottle of schnapps; 
during the apprentice’s initiation ceremony, libations are poured and the master 
goldsmith spat some of the drink into the eyes of the new apprentice.95 This liturgy 
is thoroughly customary, and suggests a clear connection between traditional and 
contemporary apprenticeships.
This link is evident also from Smutylo’s work on wayside fitting workshops 
in Accra in the early 1970s. Smutylo found that, before apprentices were taken on, 
a secret ceremony was performed where payments were presented, the guidance and 
protection of the ancestors summoned, and rituals conducted giving tools, advice and 
blessings to the new apprentice.96 This was very similar to an initiation ceremony 
described by Rattray in the 1920s. Then, sacrifice and prayers for new equipment 
or tools were performed by craftsmen; the blood of a fowl was poured over a 
blacksmith’s newly built forge; and a libation was poured asking for success in work, 
freedom from accidents and long life for the user.97 Peil’s work on apprenticeship 
in Accra in the 1960s also suggests a link between the past and the present.98 Peil 
found that in ‘traditional’ trades, such as goldsmithing or carpentry, apprentices often 
were paid in kind and lived with their masters—just as in the traditional 
apprenticeship system.99
94 Claire C. Robertson, Sharing the Same Bowl. A Socioeconomic History o f Women and Class in 
Accra, Ghana (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984), p. 135.
95 Joseph Kwasi Adjei, ‘Traditional Goldsmithing: an Analysis of Symbolism in Goldsmithing and 
Gold Products at Tarkwa’, UST, MA (African Art) 1992, pp. 36-8.
96 Terrence S. Smutylo, ‘Apprenticeship in the Wayside Workshops of an Accra Neighbourhood’, 
University of Ghana, Institute of African Studies, MA, 1973, pp. 170-1.
97 R.S. Rattray, Religion and Art in Ashanti (London: Oxford University Press, 1927), p. 315, 
cited in ibid., pp. 8-9.
98 Margaret Peil, ‘The Apprenticeship System in Accra’, Africa, 40 (1970), pp. 137-50.
99 Quartey-Papafio, ‘Apprenticeship’, p. 420.
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Thus, to conclude this section about apprenticeship, it would appear that the 
use of apprentices has been particularly common in Ghanaian small industries 
compared to other African countries. Also, the present Ghanaian apprenticeship 
system is rooted in that which emerged in response to structural changes in the 
colonial economy. Ultimately, though, the purpose of an apprenticeship is to 
reproduce small industry skills. Therefore, it is highly probable that, if small 
industries had not survived the colonial period, then the apprenticeship system would 
not have persisted into the postcolonial era.
Learning by Observation
A phenomenon which the Kumasi Survey reveals quite clearly, but which previous
surveys have not stressed, is learning by observation. Many respondents in the
Kumasi Survey claimed to have acquired their industrial skills by observing other
small industrialists—typically, competitors, friends or relatives—at work.
Many metal-workers claimed that they had learnt skills from their competitors.
For example, one manufacturer of agricultural machinery remarked that:
. ..  not everyone know[s] everything. We teach one another. So if  Fm  
making a machine, and I make mistake and someone come and tell me, 
please, this you have made a mistake then I agree. I let him teach me what 
to d o .100
Another respondent, when asked if he learnt anything from others in the Suame
Magazine, replied:
As for that actually, we learn from each other. We learn from each other ...
As for competition, there is no competition. If you use some technology, 
you go to your friend and you learn from him .101
Even if the metal-workers were sometimes slow to concede that they had
acquired skills from others, most were quick to claim to have imparted skills to their
peers. Typical of this was one respondent who recounted:
Some people ...  do not learn the trade very well, so sometimes they have 
problems and they come over to me for advice, and I teach them, I advise 
them on what they should do. How to make their goods quality ... last year,
I had a friend up here, and he didn’t know how to do it very well, so ... he 
often came to me for advice and I gave him. I taught him almost everything
100 Metal 1.
101 Metal 7.
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I know. And now he’s doing very w ell.102
While some learnt from other small industrialists, two of the respondents
acquired their industrial skills by observing their fathers at work. One welder was
introduced to his trade by watching his father, who was also an electric welder, at
work after school.103 Likewise, a cement-block machine-builder learnt to weld by
observing his father who used to be a welder in a large construction company.104
Among the miscellaneous workers, 11 respondents claimed to have learnt
industrial skills by observing their mother, friend, husband or sister. In some cases,
learning by observation was the sole ‘agent of skill transfer’. For example, a palm
nut cracker learnt all the skills of his trade by watching others in action, after he had
lost his job as a labourer at UST:
. ..  when I came out o f  the University ... I was going round daily, looking for 
em ploym ent... So, I came and met these people here. I saw somebody using 
some o f  these machines, got to know how it is used. I came and met these 
people here and realized that i f  I also got the machines here, it would help 
me. So I asked and I was directed to Magazine where I got the machines and 
bought them and brought them here. So I didn’t have any intention o f being 
in this business when I was in the University.105
The transmission of skills from mother to offspring is a particularly interesting 
‘agent of skills transfer’. One manufacturer of palm kernel oil had never been to 
school, but had learnt to manufacture the oil while helping her mother manufacture 
the same oil from an early age.106 A palm oil-maker, who was using machines to 
make oil, originally learnt to make palm oil in the traditional way by watching his 
mother:
When we were young, even our mothers have been doing it [palm oil- 
making], we have been selling, we have been doing everything, we know  
how to flavour, do everything. That is something by birth. So, that idea is 
with us. And that helps us a lo t.107
One of the pito brewers said that she had learnt to brew pito from her mother, who,
102 Metal 9.
103 Metal 5.
104 Metal 13.
105 Misc 10.
106 Misc 7.
107 Misc 3.
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in turn, had learned the trade from her mother.108 A pastry manufacturer said that 
she had acquired her pastry-making skills from her mother, who had learnt the skills 
from her mother.109 In both these cases, small industrialists operating today had 
acquired their skills from small-scale industrialists operating two generations, or about 
50 years, ago. The Kumasi Survey does not indicate how widespread this particular 
means of skills acquisition has been among small industrialists in Ghana as a whole. 
Nevertheless, in view of the fact that a significant number of small industries survived 
the colonial period (Chapters Two and Three) these examples of skill transfers across 
generations suggest that the ‘explosion* of small-scale industrial activity in post­
colonial Ghana has been based, in part, on the survival of the small industry sector 
before.
Trading
It has been shown how a palm oil-maker learnt the ethic of hard work while in 
Germany (p. 234), and how several respondents had learnt to calculate while at 
school (p. 230). However, apart from these cases, so far, the discussion of skills 
acquisition has been limited to the issue of specific technical-industrial skills. There 
has been little examination of the acquisition of general business skills like the ability 
to think through investment decisions or to decide how to market a product.
The issue of general business skills accumulation is complex, but the wider 
literature suggests that previous trading activity may stimulate industrial 
entrepreneurship.110 In the Kumasi Survey, none of the metal-workers had had 
previous trading experience, but among the miscellaneous workers, 10 had been 
traders either before, or while working as a small industrialist. Among these, there 
were three clear cases of trading having contributed to the development of general 
business skills. The first was the small-scale soap, detergents and cosmetics-maker
108 Misc 12.
109 Misc 15.
1,0 Alec P. Alexander, ‘Merchants and the Recruitment of Industrialists’, in Reed Moyer and 
Stanley C. Hollander (eds.), Markets and Marketing in Developing Economies (Homewood, Illinois: 
Richard D. Irwin, 1968), pp. 190-208. John R. Harris, ‘Nigerian Entrepreneurship in Industry’, in 
Peter Kilby (ed.), Entrepreneurship and Economic Development (New York: The Free Press, 1971), 
table 16-5, p. 335.
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who had acquired his technical skills through his school education and work in soap
factories abroad (pp. 230, 234). However, for this respondent, business skills appear
to have originated from earlier work in his father’s import business. As the
respondent remarked about his time there:
It has helped me a lot. I see that my father has contributed so much to the 
little successes I’m making now ... At times, he would argue with me about 
certain products I wanted to bring in, but I, you know, I was able to make 
my points clear, then he’ll come to understand. And when he’ll bring those 
things in, he’ll be making so much money ... that talent has been working for 
me now ... And it continues to help me, even as at now to the extent that 
I’ve been able to develop this project [the business] . . .U1
The ice cream maker (p. 230) appears to have acquired some general marketing skills
while working as a trader. As this respondent recollected, to be a successful trader
‘you have to be conversant with the people and how to be able to move them to your
side and accept your goods’.112 A baker learnt similar marketing skills, while
previously selling bread for her mother:
to get quick or rapid selling, it all depends on how you prepare it. If the 
things is prepared in a hygienic way, if it is hygienically prepared. It also 
depends on the taste, how rich that you make the thing.113
This chapter has introduced previous surveys of Ghana’s small industry sector and 
outlined the Kumasi Survey. Using data from these sources, it has been argued that 
the industrial skills employed in Ghanaian small industries have originated from 
formal education, work experience in large-scale industry (both in Ghana and abroad), 
apprenticeships, learning by observation and trading. In addition, this chapter has 
examined the origins of the apprenticeship system in Ghana.
The next chapter considers the availability of resources to complement these 
industrial skills—capital, labour and raw materials—and then examines the existence 
of profitable opportunities for small industry activity.
111 Misc 3.
112 Misc 13.
113 Misc 19.
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10 COMPLEMENTARY RESOURCES, DEMAND AND 
OTHER SUPPLY-SIDE FACTORS
The previous chapter has argued that there has been a growth in the number of 
Ghanaians possessing the skills for small-scale industrial activity. To use Steel’s 
terminology (pp. 216-218), there has been an increase in agents willing and able to 
respond to small-scale industrial opportunities. Thus, the potential for small-scale 
industrial expansion in Ghana has been large. Yet to realize this potential, 
entrepreneurs must have capital, labour and raw materials at their disposal. They 
also must have profitable opportunities or incentives to produce. This chapter 
considers each of these factors, continuing to draw on data from previous studies as 
well as the Kumasi Survey.
10.1 Complementary Resources: Capital
The Kumasi Survey found that small industries had developed institutions which 
reduced the need for capital accumulation prior to entering the sector. One way of 
reducing the capital entry barrier was to rent facilities from others. Thus, one metal­
worker had rented both a workshop and machines from an ex-small industrialist who 
had grown old and did not use them any more.1 Another rented his machine from 
the local Intermediate Technology Transfer Unit.2 A different means of reducing the 
capital entry barrier was to use the workshop of another industrialist on a pay-per-use 
basis. Hence, one metal-worker paid C6,000 to the workshop owner for each cement 
block-making machine which he produced.3 A further means of overcoming the 
capital entry barrier was to use suppliers’ credits. A soap-maker started her business 
by obtaining oil and burnt cocoa pods on credit from acquaintances,4 while a baker
1 Metal 2.
2 Metal 6.
3 Metal 15.
4 Misc 6.
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used her network of friends to secure, on credit, her initial consignment of flour.5
Yet it is likely that, for most prospective small-scale industrialists, some 
capital has to be accumulated before a firm can be established. This capital 
requirement has varied. According to Dawson, in the late 1980s, a small metal­
working firm could be established for $180, while a small vehicle repair workshop 
required between $300 and $900.6
The Kumasi Survey confirms the picture that, generally, a certain amount of 
capital needs to be accumulated before a small firm can be established. For example, 
one soap-maker, who was asked if he feared that his apprentices might compete 
against him after they had qualified, noted that not all apprentices went on to start 
their own firm. This was because ‘when they get to know how to make the soap ... 
they may be with me for some more time, until they have enough money to start their 
own businesses’.7 Another soap-maker responded to this question in virtually the 
same way, observing ‘I don’t think they will start their own businesses because the 
raw materials we use are very expensive and I don’t think they will get the money to 
start their own business’.8 Similarly, a metal-worker confirmed that one of his 
former apprentices had stayed on with him because he had yet to acquire the capital 
to buy his own machines.9 All these examples reinforce the argument that the Ninsin 
and Dawson explanations of Ghanaian small industry growth are myopic because they 
do not consider the issue of how barriers to entering the small industry sector are 
surmounted (pp. 21-25).
It has been government policy since the 1960s to increase lending to local 
entrepreneurs through the banks (such as the National Investment Bank) and state 
institutions (like the Small Business Credit Scheme). However, this policy has failed 
to have a large impact on small industry (Chapters Four to Eight). If successive
5 Misc 18.
6 Jonathan Dawson, ‘Development of Small-scale Industry in Ghana—A Case Study of Kumasi’, 
in Henk Thomas, Francisco Uribe-Echevarria and Henny Romijn (eds.), Small-Scale Production. 
Strategies fo r Industrial Restructuring (London: Intermediate Technology Publications, 1991), pp. 194, 
190.
7 Misc 11.
8 Misc 5.
9 Metal 14.
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governments have played only a small role in providing the capital for small-scale 
industrialization, what have been the origins of the capital employed in this sector?
The surveys suggest conclusively that most of the capital has originated either 
from the personal savings of the entrepreneur, or from those of relatives and friends. 
Sowa et al. found that 77 per cent of entrepreneurs had established their enterprises 
with their own savings.10 Anheier and Seibel found that 95 per cent of their 
respondents had obtained some starting capital from their own sources, while 64 per 
cent had secured some from relatives or friends.11 In Thomi and Yankson’s survey, 
88 per cent of entrepreneurs claimed to have found their start-up capital from friends 
or relatives.12 Of the small industrialists surveyed by Domfeh, 90 per cent said they 
that had financed their business in this way,13 while in Effah’s study, this figure was 
78 per cent.14 Kennedy also suggests a high figure.15
Since small-scale industrialists have started their firms with either their own 
savings or those of their family and friends, it would be useful to ask how this capital 
has been accumulated in the first place. It is likely that there is a much larger story 
of capital accumulation to tell here: with per capita income at only $350 per year in 
1984,16 a small-scale vehicle repair workshop could cost anything between one and 
two-and-a-half years of average income to establish (p. 247), clearly a significant
10 Nii K. Sowa, A. Baah-Nuakoh, K.A. Tutu and B. Osei, Small Enterprises and Adjustment. The 
Impact o f Ghana’s Economic Recovery Programme on Small Industrial Enterprises (London: Overseas 
Development Institute, 1992), p. 23.
11 Helmut K. Anheier and Hans Dieter Seibel, Small-Scale Industries and Economic Development 
in Ghana: Business Behavior and Strategies in Informal Sector Economies (Saarbrucken: Verlag 
breitenbach, 1987), table 6.2, p. 63.
12 W.H. Thomi and P.W.K. Yankson, Small Scale Industries and Decentralization in Ghana. A 
Preliminary Report on Small Scale Industries in Small and Medium Sized Towns in Ghana (Legon: 
Department of Geography, University of Ghana, 1985), table 11, p. 40.
13 Samuel Djiabour Domfeh, ‘Problems and Prospects of Small Scale Scrap Metal Workshops in 
Wenchi’, UST, BA (Social Sciences) 1987, table 4, p. 26.
14 Alex Effah, ‘The Role of Small-Scale Metal Industries In The National Economy. (A Case Study 
of Suame in Kumasi)’, UST, BSc (Development Planning) 1988, table 6, p. 42.
15 Paul T. Kennedy, Ghanaian Businessmen. From Artisan to Capitalist Entrepreneur in a 
Dependent Economy (Munich: Weltforum Verlag, 1980), table 8, p. 49.
16 World Bank, World Development Report 1986 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), p. 
180, cited in M.M. Huq, The Economy of Ghana. The First 25 Years since Independence (London: 
Macmillan, 1989), p. 48.
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amount. There has been little research into the origins of the capital employed in 
small-scale industries, but previous surveys suggest four possible sources: trading, 
large-scale industrial or formal sector activities, agriculture and remittance from the 
Ghanaian community abroad.
Trading
A migration of capital from trading to industry is known to have occurred in both 
postwar Zaire17 and Nigeria.18 However, most of the Ghanaian surveys do not 
address this issue specifically. Nevertheless, there is a hint of this phenomenon 
occurring. For instance, 14 per cent of van Ommering and van der Ree’s respondents 
cited trading as one source of their initial capital,19 leading them to write that in 
Dunkwa, ‘especially palm-oil makers and soap makers (many of them women) used 
their profits from trading to start small-scale production’.20
In the Kumasi Survey, three metal-workers and six miscellaneous workers 
cited trading as a source of their start-up capital. However, in most of these cases, 
trading was just one of many sources of initial capital. It is interesting to note, 
though, that at least one industrialist, a small-scale miller, had established his firm 
on the back of trading profits alone.21 This particular respondent previously had 
been selling spare parts, and noted, ‘When I was selling spare parts, I was able to 
save some money. So when the business collapsed, I invested what I had saved into 
these machines [in my mill]*.22
Another interesting case was that of the small-scale manufacturer of soap, 
detergents and cosmetics (p. 244). This respondent used to work for his father’s
17 Janet MacGaffey, Entrepreneurs and Parasites. The Struggle fo r Indigenous Capitalism in Zaire 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), p. 16.
18 Tom Forrest, The Advance o f African Capital. The Growth o f Nigerian Private Enterprises 
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1994), p. 84.
19 Addie van Ommering and Kees van der Ree, ‘Small-Scale Industries in Ghana. Past, present 
and possible role in economic growth and spread of development’, University of Amsterdam, 
Department of Human Geography, MA, 1983, table 5.20, p. 99.
20 Ibid., p. 141.
21 Misc 4.
22 Ibid.
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import business, but still traded when the opportunity arose. Any profits from his 
present trading activities were pumped into his industrial firm:
Q So are you still trading now? Or now you’ve given up?
A When die opportunity arises, I trade. You see, once a trader, always a
trader ...
Q Now, if  you do a little bit o f trading today, you do still try to put a bit o f
money into your [soap] business? Or do you take that money out?
A I put, now I put everything I make into this business.23
Although the previous surveys do not provide more information on the 
prevalence of capital transfer from trading to small-scale industry, there is a good a 
priori case for suspecting that this has taken place. This is because trading was 
making such an important contribution to household budgets by the end of the 
colonial period (p. 64). Furthermore, during the 1970s and early 1980s, economic 
incentives strongly favoured trading over other forms of economic activity (pp. 178- 
179). Thus, just as the growth of the cocoa industry in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth century was based, in part, on the transfer of capital from trading to 
cocoa,24 so it is possible that some of the growth in small-scale industries since the 
1940s has been financed by the profits of trading as well.
Large-scale Industry and the Formal Sector
An additional source of capital has been work in large-scale industries and the formal 
sector. In van Ommering and van der Ree’s survey, 8 per cent of respondents cited 
savings from employment in large-scale industry as being one source of their initial 
capital, with 14 per cent citing work in government service as another.25 In the 
Kumasi Survey, four metal-workers indicated that large-scale industry, or the formal 
sector generally, had been a source for their initial capital, as did four miscellaneous 
workers.
In the previous chapter it was shown how workers who had acquired skills in 
large-scale industries or the formal sector later migrated into the small-scale industrial 
landscape (pp. 231-234). The Kumasi Survey confirms that some of these migrants
23 Misc 2.
24 Polly Hill, The Migrant Cocoa-Farmers o f Southern Ghana. A Study in Rural Capitalism 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1963), p. 166.
23 Van Ommering and van der Ree, ‘Small-Scale Industries’, table 5.20, p. 99.
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took parcels of capital with them in order to establish their own firms. One 
respondent, who had learnt machine skills with a large Lebanese engineering firm, 
saved some money while working there and used this to start his own business.26 
Similarly, two former labourers at the University used savings from their work there, 
as well as their severance pay, to establish their firms.27
Agriculture
In the agricultural sector, there was plenty of scope for capital accumulation until the 
late 1950s when producer prices for cocoa were high.28 However, from then until 
the early 1980s, producer prices for cocoa fell substantially,29 which would suggest 
that the potential for accumulation in the cocoa industry was smaller. Nevertheless, 
during the 1970s in particular, food crop prices rose faster than urban wages, 
increasing the possibilities for accumulation in the non-cocoa agricultural sector.30
Accordingly, there is evidence that some capital has been generated in the 
agricultural sector and transferred to small industries. Van Ommering and van der 
Ree found a clear diffusion of capital from farming to small industry in rural 
areas.31 In their survey, 22 per cent of respondents claimed that agriculture was one 
of the sources of their initial capital.32 The Kumasi Survey supports these findings 
with five metal-workers and two miscellaneous workers indicating that agriculture had 
been one of their sources of capital.
Ghanaians Abroad
Finally, previous surveys suggest that the remittances of the large Ghanaian diaspora 
living in the West have assisted capital formation in some small-scale industries.
26 Metal 3.
27 Misc 10 and 17.
28 Jonathan H. Frimpong-Ansah, The Vampire State in Africa. The Political Economy o f Decline 
in Africa (London: James Currey, 1991), table 5.13, p. 89.
29 Huq, Economy of Ghana, table 5.2, p. 110.
30 Merrick Posnansky, ‘How Ghana’s crisis affects a village’, West Africa, 1/12/1980, pp. 2418-9.
31 Van Ommering and van der Ree, ‘Small-Scale Industries’, p. 141.
32 Ibid., table 5.20, p. 99.
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According to Dawson, the growth of the Suame Magazine has been facilitated by 
expatriate Ghanaians sending machines back to Ghana.33 In the Kumasi Survey, one 
metal-worker explained how his father had lived in Britain and had brought a 
moulding machine with him on his return to Ghana. At that time, the respondent had 
no manual for the machine and did not know how to use it. It was only later that he 
came to know of the machine’s use.34
Three of the miscellaneous enterprises were funded by industrialists who had 
worked abroad. The orange juice manufacturer, who had worked in Zambia and 
Uganda (p. 233), used the money which he had saved in these jobs to buy an orange 
juice-making machine on his return to Ghana.35 The manufacturer of palm oil, who 
had worked in Germany (p. 234), used the money which he had saved there to buy 
a house, which then was used as collateral for obtaining a bank loan.36 Similarly, 
a soap-maker established her business on the basis of the money which her husband 
had brought back from his work as a block-maker in Nigeria.37
Other Means o f Accumulating Capital: Evidence from the Kumasi Survey 
The Kumasi Survey, with its in-depth analysis, suggests that there have been other 
sources of capital, in addition to those identified by previous surveys. These include 
employment in small-scale industries and work in the service sector.
It was found that twelve metal-workers and five miscellaneous workers had 
acquired some start-up capital from previous employment in the small-scale industrial 
sector itself. In other words, savings from previous small industry work was the 
most common source of capital used by the entrepreneurs in the Kumasi Survey. 
This is a finding which other surveys have failed to highlight, but its implications are 
considerable because it suggests a strong connection between Ghana’s present small-
33 Jonathan Dawson, ‘Impact of Structural Adjustment on the Small Enterprise Sector: a 
Comparison of the Ghanaian and Tanzanian Experiences’, in A.H.J. Helmsing and Th. Kolstee (eds.), 
Small Enterprise and Changing Policies (London: IT Publications, 1993), p. 73.
34 Metal 5.
35 Misc 1.
36 Misc 3.
37 Misc 5.
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scale industries and those of past. In turn, this emphasizes the importance of 
explaining Ghana’s postwar small-scale industrial ‘explosion* with reference to the 
survival of small industries before the War (Chapters Two and Three).
Despite Ghana’s history of high inflation,38 two of the metal-workers 
managed to establish their businesses solely on the basis of the little money which 
they had saved while serving their apprenticeships.39 Among the five miscellaneous 
workers who cited previous small industry work as a source of capital, one miller had 
set up her business using capital which had been given to her by her husband, who 
owned a small workshop in the Suame Magazine.40 Three others had obtained some 
start-up capital through relatives who worked in the small-scale industrial sector.41 
The final miscellaneous worker who had used capital from small industry sector was 
a pito brewer who, used the profits from this business to move into nut-cracking.42
Finally, it would appear that the non-trading service sector has been a source 
of capital too. In the Kumasi Survey, one exhaust-maker had started his firm after 
his brother, a taxi driver, had bought him a carbide port and the other necessary 
tools.43 Also, a producer of palm kernel oil mentioned that one of the sources of 
her initial capital was her husband who was a truck driver.44
Given the methodological constraints of the Kumasi Survey, it is not possible 
to tell how important these additional sources of capital have been in explaining the 
development of small-scale industry in Ghana as a whole. Nonetheless, the Kumasi 
Survey has shown that these additional sources do exist; other surveys may be able 
to determine their extent.
38 Douglas Rimmer, Staying Poor. Ghana’s Political Economy, 1950-1990 (Oxford: Pergamon 
Press, 1992), table 7.4, p. 149.
39 Metal 4 and 12.
40 Misc 9.
41 Misc 11, H and 18.
42 Misc 12.
43 Metal 17.
44 Misc 8.
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10.2 Complementary Resources: Labour
The availability of labour for work in small industry has not been in short supply,
especially since the 1960s. This is because, as Ninsin argues,45 the shortage of
formal sector jobs has forced many to look for work elsewhere.
It is likely that attitudes towards work in the small-scale industrial sector have
changed significantly since the colonial period. During that time, contemporaries
frequently remarked on the reluctance of Africans to take blue collar employment.
White collar jobs were held in high esteem, and consequently, Africans had a strong
desire for a literary education. As an education inspector observed, in a letter to the
Commissioner of the Eastern Province in 1925:
There is, also, rightly or wrongly, on the part of the people of this country 
a desire that their children should have a literary education. The large money 
gains made by a few in the past blind them to what has been the fate of 
others.46
Governor Gordon Guggisberg lamented the reluctance of the African population to 
enter blue collar jobs, arguing that the Gold Coast had an over-supply of white collar 
workers:
I doubt very much whether five hundred clerks per annum are required to 
replace the normal wastage throughout the country. What employment is 
open to the remainder, roughly four thousand able-bodied and intelligent but 
wrongly educated youths who failed to find clerical work? Cocoa 
brokers?47
According to the Governor, although there were ample blue collar jobs opportunities, 
most youths considered any form of manual labour as being beneath their status.48
A general apathy towards technical education and blue collar work appears to 
have persisted into the early postwar decades. T. Barton, the Permanent Secretary 
to the Ministry of Education and Social Welfare, observed this in 1950:
45 Kwame A. Ninsin, The Informal Sector in Ghana’s Political Economy (Accra: Freedom 
Publications, 1991), p. 58.
46 NAGA ADM 39/1/233, Education Department’s Provincial Inspector’s Office, Keta, to the 
Commissioner of the Eastern Province, 31/10/1925.
47 Governor’s Annual Address, Legislative Council Debates, 1925-6, para. 91, inG.B. Kay (ed.), 
The Political Economy of Colonialism in Ghana: a Collection o f Documents and Statistics, 1900-1960 
(London: Cambridge University Press, 1972), p. 284.
48 Governor’s Annual Address, ibid., para. 92, cited in Kay, ibid., p. 285.
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There is a danger in the Gold Coast of a repetition of an educational, social 
and political fault which has done much harm in the United Kingdom, the 
separation in the public mind of the more academic and professional kinds of 
training from the technical and technological kinds. This has caused a deep 
snobbery which regards the technician as of a lower order than the clerk and 
the teacher and the like ...49
It is probable that, since the 1960s, workers have become more willing to
undertake blue collar work. Kwasi Boakye’s 1973 survey of youth attitudes towards
employment in Yamoransa, a village six miles from Cape Coast, is instructive in this
regard.50 Boakye found that, among unemployed male youths, 94 per cent desired
to be machine mechanics, motor mechanics or craftsmen. Among unemployed female
youths, 75 per cent sought craft work, and only 22 per cent wanted a ‘clerical and
services’ job.51 According to Boakye, the reason for this willingness to engage in
blue collar activities lay in the shortage of formal sector jobs.52
Diminishing white collar job opportunities have altered attitudes towards blue
collar work. While before independence, those with a little primary school education
could expect a white collar job, by the late 1960s, even those with more than a
decade of schooling could not. As David Brokensha observed in 1969, from an
anthropological study of the life of Kofi, a youth with 12 years of formal education:
Kofi, in contrast to many others in his position, was fairly realistic in his 
goals, and did not indulge in fantasies. It would be a mockery to tell him to 
work on the land. Yet he was prepared to do manual work, and was not 
handicapped by a false pride, or a desire for white collar work. The 
desirable steady jobs were in factories such as Ghana Textiles.53
A similar conclusion can be drawn from Smutylo’s work on apprenticeship in
Accra.54 Analyzing the reasons for the willingness of labour to undertake poorly-
paid apprentice work in Accra’s wayside workshops, Smutylo found that:
Having a trade, no matter which one, was considered by most respondents
49 T. Barton, Education in the Gold Coast (London: Thomas Nelson, 1954), p. 17.
50 J. Kwasi Ayim Boakye, Occupational Activities of Rural Youth and Their Attitudes towards Craft 
Training (Cape Coast: University of Cape Coast, 1973).
51 Ibid., table 24a, p. 40 and table 24b, p. 41.
a  Ibid., p. 8.
53 David Brokensha, ‘Kofi in search of a job’, Odu, new series, 1 (1969), pp. 82-3.
54 Terrence S. Smutylo, ‘Apprenticeship in the Wayside Workshops of an Accra Neighbourhood’, 
University of Ghana, Institute of African Studies, MA, 1973.
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as greatly preferable to not having one. Apprentices who had found unskilled 
or semi-skilled work after leaving school often expressed how insecure they 
had felt, and how limited future opportunities had seemed at these jobs.
Sudden and frequent lay-offs and low pay made many turn to heed the advice 
of family or friends that they should learn a trade ... As one apprentice who 
had previously held a factory job put it, *... they teach you to work with their 
machine ... then one day if they take the machine away you have nothing’.55
Ghana’s experience here is different from Nigeria where a sizeable small-scale
industrial sector exists too. In Nigeria, a 1979 study of informal sector repair and
manufacturing enterprises in Oyo and Ede found that small firms generally
complained of their inability to find apprentices.56 Indeed, in Abeokuta, the capital
of the Ogun State, carpenters actually had to advertise for apprentices in the
media.57 This shortage of apprentices was a result of the expansion of teacher
training facilities (which attracted young people) and the construction boom (which
offered the possibility of making quick money).58
10.3 Complementary Resources: Raw Materials
Turning to the availability of raw materials for small industries, several surveys 
concur that the non-availability of inputs has been one of the major problems facing 
small industries.59 However, it is evident that, compared to the large-scale industrial 
sector, many small firms have had easy access to these.
The large-scale industrial sector has suffered from a heavy dependence on 
imported inputs: in the mid 1970s, 80 per cent of its raw materials and semi-finished 
materials and almost all of its equipment was imported.60 By contrast, all the
55 Ibid., p. 72.
56 Olatunji Y. Oyeneye, ‘Factors Influencing Entry into the Informal Sector Apprenticeship System: 
the Nigerian Case’, African Social Research (1981), p. 5.
57 Ibid., p. 7.
58 Ibid.
59 Anheier and Seibel, Small-Scale Industries, table 8.1, p. 88. Sowa et al., Small Enterprises, p.
42.
60 Bundesstelle fur Au/Senhandelsinformationen, Ghana, Wirtschaftsstrukturen (Cologne: 
Bundesstelle fur Au/Senhandelsinformationen, 1976), cited in G. Fischer-Quincke, ‘Small Enterprises 
for the Needs of the People: Ghana’s ‘Small-Scale Industrial "Take-Off"” , in Karl Wohlmuth et al. 
(eds.), African Development Perspectives Yearbook, 1989. Vol. 1: Human Dimensions o f Adjustment 
(Berlin: Scholzky and Jeep, 1990), p. 237.
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surveys show that small industrial firms have had a high propensity to use locally- 
available inputs. Thomi and Yankson as well as Kwame arrive at this conclusion.61 
In Sowa et al. ’s survey, 88 per cent of firms claimed that they did not require any 
foreign exchange at all for their operations.62
Although small-scale industries have found it relatively easy to secure inputs, 
this is not to argue that all small industrial firms have been able to do so and at all 
times. Thus, van Ommering and van der Ree found that Kumasi’s small metal­
workers had problems obtaining certain metal inputs in the early 1980s.63 In the 
Kumasi Survey, two palm kernel oil makers complained that, of late, it was difficult 
to buy palm kernels because of the increased tendency to chop down palm trees to 
make palm wine.64 Two of the exhaust-makers complained of the difficulty of 
finding scrap steel, apparently because Tema Steel Mills had started to collect this for 
refabrication.65 Nonetheless, it is difficult to dispute that, when compared to the 
large-scale industrial sector, most small industrial firms have been in a good position 
to secure their input requirements.
10.4 Incentives for Small Industry Production
Previous surveys offer some circumstantial evidence that profitable opportunities or 
incentives have been available for small industry work. When Anheier and Seibel 
asked their respondents, ‘If you could work for a big modem company or for the 
government, would you do it or would you keep your business?’, 90 per cent 
indicated that they intended to retain their businesses.66 On the basis of this, 
Anheier and Seibel write that, ‘For small-scale industrialists, the formal economy
61 Thomi and Yankson, Small Scale Industries, pp. 37-8, 51. Adjei Kwame, ‘Locational Analysis 
of Selected Informal Metal Industries in Kumasi’, UST, BSc (Development Planning) 1990, table 4:3, 
p. 37.
62 Sowa et al., Small Enterprises, p. 44.
63 Van Ommering and van der Ree, ‘Small-Scale Industries’, p. 67.
64 Misc 7 and 8.
65 Metal 15 and 17.
66 Anheier and Seibel, Small-Scale Industries, p. 55.
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appears to have lost much of its former attraction’.67 Similarly, 78 per cent of
respondents in Sowa et al. ’s survey claimed that they would not leave their jobs if
offered paid employment elsewhere.68 Thus, Sowa et al. argue that ‘the small-scale
sector provides an attractive job avenue’.69
The problem with such data is that they make only a circumstantial case for
the existence of profitable opportunities. After all, entrepreneurs may work in small-
scale industries for reasons other than to make a profit. The Kumasi Survey
discovered widespread evidence of this. When respondents were asked why they
engaged in small industry work, a typical answer was the desire to be independent.
Many said they had no wish to work for other people, with one observing that
‘everyone want to be a boss himself in Ghana here. And if you want to corporate
them, they’ll never agree*.70
Non-profit reasons for working in small industries may represent barriers to
exiting unprofitable enterprises. The Kumasi Survey found evidence of this too. Five
metal-workers and two miscellaneous workers said that they would not leave their
business, even if offered a well-paying job elsewhere. All the metal-workers who
gave this response cited their obligation to train their apprentices as one reason for
not closing down their firm.71 Among the miscellaneous workers, one respondent
reasoned, from her experience of losing her previous job at the University, that she
would not close her firm, whatever happened:
I don’t think I’ll close my shop. When I was in the University, I liked the 
work ... But at sometime, I was asked to leave. The person who the work 
belongs to asked me to leave, and I had nothing to do but to leave ... But 
with this business, it is mine. Whether it’s good or not, at least it is for me.
So I’m proud of it. I don’t think I’ll stop, close this shop and join 
anybody.72
An ice cream maker said that he was engaged in manufacturing because he wanted 
to bequeath something tangible to his children, noting, ‘In the long run, I want to be
67 Ibid.
68 Sowa et al., Small Enterprises, p. 28.
69 Ibid.
70 Metal 6.
71 Metal 6, 7, 8, 10, 18.
72 Misc 10.
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a manufacturer so that after even I have gone, my children can continue and depend
upon what I have started, to make it large’.73
Clearly then, some have worked in small industries for reasons other than to
make profits. However, at the same time, some respondents were quite definitely
involved in manufacturing because that is where they felt that profitable opportunities
lay. Hence, one soap manufacturer argued:
It is safer to manufacture because even if I’m manufacturing here today, and 
you come and pull down this building, I can go and put up a hut in my 
village and so continue to manufacture. And people will still come to me to 
buy! Because if you are manufacturing, you are always in demand ... I 
thought to myself, I have to manufacture something that people need every 
day. Every household will need. Not these things you buy and then ten 
years you don’t buy it again ... But if you manufacture something that every 
household needs, the moment you get up from bed, either it’s food or it’s a 
daily use item. Then somehow you’ll be safer.74
The ice cream maker, who said that he wanted to bequeath something to his children,
also reasoned that manufacturing was better than trading in the long run. When asked
why, he replied:
... now in Ghana what I see is that a lot of people are putting up stores. So 
the question I keep on asking myself is: you are putting up stores; who are 
to manufacture to fill the stores? So I want to be one of die manufacturers 
to fill those stores.75
Whatever the reasons for engaging in small industry work, it is apparent, 
nonetheless, that profitable opportunities have been available in this sector. 
According to Aryee, masters of small-scale industries in Kumasi earned an average 
of C78 per week in 1975, while the equivalent wage in the large-scale sector at the 
time was C80 per month, before tax.76 While this statistic may be dubious on 
account of the difficulty in measuring income in the small industry sector, it does give 
a sense that, for masters, small-scale industrial activity can be profitable. This is not 
a surprising conclusion for three reasons. First, the products of small-scale industries 
have been in demand. Second, the supply-side characteristics of small industries have
73 Misc 13.
74 Misc 2.
75 Misc 13.
76 George Aryee, ‘The informal manufacturing sector in Kumasi’, in S.V. Sethuraman (ed.), The 
urban informal sector in developing countries. Employment, poverty and environment (Geneva: 
International Labour Office, 1981), p. 94.
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made them price competitive. Third, small-scale industries have been able to escape 
from government regulation. Each of these factors is considered in more detail 
below.
The Demand fo r Small-scale Industrial Products
It is clear that the collapse of large-scale industries and the import squeeze of the 
1970s and early 1980s created some ‘economic space’77 for small firm expansion. 
Previous surveys, even apart from Dawson’s, have demonstrated how small industrial 
firms have profited from downturns in the large industry sector.78 Nikoi and 
Schmitz have both observed how output from small-scale soap producers has been 
inversely related to production in large soap factories, particularly that of Lever 
Brothers.79 Anheier and Seibel found that 39 per cent of small-scale metal- and 
wood-workers considered that one of their best years had been between 1980 to 1982, 
precisely when the crisis in the large-scale industrial sector was at its peak and the 
import famine was most acute.80 Similarly, 40 per cent of firms in Sowa et al. ’s 
sample had been established during the ‘hard times’ of 1978-83.81
However, while the collapse of large industries and imported manufactures 
created some demand for small industry products, it is apparent that this had been 
rising since the 1950s, and for several reasons. First, until at least the early 1960s, 
some small-scale industrial activities had managed to establish themselves on the back 
of demand from the developing economy of the ‘big push* era. The relationship 
between economic development and small-scale industrial growth was noted in 
Chapter Two: the necessity to transport palm products to the coast resulted in the 
development of the cask-rolling industry, which, in turn, stimulated the carpentry 
sector (p. 48). Economic development had a similar effect on the demand for some
77 Jonathan Dawson, ‘The Wider Context: the Importance of the Macroeconomic Environment for 
Small Enterprise Development’, Small Enterprise Development, 1 (1990) no. 3, p. 44.
78 Van Ommering and van der Ree, ‘Small-Scale Industries’, pp. 91, 93.
79 Samuel Nii Ashie Nikoi, ‘Economic Problems of the Small-Scale Soap Manufacturing Industry 
in Accra’, UST, BA (Social Sciences) 1985, p. 4. Jurgen Riedel and Hubert Schmitz, Grass-Root 
Industrialization in a Ghanaian Town (Munich: Weltforum-Verlag GmbH, 1989), p. 158.
80 Anheier and Seibel, Small-Scale Industries, table 4.2, p. 35.
81 Sowa et al.. Small Enterprises, pp. 22-3.
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small industry products during the ‘big push*. Rowena Lawson’s study of the 
economy of the Lower Volta is pertinent here.82 In the village of Battor, in the 
Lower Volta Region, there was an increase in the number of tailors, seamstresses, 
carpenters, masons, fitters and motor mechanics between 1954 and 1964.83 This 
was because of the modernization and expansion of the economy at the time. 
Growing numbers of school children created greater demand for tailors and 
seamstresses to make school clothes. The increase in building resulted in more 
demand for carpenters and masons. The growth in motor traffic passing through the 
region led to a greater need for fitters and car mechanics.84 Thus, it was not merely 
the ‘great collapse’ which created demand for the products of small-scale industries. 
Rather, some small-scale industries had benefitted from the economic modernization 
of the preceding decade.
Second, it is important to take into account that Ghana’s economic collapse 
during the 1970s and early 1980s was a collapse from a relatively developed state (p. 
29). The importance of this can be illustrated with reference to the vehicle repair 
sector. By the 1960s, thanks to the country’s wealth and sophisticated exchange 
economy, Ghana was a highly motorized society by African standards. Motor 
transport played an established role in Ghana’s economy, for example, in the haulage 
of cocoa to the coastal ports.85 Hence, by 1975, the number of people per 
commercial motor vehicle was low by African standards, as table 10.1 illustrates.
82 Rowena M. Lawson, The Changing Economy of the Lower Volta, 1954-67. A Study in the 
Dynamics o f Rural Economic Growth (London: Oxford University Press, 1972).
83 Ibid., pp. 26-7.
84 Ibid.
85 Kay, Political Economy, pp. 22-3.
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Table 10.1. Population per Commercial Motor Vehicle, 1975.
Country Population per Commercial Motor 
Vehicle, 1975
Ghana 231
Burkina Faso 614
Kenya 200
Malawi 406
Niger 438
Togo 457
Tanzania 370
Sources: United Nations, 1985/86 Statistical Yearbook (New York: United Nations, 1988), 
table 145, pp. 713-9. United Nations, The Sex and Age Distribution of the World 
Populations. The 1994 Revision (New York: United Nations, 1994).
Therefore, when foreign exchange became short and the output of vehicle spares from 
large factories contracted, Ghana had a substantial stock of vehicles which needed to 
be maintained if the economy was not to collapse completely. It is likely that this 
imperative created the demand for small-scale vehicle repair workshops and locally- 
produced vehicle spares. In this way, some small industrial firms were able to grow 
during the ‘great collapse* because, in a sense, the foundations of their markets had 
been laid in the period before.
A third factor in maintaining the demand for the products of small industries 
has been consumer tastes. In Japan since 1868, small firms often have catered for 
traditional tastes and have been protected by their only gradual Westernization.86 
Ghanaian small-scale industries are likely to have benefitted in a similar manner since 
the 1950s. Kente cloth provides an example of this. The wearing of kente in 
Ghanaian society still reflects the status of the wearer.87 Although factory kente is 
available, it is considered to be inferior to the hand-made item.
Finally, the Kumasi Survey provides three tangible examples of how small
86 Nakamura Takafusa, ‘The Modem Industries and the Traditional Industries at the Early Stage 
of the Japanese Economy’, Developing Economies, 4 (1966) no. 4, pp. 567-93.
87 Venice Lamb, West African Weaving (London: Duckworth, 1975), p. 141.
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industry sectors have become monopolists by producing articles which neither can be
imported nor manufactured in large Ghanaian factories. One is the ‘donkey cart’, a
metal wagon fitted with rubber tyres and pulled by donkeys. According to one
respondent, as of March 1996, there were no producers of donkey carts outside the
Suame Magazine.88 Soap-makers and pito brewers have faced similar conditions.
The manufacturers of Allata Soap (the traditional soap made from oil and ash) said
that customers felt that it had certain medicinal properties, in particular an ability to
cure skin rashes.89 As one producer of this soap noted:
Some people prefer using Key Soap for washing and they prefer using this 
for bathing. That’s ... because this soap is able to cure rashes and other skin 
diseases. And those in Ougadougou and Abidjan usually prefer this kind of 
soap for bathing.90
Pito, a traditional beer brewed from millet, has been considered to have similar 
therapeutic qualities, with two pito brewers claiming that their customers found that 
the beer was particularly useful in combatting fever.91
Supply-side Characteristics o f Small-scale Industries
The previous section has demonstrated how the products of small-scale industries have 
been in demand. This section considers how the supply-side characteristics of small 
industries have made such firms competitive and thereby aided their expansion.
One factor in the competitiveness of some small-scale industries has been their 
use of cheap raw materials. For instance, small-scale soap producers have used 
inexpensive inputs consisting of the burnt ash of cocoa pods, banana and plantain 
peel.92 Such ash is relatively cheap to procure since, typically, plantains and 
bananas have been grown together with cocoa, Ghana’s main export crop, while the 
ash itself has had little other value. By contrast, large-scale soap producers generally 
have relied on expensive, factory-produced caustic soda. This is not to suggest that 
small-scale soap producers pay nothing for their inputs. There is a cost in burning
88 Metal 18.
89 Misc 5, 11, 14 and 16.
90 Misc 16.
91 Misc 12 and 20.
92 Van Ommering and van der Ree, ‘Small-Scale Industries’, p. 63.
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plant matter to make ash, at least in the form of labour time and the opportunity cost 
of activity foregone. In addition, some inputs for small-scale soap manufacture do 
have to be paid for. Nikoi found that small soap-makers in Accra paid to bring in 
firewood from the Accra hinterland.93 In the Kumasi Survey, two soap-makers had 
to pay to transport ash from the Brong-Ahafo Region to Kumasi,94 while one 
imported her oil from C6te d’Ivoire.95 Clearly though, some small-scale industries’ 
use of cheap raw materials has given them a competitive edge over larger industrial 
firms.
This competitive edge has been consolidated by the small industry sector’s 
heavy use of cheap, apprenticed labour. The surveys indicate conclusively that the 
bulk of small industry workers have been apprentices. For instance, Aryee found that 
86 per cent of employees in Kumasi’s small-scale industries in the mid 1970s were 
apprentices.96 Kennedy’s survey of small-scale producers in Accra in 1977 revealed 
that 182 of the 310 workers employed in sampled firms were apprentices, most of 
whom were paid a ‘chop wage’.97 Likewise, Riedel and Schmitz found that 76 per 
cent of employees in Techiman’s small-scale industries in the late 1980s were 
apprentices,98 while Elleithy cites a corresponding figure of 53 per cent among the 
wood-workers of Anloga.99 Dawson and Effah demonstrate that apprentices 
dominate the small industry labour force in the Suame Magazine.100
In Ghana, apprentices have been integrated into the firm’s production function, 
but, nonetheless, they have received only a ‘chop wage’, a salary barely covering the 
cost of food and perhaps travel to and from work (pp. 235-236). In addition to
93 Nikoi, ‘Economic Problems’, p. 10.
94 Misc 6, 11.
95 Misc 16.
96 Aryee, ‘Informal manufacturing’, p. 92.
97 Paul Kennedy, ‘The Role and Position of Petty Producers in a West African City’, Journal of 
Modem African Studies, 19 (1981) no. 4, p. 586.
98 Riedel and Schmitz, Grass-Root Industrialization, p. 93.
99 Amr Ali Elleithy, ‘Small Scale Industrial Agglomeration. A Case Study of the Small Scale 
Wood Industry Spontaneous Agglomeration at Anloga, Kumasi’, UST, MSc (Development Planning 
and Management) 1990, table 3.2, p. 31.
100 Dawson, ‘Development of Small-scale Industry’, p. 181. Effah, ‘Small-Scale Metal Industries’, 
p. 41.
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providing low cost labour services, in many cases, apprentices actually pay their 
masters for training. Velenchik has found, from a study of 185 small industries in 
1992, that of the 100 sampled firms with apprenticed labour, 59 charged fees to 
apprentices.101 Other surveys suggest that fee payment has been even more 
common. Koney found that 85 per cent of apprentices in vehicle repair and metal­
working in Suame had paid a fee to their masters before embarking on their 
training.102 In Domfeh’s study of scrap metal-workers, the corresponding figure 
was 96 per cent.103
The result of the use of cheap, apprenticed labour has been that small firms 
frequently have been able to undercut prices charged by larger companies. P.K.K. 
Quaidoo, a Member of the Legislative Assembly during the Busia years, expressed 
this lucidly. Contributing to a debate on the National Vocational Bill in November 
1970, Quaidoo explained why drivers repaired their vehicles in small wayside 
workshops:
These are the sort of shops which provide quick and useful services to 
motorists without their having to pay through the nose, instead of going to 
the recognised motor workshops where you have to pay as much as NC2 an 
hour for repairs apart from the cost of spare parts which is very 
exorbitant.104
Quaidoo’s point here is clear: whereas large vehicle repair workshops charged a high 
rate for labour, in smaller workshops, labour costs were lower. Sunnu’s survey 
substantiates the existence of this competitive advantage in labour costs. Sunnu found 
that, in the 1974, small-scale vehicle repair workshops charged between C20 and C80 
in labour costs for car engine reconditioning. By contrast, in larger workshops, the 
labour cost of the same job, completed to a similar standard of workmanship, was
101 Ann D. Velenchik, ‘Apprenticeship Contracts, Small Enterprises, and Credit Markets in Ghana’, 
The World Bank Economic Review, 9 (1995) no. 3, table 3, p. 457.
102 Daniel Laryea Koney, ‘The Role of Artisans in the Socio-Economic Development of Ghana. 
A Case Study of Suame Magazine in Kumasi’, UST, BA (Social Sciences) 1987, p. 24.
103 Domfeh, ‘Problems and Prospects’, p. 23.
104 Ghana, Parliamentary Debates. Official Report, 2nd series, vol. 5 (Accra: Ghana Publishing 
Corporation, n.d.), col. 167, P.K.K. Quaidoo, All People’s Republican Party, Amenfi, Second 
Reading of the National Vocational Training Bill, 16/11/1970.
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around C125.105 In short, the use of cheap, apprenticed labour has been important 
in the success of many small-scale industries.
Another factor aiding the position of some small industries has been their 
sparing use of capital relative to other factors of production. In Aryee’s study, the 
average small-scale, informal-sector industry had 4.5 workers, and C780 of capital 
per enterprise in 1975,106 or C173 of capital per worker. By contrast, in the large- 
scale, formal sector in 1970, capital per worker was several times this level, 
averaging C6,200 in chemical factories, C8,900 in textiles, and 013,800 in food 
manufacturing.107
The sparing use of capital often has translated into the use of efficient 
technologies, appropriate for Ghana’s factor endowments. A case in point has been 
the narrow loom of the Ashanti kente weavers. To the Western eye, which often 
equates size with economies of scale and thus efficiency,108 at first sight, the 
Ashanti narrow loom appears to be a less efficient machine for kente weaving than 
the wide loom. Yet, in the 1970s, several schemes to introduce the wide loom to 
Ashanti kente weavers failed.109 There was a simple reason for this: while the 
traditional kente narrow loom cost about C5 to buy at the time, the wide loom cost 
around C100, an amount beyond the reach of most kente weavers.110 Thus, as 
Browne writes:
The example of Ashanti narrow-loom weaving illustrates that low-level 
technologies are not necessarily inferior technologies ... The point is simply 
this: village industries like Ashanti kente-weaving are technologically optimal, 
and little can be gained by interfering with them.111
By contrast, the large-scale industrial sector has been crippled by the use of
105 Samuel Billy Kofi Sunnu, The Wayside Fitters. A Study of Small-Scale Vehicle Repair Activity 
in Urban Areas o f Ghana (Kumasi: UST Department of Planning, 1975), pp. 7-8.
106 Aryee, ‘Informal manufacturing’, pp. 92-3.
107 Ibid., p. 94.
108 Rajnarayan Chandavarkar, ‘Industrialization in India before 1947: Conventional Approaches and 
Alternative Perspectives’, Modem Asian Studies, 19 (1985) no. 3, pp. 623-68.
109 Angela W. Browne, ‘Rural Industry and Appropriate Technology: the Lessons of Narrow-Loom 
Ashanti Weaving’, African Affairs, 82 (1983) no. 326, pp. 29-41.
110 Ibid., p. 35.
111 Ibid., p. 40.
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technologies which often have been inappropriate for Ghana’s factor endowments.112
Some small-scale industries have maintained their competitive positions by 
locating close to their markets. Car tyre vulcanizers fall into this category. In a 
country such as Ghana, where telephone facilities and vehicle recovery services are 
poor, small-scale wayside vulcanizers are probably the most efficient form of tyre 
repair, since they are located near to their customers. The Kumasi Survey found that 
bakers enjoyed similar competitive advantages. One baker, who was asked why 
customers bought their bread at her bakery and not at the big bakeries in Kumasi, 
thought:
Another reason is proximity. Sometimes people buy from the area in which 
they are. If the baker is in that particular area, they buy from that area, 
instead of travelling to a different area to buy that same bread from a 
different baker.113
Another baker offered the same explanation: consumers were unwilling to pay to 
travel to buy bread, when they could purchase it from their local bakery.114
It can be hypothesized that one further reason for the cost competitiveness of 
certain small-scale industries has been their flexibility. It would be arguing too much 
to say that Ghanaian small industries have been engaged in 'flexible specialization’. 
'Flexible specialization’ is a term coined originally from Japanese and Italian studies 
which showed that small firms could increase their efficiency by using highly 
specialized and skilled labour, low degrees of product standardization and short 
production runs.115 Ghanaian small-scale industries do not fit the Western ‘flexible 
specialization* paradigm, because they have not employed labour with skills and 
specialization comparable to Italy or Japan. Nevertheless, there is reason to suspect 
that the general flexibility of small firms has been of great benefit to them.
In the Kumasi Survey, there were some graphic examples of small firm
112 Tony Killick, Development Economics in Action. A Study o f Economic Policies in Ghana 
(London: Heinemann, 1978), pp. 195-205.
113 Misc 19.
114 Misc 18.
115 M. Piore and C. Sabel, The Second Industrial Divide: Possibilities fo r  Prosperity (New York: 
Basic Books, 1984), cited in A.H.J. Bert Helmsing, ‘Small Enterprise and Industrialization Policies 
in Africa: some Notes’, in Helmsing and Kolstee, Small Enterprises, p. 34. David Friedman, The 
Miracle Misunderstood. Industrial Development and Political Change in Japan (New York: Cornell 
University Press, 1988), ch. 4.
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flexibility, flexibility which the large-scale industrial sector is unlikely ever to have
attained. This was in three areas: labour, inputs and products. With regard to labour,
it is evident that some firms in the Kumasi Survey operated in an almost completely
unregulated labour market which permitted labour use (and thus labour costs) to be
matched very closely to output. One small soap-maker described this Adam Smithian
labour market in action:
You know, I have about 10 people, but they are not always in there, because 
at times because of funding and lack of raw materials and so on and so forth.
When we are in a position to produce, they come and then they produce ...
We pay them ... on the work they are able to put in within some few days 
or hours.116
In other words, labour was employed as and when there was work to be done: when
there was no work, workers were discharged promptly, and their labour costs saved.
Big firms, by contrast, have not had such flexibility in hiring and firing labour.
With regard to using inputs flexibly, the case of a pito brewer and palm kernel
oil-maker is instructive. This small-scale industrialist switched between pito brewing
and palm kernel oil-making depending on the season and the costs of her raw
materials. Thus, when millet was plentiful, she brewed; when palm kernels were in
season, she made palm kernel oil. As she recounted:
when there isn’t enough millet on the market, if there’s a shortage, then I 
produce palm kernel oil... Around this time of the year, the millet, you will 
get the millet, but it is very expensive. So I make the palm kernel oil around 
this time of the year. When the prices come down, I buy, I go back into 
brewing.117
Again, there is little comparison with the large-scale industrial sector here: when that 
sector’s imported inputs became scarce, much of it simply collapsed.
Finally, there were several cases of flexibility in the manufacture of products 
to suit the precise requirements of the market. In some cases, this flexibility was 
relatively minor. For example, one palm oil-maker could spice his oil according to 
the tastes of the individual customer,118 which big companies could not do. In the 
same way, a shito-maker could vary the amount of pepper in her product so as to
116 Misc 2.
117 Misc 20.
118 Misc 3.
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reflect the palate of the individual customer.119 Among the metal-workers, there
was quite a large degree of product flexibility. Thus, one machine-maker, when
asked what sort of products he manufactured, gave this reply:
machines which people come with their views and we magnify. We magnify 
peoples’ ideas. There are some machines we have not produced before but 
the people come and they give us their views. What they want a machine to 
do, so that we put it in practice.120
An electrical engineer also explained how he built machines to order, so as to reflect
the exact needs of the customer.121 An exhaust-maker held a range of exhausts in
stock, but, if a customer required another type, then he designed and manufactured
it there and then.122 Very few large industries in Ghana have come close to
achieving such levels of product flexibility.
The small-firm industrial sector’s use of low-cost inputs, cheap labour, sparing
application of capital, proximity to demand and flexible methods of production
account for some of the profitable opportunities that have been available for this
sector. In addition, there are some very specific cases of small industrial firms
increasing their collective efficiency by locating close to one another in ‘industrial
districts’. According to Khalid Nadvi, ‘industrial districts* are:
clusters of small- and medium-sized enterprises within a specific industrial 
sector; they are usually process-specialized and interlinked with each other 
through production subcontractual arrangements, located in close proximity 
to one another within a well-defined geographical space and bound together 
by various sets of common social categories and values.123
There are two prime examples of ‘industrial districts’ in Ghana: Anloga and the
Suame Magazine. By the late 1980s there were about 2,000 workers in Anloga,
engaged in a variety of wood-processing activities such as saw-milling, carpentry and
charcoal burning.124 By 1984, there were around 40,000 workers in the Suame
119 Misc 15.
120 Metal 10.
121 Metal 19.
122 Metal 17.
123 Khalid Nadvi, ‘Industrial District Experiences in Developing Countries’, in United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development/Deutsches Zentrum fur Entwicklungstechnologien, 
Technological Dynamism in Industrial Districts: an Alternative Approach to Industrialization in 
Developing Countries? (New York: United Nations, 1994), p. 191.
124 Elleithy, ‘Small Scale Industrial Agglomeration’, p. 6.
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Magazine,125 involved mainly in metal-working activities, such as vehicle repair and 
machine-building.
The clustering of small industries in Suame has increased the efficiency of all 
firms within the Magazine. There have been five reasons for this. First, the 
concentration of metal-workers has enabled small workshops to undertake large jobs 
by sub-contracting parts of them to other local firms. Indeed, 25 per cent of the 
Suame metal-workers interviewed in Effah’s survey claimed that sub-contracting 
formed an essential part of their operations.126 Thus, Suame’s metal-workers 
straightened rods and produced nuts and bolts for small local vehicle repair 
workshops.127 Second, there has been substantial sharing of equipment within 
Suame. This has reduced collective capital costs to the benefit of all firms in the 
Magazine. In Effah’s survey, 43 per cent of respondents acknowledged that they 
shared equipment with others in the Magazine.128 Third, the availability of local 
machine-makers has given other local industries a boost: machine-makers in the 
Suame industrial ‘shanty town* have been manufacturing machines suited to the 
specific needs of other firms in the Magazine.129 Fourth, in addition to the 
exchange of skills within the Magazine (p. 242), there has been a movement of 
designs among workshops in the Magazine. The Kumasi Survey demonstrates this 
vividly. One machine-maker admitted that he had given the measurements for some 
of his machines to other, less qualified Magazine machine-makers.130 Another 
described how he came to work one morning to see another machine-maker 
measuring his newly-designed bandsaw:
sometime ago, when I designed the bandsaw ... I came here one time at
about six o’clock in the morning, and there was somebody standing by it
measuring everything to go and do it. He didn’t know I was coming at that
125 John Powell, ‘Kumasi University’s Involvement in Grassroots Industrial Development’, Small 
Enterprise Development, 2 (1991) no. 2, p. 35.
126 Effah, ‘Small-Scale Metal Industries’, p. 52.
127 Ibid., pp. 53-4.
128 Ibid., p. 50.
129 Dawson, ‘Development of Small-scale Industry’, p. 182.
130 Metal 12.
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time.131
Finally, the clustering of small firms in Suame has led to the development of 
institutions to assist the entire ‘industrial district*. The Technology Consultancy 
Centre and the Intermediate Technology Transfer Unit have both had a positive 
impact on the development of the Magazine (pp. 206-207). In addition, it is useful 
to note the activities of the Ghana National Association of Garages (GNAG). GNAG 
is an institution which has assisted Suame industrialists to resolve trade disputes. One 
metal-worker had experience of this, when he became involved in an argument with 
a militia man over payment for a donkey cart. In this instance, GNAG attempted to 
arbitrate between the two parties and, when this failed, provided the metal-worker 
with an escort to the police station.132 An engine-reborer recollected that when an 
engine block which he was repairing broke accidentally, GNAG arbitrated between 
himself and the customer,133 thus precluding a long and expensive court case.
In view of the importance of the Suame Magazine in total small industry 
employment in Ghana (p. 72), it is worth enquiring into its history. Primary and 
secondary sources give an indication of this. In 1939, the Acting Senior Health 
Officer of Ashanti and Northern Territories described Suame as a ‘village of some 
100 compounds and an estimated population of about 1,430*.134 It is unclear what 
happened after 1939. The ‘official’ view stresses the importance of the government’s 
hand in establishing the Magazine. According to the Kumasi Regional Lands 
Secretary:
The history of Suame Magazine dates as far back as the late 1950s when the 
then Kumasi Municipal Council decided to resettle all fitters in Kumasi. The 
result of this effort now is the Suame Magazine.135
A less flattering view of the government’s role is offered by Sunnu and Effah. 
According to them, small industries had been spread across Kumasi, with a 
concentration near the location of the present-day zoo. The army Magazine had been
131 Metal 10.
132 Misc 18.
133 Metal 11.
134 NAGK D 1262, R. Ramsay, Acting Senior Health Officer, Ashanti and Northern Territories, 
to the District Commissioner, Kumasi, 23/12/1939, enclosure to p. 1..
135 KLO K 4966, J.O. Sarpong, Regional Lands Secretary in memo to file, 1/3/1991.
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nearby, hence the term ‘Magazine*. The City Council later moved the fitters to 
Ashanti New Town, probably to make way for the zoo and to remove the visual 
eyesore which the workshops had created. After that, the Magazine was moved to 
the site of the present Suame Police Station. In 1961, it was moved again, this time 
to its present site, to make way for the new Police Station.136
It is interesting to note that ownership of the land on which the Magazine has 
developed is unclear, and is being contested. According to the Regional Lands 
Secretary in Kumasi, the government had acquired the land by Executive Instrument 
in 1974. Subsequently, the land was given to Kumasi City Council on the condition 
that the Council maintained it.137 The identities of the traditional stool land owners 
were not known, and there was no evidence that they had been compensated.138 
Moreover, the original Executive Instrument by which the government had acquired 
the land was missing.139 By the 1980s, the ownership of the land was in hot 
dispute, with six caretaker chiefs claiming that they had not been compensated when 
the government had acquired the land in 1974.140 Surprisingly, however, such 
uncertainty over ownership has not prevented the emergence of one of the largest 
concentrations of small-scale industries in West Africa.
Escaping Government Censure
Previous sections have shown that small-scale industries often have been competitive 
producers and that their products have been in demand. Both these factors account 
for the fact that there has been many profitable business opportunities for small 
industrialists. Another contributory factor has been the relative lack of government 
censure of this sector.
The Manufacturing Industries Act of 1971 makes it obligatory for all industrial 
firms to register themselves with the Ministry of Industries and hence pay taxes.
136 Sunnu, Wayside Fitters, pp. 22-3. Effah, ‘Role of Small-Scale Metal Industries’, p. 31.
137 KLO K 4966, J.O. Sarpong, Regional Lands Secretary in memo to file, 1/3/1991.
138 Ibid.
139 KLO K 4966, H.I. Baryeh, Regional Lands Officer, to the Acting Executive Secretary, Lands 
Commission Secretariat, 7/2/1996.
140 KLO K 4966, Boaitey and Co., to the Kumasi Metropolitan Assembly, 29/11/1989.
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However, most small industries have not done so. This evasion has been facilitated 
by the collapse of the government’s administrative capacity during the 1970s and 
1980s (pp. 183, 197) and its only gradual recovery since then. Thus, in Anheier and 
Seibel’s survey, only 50 per cent of small firms were found to be registered with the 
government.141 Sowa et al. cite a figure of 35 per cent,142 while Aryee puts it 
lower still at only 19 per cent.143 The yawning gap between the government and 
the small industry sector is illustrated clearly in Riedel and Schmitz’s fieldwork in 
Techiman. According to the estimates of the Techiman District Council, there were 
between 120 and 150 small manufacturing enterprises in Techiman in the late 
1980s.144 In the event, Riedel and Schmitz’s enumeration team identified 578,145 
almost four times the local government’s estimate.
The benefits of remaining small and unobtrusive have been great, at least for 
employers. In 1975, the legal minimum wage was C2 per day.146 By contrast, 
Aryee reports that apprentices were being paid a mere C 2.40 per week at that 
time.147 In 1996, the legal minimum wage had risen to Cl,700 per day,148 while 
a typical apprentice in the small-scale industrial sector received daily ‘chop money’ 
of only C500 to Cl,000. Thus, by not registering with authorities, many small-scale 
industries have been able to avoid minimum wage costs. By contrast, larger firms 
have found it comparatively more difficult to avoid government regulations because 
of their very size.
To be sure, there may be costs involved in evading government regulation. 
For example, small industrialists may have to bribe government officials to remain 
unnoticed. Nevertheless, it is difficult to dispute the general point that, by avoiding 
government censure, small-scale industries have managed to become more profitable.
141 Anheier and Seibel, Small-Scale Industries, p. 9.
142 Sowa et al., Small Enterprises, p. 25.
143 Aryee, Small-Scale Manufacturing, p. 28.
144 Riedel and Schmitz, Grass-Root Industrialization, p. 35.
145 Ibid., pp. 35-6.
146 Aryee, Small-Scale Manufacturing, p. 37.
147 Aryee, ‘Informal manufacturing’, p. 97.
148 Daily Graphic, 11/4/1996, p. 1.
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At the same time, the threat of government censure has given many firms an incentive 
to remain small and unnoticed.
This chapter has examined the existence of resources to complement small industry 
entrepreneurship and has concluded that these have been relatively easily obtainable 
since the War. Capital has been available from trading, large-scale industries and 
agriculture. Another important source, which past studies of Ghanaian small 
industries have failed to identify, has been small industry work. In addition, small 
industries have not found it difficult to recruit labour (unlike their Nigerian 
counterparts in the 1970s) while raw materials have been in more easily available than 
for large industries.
With regard to the demand for small industry products, some of this (such as 
the demand for vehicle repair services) derived from before the ‘big collapse*. 
Finally, it was demonstrated how small firms have been competitive by using cheap, 
apprenticed labour, engendering flexibility, locating in close proximity to each other 
so as to raise collective efficiency, and avoiding government censure by operating in 
the parallel economy.
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11 CONCLUSIONS
This chapter closes the thesis by highlighting and discussing some of its central 
findings. In Section One, the main conclusions concerning the development of small- 
scale industries in the colonial period and the quantification of the sector’s postwar 
growth are discussed. Section Two reviews government policy towards small 
industry from c. 1945 to c. 1992. Section Three collates the survey data to test the 
central hypothesis of the study that the postwar small industry ‘explosion*1 has been 
a consequence of Ghana’s pattern of economic development followed by collapse. 
Section Four outlines an agenda for further research, while Section Five examines 
some of the wider policy implications of the study’s findings.
11.1 Ghana’s Small Industry Inheritance and the Postwar ‘Explosion’
The development of small industries during the Gold Coast’s integration into the 
world economy from c.1800 has attracted little serious attention from academics. 
Yet, eye-witness accounts, import data and population census material provide useful 
sources for understanding this subject. From their study, it is apparent that small- 
scale industries survived the colonial period. Indigenous industries were not 
eradicated by cheap, machine-produced manufactures from an industrializing Europe, 
as the Dependency view suggests (pp. 39-43). Indeed, by the period between the 
World Wars, small industries were well-established in the emerging towns of the 
Gold Coast (pp. 52-55).
In Chapter Three, Ghana’s small-scale industrial inheritance was quantified, 
again using eye-witness accounts, but also adding material from a series of official 
household budget surveys which were conducted in the Gold Coast in the 1950s (pp. 
59-61). These budget surveys have never been examined closely, despite the wealth 
of information which they contain. It was suggested that, by the 1950s, between 5 
and 7 per cent of all employment in the Gold Coast was being provided by small
1 Jonathan Dawson, ‘Development of Small-scale Industry in Ghana—A Case study of Kumasi’, 
in Henk Thomas, Francisco Uribe-Echevarria and Henny Romijn (eds.), Small-Scale Production. 
Strategies fo r  Industrial Restructuring (London: Intermediate Technology Publications, 1991), p. 173.
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industries (table 3.1, p. 57). Thus, Ghana’s postwar small industry ‘explosion’ did 
not materialize out of nothing. This is a point which the literature has failed to 
recognize, but it is clearly pertinent.
Chapter Three also attempted to quantify that ‘explosion’. By defining a small 
industry as having fewer than ten workers, it was estimated that, in 1960, 210,456 
workers were engaged in the small industry sector (p. 68). By 1984, this had 
increased to 508,618 (p. 70). Much of this growth was based on the exceptionally 
rapid expansion of food-processing and beverage manufacturing (pp. 70-71). 
Moreover, there has been a growth not only in small-industry employment, but also 
in the sophistication of these firms (pp. 75-77). While at the end of the colonial 
period small industries produced relatively simple consumer items, by the 1990s, 
some were producing complex capital goods. While most were dependent on hand 
power in the 1960s, by the 1980s, an increasing number were using electricity.
One point to highlight is the enormous contribution of small industries to total 
industrial employment in postwar Ghana. If the figures derived in Chapter Three are 
to be believed, then since 1960, small industries have accounted for no less than 86 
per cent of total industrial employment (pp. 68-70). This is the reality within which 
postwar governments* industrial policies must be assessed.
11.2 Government Policy towards Small-scale Industries
Although postcolonial African governments typically have consumed only a small 
proportion of national income, their influence over economic development generally, 
and industrial development specifically, has been immense (pp. 25-26). As David 
Andoh, a former Chairman of the United Africa Company, Ghana, noted in 1978, for 
the private sector, ‘The first consideration for investment must be the attitude and 
policies of Governments*.2
Chapters Four to Eight charted government policy towards small-scale 
industries and, where source constraints prevented such a narrow line of enquiry, the 
private sector generally. The study took as its terms of reference Iliffe’s
2 David Andoh, The Private Sector: a Case (Accra: Ghana Universities Press, 1980), p. 1.
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generalization that African states* dealings with the private sector have fallen into one 
of three categories: ‘suppressive*, ‘nurturist’ and ‘parasitic’.3 The main sources used 
were internal government documents in the Public Records Office and the National 
Archives of Ghana (particularly, but not exclusively, for the period up to c.1966) as 
well as Parliamentary Debates, published policy documents, party manifestos, 
newspapers and the secondary literature.
Before the Second World War, the government was ambivalent towards 
indigenous industrial entrepreneurs, as African nationalists argued (p. 80). However, 
the ‘nationalist* charge that the colonial government was consistently hostile towards 
indigenous industrialists was an exaggeration. Some members of the administration 
were enthusiastic about small industries and, indeed, a Bureau of African Industries 
was established in Takoradi in 1938 to act as a ‘shop window* for the products of 
local manufacturers (pp. 80-81). During the War, the imperative to use local 
resources led to a considerable degree of small-scale import-substitution, particularly 
of wood products (pp. 82-85). After the War, and pressed by African public opinion, 
the government established the Industrial Development Board, which promoted 
several native industries between 1947 and 1951 (pp. 91-92). District Commissioners 
also helped their local indigenous industrialists in various ways (pp. 93-95).
Most scholars have argued that, during the Nkrumah years, 1951 to 1966, the 
government favoured the state and foreign sectors and was hostile to indigenous 
private businessmen (p. 102). Since almost all small-scale industries at this time were 
in the private sector, this implies that the Nkrumah government was hostile to them 
too. From a detailed examination of internal government documents, most of which 
have been released only recently and few of which have been studied 
comprehensively, it is clear that the regime’s rhetoric and private language towards 
small industries vacillated between encouragement and discouragement (pp. 106-107, 
109-110). However, the cabinet stages of the National Investment Bank Bill, 
disprove the idea that the government sought to suppress small industries all of the 
time (p. 108). Nevertheless, in terms of actions, the Industrial Development 
Corporation had a minimal impact on the small industry landscape. Meanwhile, the
3 John Iliffe, The Emergence o f African Capitalism (London: Macmillan, 1983), ch. 4.
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government’s own foray into industrial development and its encouragement of foreign 
industrialists both had adverse effects on indigenous industries (pp. 110-118).
The National Liberation Council (NLC) overthrew Nkrumah in 1966 and 
promised, in public, to return Ghana to democratic politics, roll back the economic 
frontiers of the state, encourage the private sector and promote small-scale industries. 
The few internal government documents which are available suggest that the public 
promises of the NLC were sincere (pp. 138-140). One of the NLC’s main measures 
to support the Ghanaian private sector was Decree 323, the Ghanaian Enterprises 
Decree. This Decree legislated small firms into the hands of Ghanaians (pp. 142- 
143). Ghanaian small industries did not benefit substantially from this measure since 
most expatriate industrial firms were large already (p. 144). Nonetheless, the regime 
adopted a clear ‘nurturist* stance vis-a-vis the Ghanaian private sector.
Kofi Busia’s Progress Party (PP) came to power in 1969 promising to be the 
champion of Ghanaian businessmen (pp. 145-146). In its election manifesto, the PP’s 
rhetoric was blatantly ‘nurturist’, promising to strive to ‘promote, assist, reward and 
encourage private risk taking’.4 The Busia government started broadening the 
reserved sectors which had been established by the NLC (pp. 147-148), and founded 
the Small Business Credit Scheme to finance the development of Ghanaian 
enterprises. The Credit Scheme served traders in the main and failed to have a 
significant impact on small industries (pp. 154-155). Again, however, it is difficult 
to avoid the impression that the PP had a genuine ‘nurture* capitalist agenda.
At first sight, government policy between 1972 and 1979 marked a distinct 
break with the PP years. Both the National Redemption Council (NRC) and Supreme 
Military Council (SMC) appeared to espouse the twin causes of statism and planning 
(pp. 165-167), both hallmarks of a ‘suppressive* stance towards the private sector. 
Yet, what distinguished the NRC-SMC’s statism and planning from that of Nkrumah 
was the emphasis on self-reliance and Ghanaianization. The policy of self-reliance 
augured particularly well for small industries since most have been deeply integrated 
into the domestic economy (pp. 167-169). The policy of Ghanaianization also 
resulted in several manufacturing industries being reserved for Ghanaians (pp. 169-
4 Progress Party, The Progress Party Manifesto (Accra: New Times Press, 1969), p. 7.
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170), in contrast to the reservation policies of the NLC and PP.
With regard to credit provision for small-scale industries through the Ghanaian 
Enterprises Development Commission (GEDC), a major development during the 
NRC-SMC era was the redirection of credit from traders towards small industrialists 
(pp. 175-176). Thus, by the financial year 1980-81, industrial enterprises were 
attracting the bulk of the GEDC’s loanable funds. However, the military’s specific 
‘micro* attempts to promote small industries were frustrated by broader ‘macro’ 
developments. In particular, the growth of kalabule, which was a direct result of the 
government’s economic policies, worsened the immediate conditions for small-scale 
industrialists by shifting price incentives from production to trade (pp. 178-179). 
Consequently, despite the military’s ‘nurturist* intentions, in practice, its economic 
policies frequently ‘suppressed* the small industry sector.
The Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) worsened the climate for 
the private sector dramatically. Previous accounts have suggested that traders bore 
the brunt of Rawlings* ‘moral revolution*. However, it was demonstrated that small 
industrialists suffered at the hands of the government too. Many were dragged off 
to register their businesses and pay tax. The arbitrary use of state power increased, 
as the vivid recollections of Suame metal-workers attest (pp. 184-186). By contrast, 
the People’s National Party (PNP), despite its ostensible socialist leanings, was 
generally supportive of small industries (pp. 190-193). Still, economic ‘distortions’ 
continued to increase, providing further incentives to trade rather than to produce (p. 
196). Also, the PNP did not survive to witness its central contribution to small 
industry promotion, namely, the establishment of the National Board for Small-Scale 
Industries (pp. 194-196).
Under the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC), the private sector 
in general, and small industries in particular, were singled out for encouragement and 
support after 1983. The PNDC voiced regular, if not consistent, support for the 
private sector and unwavering enthusiasm for small industries (pp. 200-203). The 
‘macro’ environment for small industries improved considerably after 1983 as 
economic liberalization helped to reconstruct price incentives in favour of domestic 
manufacturing (pp. 203-204). The regime’s ‘micro’ policies were relatively 
successful too, with the Ghana Regional Appropriate Technology Industrial Service
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(GRATIS) becoming a role model for other African countries by the early 1990s (p. 
208). Thus, the PNDC after 1983 was clearly eager to ‘nurture* small industries.
Considering the long period from c. 1945 to c. 1992, it appears that government 
policy cannot account directly for Ghana’s small industry ‘explosion*. While several 
governments were supportive of local businessmen, most government initiatives failed 
to reach the small industry sector. For instance, the PP’s Small Business Credit 
Scheme was established to ‘enable local businessmen with ability, drive, imagination 
and sound business ideas, but lacking adequate funds, to start business in a small 
way’.5 However, most of its loans were disbursed to large businesses (pp. 154-155). 
The Supreme Military Council’s Five Year Plan of 1975-80, although professing 
strong support for small industries, actually earmarked only C5.2 million for the 
promotion of this sector, against more than C75 million for large factories.6 
Similarly, the GRATIS programme, despite its successes, provided training for only 
637 people in 1989.7 In fact, in Sowa’s study of 1,365 small businessmen conducted 
in 1990, barely a quarter of respondents had even heard of the scheme.8
It is strange that governments have devoted so few resources to small 
industries, despite such firms’ huge contribution to industrial employment. In many 
ways, it is perverse that large industries—which have never provided more than 16 
per cent of all industrial jobs in postcolonial Ghana—have been showered with 
substantially more public resources than smaller firms. This cannot be explained by 
ignorance on the government’s part because, by the late 1950s, the government was 
aware of the benefits of small industry promotion (p. 122). Yet small industries were 
never promoted aggressively. Why?
Bates has argued that, in Africa, peasant farmers have found it difficult to 
lobby governments for higher food prices. This is because small farmers have been
5 NAGA RG 6/1/189, ‘Press Release by the Minister of Finance and Economic Planning on the 
Small Business Credit Scheme (9/12/1970)’.
6 Republic of Ghana (Supreme Military Council), Five-Year Development Plan, 1975/76-1979/80, 
Part II (Accra: Ministry of Economic Planning, 1977), pp. 201-4.
7 West Africa, 23/4/1990, p. 662.
8 Nii K. Sowa, A. Baah-Nuakoh, K.A. Tutu and B. Osei, Small Enterprises and Adjustment. The 
Impact o f Ghana’s Economic Recovery Programme on Small-Scale Industrial Enterprises (London: 
Overseas Development Institute, 1992), table 6, p. 24.
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numerous and the costs of collective action have been high.9 It is possible that 
Bates’ argument can be extended to small industries too. Being relatively large in 
number and geographically dispersed, as well as operating in the semi-legal parallel 
economy (pp. 272-273), most small industries face high costs if they wish to engage 
in collective action. This may provide one explanation for their inability to lobby 
Ghanaian governments successfully.
However, several other factors determined government policy towards this 
sector as well. First, at times, the nature of the political system was important. 
During the PP era, a democratic political system encouraged Ghanaian businessmen 
to lobby for support and made the government particularly receptive to their demands. 
Indeed, the PP considered that a healthy Ghanaian business class was a necessary 
corollary to the democratic political system which it sought to safeguard (pp. 158- 
159). Other governments, while not being elected by the ballot, have courted popular 
favour through a policy of Ghanaian business promotion as well. The colonial 
government between c.1945 and 1951 falls into this category (p. 96), as does the 
PNDC after 1983 (pp. 213-214).
Second, government policy during the Nkrumah period raises the issue of the 
importance of individuals in shaping events. This was quite considerable in the case 
of Ghana between c.1960 and 1966: as Nkrumah began to dominate the Ghanaian 
state, his socialist, statist ideas were imprinted firmly on policy (pp. 103-105) and 
small industry promotion became a low priority.
Third, the role of prevailing economic ideologies in contributing to the 
formulation of small industry policy was substantial. In the late colonial period, 
many government officials still were committed to the ideal of laisser-faire and thus 
opposed a policy of aggressive small industry promotion (p. 99). These ideas 
persisted into the early years of the Nkrumah government, before being overturned 
by the prevailing ideologies of the late 1950s which stressed the importance of the 
state in modernizing ‘backward* economies (p. 127).
Finally, it is worth underlining the significance of external actors in shaping 
policy. Foreign aid helped create the Management Development and Productivity
9 Robert H. Bates, Markets and States in Tropical Africa. The Political Basis o f Agricultural 
Policies (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981), pp. 87-90.
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Institute and the Tema Small Industries Centre in the 1960s (p. 151). The attitude 
of foreign donors was one factor behind the creation of the National Board for Small- 
Scale Industries (pp. 194-195) and the GRATIS scheme (p. 208). After 1983, the 
importance of foreign pressure on economic policy became quite significant, as the 
PNDC embarked on a World Bank/International Monetary Fund Structural 
Adjustment Programme (p. 213).
11.3 Hypothesis Testing: Small Industries a Consequence of Ghana’s Pattern 
of Economic Development and Collapse?
Small firms across Africa share several inherent features which make them 
particularly well-suited to African economic conditions (pp. 17-18). For instance, 
many rely on local inputs, use little capital, are highly flexible and cater for local 
consumer tastes. Most operate in the parallel economy and thereby evade government 
controls and taxation. Thus, there is good reason to expect small industry growth 
across Africa. Even so, the growth of Ghanaian small-scale industries has been 
particularly pronounced by African standards. Why has Ghana been different?
In Chapter One it was hypothesized that the ‘explosion’ of small industry in 
Ghana can be explained with reference to the particular manner of the country’s 
economic development until the mid 1960s, followed by the specific nature of the 
subsequent economic collapse (pp. 29-30). The evidence presented in Chapters Nine 
and Ten confirms this hypothesis.
Economic Development
Small-scale industries survived the colonial period and were accounting for between 
5 and 7 per cent of total employment in the mid 1950s (table 3.1, p. 60). In other 
words, indigenous industrial entrepreneurship—a classic feature of economic 
development—was alive at the end of the colonial era. In East Africa, by contrast, 
coastal towns were simply entrepots for primary commodity exports and manufactured 
imports, with the latter causing the death of the East African craft sector in all but
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the most inland areas.10 Hence, many studies conclude that, by the end of the
colonial period, indigenous entrepreneurship in West Africa was more developed than
in East Africa and particularly advanced in the Gold Coast.11
The survival of small industries had several ramifications for subsequent small
industry growth. First, it provided a pool of skills which were passed down to future
generations. Two respondents in the Kumasi Survey were living witnesses to this
process: one pito brewer had learnt her brewing skills from her mother who had
learnt them from her mother;12 a pastry maker had acquired her baking skills from
her grandmother in the same manner.13 Second, the Kumasi Survey demonstrated
how capital accumulation from previous small industry work has financed today’s
small industries (pp. 252-253). Given the methodological limitations of the Kumasi
Survey (pp. 225-227), it is unclear how important this source of capital has been.
Nevertheless, it is highly probable that, by surviving the colonial period, small
industries provided themselves with skills and capital for subsequent expansion.
Related to the survival of small industries is the apprenticeship system.
Apprentices constitute a pool of cheap labour and apprenticeships increase the number
of skilled industrial workers. As Thomi and Yankson write:
In general it looks like the small-scale industrial sector is qualifying migrants 
and at the same time using apprentices to improve their economic situation 
by using their cheap labour.14
The apprenticeship system has been particularly prevalent in Ghana and West Africa
in comparison with East Africa. Again, this is probably because numerous small
industries survived the colonial era, thereby preserving the institution for future
generations (pp. 237-242).
10 Ralph A. Austen, African Economic Development. Internal Development and External 
Dependency (London: James Currey, 1987), p. 73.
11 Theodore Geiger and Winifred Armstrong, The Development o f African Private Enterprise 
(Washington D.C.: National Planning Association, 1964), pp. 25-6. Margaret Katzin, ‘The Role of 
the Small Entrepreneur’, in Melville J. Herskovits and Mitchell Harwitz (eds.), Economic Transition 
in Africa (London: Routledge, 1964), pp. 179-198.
12 Misc 12.
13 Misc 15.
14 W.H. Thomi and P.W.K. Yankson, Small Scale Industries and Decentralization in Ghana. A 
Preliminary Report on Stnall Scale Industries in Small and Medium Sized Towns in Ghana (Legon: 
Department of Geography, University of Ghana, 1985), p. 35.
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One feature of Ghana’s economic development, which helps to explain the 
growth of small industry, was education. Previous surveys have demonstrated that 
small industrialists typically have been more educated than the general population (pp. 
228-229). The Kumasi Survey investigated this correlation and explained how school 
and technical school education has fostered industrial entrepreneurship (pp. 229-231). 
In this connection, it is evident that, by the 1960s, Ghana had one of the best- 
developed school systems in Africa. For example, in 1965, primary and secondary 
school enrolment rates were higher in Ghana than in Tanzania, Mozambique, Zambia, 
Niger, Kenya, the Ivory Coast and Botswana.15 Even after the ‘great collapse*, the 
provision of formal education remained excellent by African standards.16 Technical 
education facilities have also been good, as the success of the GRATIS scheme 
illustrates (p. 208).
Another aspect of Ghana’s economic development that helps to account for the 
subsequent ‘explosion* in small industry activity was the specific nature of Nkrumah’s 
industrialization programme, which emphasized the development of large-scale 
factories (pp. 130-131). Although other Africans countries pursued policies of state- 
led, large-scale industrialization after independence, Ghana exemplified this strategy 
par excellence since, in the 1950s, it was equipped with the resources to do so (p. 
213). Large-scale, state-led industrialization bankrupted the Ghanaian economy in the 
short run. However, in the long run, it had two positive ramifications. On the one 
hand, skills were accumulated in large industries and, when these enterprises 
collapsed, workers took these skills into the small industry sector (pp. 231-234). On 
the other hand, workers took capital with them as well (pp. 250-251). Thus, Killick’s 
contention that public sector employment represented a ‘high-cost way of providing 
what were, in effect, unemployment benefits’17 needs a little refinement. Evidently, 
employment in large-scale public industries provided the opportunity for skills 
acquisition and capital accumulation too.
15 World Bank, World Development Report 1989 (Washington D.C.: Oxford University Press, 
1989), table 29, pp. 220-1.
16 Ibid.
17 Tony Killick, Development Economics in Action. A Study o f Economic Policies in Ghana 
(London: Heinemann, 1978), p. 239.
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Finally, it is important to note the aspects of Ghana’s economic development 
up to the 1960s which created the basis for some of the later demand for small 
industry products. For example, by the late 1960s, thanks to a sophisticated exchange 
economy, Ghana was a highly motorized society (table 10.1, p. 262). Therefore, 
when foreign exchange supplies contracted in the 1970s, there was a ready market for 
vehicle repair services. If there had been fewer motor vehicles, then the growth of 
small vehicle repair workshops in the 1970s certainly would have been less 
pronounced. Thus, it was not simply the foreign exchange crisis which created the 
demand for small industry products, as Dawson argues.18 In fact, some of the 
foundations of this demand had been constructed before.
The * Great Collapse*
The particular nature of Ghana’s ‘great collapse* also explains part of the postwar 
small industry expansion. Ninsin draws attention to this when arguing that, as the 
economy contracted in the 1970s, formal employment opportunities became limited 
and labour was forced to ‘eke out a living* in the small industry sector.19 During 
the colonial period, Africans typically sought a formal education and a white collar 
job. By the 1960s, because of the collapse of the formal economy, a technical 
education and blue collar work were widely coveted. Thus the supply of labour for 
work in the small industry sector grew after the 1960s (pp. 254-256). By contrast, 
in Nigeria—the other West African country with numerous small industries—the 
supply of labour to this sector in the 1970s was scarce (p. 256).
Two other aspects of the ‘great collapse’ deserve particular emphasis. First, 
during the 1970s and early 1980s, Ghanaians emigrated in their hundreds of 
thousands in search of better living conditions abroad. Indeed, during the 1970s, 
almost a third of all Ghanaians were domiciled outside the country.20 By that time,
18 Jonathan Dawson, ‘The Wider Context: the Importance of the Macroeconomic Environment for 
Small Enterprise Development’, Small Enterprise Development, 1 (1990) no. 3, pp. 39-46.
19 Kwame A'. Ninsin, The Informal Sector in Ghana's Political Economy (Accra: Freedom 
Publications, 1991), p. 2.
20 Victor Azarya and Naomi Chazan, ‘Disengagement from the State in Africa: Reflections on the 
Experience of Ghana and Guinea’, Comparative Studies in Society and History, 29 (1987) no. 1, p. 
119.
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the Ghanaian diaspora in the West was probably one of Africa’s largest, and certainly 
larger than those of countries such as Tanzania.21 In the short run, mass emigration 
had adverse affects on the economy, as skilled labour left the country. However, the 
Kumasi Survey suggests that this exodus may have had positive consequences, at least 
in the long run and from the perspective of small-scale industrialization. This is 
because, when emigrants returned to Ghana, some brought capital (p. 252) and 
valuable skills (pp. 233-234) with them. In view of the methodological constraints 
of the Kumasi Survey, it is impossible to tell how widespread this phenomenon has 
been. However, given the fact that so many left Ghana in the 1970s and early 1980s, 
it is likely that using capital and industrial skills accumulated abroad has been a 
relatively common occurrence.
A final distinguishing aspect of the ‘great collapse* was the growth of the 
parallel market or kalabule. The parallel market has been prevalent in most 
postcolonial African economies. However, it was probably more common in 1970s 
and early 1980s Ghana than in most others, given that price ‘distortions* were so 
acute (p. 196). In the short run such distortions increased incentives to trade rather 
than to produce (pp. 178-179). However, in the long-run, kalabule may have had a 
positive impact on the potential for small industry growth. Most of the capital 
employed in small industries has come from the savings either of the industrialist, or 
of the industrialist’s family and friends. Previous surveys, as well as the Kumasi 
Survey, show that this capital often has been accumulated through trading first (pp. 
249-250), though how much of this has been from kalabule trading is unclear. Also, 
some of the miscellaneous workers in the Kumasi Survey gave a hint of how a trading 
background had helped them develop specific business skills such as the ability to 
think through an investment decision or the know-how to market a product effectively 
(pp. 244-245).
Implications
If Ghana’s small industry ‘explosion’ can be understood with reference to the
21 Jonathan Dawson, ‘Impact of Structural Adjustment on the Small Enterprise Sector: a 
Comparison of the Ghanaian and Tanzanian Experiences’, in A.H.J. Helmsing and Th. Kolstee (eds.), 
Small Enterprise and Changing Policies (London: IT Publications, 1993), p. 74.
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country’s economic development and collapse, then a major implication would be that 
government economic policies between independence and 1984 were not the complete 
disaster which some claim it to have been.22
On close examination, government policy appears to account for several 
aspects of Ghana’s development and collapse. For example, it is clear that, wittingly 
or unwittingly, the Ghanaian state engineered an industrial skills ‘explosion* from the 
1960s, through the provision of general and technical education and the creation of 
large-scale industries. Government policies which collapsed the economy also led to 
an exodus of workers and the growth of kalabule. On balance, however, government 
economic policies ruined the economy: between 1974 and 1983, recorded income per 
head fell by 40 per cent,23 while domestic investment slumped from 14 per cent to 
2 per cent of national income.24 However, from the viewpoint of small industry 
development, the same policies, paradoxically, had some favourable consequences.
11.4 An Agenda for further Research
To explain Ghana’s small industry ‘explosion’ more comprehensively than this thesis 
has done, there are several issues which could be researched further. This section 
considers some of these.
Small-scale Industries during the Colonial Period
The subject of the development of small industries during the colonial period still 
requires more research. Understanding it better could help to explain more fully the 
reasons for the subsequent growth of small industries. In this regard, research into 
the origins of the apprenticeship system may prove particularly rewarding, given this 
institution’s critical function in reducing small industries’ labour costs and increasing 
the pool of labour with small industrial skills. Although there is a literature on
22 Killick, Development Economics. Douglas Rimmer, Staying Poor. Ghana’s Political Economy, 
1950-1990 (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1992). Jonathan H. Frimpong-Ansah, The Vampire State in 
Africa. The Political Economy of Decline in Africa (London: James Currey, 1991).
23 M.M. Huq, The Economy of Ghana. The First 25 Years since Independence (London: 
Macmillan, 1989), table A.2, p. 288.
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apprenticeship in Ghana, it remains small and patchy (pp. 237-242).
The National Archives of Ghana hold numerous records on the subject of 
small industries during the colonial period. Only a small number of them have been 
analyzed in this thesis. The records of the Ministry of Labour may be particularly 
helpful in documenting the history of apprenticeship. These were closed for 
reorganization in 1996 when the research for this thesis was conducted. Once they 
are reopened, it should be possible to fmd some interesting files on apprenticeship 
because in 1961, the Nkrumah government passed a law regulating the terms and 
conditions of apprenticeship contracts.25 It is likely that the Ministry of Labour was 
active in formulating this law. Therefore, its records should have much to offer.
Local Government Policy
Small-scale industries operating outside the larger cities such as Accra and Kumasi
probably are affected more by the institutions of local government than those of
central government. Local councils often have been the primary point of contact
between government and small industries. For instance, in Kumasi in the 1980s,
some council members sought the strict enforcement of residential zoning laws
prohibiting small firms from operating in residential areas.26 Council ‘city
beautification* programmes have affected small industries as well. As Appiah notes:
I doubt if  in formulating policies generally, there is any real awareness o f the 
existence and contribution o f small scale enterprises to the economy. It may 
be relevant to point to the fact that at any time some City or Urban Council 
officials want to give a face-lift to their town, they chase down such 
enterprises because they are probably regarded as a disgrace to the town’s 
beauty.27
This thesis has focused mainly on central government policy towards small- 
scale industries. Local government policy was studied only for the late colonial 
period (pp. 93-95). This is a subject which future researchers may wish to pursue. 
The National Archives of Ghana in Kumasi, Sunyani and Cape Coast (none of which
25 NAGA ADM 4/1/322, Apprentices Act, 1961.
26 Kafui Kojo Tagboto, ‘Multiple Land Use in Residential Areas. A Case Study of Kumasi’, UST, 
BSc (Land Economy) 1988, p. 81.
27 A.K. Appiah, ‘Lending to Small Scale Enterprises (SSE)’, Journal o f the Ghana Institute of 
Bankers, 2 (1987) no. 2, p. 7.
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have been used extensively by historians for this purpose) may well be useful.
Issues for Future Surveys
The respondents to the Kumasi Survey were not chosen at random, and were not 
necessarily representative of Ghana’s small-scale industrialists (pp. 225-227). In fact, 
the metal-workers interviewed may have been exceptional by Ghanaian standards, 
given that they worked in the Suame Magazine where some of Ghana’s most 
sophisticated small-scale industrial firms are located (p. 75). It is likely that rural 
small-scale industries are less sophisticated than those in the Magazine, and hence the 
explanations for their development may be different.
Nonetheless, the strength of the Kumasi Survey was its in-depth analysis, and 
its ability to highlight the range, if not the incidence, of the variables underpinning 
small industry growth. Several were located, which previous studies have failed to 
pinpoint. For instance, the Kumasi Survey demonstrated the importance of working 
abroad as a source of the skills (pp. 233-234) and capital (p. 252). In addition, it 
illustrated that a significant source of the capital employed in today’s small industry 
sector has been previous small industry work (pp. 252-253).
For a more complete understanding of small industry growth, it would be 
necessary to ascertain the incidence of these variables. This would require 
constructing a representative survey of small-scale industries. Nevertheless, by 
uncovering hitherto hidden variables, the Kumasi Survey suggests some new issues 
which such surveys could investigate.
11.5 Policy Recommendations
Although this thesis is a study in economic history, it is possible to draw on its 
findings to offer some policy recommendations.
Gerschenkron, Rostow and the first generation of development economists had 
little concern for the activities of small-scale industries. According to them, 
industrialization in the Third World would be based on modem, large-scale factories 
(pp. 15-16). More recently, development economists have turned their focus to the 
activities of small industries (pp. 16-20). This study suggests that this is a valid shift
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in concerns. Ghanaian small industries have been important in terms of employment 
generation (pp. 68-70) and have demonstrated an ability to move into the production 
of increasingly sophisticated goods (pp. 75-77). As with the proto-industries of early 
modern England and Japan (pp. 12-15), some small Ghanaian industries have grown 
into large concerns (p. 18).
It has been argued that the economic policies which collapsed the general 
economy had some benefits for small industries. However, for other African 
countries formulating small industry development programmes today, deliberately 
collapsing the economy is clearly not a viable policy option.28 Even so, some 
positive policy recommendations are possible.
First, small industry development is a long-term process. The postwar 
expansion of Ghana’s small industry sector was rooted in developments which took 
place not just after 1945, but also for up to a century before. Therefore, although 
government small industry programmes may be able to stimulate this sector 
temporarily, real growth probably can only take place over a long period. With 
regard to ‘micro* small industry development projects, Powell writes that ‘It is a 
fallacy to think that if a project cannot succeed in two years it is a failure*.29 The 
same conclusion appears to be valid for general policies to promote the small industry 
sector as well.
Second, the Kumasi Survey has stressed the importance of skills acquisition 
in small industry growth. None of those interviewed would have been able to 
establish their business without previously having acquired certain industrial skills. 
In some cases, this process was lengthy. One respondent had attended a University 
technical school, completed an apprenticeship in the Suame Magazine and then 
worked in a large brewery in Nigeria before starting his small machine-building firm. 
He attested:
... I can say that all these fabrications and other I’m doing are as the result 
of the accumulated working experience: from the University, when I lived 
here in the Magazine, and in Nigeria. That is ... all these places there were
28 Dawson, ‘Wider Context’, pp. 45-6.
29 John Powell, ‘Kumasi University’s Involvement in Grassroots Industrial Development’, Small 
Enterprise Development, 2 (1991) no. 2, p. 42.
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fabrication working places.30 
Thus, the Kumasi Survey’s findings lend support to new ‘endogenous* growth 
theories which stress the importance of human capital formation in the process of 
economic development.31 As Crafts argues, ‘endogenous’ models of growth 
accounting ‘stress the role of human capital and would imply that traditional growth 
accounting will give incorrect estimates of human capital’s contribution to growth’.32
Finally, it is worth emphasising that even well-constructed and adequately- 
funded ‘micro’ programmes to assist small industries are liable to fail if the ‘macro’ 
conditions are not correct. The NRC/SMC era provides a clear example of this. 
Although the NRC/SMC sought to promote small industries, its efforts were thwarted 
by the deteriorating ‘macro’ climate: increasing price distortions raised the incentives 
to trade rather than to produce (pp. 178-179); the official ‘rules of the game* became 
increasingly unclear as soldiers on the ground took the law into their own hands (p. 
180). Thus, patience, measures to transfer industrial skills and good governance are 
perhaps the keys to small industry growth.
30 Metal 10.
31 Paul M. Romer, ‘The Origins of Endogenous Growth’, Journal o f Economic Perspectives, 8 
(1994) no. 1, pp. 3-22. Norman Gemmell, ‘Evaluating the Impacts of Human Capital Stocks and 
Accumulation on Economic Growth: Some New Evidence’, Oxford Bulletin o f Economics and 
Statistics, 58 (1996) no. 1, pp. 24-5.
32 N.F.R. Crafts, ‘Human Capital and Productivity in Advanced Economies’, in John A. James 
and Mark Thomas (eds.), Capitalism in Context. Essays on Economic Development and Cultural 
Change in Honour ofR.M. Hartwell (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), p. 190.
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